Chapter 12: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part I—Intentions

From AnEnquiry.info

This chapter has the following predominant aim: It intends to intelligibly demarcate an eidem’s own volition and related drives from those occasionally occurring volitions and related drives applicable to a total self which are not the eidem’s own. To do so, an investigation into different types of intentions relative to a total self will be first made, after which it will be shown that volitions are constitutionally determined by intentions.

So accomplishing will better facilitate a subsequent enquiry into the fundamental and invariably fixed requisites of any instantiation of volition—including those of both narrow and wide free will—on the part of the eidem.

Of note, this chapter will require a sizable amount of introspection on the part of the reader. We ordinarily focus on factors external to ourselves as total beings, and, generally, this for very pragmatic reasons. This chapter, however, will directly focus on often subtle but nevertheless important aspects of our minds’ own workings—such that, for example, we as eidems will be shown to at times intentionally interact with the disparate intentions of our total selves, or, more specifically stated, of our total minds. Furthermore, to address the topics of this chapter with optimal precision, a fair sum of technical terminology previously introduced in Part 2 of this work will be employed.

12.1. Preliminary Understandings

Following are understandings that shall be employed throughout this chapter.

12.1.1. Demarcating Intentions

The term intention can hold multiple meanings. These will include a) a synonym for the verb “intend” (e.g., she intentioned to become a university student), b) “a goal or aim” (e.g., his intention is to be home by midnight), and c) “the process of intending” as a noun (e.g., their intentions to help out were resolute).

In the latter sense of “the process of intending” as a noun, intention will then necessitate the occurrence of intending; furthermore, the occurrence of intending will itself necessitate something which is intended—with the latter being equivalent to an intent, which will itself be equivalent to the second given sense of intention: “a goal or aim”.

When interpreted as just outlined, the term intention will then necessitate the occurrence of goals or aims—and, hence, of teloi. Any alternative interpretation of the term intention which rejects that the specified concept is contingent on the occurrence of goals or aims—and, hence, teloi—will not be addressed in this work (if such an interpretation were indeed at all possible to intelligibly sustain).

12.1.1.1. Intents as Telosial Determinants

As §8.3 is believed to have established, it is an unfalsified certainty that teloi (including those of actively held goals or aims) can only be cogently deemed to be telosial determinants—rather than being genesial, constitutional, or formational determinants—this if teloi are at all ontically occurrent. As Chapter 11 is believed to have established, because it is an unfalsified certainty that we as eidems are poietic causes to choices made during times of deliberation, and because poietic causation necessitates the ontic occurrence of telosial determinacy, the ontic occurrence of telosial determinacy—and, hence, of teloi—will thereby itself be concluded unfalsifiedly certain.

Because all intentions will entail respective teloi, all intentions will then be forms of what §8.3.1.2 has termed telosation—which can only occur when one or more teloi telosially determine (hence, telosially set limits or boundaries to) that which the respective genesial determinant (i.e., cause) can bring about as a genesial effect. This then entails that to intend X is to telosate X.

In further review of the concluding portions of §11.1.4.2, the generalized term “agent” shall here be understood to specify a mesocept-endowed protocept, which, thereby, is aware of allocepts, and which via its awareness is able to exert power in respect to that which it is aware of. The reality of the eidem’s free will capacity evidenced in Chapter 11 then entails that an eidem will be an unfalsifiedly certain instantiation of the general class of kentrons termed “agents”—such that, via its free will, an eidem (more specifically, an eidemic protocept) will of itself be the poietic cause to resultant decisions.

An agency will furthermore be here understood to be the capacity of an agent and, by extension, to be an agent which acts to produce a certain result.

In summation, intentions are here understood to only occur when one or more intents (hence, teloi) are actively held by (and, hence, telosially determine) one or more agencies’ poietic causations—with eidems being the only instantiation of such agency so far established with unfalsified certainty.

As an example of the aforementioned, if I am driving in the city with the intent of arriving at a specific store in as brief a time as possible, this intent will telosially set limits or boundaries to (i.e., will telosially determine) the choices I then make in terms of which streets I travel—this whenever alternative streets are available to me. This due to my want to fulfill the stated intent for as long as it is actively held by me as an eidem.

12.1.1.2. Regarding Current Philosophical Literature on Intention

Current philosophical literature distinguishes between at least the following three types of intention: intention for the future (e.g., intending that one will at some future time be endowed with highly defined abdominal muscles); intention with which one acts (e.g., setting up the space and equipment in one’s room—which one deems required to engage in abdominal exercises—with the intent of so engaging in abdominal exercises for the sake of having defined abdominal muscles); and intention in action or, else, intentional action (e.g., actively doing abdominal exercises in an intentional manner, i.e. in a manner intending to fulfill one’s intent of having defined abdominal muscles)—and the literature further asks how these three types of intention can be cogently unified under one general conceptualization regarding intentions.[1]

From the vantage of this treatise’ philosophical outlook, the just expressed questions posed of intention typically suffer from sometimes significant degrees of ambiguity, if not equivocation, in the following two respects:

Firstly, there appears to be some ambiguity between a) intention as telos (as goal or aim), b) intention as telosation (as the process of intending in noun form) and c) the verbal form of “to intention” as the process of telosating (as the process of intending in verbal form). Yet—as per §8.3.1.2—the occurrence of one just specified aspect will entail the occurrence of the other two (and, as per §8.3.1.2.3, this in addition to the occurrence of telostases, i.e. the results of intentions—be they either syntelostases or dystelostases). For example, an “intention for the future” (i.e. the telosating of a future actuality) will necessarily involve one or more actively held teloi whose fulfillment (i.e., whose syntelostasis) one telosates in an act of telosation—this just as much as an “intention in action” or, else expressed, an "intentional action" (i.e., a telosational activity) will require. And in both cases the given telos (or teloi) is that “intention (or intentions) with which one acts” (i.e., that telos with which one acts), be the addressed activity strictly psychological or also physiological. So understood, all the three types of intention typically addressed in philosophical literature will then necessarily be unified under one general conceptualization of telosial determinacy. Yet philosophical literature on the matter raises a plethora of additional complications. But these themselves typically fail to address the following second ambiguity, if not outright equivocation:

To the author’s knowledge, the literature mostly fails to address what this work deems to be the very important differentiations between a) conscious and hence voluntary intentions, b) unconscious but yet voluntary intentions, and c) the involuntary intentions of an eidem’s total self—be the latter either i) consciously experienceable by the eidem or else ii) unconscious, and hence only inferable from what the eidem consciously experiences.

There, again, is a plethora of significant questions raised by philosophical literature on intentions. To however address these many questions more properly, first a sufficient enquiry into the workings of a total mind will need to be made.

This chapter, if successful, will only commence this enquiry into the working of a total mind by, first, establishing a novel subcategory of mind that is requisite for protologic consciousness and, secondly (in making use of this newly discerned subcategory of mind) by then cogently differentiating voluntary intentions form those intentions of a total self that relative to the respective eidem are involuntary.

12.1.2. Concerning Total Selves Endowed with More Than One Eidem

There can occur cases wherein a total self can be said to hold more than one eidem—as can, for example, be stipulated for the abnormality of two-headed lesser animals; for certain, if not all, cases of human conjoined twins; and, possibly, for humans who have undergone split-brain surgery.

This chapter’s topics will be strictly addressed from a first-person perspective—hence addressing the perspective of the singular eidem which all those here concerned are, this in conjunction with the singular total self all those here concerned deem ourselves as eidems to be an aspect of. Yet, for the technical purposes of stringency, it is to be observed that such singular total self will apply even for total selves that are endowed with more than one eidem—as can be the case for conjoined twins—such that the respective eidem here addressed yet holds one singular total self which, as total self, contains one or more eidems which are other relative to the respective eidem concerned.  

To optimally simplify what will likely already be a cumbersome topic, this chapter will not address cases wherein total selves are endowed with more than one eidem. Notwithstanding, in all such either actual or hypothetical cases of a total self endowed with more than one eidem, it can yet be affirmed that each respective eidem will hold the potential to experience all aspects of mind to be here specified—this in addition to experiencing (or, as might be supposed of split-brain patients, potentially experiencing) the other eidem(s) of its given total self (if it is to be deemed that split-brain patients in fact can have two individual eidems simultaneously cooccurring).   

12.2. Establishing a Novel Subcategory of Mind

This section endeavors to intelligibly establish a new subcategory of mind which is to be herein coined paraconsciousness. Upon so establishing, further sections of this chapter will then make use of this category in addressing intention-types.

12.2.1. Traditional Understandings of a Total Mind

As is always implicitly established from the vantage of an eidem, a total human mind has traditionally been partitioned into two general categories: those of a) the conscious mind, aka consciousness, and of b) the unconscious mind, aka unconsciousness (with the latter holding the synonym of the subconscious mind, aka subconsciousness).

In this dichotomy, the conscious mind will consist of all aspects of mind which the eidem is aware of—to include thoughts and felt desires—whereas the unconscious mind will consist of all aspects of mind of which the eidem does not hold an awareness of.

To this dichotomy can then be appended the preconscious mind: that portion of the unconscious mind which the conscious mind has access to. As an example of this, when one as eidem momentarily does not hold awareness of a particular memory but can recall this memory at will, this addressed memory will then be understood to be one aspect of one’s preconscious mind. In so appending, the otherwise singular category of the unconscious mind becomes itself dichotomized into a) aspects of the unconscious mind which can be accessed by consciousness, which are then termed one’s preconsciousness and b) aspects of the unconscious mind which cannot be easily, if at all, accessed by consciousness.  

This traditional subcategorization of mind will then be consistent with what in Chapter 7 has been demarcated as eidemic consciousness.

In review, eidemic consciousness will consist of all that the eidemic protocept is aware. More specifically, it will consist of the eidemic protocept’s autological awareness of both itself as protocept and of its mesocepts as well as of the eidemic protocept’s alloawareness of all allocepts which it as protocept apprehends via its mesocepts. So conceptualized, eidemic consciousness will fit any semantic wherein one, for example, might want to affirm that “the memory I am currently remembering is a constituent of my present consciousness”.

12.2.2. Reappraising the Concepts of Protologic and Eidemic Consciousness

The traditionally upheld understandings of mind previously outlined will however be found lacking whenever one addresses consciousness in the sense of what Chapter 7 has demarcated as protologic consciousness.

In review, protologic consciousness will strictly consist of the eidemic protocept’s protoawareness at the exclusion of both the eidemic protocept’s mesocepts and its allocepts. In consciousness being so conceptualized, there will then occur a subtle and maybe difficult, but nevertheless important, differentiation between oneself as protocept and oneself as eidem:

In the conceptualization of protologic consciousness, any alloawareness the protocept might have will be understood as the protocept’s protoawareness of apprehending one or more allocepts via the mesocept(s) that are the means of apprehending allocepts which the protocept is endowed with and is likewise protologically aware of—such that the protocept’s awareness of both its allocepts, which are alloceived, and its mesocepts, which are autoceived, is contained within the protocept’s stated protoawareness—this while nevertheless conceptually distinguishing the momentarily occurring protoawareness of the protocept, not only from its allocepts, but also from the mesocepts with which it is autologically endowed.

Hence, here, any awareness which we hold will be held by us as protocepts—protocepts which can be aware of what they momentarily are as protocepts (e.g., I, as a protocept, am currently interested), of their own mesocepts (e.g., I, as protocept, am currently endowed with physio-sight), and of allocepts (e.g., I, as protocept, am currently aware of this text).

This, then, will outline what our protologic consciousness consists of—namely, here, consciousness will strictly consist of our protoawareness as protocepts. In other words, protologic consciousness will strictly consist of us as that which is aware—be this awareness of our own states and process of being as “that which is aware”, else of our own mesocepts of which we are autological aware, else of our allocepts which we alloceive via our mesocepts.

From a subtly different vantage, any awareness which we hold can be dichotomized into either being autological or allological. Our autoawareness will consist of both a) ourselves as protocepts (and the protoawareness this entails) and b) all our actively experienced mesocepts (which pertain to us as—necessarily protoaware—protocepts). Our alloawareness, on the other hand, will consist of all that is neither (a) nor (b) just mentioned. Yet, because our active mesocepts will necessitate that something alloceptual is experienced through them, we will here then necessarily dwell within a duality between us as mesocept-endowed protocepts, i.e. eidems, and that which is other relative to us as eidems.

This necessarily dualistic dwelling of us as eidems within realms of apprehended otherness will then equate to our eidemic consciousness—such that, here, consciousness will consist of the entire duality of awareness concerned: always including both a) ourselves as mesocept-endowed protocepts and b) everything we via our mesocepts are alloaware of as protocepts.

Hence, whereas oneself as eidem is positioned as that autoawareness (consisting of both protoceptual and mesoceptual cognita—both of which are autoceived) which is then necessarily conjoined in dualistic fashion to its alloawareness of other, oneself as protocept is positioned as that which is aware of all cognita (be these cognita autological or allological). Whereas the former’s awareness is then necessarily bound to a duality of self and other, the latter’s awareness does not specify such duality but, instead, strictly specifies that which is aware (be it of itself as protocept which it as protocept autoceives; of its means of apprehending other, i.e. of its mesocepts, which it as protocept also autoceives; or of anything other than itself as a mesocept-endowed protocept, i.e. of any allocept, which it as protocept via its mesocepts thereby alloceives).

With this review mentioned, of these two conceptualizations, the conceptualization of eidemic consciousness will not be able to make rational sense of our process of awareness in logically consistent manners: It will be logically invalid to affirm that the subject of awareness which is construed to be a simultaneous composite of the eidemic protocept, its mesocepts, and all allocepts thus apprehended will as a so construed composite totality—i.e., as an eidemic consciousness—then of itself perceive any singular, alloceptual object of awareness as something other than itself. Here, a logical contradiction unfolds: at the same time and in the same respect, the subject of awareness as eidemic consciousness both a) will be other relative to any alloceptual object of awareness it apprehends (this being entailed by allocepts being other than the subject of awareness which apprehends them) and b) will not be other relative to any alloceptual object of awareness it apprehends (this being entailed by the protocept’s allocepts being intrinsic aspects of the respective eidemic consciousness addressed).

Therefore, for a logically consistent understanding of mind, the conceptualization of protologic consciousness will need to be utilized whenever we specify a subject of awareness being conscious of some object of awareness—irrespective of what this object of awareness might be.

Hence, this necessity will hold regardless of whether the addressed object of awareness is either a) an autological cognitum, to include both i) protological cognita—e.g., I am conscious (else, aware) of being pleased (as a protocept), with my being pleased being the very protological object of awareness that I as protocept am autoaware of momentarily being—and ii) mesological cognita—e.g., I am conscious (else, aware) of my faculty of sight (which I as an eidemic protocept am autologically endowed with) presently being more blurry in comparison to previous times—or, else, b) an allological cognitum—e.g., I am conscious (else, aware) of the tree I am looking at (via my mesocept of physio-sight, through which I as a protocept see the tree), a tree which I as a protocept am furthermore aware of being something other than myself as a mesocept-endowed protocept (i.e., as being other than myself as eidem).

Unlike the concept of eidemic consciousness, the concept of protologic consciousness will then cogently fit any semantic wherein one, for example, might want to affirm that “I am conscious (else, aware) of some given, i.e. of some object of awareness”.

With that having been presented, whenever the conceptualization of protologic consciousness is utilized, there will then also be required a conceptualization of two distinct aspects of ones non-unconscious mind: one aspect consisting of one’s awareness as an eidemic protocept per se—this being protologic consciousness, aka protoawareness—and the other consisting of all endoallological objects of awareness (i.e., of all endological allocepts—hence, all allocepts internal to one’s total self) that one as eidemic protocept is immediately aware of (to include cognized reasons, felt emotions, entertained ideas, and one’s conscience).

In concluding this subsection, the following are then upheld to be unfalsifiedly certain on logical grounds:

Firstly, it is unfalsifiedly certain that the notion of eidemic consciousness will be consistent with those abstractions of consciousness wherein consciousness is deemed to consist of everything one (as a protocept) is aware of. By entailment, this specific notion of consciousness will then facilitate a strict dichotomy of conscious mind and unconscious mind (with the unconscious mind then being further partitionable into the preconscious mind and those aspects of one’s unconscious mind one as protocept cannot easily, if at all, hold direct awareness of).

Secondly, it is likewise unfalsifiedly certain that—in stark contrast the just expressed conceptualization of epistemic consciousness—the notion of protologic consciousness will be consistent with all conceptualizations of consciousness (else, awareness) as process wherein a subject of awareness holds cognizance of objects of awareness (be the latter autological or allological). By entailment, this latter addressed notion of consciousness will however then further necessitate two aspects of one’s non-unconscious mind: one of these being oneself as protologic consciousness per se and the other being all features of one’s own mind one as protologic consciousness holds immediate endo-alloawareness of.

12.2.3. This Treatise’s Use of Protologic Consciousness

As Chapter 7 evidenced, given all unfalsified certainties established between Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, only two conceptualizations of consciousness are possible to validly uphold: that of eidemic consciousness and of protologic consciousness.

As was evidenced within §11.1.4.2, we as free-will-endowed agencies can only be validly interpreted as being protologic—rather than eidemic—consciousnesses: When we poietically cause the selection of one alternative rather than others, neither our allocepts nor our mesocepts can be validly deemed to play a causal role in the decision we make as eidems (more specifically, as eidemic protocepts). Instead, it will strictly be us as eidemic protocepts—i.e., as protologic consciousnesses—which so poietically cause the effect of a made choice.

Furthermore, as was evidenced in §12.2.2, it will only be protologic consciousnesses which can make cogent sense of propositions such as, “I am conscious (or else aware) of X”.

Due to these reasons, this treatise will make use of protologic consciousness whenever referencing the immediate awareness of all those here concerned in relation to objects of awareness.

So doing will, in turn, then necessitate that this treatise makes a distinction between those non-unconscious portions of mind a) which strictly consist of protologic consciousness and b) which consist of all aspects of mind a protologic consciousness is immediately aware of.

12.2.4. Demarcating the Paraconscious Mind

The prefix “para-” can hold several senses, including those of near, besides, and surrounding. It will be in these latter three senses that the prefix “para-” will be here affixed to the term “consciousness”—thereby signifying that which is near, besides, or surrounds protologic consciousness.

So understood, one’s paraconsciousness—aka, one’s paraconscious mind—can be generally demarcated as follows: Let one’s paraconsciousness be comprised of all those endoallological portions of mind of which one as eidemic protocept is aware.

Examples of what one’s paraconsciousness can consist of will include those endoallocepts categorizable as remembrances, thoughts, concepts, ideas, imaginings, felt desires, felt emotions, conceptualized or else envisioned goals, and a person’s internal voice or dialogue, among others—granting that one as a protologic consciousness is immediately aware of these. Hence, for example, when one is conscious of a memory, via use of protologic consciousness as concept one here obtains the following understanding: one as mesocept-endowed protocept will here be interpreted to be protologically conscious of the respective memory, with the latter being one endoallological object of awareness that resides within one’s paraconsciousness.

(This will stand in contrast to conceptualizing the just addressed metal state as being “a conscious memory”, which will instead be in keeping with the notion of eidemic consciousness, rather than that of protologic consciousness: the said memory will here be understood as a constituent of one’s eidemic consciousness in whole—rather than, for example, being understood as holding a protologic awareness of its own.)

More detailed demarcations of the paraconsciousness can branch into different directions based on certain philosophical presumptions regarding how one’s mind relates to the (external) world—with the contrasting views of direct realism and of indirect realism as one example of this—and will for this reason be currently left open-ended. The following observation may nevertheless be made: the same philosophical complexities—e.g., whether one’s physiopercepts are aspects of one’s own mind and, hence, aspects of one’s total self—will emerge regardless of whether one conceptualizes consciousness as being either protologic or eidemic.

12.2.5. Reappraising Eidemic Consciousness

Having so dichotomized the non-unconscious portions of mind into a) protologic consciousness and b) its paraconsciousness, this treatise will then interpret eidemic consciousness as that category of a total mind which strictly encapsulates both (a) and (b) just specified—thereby addressing all non-unconscious aspects of mind as a totality.  It will then be eidemic consciousness—rather than protologic consciousness—which stands in direct contrast to the unconscious portions of mind.

Even though this chapter will often specify which form of consciousness is being addressed, in general, the two forms of consciousness—that of eidemic consciousness and of protologic consciousness—can well be discerned via their linguistic contexts.

12.2.6. In Summation

Different systems of thought can find it useful to subcategorize an individual’s total mind in different ways.

The most rudimentary form of such subcategorization will be that of a strict dichotomy between the conscious mind (consisting of the eidemic protocept and all aspects of mind it is conscious of) and the unconscious mind (consisting of all aspects of mind the eidemic protocept is unaware of).

Notwithstanding, wherever the concept of consciousness is understood in terms of protologic consciousness (rather than the sole other viable option of eidemic consciousness), a second category pertaining to the non-unconscious mind—what has been herein coined the paraconscious mind—will become rationally necessitated to account for those endoalloceptual mental states and processes of which the protologic consciousness is aware (such as those of actively recalled memories). This dichotomization of an eidemic consciousness into protologic consciousness and paraconsciousness will logically hold irrespective of how one chooses to further subcategorize an individual’s total mind in all other respects.

Hence, to readdress one possible example, when one expresses, “a conscious memory (this in contrast to an unconscious memory),” one will be implicitly addressing the concept of eidemic consciousness—here specifying the memory to be conscious only in the sense that the respective, implicitly addressed eidemic protocept is conscious of it. Conversely, when one for example expresses, “he is now conscious of his own memories of being a preadolescent,” one will then be here implicitly addressing the concept of protologic consciousness—here specifying that the eidem (the first-person, mesocept-endowed protocept) is conscious of one or more memories as endoallological objects of awareness (as endological cognita that are thereby other than the subject of awareness which is aware of them despite yet occurring within the eidem’s total self) which, as endoallocepts, will technically reside within the agent’s paraconscious mind.

Likewise, the expression of, “a memory was brought into consciousness,” will implicitly specify the consciousness concerned as being eidemic; whereas, via use of protologic consciousness as concept, the same addressed occurrence will become expressible as, “a memory was brought into (the respective eidem’s) paraconsciousness.”

12.3. Possible Intention-Types Applicable to a Total Self

The dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary activities will be appraised relative to the eidem in question. Hence, for the purposes of this section, that which the eidem itself intends will thereby be voluntary relative to the eidem. That which occurs within the eidem’s total self that is not intentional relative to the eidem in question will then be involuntary relative to the eidem.

To present this differentiation in intentions via more stringent demarcations, an eidem’s voluntary intentions will be understood to be autological relative to the eidem—and will be termed an eidem’s autological intentions. Conversely, intentions pertaining to the eidem’s total self which are involuntary relative to the eidem will be understood to be non-autological relative to the eidem—and will be termed the non-autological intentions of the eidem’s total self.  

To illustrate what is here being addressed with optimal brevity, first will be presented a somewhat complex account of autological and non-autological intentions. The upheld unfalsified certainties of this section will then only be specified after this relatively lengthy presentation is concluded.

12.3.1. The Eidem’s Autological Intentioning

In further review of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6:

An eidem will be comprised of all aspects of awareness which are autoceived—of both the protocept and its mesocepts. Although autoceived by the respective eidem, the intentions of an eidem will however be strictly enacted by the eidemic protocept—and not by the protocept’s mesocepts per se. For example, if I intend to better see X, this intention will not pertain to any of my mesocepts, including my mesocept of physio-sight with which I see X, but will instead pertain to me as protocept which, via my agency as protocept, will do what is within my power to better see X via my mesocept of physio-sight (maybe by moving my eyes into closer proximity to X).

Furthermore, all protological autocepts which we could otherwise conceptualize (and thereby ennooceive) or, maybe, visualize (and thereby phainoceive) will within our strict autoawareness be synchronically undifferentiable aspects of ourselves as protocepts. For example, when one verbalizes that one is both very confident and only mildly happy, these two, distinct here conceptualized states of protological being will nevertheless occur within oneself as an eidem (more specifically, as an eidemic protocept) such that they take the form of one synchronically undifferentiable state of being. It is not until we pick out conceptualizations which best represent and thereby reference our synchronically undifferentiable state of being as protocept that we are then able to differentiate different states of protological being which we otherwise synchronically experience in undifferentiated manners—this via our autoawareness of ourselves a protocepts.

To emphasize, whenever one's own protologic autocepts are in any way addressed, they will be conceptualized, i.e. ennooceived—and will hence reside within one’s paraconscious mind as endoallocepts that represent one’s own autological state or process of being as protocept (else expressed, as protologic consciousness). Hence, whenever protologic autocepts are conceptualized—such as when one can verbally affirm that one (as protocept) is very confident and only mildly happy—one’s otherwise synchronically undifferentiated autoception of being a singular and partless protocept will at such juncture then become represented via concepts, with the latter being themselves ennoocepts (in review, these again being purely senceptual cognita that, as objects of awareness, stand apart from the subject of awareness which is aware of them—thereby being a type of allocept; more specifically, a type of endoallocept, rather than being a type of exoallocept). When this takes place, we can then conceptualize distinct protological autocepts as simultaneously occurring within oneself as eidem: such that, for example, one’s momentarily high degree of confidence will here be one conceptualized autocept that is itself distinct from the second conceptualized autocept of one’s momentarily mild happiness. This, though, in practice what we autologically experience is a singular, synchronically undifferentiable state of protoceptual being which—at the juncture concerned—is us as the very singular protocept concerned (which, as protocept, is then aware of allocepts via its mesocepts).

Then, with the just mentioned in mind, the following first conclusion obtains in respect to intentions: Because all our intentions as eidems will occur within—or, else expressed, as aspects of—ourselves as protocepts, and because our purely autoceived state of being as protocepts will in practice be singular and synchronically undifferentiable (this to us as the protocepts which autoceive ourselves as protocepts), all our actively held intentions as eidems will then in practice be synchronically undifferentiable aspects of ourselves as protocepts. Furthermore, this synchronically undifferentiable aspect of ourselves as protocepts which we term our intentioning will furthermore be synchronically undifferentiable from ourselves as the very protocepts which intention.

First presented as a generalized example, unless time is taken to conceptualize one’s intents as eidem in performing an action X, one will perform X as eidem in what one is autoaware to be intentional manners such that one’s active intentioning both a) is autoceived to be one fully unified process and b) is—due to being autoceived—an object of one’s autoawareness that is undifferentiable from oneself as that which autoceives (such that there occurs no duality between the autological object of awareness and the subject of awareness which is autoaware).

More concretely exemplified, typically, when one replies “yes” to a question in a conversation with another, one will do so while aware that one has replied in intentional manners—this despite not having taken the time to conceptualize one’s particular intents in so saying “yes”. One will hence know that one replies intentionally, not via conceptualization-based inference, but via one’s direct autoawareness during the process of so replying “yes”. One will hence typically not be aware of the different intent-driven intentions one simultaneously holds in so saying “yes” but, instead, will autologically experience oneself as eidem simply engaged in an undifferentiated process of intentioning. Furthermore, this object of one’s autoawareness which is one’s own intentioning as eidem will at such juncture be utterly unified with—and undifferentiable from—oneself as eidem which so replies “yes”.

Then, the following second conclusion will be in part derivable from the first conclusion previously expressed: It will hence not be until we as protocepts in any way conceptualize and hence ennooceive, or otherwise phainoceptually represent, our own autologically held intents (with each intent telosially determining its own intention) that we can distinguish the actively held, autological intentions which occur within our autological intentioning. Otherwise expressed, it will only be when one allologically cognizes one’s own present or former autological intentioning—with this alloawareness furthermore occurring in respect to one’s own paraconscious mind—that one as eidem will be able to differentiate between the different intents and, hence, the different intentions that are otherwise simultaneously active in experientially undifferentiable manners within one’s own being as eidem.

Expressing this in more technical, in-depth manners: It will only be when one as eidem forms a representation of one’s own either present or former autological intentioning either via ennoocepts—which, here, are purely senceptual endoallocepts; e.g., by cognizing a non-perceptual understanding regarding one’s intent (with these forming cognita that stand apart from oneself as eidem which so cognizes one’s own conceptual understanding of one’s intents)—or as phainocepts—which, here, are phainological endoallocepts; e.g., by visualizing what one’s intent is (with these forming cognita that stand apart from oneself as eidem which so cognizes one’s own visualization of one’s intents)—that one as eidem can then differentiate between different intents (and their respective, different intent-driven intentions) with which one engages (or, else, engaged) in intentional activities. Again, these being intentional activities that are (or, else, were) performed via an otherwise perfectly unified and autologically undifferentiable intentioning. Furthermore, all these endoallocepts—be they either ennoocepts or phainocepts—which one as eidem can alloceive via one’s protologic consciousness will then take place within one’s paraconscious mind.

In passing, it might be noteworthy to emphasize that just as conceptualizing what consciousness is will be an experience apart from being conscious of this just expressed conceptualization (the concept being a senceived ennoocept occurring within one’s paraconsciousness, whereas “being conscious of” shall of itself be an autological process utilized in so ennooceiving the said concept), so too will be the case for any autological intention one may become alloaware of: For example, conceptualizing what one’s own autological intention is will be an experience apart from autologically intentioning—the latter being that via which one, in part, conceptualizes at will what one’s particular, context-relative intention is; and the conceptualization of one’s own intention will itself occur within one’s paraconsciousness, rather than being an autocept of one’s immediate being as protologic consciousness.  

With the aforementioned two conclusions having been here briefly outlined, again, one as eidem nevertheless does hold the ability to ennooceive, if not also phainoceive, at least some of the teloi one actively holds in one’s autological intentioning. And, in so doing, one as eidem then gains the ability to modify the autological intentioning with which one as eidem currently acts and will act in the future.

As an example of the aforementioned, during my first attempt at writing this section, I had been writing it without being in any way conscious of my intentions to finalize the writing of this treatise in its entirety, and this so as to someday disseminate this philosophy in paperback form—focusing instead on the goal of writing sentences which best express the general notions I’d like to intelligibly communicate, and this for the sake of expressing what autological intentions are in a relatively straightforward yet comprehensive manner. However, upon reflecting on this matter—wherein in I willfully conceptualized my intentions—I can confidently confirm that my autologic intentions in having typed the words of this and previous paragraphs include all four stipulated goals (doubtlessly among others)—hence, my autological intentioning was and remains telosially determined by the intent of writing sentences with optimal intelligibility (this given my own limitations of mind), this for the sake of properly finishing this section, this for the sake of eventually finalizing this treatise, and this for the sake of someday disseminating this philosophy in paperback form. And yet, my actively held, autological intentions to fulfill these four aims (these teloi) are often enough enacted by me without my holding any conscious awareness of the aims (i.e., teloi) just addressed—with these multiple intentions being instead enacted by me via one undifferentiable process of intentioning which I autoceive.

But again, whenever an intent (a telos) of my autological intentioning is brought into my paraconscious mind—either by my so intending as an eidem or else by the workings of my unconscious mind—I as eidem will then be alloceptually aware of the intent and, thereby, will be able to modify my autological intentioning by use of my free will in relation to the intent (telos) I am now conscious of—this were I to so choose.

As one example of this, were I to cognize my intent to finish this subsection of the chapter, I might then question whether this one subsection merits being finished in currently uninterrupted form or, as an alternative, whether this one subsection ought to itself be endowed with its own subsections.

12.3.1.1. Conscious Aspects of

In review, whenever we can cognize the teloi of our autological intending within our paraconscious mind as endoallocepts, our autological intentioning will at that juncture become differentiable into different intentions—some being predominant relative to others that are then subordinate.

To be clear, this is not to then affirm that we can at any point in time become conscious of all the teloi we are telosially determined by as eidems in our autological intentioning. (In parallel, when we honestly affirm what it is we are looking at, it will be impossible to verbally express in one sentence or two all that we in fact see—to include all the many details of colors and shapes, found in both foreground and background, present both within our visual field of focus and in our peripheral vision.) Nor will it be to then affirm that whatever telos we might become conscious of will itself necessarily be the primary telos by which our telosation as eidems is telosially determined. (For example, one might honestly affirm that the telosial reason one has sat down on a chair was to better relax when, maybe, the predominant telosial reason one has done so was to not appear pompous to one’s company, and this for the sake of better engaging in a desired communication with them. In this example, both affirmed teloi will be accurate in so far as being one’s telosial determinants for the action of sitting on the chair but, in the example given, the telos one was immediately conscious of will not be the predominant telos by which one so acted.)

These complexities however for now being placed aside, it nevertheless remains the case that whatever goal or aim (i.e., whatever telos) we of our own impetus as eidems gravitate toward so as to fulfill of which we are endoalloceptually conscious can then be deemed a conscious telos and, hence, a conscious telosial determinant (this under the conceptualization of eidemic consciousness). Yet again expressed via the notion of protologic consciousness, this being a telos applicable to one’s autological intentioning as eidem which becomes cognized within one’s paraconsciousness and, hence, of which one as eidem becomes conscious of as endoallocept (an endoallocept that is either purely senceptual and hence an ennoocept or, else, also phainoceptual in some respect).

As just one example of this, if I move my hand toward a glass of water with the intent of drinking the water therein for the sake of satisfying my thirst (with satisfying my thirst being my predominant intent relative to my subordinate intent of drinking the water), and if am conscious of these two intents, I will then be engaging in a (eidemically) conscious autological intentioning.

12.3.1.2. Unconscious Aspects of

All teloi applicable to one’s autological intentioning as eidem of which one as eidem is not immediately conscious of as endoallocepts will then be unconscious teloi which one actively holds and, thereby, which telosially determine one’s actions as eidem.

Such unconscious teloi of one’s autological intentioning can take any number of forms, all of which can be classified into the following two types: they could either a) pertain to one’s preconscious mind and, thus, be readily brought into consciousness at will (else expressed: be brought into paraconsciousness, and, thereby, become an eidem’s endoallological objects of awareness, at will) or, else, b) they might not be easily, if at all, brought into consciousness at will by the eidem.  

To illustrate category (a), if I were to now ask you why you just read the former sentence, you will in all likelihood be readily capable of providing at least one telosial reason (i.e., one telos, this in the form of an intent) for having read the former sentence (as one example, maybe, for the sake of satisfying your curiosity). You, however, will likely not have been consciously aware of this telos—whatever it might be—while so reading the addressed sentence prior to my asking you for it. Here, then, will be one example of an unconscious yet actively held telos of one’s autological intentioning that one is readily capable of bringing up into consciousness at will. Hence, of an actively held telos to one’s autological intentioning that thereby telosially determined one’s motions as eidem which, as such, resided within one’s preconscious mind.

As pertains to category (b), these unconscious teloi can range from the telosial reason one, for example, voluntarily—and, hence, intentionally—moved one’s eyes toward one’s peripheral field of vision when one did so unthinkingly to, as another example, the conatus which can be deemed to be that ultimate predominant telos in relation to all other both potential and actual teloi one might actively hold. This conatus could potentially thereby take the form of Schopenhauer’s “Will to Live”, or of Nietzsche’s “Will to Power”, or of Freud’s “Pleasure Principle”, or of Frankl’s “Will to Meaning”, among other possibilities. All these just expressed conatuses being different possibilities pertaining to that ultra-predominant intention relative to all other intentions one might hold and enact: the ultra-predominant intention to obtain optimal life, or optimal power, or optimal pleasure, or optimal meaning, respectively.

It bears emphasis that—if an unconscious telos is indeed autologically enacted—any such unconsciously held telos will yet be autologically intentional in full on the part of oneself as eidem—and will be autoceived to so be. For one example, when one as eidem voluntarily (and, hence, intentionally) moves one’s eyes’ gaze so as to better see something without a moment’s thought, one will in all likelihood do this with the intent of better seeing that toward which one’s eyes move but which one is as of yet not conscious of—hence, one will do this via one’s autological intentioning despite the movement having resulted from intents that one as eidem was not consciously aware of (this at the time of the given movement). These movements of one’s eyes will not result from non-autological intentions (to be discussed below) on account of these movements not having been discordant to one’s autological intentioning of which one is autoaware.

Else exemplified, this on the opposite side of the spectrum, one’s perpetually enacting that ultra-predominant conatus which telosially governs all other teloi one might hold as an eidem—irrespective of what this conatus might in fact be (here tentatively granting its occurrence all the same)—can, as an actively maintained ultra-predominant telos, only always be autologically intended, this despite the ultra-predominant telos being unconsciously occurrent. This conatus, by its very demarcation, can at no time ever be discordant to one’s autological intentions and be thereby non-autological. Hence, one as eidem will, and can only, always intentionally enact it in unconscious manners (this, again, were the ultra-predominant telos just addressed to in fact so be ontically occurrent).

[Chapter 13 will in large part address this very notion of a conatus to all autological intentioning which, as such, will be the metaphysically fixed, and thereby inalterable, ultra-predominant telos relative to all other logically conceivable teloi which we might actively hold.]

12.3.1.3. One’s Control Over One’s Autological Intentioning

Simply put, one as eidem can only hold control over one’s own autological intentioning via utilization of one’s free will.

For this capacity to be enacted, one as eidem will need to be aware of one’s own actively held intents and related processes of intending. This awareness of the eidem of its own intents and intentions can either emerge from the eidem’s own autological intentioning to so gain awareness or, otherwise, from the non-autological intentions of the eidem’s total self (which are to be touched upon below). Only when this awareness is at any juncture obtained can the eidem then contrast the actively held intent(s) (and respective process(es) of intending) with alternative possibilities. And it can only be when alternative possibilities are available to the eidem that the eidem can then poietically cause one alternative to become manifest at expense of all others.

In respect to one’s autological intentioning, it then can only be when one as eidem holds either ennoological or else phainoceptual awareness of intents pertaining to one’s autological intentioning that one as eidem can exert control over what one’s present and future autological intentioning consists of.

[The subtleties of this topic will become further investigated in Part 5 of this work.]

12.3.2. The Non-Autological Intentions of an Eidem’s Total Self

This subsection seeks to illustrate, in relatively brief manners, intentions of a total self which are non-autological relative to the eidem in question. Such non-autological intentions can either be directly alloceived by the eidem within its paraconscious mind or, else, can be inferred by the eidem from the eidem’s total experiences to occur within the eidem’s unconscious mind.

12.3.2.1. Pertaining to the Paraconscious Mind

Let it first be observed that during times when one finds oneself as eidem in what has been described as “flow” (else, described as states wherein one is “in the zone”), the momentary occurrence of one’s paraconscious mind will be minimal—this if at all discernable to oneself as eidem and, hence, if at all present. At most other times, however, one as eidem will be to some extent embedded within one’s paraconscious mind to varying degrees—such that one as eidem experiences thoughts, ideas, physiological urges, emotions that will in some way influence one as eidem, and so forth, all of which will in one way or another be endoallocepts relative to oneself as eidem.

Because there are innumerable states of mind that could be addressed which will pertain to one’s paraconsciousness, a thorough discussion of non-autological intentions pertaining to one’s paraconscious mind will not be presently feasible—nor will it be necessary for the present purposes of this chapter. Instead, only two examples of non-autological intentions pertaining to one’s paraconsciousness will be focused on: the intentions of one’s conscience and the intentions of one’s endoalloceptual envy, this whenever either might be present within one’s paraconsciousness. (Of note, envy is being here addressed as an example of endoalloceptual emotions on account of the relatively clearcut telos which this emotion necessarily holds: the telos of obtaining something not yet possessed, such that not yet possessing that concerned is accompanied by resent.)

Suppose a person is running a marathon and comes across a possible shortcut to the finishing line. Furter suppose that the eidem in question then autologically intends to take the shortcut—this despite so doing being cheating. Next suppose that upon so intending, the eidem then finds itself aware of their conscience which, as conscience, senceptually informs the eidem that it would be better to not win by cheating via the taking of the shortcut. The eidem then deliberates between the two alternatives now present to it—that of cheating (which it as eidem initially wanted) and that of not cheating (which is what its conscience desires)—and subsequently decides upon not taking the shortcut. The following can then be appraised:

The presence of the eidem’s conscience—with this presence occurring within the eidem’s paraconscious mind—was not an outcome of the eidem’s autological intentions. The eidem’s conscience, instead, appeared to the eidem in manners unintended by the eidem. Secondly, the eidem’s conscience favored an aim (a telos) directly contrary to the aim (telos) momentarily favored by the eidem—this prior to the eidem’s consequent deliberations and ensuing decision. The conscience of the eidem hence intended that the eidem engage in an activity directly contradictory to that activity which the eidem was initially autologically intending to pursue. Because the conscience’s intentions are directly contradictory to the intentions of the eidem, and because the conscience resides within the eidem’s paraconsciousness, the intentions of the conscience were then non-autological intentions found within the eidem’s paraconscious mind of which the eidem was allologically aware (rather than autologically aware). It is not until—as the outcome of the eidem’s deliberations on the matter—the eidem chooses to concede to its conscience that the eidem’s autological intentions then become unified with those of its conscience in a then autologically held intentioning to not take the shortcut.

For the second example, suppose a person is engaged in conversations with a friend who then presents to the person a picture of a newly obtained luxury sports car. Further suppose that at this juncture the person in question experiences a pang of envy at their friend’s new acquisition. At the specific juncture when the pang of envy first occurs, the eidem in question is hence not autologically envious of the friend’s new car but, instead, experiences this pang of envy as an endoallocept within their paraconsciousness, an endoallocept which senceptually urges the eidem to so become autologically envious about the friend’s car. For this example, the eidem in question—being now presented with the senceptual alternatives of either becoming envious or of not becoming envious—decides that becoming autologically envious of his friend’s car is entirely unwarranted and thereby wrong. In so doing, the eidem then chooses against this pang of envy and this pang of envy then vanishes from the eidem’s paraconsciousness.

As with the example of an eidem’s conscience, the eidem did not here intentionally bring about the presence of this pang of envy within its paraconsciousness. Unlike the example of the eidem’s conscience, however, the pang of envy does not directly goad the eidem toward a specific activity but, instead, directly goads the eidem toward a certain state of autological being—namely, that of becoming envious as an eidem—at which point specific actions could then be taken.

That mentioned, because the pang of envy will ennooceptually urge—and thereby attempt to influence—the eidem’s autological state of being toward becoming envious of the friend’s car, the pang of envy will then hold a telos other than the telos (or teloi) actively held by the eidem at the given moment concerned: namely, that of bringing the respective eidem into a state of enviousness—this being an intent found within the eidem’s paraconsciousness of which the eidem could well be opposed to due to holding discordant intents. The pang of envy will then be an endoalloceptual emotion whose envy-contingent intentions momentarily stand apart from the autological intentions of the non-envious eidem which ennooceives the stated pang of envy within its paraconscious mind. Here, then, one as eidem feels envy within oneself as total self while yet not being envious oneself as eidem. As was provided in the respectively given example, instead of becoming envious due to the influences of this felt pang of envy, the eidem instead chooses to stand in opposition to the endoalloceptual intentions of its pang of envy. Here, the eidem’s autological intentions are directly antagonistic to the eidem-relative non-autological intentions which the eidem senceives in (or else as) its pang(s) of envy—and the eidem persists in so being antagonistic to this aspect of its paraconscious mind till the pang(s) of envy experienced are no longer felt.

In the case of both one’s conscience and at least some of one’s endoalloceptual emotions (with envy being here exemplified), the eidem’s autological intentions will then most often be distinctly other relative to those non-autological intentions found within its paraconscious mind.

Innumerable other examples can be provided wherein the eidem’s autological intentions are other than those intentions a) it as eidem does not autologically hold but b) are nevertheless present within its paraconscious mind: As an additional illustration, some will complain of and seek help for being bothered by negative thoughts which they (as eidems) cannot control or easily subdue—such as thoughts which convey to the eidem “you are stupid”—here again clearly indicating the eidem’s autological intentions of not being so bothered by negative thoughts to be fully discordant to the non-autological intentions found within the eidem’s paraconscious mind to so demean the eidem in question.  

For the time being, these examples are deemed sufficient to illustrate that, at times, an eidem can experience what are relative to itself non-autological intentions pertaining to its (ever-changing) paraconsciousness of which it is endoalloaware and with which it interacts.

12.3.2.2. Pertaining to the Unconscious Mind

Because the eidem is by definition not conscious of its unconscious mind’s states and processes of being, far less can be here said of non-autological intentions pertaining to its unconscious mind. Notwithstanding, there are commonly enough experienced occurrences whose intending can only be inferred to neither be autological (either consciously or unconsciously so) nor to be the non-autological intentions pertaining to one’s paraconscious mind. One such experience, that of slips of the tongue, will be next addressed.

If the eidem intends to say that they want to go left but instead states “I want to go right” what ends up being manifested by their total self will be contradictory to what the eidem itself autologically intended to manifest. Furthermore, the eidem experiencing itself to unintentionally (and, hence, involuntarily) express “I want to go right” will—in many, if not most, cases—be in no way influenced by its paraconscious mind (such as by its conscience or by some endoalloceived emotion which it feels). In many such cases, then, the unintended expression of “I want to go right” will not be in any way influenced by non-autological intentions present within the eidem’s paraconsciousness (of which the eidem is (protologically) conscious of). In many such cases it therefore stands to reason that, at the juncture in which the eidem autologically intended to say “left” but instead ended up saying “right”, aspects of the eidem’s unconscious mind where intending the expression of “right” instead of “left”—and this in such manner that the eidem’s autological intentions to say “left” were overridden by the eidem’s unconscious mind.

Other more extreme examples can include that of alien hand syndrome—wherein the respective eidem reportedly holds no awareness whatsoever of what its alienized portion of body (such as a hand) will of its own intentions do.

For the time being, these two examples are deemed to suffice in illustrating the possibility of intentions which are non-autological relative to the given eidem and which are furthermore aspects of the eidem’s unconscious mind.

12.3.4. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

For the purposes of forming a reliable foundation on which the next chapter’s arguments can be better expressed, the following will suffice:

Firstly, all those here concerned can—at least at times—experientially discern a difference between what we as eidems actively intend and those aspects of our total selves (to include the paraconscious and unconscious portions of our total mind) which are in no way intended by us as eidems.

And secondly, what we intend as eidems will then necessarily be our autological intentions—which we autoceive as our autologically undifferentiated intentioning and of which we can become protologically conscious of via endoalloceptual objects of awareness (be these ennoological or phainological) that thereby occur within our paraconscious mind. Conversely, those intentions of our total selves which we as eidems do not autoceive to be our own autological intentioning as eidems will then be relative to us as eidems the non-autological intentions of our total selves.

Hence, what will be herein affirmed and upheld as unfalsifiedly certain is the following:

All those here concerned can—at least at times—distinguish between our own autological intentions as eidems and those intentions of our total selves which are non-autological relative to ourselves as eidems.

12.4. Intentions as the Constitutional Determinants of Volition

In keeping with common understandings, the term volition shall be defined as “purposive striving” and shall be further understood to be synonymous with at least some senses of will.

Then, with volition (aka will) being understood as purposive striving, the following will obtain:

Volition shall entail attempts to actualize a result—this being entailed by “striving”—such that the addressed, as of yet unactualized result striven for is the very intent (i.e., telos) whose fulfillment is intended (i.e., telosated)—i.e., such that the strivings addressed are necessarily telosial, with this being entailed by “purposive”.

Hence, given the understanding that volition is purposive striving, it will then be unfalsifiedly certainty that volition will consist of telosations to fulfill one or more teloi—more specifically, of intentions to fulfill one or more intents.

Because an agency’s singular volition (aka, its will)—such as the eidem’s will (which is always singular)—shall be comprised of multiple intents which are thereby intended, it is then further concluded as unfalsified certainty that a given volition will be constitutionally determined by a plurality of otherwise individual intentions of which it is comprised.

Intentions pertaining to a total self have been in §12.3 evidenced categorizable in the following way: they could be a) autological relative to the eidem in question such that these autological intentions are either i) consciously appraisable or ii) unconscious or else b) non-autological relative to the eidem in question such that these non-autological intentions either pertain to aspects of the eidem’s i) paraconscious mind or ii) unconscious mind.

This will thereby further entail that volition too can either be autological or else non-autological relative to a given eidem.

12.4.1. Autological Volition

As was addressed in §12.3.1, all autological intentions which one as eidem can conceptualize as being in any way differentiated—be these intentions either a) consciously appraisable within one’s paraconsciousness, b) preconsciously available to one’s conscious awareness at will, or else b) enduringly unconscious and thereby only inferable by the eidem from the eidem’s lived experiences—will, as conceptually differentiable intentions, be nevertheless autologically enacted by the eidem in a unified manner, such that these otherwise conceptually differentiable intentions are autologically enacted as one singular process of intentioning.

Then, because one’s autological intentioning as an eidem can be appraised by oneself as eidem upon analysis to be comprised of multiple co-occurring intentions (such that some intentions are predominant relative to others which, then, are subordinate), one as eidem can then conclude that, at any juncture of one’s autological intentioning, one will be telosially determined by more than one identifiable teloi. Furthermore, because one’s autological intentioning at any given specific juncture shall, relative to one’s autoawareness as eidem, be a singular and undifferentiable process which is otherwise termed “one’s will (aka, volition) as eidem”, one can then conclude the following:

One’s autological will (i.e., volition) as eidem shall at all times be strictly constitutionally determined by all predominant and subordinate intentions which one as eidem is actively engaged in autologically—hence, by both those autological intentions one can bring into (eidemic) consciousness at will and thereby be (protologically) conscious of as well as those autological intentions that remain unconsciously occurrent.

12.4.1.1. Differentiating an Eidem’s Free Will, Will, and Willpower

As a useful addendum: Given all that has so far been introduced in this treatise, the following differentiations shall be now made between the a) free will, b) will, and c) willpower of an eidem:

An eidem’s free will shall be constituted of the eidem’s decisional freedom to intentionally choose between two or more alternatives the eidem is aware of—irrespective of whether these alternatives are purely senceptual or otherwise in any way perceptual. As such, an eidem’s free will can then be further differentiated between an eidems narrow free will, which occurs only during the process of such choice making, and an eidem’s wide free will, which occurs when an eidem implements decisions made during former instantiations of its narrow free will.

Generally addressed, an eidem’s will shall be constituted of the eidem’s autological intentioning—i.e., the eidem’s own purposive striving—this irrespective of whether the autological intentioning is being presently chosen or else was formerly chosen by the eidem in question via its free will. As one example of this, that one as eidem autologically willed—and, thus, autologically intentioned—to turn one’s head at hearing a loud noise does not entail that one’s so willing to turn one’s head was resultant of one’s decisionally free choice between alternatives, aka resultant of one’s free will (be the free will narrow or wide).

Lastly here specified, and in keeping with common usage, an eidem’s willpower shall in this treatise be understood to be the eidem’s ability to unwaveringly implement its intentions via its autological will—such that the eidem’s willpower shall fully equate to the eidem’s power of will. Less laconically expressed, an eidem’s willpower shall be herein understood as the eidem’s ability to persist in autologically intending the implementation of an intent which the eidem has previously chosen via its free will, such that this persistence is maintained irrespective of both external influences (such as other people’s influence upon the eidem) and internal factors (such as the non-autological volitions of an eidem's total self which might urge the eidem to do otherwise). As one example of this, a drug addict which has chosen to no longer use the given drug (this being the chosen intent) and which persists in so autologically intending to fulfill this intent despite a) drug dealers’ and drug-addicted acquaintances’ influence upon the addressed drug addict to once again use the drug and b) his own endoalloceptual urges of his paraconscious mind to once again use the drug shall then—by all reasonable accounts—be as eidem endowed with a very large magnitude of willpower.

Despite these differences, an eidem’s free will, will, and willpower shall all nevertheless be autological relative to the eidem in question—thereby being three differing aspects of the eidem’s autological volition.

12.4.2. The Non-Autological Volitions of an Eidem’s Total Self

Readdressing the previously given two examples of an eidem’s conscience and pangs of envy, consider the following scenario:

The eidem first experiences pangs of envy which tempt the eidem to become envious and, given the eidem’s initially resulting inclination to so become envious, the eidem then also experiences its own conscience informing it that it would be best to not become envious despite the emotive push the eidem senses within its total self to so become—this such that the eidem now finds itself simultaneously influenced by both its pangs of envy and its conscience, with the eidem’s own state of being currently being undecided as to which of the two influences would be best to conform to.

In this scenario, the eidem’s own state of being shall momentarily be comprised of a purposive striving, i.e. of a volition, which stands apart from the momentarily occurring two antagonistic purposive strivings, i.e. volitions, found in the eidem’s paraconsciousness: namely, that paraconscious volition urging the eidem to become envious and that contradictory paraconscious volition urging the eidem to not become envious. Neither of the latter two purposive strivings of the eidem’s total self will either a) have been intended, and hence willed, by the eidem to occur or b) currently be the eidem’s autological intentioning—hence the eidem’s own purposive striving and, hence, the eidem’s autological volition. Because of this, the latter two contradicting volitions of the eidem’s total self will each be a non-autological volition pertaining to those aspects of the eidem’s total mind of which the eidem is consciously aware of.

Hence, within this scenario, there will simultaneously occur three distinct volitions within the eidem’s eidemic consciousness: one being the autologic volition of the eidem (which at the current juncture is in a state of indecision as to how best proceed—and of which the eidem is autoaware of) and two being the non-autological volitions of the eidem’s total mind which directly contradict each other (of which the eidem is endologically alloaware and which occur within the eidem’s paraconsciousness).

Although simplistic by comparison to many other potential examples, this scenario nevertheless viably presents a possible case wherein an eidem (and, by extension, an eidem’s volition) interacts with two distinct non-autological volitions of its total mind.

On grounds that all those here concerned can relate to this scenario wherein we as eidems sometimes interact with non-autological volitions found within our paraconscious mind, it is then concluded that all those here concerned can—at least at times—distinguish between our own autological volition as eidem and the non-autological purposive strivings, i.e. volitions, of our total mind which we as eidem can (at times) find ourselves interacting with.  

On grounds that any purposive striving will need to be constitutionally determined by (and, hence comprised of) intentions, it is then concluded that our non-autological volitions (when occurrent) will all be constitutionally determined by intentions.

12.4.3. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

The following two culminating unfalsified certainties will suffice for this section:

Firstly, all those here concerned can—at least at times—differentiate between our own autological volition as an eidem and (at the very least, some of) the non-autological volitions which manifest within our own total self.

Secondly, because all volitions will be purposive strivings, all volitions—be they autological or non-autological—will be constitutionally determined by intentions (with each distinct intention holding its own intent, i.e. telos).

12.5. Of Pullward and Pushward Drives

The voluntary vs. involuntary dichotomy in relation to a total mind’s operations can in many contexts be of significant benefit to our understanding of ourselves. The case is likewise for the more technical dichotomy of autologic vs. non-autologic operations of mind herein introduced. Nevertheless, neither of these two dichotomies will specify telosial relations between that concerned and the teloi it is driven toward.  

In the belief that holding a means of specifying these telosial relations will be of additional service to our optimal understanding of ourselves, this section will introduce two novel concepts which will together form a dichotomy paralleling those previously mentioned:

First, let a drive be herein understood to simply be any goal-oriented impetus which brings about motion—be the motion psychological (e.g., the motions of mind via which a topic is further engaged in), physiological (e.g., the motions of mouth via which one continues to talk), or both.

Furthermore, let the variable “T” specify a telos or a set of teloi; let the variable “P” specify the principal agency addressed; let the variable "A” specify one or more agencies other than the principal agency addressed; and, lastly, let the variable “S” specify a syntelostasis (as was specified in §8.3.1.2.3.1, this being the successful fulfillment of a telos or a set of teloi).

Then:

Let a pullward drive take the following form: The T actively held by P attracts, else draws—and, thereby, pulls—P toward a respective S, this irrespective of whether S ends up becoming realized. For example, an eidem’s actively held intent of reaching the peak of a hill pulls the eidem in question toward the syntelostasis of having successfully reached the peak of the hill—this irrespective of whether the eidem eventually succeeds in so reaching. Here, then, the eidem will be pullwardly driven in its motions by the intent (i.e., the telos) it actively holds.

Secondly, let a pushward drive take the following form: A compels, else urges—and, thereby, pushes—P toward an S which A intends via A’s actively held T—this irrespective of whether S ends up becoming realized. For example, an eidem’s endoalloceived urges to prove to others that it is better than they are pushes the eidem in question toward the syntelostasis of having successfully reached the peak of the hill first—this a) irrespective of whether the eidem ends up acting in accordance with its just expressed endoalloceived urges (for the eidem might instead dispel them as improper) and, in the case that it does, b) irrespective of whether the eidem eventually succeeds in so reaching first. Here, then, the eidem will be pushwardly driven in its motions—at the very least, its motions of choice making—by its endoalloceived urges.  

Because an eidem can be pushwardly motivated by both its inner process of paraconscious mind as well as by external agencies, a further dichotomization of pushward force can be identified for added specificity:

Let the term endopushward be understood to indicate a pushward force occurring within one’s total self—with one’s pangs of hunger or thirst serving as one possible example of this.

Let the term exopushward be understood to indicate a pushward force occurring outside of one’s total self—with another person’s statements to oneself regarding what one should do serving as one possible example of this.

In overview of the subsections which follow: An eidem’s autological intentioning and hence its autological volition, as well as its autologically occurring wants and motivations (among other possible autological process of mind relative to the eidem—such as that of (at least some) autologically occurring emotions; e.g., that of being envious) can be specified with the one umbrella concept of being pullward processes or forces. In contrast, many of the non-autological intentions and volitions, as well as the non-autologically occurring wants and motivations of an eidem’s total self (among other possible non-autological process of mind relative to the eidem—such as that of (at least some) endoalloceived emotions; e.g., that of feeling pangs of envy) can all be specified with the one umbrella concept of being endopushward processes or forces.

12.5.1. Concerning Intentions and Volition

Firstly, an eidem’s autological intentioning (and the specific intentions one as eidem can cognize oneself to actively hold as parts of one’s autological intentioning) will at all times be pullwardly driven—for one’s autological intentioning will at all times be driven by the very teloi (be they conscious, preconscious, or enduringly unconscious) one as eidem actively holds and thereby seeks to fulfill (be this in conscious, preconscious, or enduringly unconscious manners). Here, the teloi one as eidem actively holds (either consciously, preconsciously, or in enduringly unconscious manners) shall pull one as eidem toward their successful fulfillment.

Secondly, an eidem’s volition—aka, will—in being constitutionally determined by the sum of one’s actively held intentions, will then likewise at all times be pullwardly driven, this for the same reasons aforementioned.

All intentions of one’s total self which do not pullwardly drive one as eidem but which one as eidem senceives to urge one toward some end—an end one is momentarily not pullwardly driven toward—will then be experienced by the eidem as one’s endopushward intentions.

Likewise will most, if not all, endoallological volitions be one’s endopushward volitions.

12.5.2. Concerning Wants

Also important to the subsequent chapter will be specificity regarding one’s wants—with these bifurcating into one’s pullward wants and one’s pushward wants.

In keeping with common usage, a want is to be herein deemed synonymous with a desire—and can furthermore in certain contexts be deemed synonymous with a wish—such that longing, or else yearning, will be a subset of wanting.

For an agency to want X is herein understood as an agency’s being in want of X—such that the agency deems X to be something it lacks and would be gratified to have.

So generally construed, all intentions will entail the occurrence of wants—namely, the want for the intention’s intent (i.e., the telosation’s telos) to be fulfilled (i.e., to end in a syntelostasis). Conversely, because all wants will be in regard to some as of yet unactualized future whose eventual actualization would gratify the respective agency such that the agency is magnetized toward the eventual actualization of this unactualized future, and because such unactualized future is a telos, all wants will then be telosial in nature—for all wants will in one way or another consist of intents (i.e., of teloi).

Given the dichotomy of autological and non-autological volitions—which are themselves composed of autological and non-autological intentions, respectively—this then results in a dichotomy between a) the wants of autological intentions which constitutionally determine one’s autological volition as eidem and b) the wants of non-autological intentions which constitutionally determine the non-autological volitions of one’s total self. More tersely expressed, there then occurs a dichotomy between one’s own autological wants as eidem and the non-autological wants of one’s total self.

With this general outline having been provided, our wants will themselves then either be a) our pullward wants as eidems, wherein the eidem itself is in want of a syntelostasis—i.e., of a successfully fulfilled telos, whose stated fulfillment the eidem would be gratified by—or, else, b) the pushward wants of our total selves, to which we as eidems might then for example conform to (at which juncture these would become our pullward wants) or else become antagonistic to.

As an example of this, a person falls in love with another in such manner that the respective eidem does not want to be in love (fearing this very prospect) and hence instead wants to not be in love—this despite being perpetually urged via its paraconscious mind to freely fall in love with the other. Here, the eidem’s pullward want is to not be in love while the eidem’s endopushward wants are in direct opposition to what the eidem desires. In this circumstance, the eidem might eventually concede and thereby conform to the pushward wants of its paraconscious mind—at which juncture falling in love would become one of the eidem’s pullward drives. Alternatively, the eidem might repel its pushward wants as best as the eidem can—and this with the aim of being freed from them.

12.5.2.1. Unacted Upon Desires

There can occur desires we hold that we nevertheless do not act upon.

As one example of such desire, a person P could at times want X, where X is “being younger than one currently is”. This desire will be a want of X which P holds—such that P would be gratified by obtaining X which it currently lacks. But, despite this desire, P will not intend X.

In this example, P will not intend X on grounds that P has no reason to believe that X can be had via any effort which P might enact—in all cases culminating only in a dystelostasis. But now consider the following scenario:

P is a geneticist who believes that altering one’s genome could result in a reversal of the aging process, and P desires the X previously described.

In this latter variation, P as eidem could well intend to discover the specific gene modifications which would reverse the process of aging, with this being a subordinate intent to the now actively held intent of becoming younger biologically.

This hypothetical illustrates the following: A total self can hold a desire X in such manner that desire X will be a pushward drive relative to the respective eidem, this while the respective eidem will nevertheless not be pullwardly driven toward X—will not pullwardly want X and, hence, will not pullwardly intend X’s fulfillment—this for as long as the eidem deems X’s fulfillment unrealizable (or else, in more complex scenarios, unfeasible to realize—as can, for example, be said of a want to once again be in a romantic relationship with a long lost lover, such that this would not be an impossibility but a very great improbability). And this without the eidem being in any significant way antagonistic to its pushward wants emerging from its total self. However, the moment that the same eidem deems X’s fulfillment to be feasible given sufficient effort—an effort which the eidem furthermore deems itself able to enact—the same eidem will then become pullwardly driven by, and hence pullwardly want the fulfilment of, the intent of their heretofore pushward desires.

Here, one’s pushward wants will again not stand in stark opposition to one’s pullward wants. Nevertheless, there will yet be a distinction between the two: whereas the pushward wants are ready to be gratified, the pullward want(s) will keep the pushward wants in check—this by not investing any effort in gratifying the pushward wants which are felt but instead seeking their own gratification. To utilize the previously given example, one might feel a want to become younger biologically but will not oneself actively want to so become, instead pullwardly wanting to live life as best one can given one’s current age.

In such manners, many a yearning or longing can be deemed to be a dormant pullward drive—which in dormant form yet acts as a pushward drive, one that awaits the contextual opportunities that would make a telos whose fulfilment is currently unrealizable then become realizable.

Although there are innumerable philosophical complexities that have not yet been here addressed—contingent upon further enquiries into the workings of an individual mind—the train of thought just specified regarding a distinction between pushward and pullward wants is believed to hold viability as an optimal means of addressing these very same philosophical complexities.

12.5.3. Concerning Motives

More tangentially important to the following chapters will be the subject of motives.

In keeping with common usage, a motive will be herein understood as that which makes one want to do something—thereby provoking one’s motion, be this motion either psychological, physiological, or both.

Any telos by which one is pullwardly driven will then be a pullward motive for one’s motions (of mind, of body, or of both).

By comparison, all of one’s endopushward influences—themselves pullwardly driven by one or more teloi—will then be pushward motives relative to oneself as eidem.

If, for example, one intended X on account of one’s pushward wants, this despite not having wanted to intend X in the absence of the pushward wants that so compelled one as eidem to intend, then one here would have actively moved toward X (psychologically, physiologically, or both) because of one’s pushward motives—rather than one’s pullward motives. In such cases, it can be that one’s pullward desire for X only comes into fruition once one is unwantingly compelled into intending X by pushward forces and, hence, pushward motives.

For instance, one as eidem does not want to engage in morning exercises—but feels compelled to so engage in by pushward forces whose motives one nevertheless acknowledges as thoroughly reasonable. One thereby then chooses to so engage in morning exercises and, once so engaging, one then starts to experience a pullward want to maximize one’s morning exercise routine (this rather than remaining apathetic toward it). In so doing, one as eidem than adopts the pushward motive(s) as one's own pullward motive(s).

In recap, all motives shall be telosial reasons for motions—mental, bodily, or both—but while some of these will pullwardly drive us as eidems, others shall pertain to influences (be these endological or exological) that will attempt to pushwardly drive us. Our telosial reasons, aka motives, for the motions (psychological, physiological, or both) we engage in can then either be pullward motives or pushward motives.

12.5.3.1. Motives as the Constitutional Determinants of Motivations

Although the topic of motivation is complex, it will nevertheless be observed that all motivations are comprised of—and thereby constitutionally determined by—motives, be the latter either pullward or pushward.

One’s motivation to do X might thereby be a complex mixture of both pullward and pushward motives, might otherwise be purely pullward, or might otherwise be purely pushward. Conversely, lack of motivation can be due to a lack of pullward motives; can be due to a lack of pushward motives despite one’s pullward motives (for example, wherein one doesn’t feel oneself as a total self in force to accomplish X—e.g., to jump over a hurdle—despite oneself as an eidem being pullwardly motivated to so accomplish); or else can be due to a lack of both pullward and pushward motives.  

Due to these just addressed complexities here only touched upon, there can then be a dichotomy between one’s pullward motivation as eidem and one’s endopushward motivation, itself supplied by one’s total self. As an example of this, consider the following scenario:

One as eidem is not pullwardly motivated to go fishing, this due to not favoring the telos of so going fishing. Instead, one as eidem favors the telos of completing a certain project—and is pullwardly motivated to so complete because of this. All the same, the greater portion of one’s total mind urges one to go fishing; this then being one’s momentarily experienced pushward motivations. Were one to give into one’s pushward motivations, one would in this case, upon so giving in, in all likelihood then oneself as eidem become pullwardly motivated to go fishing. However, if one as eidem insists that the given project gets completed, then, via one’s willpower as eidem, it might be possible that one as eidem shall exert the required energy to get one’s pushward motivations to themselves give into one’s momentarily held pullward motivation of completing the said project—thereby resulting in a total self’s now present pullward motivation to complete the stated project.

Hence, in the just stated example, one as eidem then pushwardly motivates one’s total mind toward that which oneself as eidem is pullwardly motivated toward. More colloquially expressed, one here pushes oneself to accomplish that which one wants to accomplish.

Despite the many, here unaddressed, complexities concerning the subject of motivation, the following is nevertheless deemed to remain a constant: motivation can be enacted pullwardly, pushwardly, or via both means at the same time.

12.5.4. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

Bearing in mind that an eidem’s voluntary behaviors will be equivalent to an eidem’s autological behaviors and that these can be further specified as pullward behaviors, the following unfalsified certainty to this section shall suffice:

Whenever competing drives occur within our eidemically conscious selves, all those here concerned will be able to—at least at times—differentiate between what has been termed our own pullward drives as eidems and those pushward drives of our total self which are other than, if not standing in direct opposition to, our own pullward drives as eidems—with our conscience and at least some of our endoalloceptual emotions (such as pangs of envy) serving as only two examples of the latter.

12.6. Concluding Remarks

In overview, the paraconscious mind is a realm of both perceptual and fully senceptual endoallocepts which we as eidems can at times manipulate at will—such as via our willed visualizations and our intentional analysis of conceptual understandings. It is likewise a ream of our both perceptual and fully senceptual endoallocepts via which, at times, we as eidems interact with agencies of our mind that are other than ourselves as eidems—with our conscience serving as one example of such.

Likewise in overview, our volition, aka will, as eidems is at all times autological, constitutionally determined by the sum of all intentions (conscious, preconscious, and enduringly unconscious) which we as eidems autologically enact, and will at all times be a pullward force. By comparison, the non-autological volitions of our minds (and, hence, of our total selves) will pertain to agencies of mind which we as eidems are not, will be constitutionally determined by what is relative to us non-autological intentions, and will often be pushward forces relative to us as eidems.

With that summation provided, it is to be said that this chapter has barely scratched the surface in respect to an analysis of how the total mind operates, an analysis which will be engaged in with greater detail within Part 5 of this work.

Despite the many topics, complexities, and details this chapter has touched upon—acknowledgedly, at times far more superficially than at others—the leading issue which this chapter endeavors to bring to light is that, briefly stated, there are times when there can occur a cognizable differentiation between a) what the eidem itself intends and thereby wills and b) what other portions of the eidem’s total self intend and thereby will. As an example, one’s conscience’s will shall not be one’s own as eidem for the duration that one as eidem senceives one’s own conscience.

This understanding will then currently suffice for the purposes of evidencing what Chapter 13 will specify as being the eidem’s prototelos: this being a metaphysically fixed, hence invariable, and foundational telos which will hence be predominant to all that we as eidems can intend—one which is thereby perpetually intended and which cannot be chosen against via our free will capacities.  

Then, for the purposes of the subsequent chapter, let the following summation be understood: our autological, pullwardly driven behaviors as eidems (be these behaviors purely psychological or also physiological) will be other than those occasionally occurring non-autological behaviors of our total selves by which we as eidems can at such junctures be pushwardly influenced.

• References

  1. Setiya, Kieran, "Intention", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/intention/>.

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