Chapter 5: Our Four Modes of Awareness
To adequately address our three strata of awareness as eidems—from which basic understandings of consciousness will be subsequently inferred—four general modes of awareness will be first established.
It is to be understood that, within the contexts here employed, all givens that an eidem experiences will be interpreted to be so experienced due to the eidem being aware of these—with these givens including external items, internal bodily states, imaginations, emotions, concepts which one understands, and what an eidem experiences to be its own states of being as an eidem. In other words, any given experientially known to an eidem will be a given of which the eidem is in some way aware. And, conversely expressed, any given of which an eidem is aware will be experienced by the respective eidem. Likewise of note, to be cognizant of as an eidem and to be aware of as an eidem shall here be interpreted as fully synonymous expressions.
Secondly, an eidem’s objects of awareness will be here interpreted as any given of which the eidem is aware—this irrespective of what the given might be—with the eidem then being the respective subject of awareness. An eidem’s objects of awareness, as here used, are hence not limited to what in ordinary speech are termed “objects”, but can also include processes, actions, thoughts, states of personal being, and so forth.
This briefly mentioned, the four modes of awareness which shall be addressed can be partly illustrated by the following: a) a tree seen with physiological eyes as one’s object of awareness, b) the visual appearance of a remembered tree seen with the mind’s eye as one’s object of awareness, c) the non-visual awareness of the generalized idea of tree as one’s object of awareness; and d) one’s non-visual, self-referential awareness of one’s own momentary psychological certainty as an eidem as one’s object of awareness—for example, one’s own experientially known psychological certainty that what is seen is in fact a tree (rather than a decoy).
While the just illustrated four modes of awareness should be easily evidenced of epistemic certainty once properly conceptualized, demarcating them in satisfactory manners for this purpose will be more challenging. This, in part, is due to a lack of unequivocal terminology through which these four modes of awareness can be expressed in the English language.
In the absence of such terminology, this chapter will propose new terms with which to specify these modes of awareness.
- 1 5.1. A Foreword Regarding Perception
- 2 5.2. Sensory Awareness and Non-Sensory Awareness
- 3 5.3. An Overview of Our Four Modes of Awareness
- 4 5.4. Physiological Awareness
- 5 5.5. Phainological Awareness
- 6 5.6. Ennoological Awareness
- 7 5.7. Autological Awareness
- 8 5.8. Concluding Remarks
- 9 • References
- 10 • Navigation
5.1. A Foreword Regarding Perception
The term perception can hold some ambiguity:
Perception can be understood as the outcome of a process which, at the time of its occurrence, necessarily incorporates the physiological senses’—and, hence, sensory receptors’—interaction with stimuli. Demarcating perception in such strict manner will, however, exclude all givens that one, for example, can visually imagine or visually recall from being givens which one holds the capacity to perceive. This is so because, in this example of visual awareness, the apprehension of images which are willfully imagined or recalled will not occur via the immediate interaction between one’s physiological eyes and stimuli: one can, for example, visually imagine or visually recall such images with eyes closed.
Perception can also be more broadly understood to simply be any firsthand awareness comprised of sensory information. So denoting will then allow for perception to include both firsthand awareness constituted of sensory information immediately obtained via sensory receptors as well as firsthand awareness constituted of sensory information which is not—in the latter case, allowing both imaginations and remembrances comprised of sensory information to be things perceived.
Alternatively, common speech will sometimes make use of the term perception to address awareness of givens that, in themselves, do not consist of sensory information. “An item’s perceived value” will often, if not always, serve as an example of this latter usage. As will be later addressed in greater detail, often, if not always, the value which one cognizes will not of itself have a given look, sound, tactile feel, smell, taste, vestibular property, nor will it hold any specific bodily property, such as that of kinesthetic sensations. In all such cases, then, though the given value will be apprehended by the eidem which is aware of it, it will not be an apprehension that of itself consists of sensory information.
Then, to ameliorate such equivocations of the term perception for the purposes of this chapter’s classifications, the term perception will in this treatise be strictly understood as the general process via which one gains cognizance of objects of awareness that consist of sensory information—regardless of whether this sensory information is obtained via the immediate interaction between sensory receptors and stimuli or not. Thus, for example, one will be stated to perceive both that which is seen with physiological eyes (e.g., a seen table) as well as that which is seen with the mind’s eye (e.g., the recalled appearance of a particular table once seen but that is no longer immediately present)—but not that which as an object of awareness is devoid of sensory information (e.g., the particular value which a given table might be cognized to hold relative to other items).
Let it be also preliminarily understood that perception can be dichotomized as either exteroceptive or interoceptive. As these terms will be used in this chapter, exteroceptive perception will concern sensory information deemed by an eidem (this tacitly if not also explicitly) to be external relative to the workings of the body; interoceptive perception, on the other hand, will concern sensory information deemed by an eidem (tacitly if not also explicitly) to be internal relative to the workings of the body.
The dichotomy between exteroception and interoception will in this treatise hold for what one discerns to be one’s real body as well as for any imaginary, and in this sense virtual, body:
In humans, six exteroceptions can be distinguished; these are our sense of sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, and our vestibular sense (the latter in part consisting of our awareness of gravitational pull via which we obtain balance relative to our environment). Hence, for example, a seen horse will as visual percept be exteroceptive relative to one’s bodily eyes. Furthermore, a visually imagined horse will as visual percept be here also classified as an imagined exteroception—rather than an imagined interoception—this relative to the imaginary, or else virtual, eyes via which is obtained the visual perspective, or point of view, from which the visually imagined horse as sensory information is seen.
In contrast, interoceptions will include our sense of physiological pain, our kinesthetic awareness, our senses of hunger and thirst, as well as other, sometimes more subtle, senses via which we directly discern bodily states of being. Hence, as example of interoception, we can kinesthetically sense our arms’ movements (even when not looking at them). Furthermore, with some effort, we could to some measure imagine what an elephant’s kinesthetic awareness of its trunk is like, such that this imagined kinesthetic awareness pertaining to an elephant’s trunk is obtained via what is to us the inner workings of an imaginary, and in this sense virtual, body—thereby making it an imagined interoception.
In review, perception will in this treatise be understood to either be exteroceptive or interoceptive awareness which, by here utilized definition, will necessarily be constituted of sensory information—this irrespective of whether the perception is deemed to be the immediate result of sensory receptor’s interaction with stimuli or, as is the case with perceptual memories and imaginations, is not so deemed to be.
5.2. Sensory Awareness and Non-Sensory Awareness
Let sensory awareness as general concept be understood to encapsulate all experience consisting of sensory information—this where sensory information is understood to consist of either a) experience immediately obtained via one’s physiological senses or, else, b) all experiences that qualitatively resemble those immediately obtained via one’s physiological senses but are not so immediately obtained. Hence, as example, one could hold sensory awareness of a dog that is seen, heard, touched, and smelled and, though in qualitatively different manners, could also hold sensory awareness of the look, sound, tactile feel, and smell pertaining to a dog one imagines to be.
Sensory awareness will then constitute one of two general forms of awareness we as eidems are endowed with. The apprehension of givens via sensory awareness will, again, be here denoted as the general faculty of perception—such that one can visually perceive a non-imaginary dog just as one can, albeit in qualitatively different manners, perceive the visual remembrance of a particular dog.
In contrast to sensory awareness will be a second, generalized, experientially evidenced, form of awareness whose givens will not consist of sensory information—here specified as non-sensory awareness. For initial illustrative purposes, one’s awareness as an eidem of one’s own quality and degree of liking for some other person will be referenced. Although awareness of the other person’s body and bodily actions is perceptually gained, the quality and degree of liking for the other—if liking for the other is in any way experienced—is not, of itself, a) gained via physiological senses, b) gained via faculties apprehending givens of sensory information resembling those directly obtained via physiological senses, and, furthermore, c) lacks proper representation via sensory information (as one example, one cannot accurately draw one’s quality and degree of liking for another). Hence, awareness of the quality and degree of one’s liking for another—where the quality and degree of this experienced liking is itself the addressed given of which one is aware—can, again, illustrate one instance of one’s own non-sensory awareness.
Because percepts—i.e., object of awareness obtained via perception—will all consist of sensory information, one then cannot consistently specify one’s own liking to of itself be a percept. One’s own liking as that which one holds awareness of—i.e., as the object of one’s own awareness—will then be benefited by a different terminology.
So as to unambiguously specify objects of non-sensory awareness—here being partially guided by some of the colloquial uses of the term sense—objects of non-sensory awareness will in this treatise be deemed obtained by a process termed senception. This term is formed by conjoining a contraction of the Latin term sentiō—whose Latin meanings include “I notice mentally” and “I have an opinion” (as example of the latter, one senses that a belief X is true, thereby then being of the opinion that X is true)—with –ception, the latter being derived from the Latin term capiō, with the same application this Latin term holds for the term perception: as will be here utilized, primarily meaning “to obtain”.
Then, to specify specific objects of awareness that are obtained via senception, the term sencept (sencepts in plural) will be adopted.
The distinction between percepts and sencepts—which will be further expounded upon in the following sections—will itself then be benefited by some umbrella term via which both these objects of awareness can be addressed. For this purpose, the term cognitum (cognita in the plural) will be adopted. This term is the vocative neuter case of the Latin participle of cognitus—whose Latin meanings include “known via experience”—and is here merely a more concise way of referencing objects of awareness in general or, else expressed, of referencing any given which one as an eidem holds any awareness of—i.e., of referencing anything cognized. Hence, anything which one as eidem takes any notice of, anything which one cognizes, will be here specified as being one or more cognita.
5.3. An Overview of Our Four Modes of Awareness
In summary of what will be addressed, we as eidems experientially find ourselves endowed with two modes of perception; one unique mode of senception; and a particular mode of awareness, which can be both perceptual and senceptual, comprised of the eidem’s awareness of itself as eidem.
One mode of perception will consist of percepts (i.e., cognita of sensory awareness) that are tacitly or explicitly deemed by an eidem to immediately result from the physiological senses of its own body. This mode of awareness will be specified as physiologic.
A second mode of perception will consist of percepts that are tacitly or explicitly deemed by an eidem to not immediately result from the physiological senses of its own body, including things perceived while remembering, while willfully imagining, and while daydreaming. This mode of awareness will be specified as phainologic.
One mode of senception will consist of sencepts (i.e., cognita of non-sensory awareness) that are tacitly or explicitly deemed by an eidem to be other than itself as eidem. Relatively straightforward examples can include an eidem’s awareness of generalized ideas, of its own conscience, and of an item’s value. This mode of awareness will be specified as ennoologic.
Lastly, as a subcategory of both perceptions and senceptions in general, there will be found a mode of awareness that is comprised of cognita which are indifferentiable from the eidem itself at the moment(s) experienced—with examples including an eidem’s awareness of its own joy or sorrow and an eidem’s awareness of its own cognitive action of engaging in deliberations. This mode of awareness will be specified as autologic.
Hence, physiologic awareness, phainologic awareness, ennoologic awareness, and autologic awareness constitute the four modes of awareness which will be presented. Subsequent to their presentation, these four modes of awareness will be argued to be of epistemic certainty for all eidems here concerned.
Figure 5-1 presents an outline of the primary nomenclature that is to be used in relation to these four modes of awareness.
5.4. Physiological Awareness
The prefix physio- can denote nature or physicality. Physio-awareness can thereby connote awareness of givens immediately obtained via physical bodies’ interaction with physical stimuli. However, in part because physicality has not been demarcated at this stage of the treatise, this denotation will be currently avoided in favor of one which can be presently established with epistemic certainty:
Irrespective of one’s current opinions regarding physicality, it is experientially evidenced to those here concerned that we as eidems hold sensory awareness of what we discern to be our own living bodies—this via sight, touch, smell, and kinesthetic awareness, among other senses. Relative to all those concerned, because no justifiable alternative can be found to the occurrence of these experiences, the occurrence of these experiences will be of epistemic certainty to us. Moreover, it is experientially evidenced that we as eidems are aware of a disparity between percepts that to us seem immediately obtained via our bodies’ senses (such as is the case with the visual appearance of something we are looking at) and percepts that to us seem to not be immediately obtained via our bodies’ senses (such as the visual appearance of something we imagine or remember while our eyes are closed). Because no justifiable alternative can be found to the occurrence of this experienced disparity between a) percepts we discern to be immediately obtained via the workings of our bodies’ senses and b) percepts we discern to not be immediately obtained via the workings of our bodies’ senses, the occurrence of this experienced disparity shall then also be of epistemic certainty for us.
Physiology is commonly interpreted to regard the biological workings of living bodies. Hence, those cognita of sensory awareness which we tacitly or explicitly deem to be immediately obtained from the biological workings of our bodies’ senses will then be here specified as physiologic percepts. So as to optimally differentiate them from other cognita, physiologic percepts will in this treatise be more succinctly specified as physiocepts. The type of perception via which physiocepts are obtained will then be specified as physiologic perception or, more succinctly, physioception. The specific senses via which physioception operates (including our six physiological exteroceptions and various physiological interoceptions, such as that of proprioception) can then likewise be termed physiological senses or, more succinctly, physiosenses—such that one can address physiologic sight, physiologic smell, etc. (and thereby differentiate these from the means via which, for example, imagined sights, smells, etc., are gained). In categorizing modes of awareness, this general mode of awareness that makes use of physioception to obtain physiocepts via physiosenses will be termed physiological awareness or, more succinctly, physioawareness.
5.4.1. The Epistemic Certainty of Physioawareness
Relative to all those here concerned, because we all experience physiocepts (as differentiated from, for example, those percepts which we willfully imagine or recall), and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of the physioceptual experiences we have, our being endowed with the faculty of physioawareness will to us be of unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty.
5.4.2. Further Comments
It might be noteworthy that regardless of the hypothetical philosophical doubts some might entertain concerning whether—or else, the degree to which—physiopercepts are real, one’s immediate experience of physiocepts shall remain epistemically certain in that the very occurrence of these experiences will be found to lack justifiable alternatives by those who experience them. Again, for emphasis, this will be so irrespective of the ontological significance one ascribes to (or else hypothesizes in relation to) the occurrence of one’s physioawareness.
Also, tangentially, there can be inferred physiocepts obtained by the eidem’s total being of mind and body that are not obtained by the eidem itself. A common example of this is being awoken from sleep by a sufficiently loud noise, such as that produced by an alarm clock. While asleep, the eidem will not physioceive the given loud noise: in cases of dreamless sleep, no eidem will be; in cases in which dreams occur while asleep, the given eidem will not itself be experiencing physiocepts but will instead be experiencing awareness of dream states. Hence, here, the eidem does not—at least initially—physioceive the loud noise even though the loud noise as physiocept will be apprehended by the eidem’s total being of mind and body, thereby resulting in an awakening of the physioaware eidem. For the purposes of classification, such physiocepts that are deemed obtained by an eidem’s total being of mind and body but not by the eidem itself can be specified as paralogical physiocepts or, more succinctly, as paraphysiocepts. Subliminal messages not perceived by the eidem yet perceived by the eidem’s total being of mind and body, as well as certain instantiations of apperceptive agnosia wherein the eidem’s total being of mind and body perceives givens which the eidem does not, can serve to further illustrate paraphysiocepts.
5.5. Phainological Awareness
The prefix phaino- is adopted from the Ancient Greek term φαίνω (phaínō), which in one Ancient Greek sense can signify “I cause to appear.” A phainological percept or, more succinctly, a phainocept can then in part be interpreted to denote any percept whose manifestation is volitionally caused by the respective eidem; for example, that which one willfully imagines and which consists of sensory information will be here classified as phainological. Nevertheless, partly because denotations of causation have not been so far established within this treatise, and in greater part because phainocepts are here intended to convey a far broader significance than that just specified, phainocepts shall here be understood to signify all perceptual cognita that are tacitly or explicitly discerned by the respective eidem to not be immediately obtained from the workings of its physiological senses. More directly, phainocepts will be understood to encompass all percepts that are not physiological.
The faculty by which phainocepts are obtained will be specified as phainological perception or, more succinctly, phainoception. Hence, for example, an eidem’s perceptual awareness of an imagined tree will occur via the respective eidem’s phainoception—this, for example, in contrast to a tree that is physioceived by the same eidem.
As with physioception, phainoception can be experienced via multiple—here, non-physiological—sensory modalities. As examples, one can visually imagine a bird and thereby phainologically see it (colloquially, with the mind’s eye—rather than with one’s physiological eyes); one can auditorily imagine a bird’s chirp and thereby phainologically hear it (colloquially, by extension, with the mind’s ear—rather than with one’s physiological ears); one can tactilely imagine a bird’s feathers and thereby phainologically feel them (colloquially, by extension, with the mind’s skin—rather than with one’s physiological skin); and so forth. The degree of vividness to these different phainocepts makes no difference to the experientially evidenced reality that we are endowed with multiple non-physiological sensory modalities, or non-physiological senses, via which phainocepts can obtain. Then, to differentiate these from physiosenses, let the different senses via which phainocepts can obtain be termed phainological senses or, more succinctly, phainosenses. Hence, the visual appearance of an imagined bird will be seen via the eidem’s phainosense of sight (i.e., the eidem’s phaino-visual awareness); the imagined bird’s chirp will be heard via the eidem’s phainosense of sound (i.e., the eidem’s phaino-auditory awareness); the imagined feel of a bird’s feathers will be tactilely felt via the eidem’s phainosense of touch (i.e., the eidem’s phaino-tactile awareness); and so forth.
In categorizing modes of awareness, this general mode of awareness that makes use of phainoception to obtain phainocepts via phainosenses will be termed phainological awareness or, more succinctly, phainoawareness.
5.5.1. Examples of Phainoawareness
As a partial listing, phainoawareness can include the following: The inner voice with which one questions and deliberates will be constituted of perceptual cognita (namely, auditory percepts) that are tacitly or explicitly deemed to not result from one’s physiosense of sound, and will thereby constitute one form of phainoawareness. All memories that take on a perceptual form will be deemed either tacitly or explicitly to be phainologically perceived by oneself as eidem via any number of phainological senses—but not via physioception, which is immediately obtained via one’s physiological senses—thereby making our perceptual apprehension of memories another form of phainoawareness. An eidem’s perception of basic and perfectly formed geometric shapes—such as of an ideal circle or triangle—will likewise consist of perceptual cognita (namely, visual percepts) that are deemed to not be immediately obtained via one’s physiological senses—and, thereby, in consisting of phainocepts, will likewise be a form of phainoawareness. One will likewise perceptually apprehend one’s own daydreams via phainoawareness. The sights, sounds, smells, tastes, etc., experienced while reading a fiction; the perceptual awareness of one’s own fantasies; and all otherwise not addressed non-physiological percepts will likewise constitute forms of phainoawareness. Such other types of phainocepts will, then, include all percepts experienced as being non-physiological by some during altered states of consciousness (be these experiences the result of meditation, the result of what some deem to be spiritual ecstasies, the result of psychedelic drugs, or the like).
It is emphasized that, while all perceptually imagined givens will be phainological, not all phainological cognita will be imaginary: for example, one can imagine some perceptual memory (of something never before experienced), but this ability does not imply that one's real perceptual memories of givens previously physioceived are imaginary. Furthermore, while all perceptually imagined givens will be phainological, not all imaginary givens will be perceptual: for example, one can imagine what it would have been like to have intended something other than what one once intended; however—as will be elaborated upon in §5.7.1—intentions do not of themselves consist of sensory information and, hence, cannot be perceptual; hence, when so imagining possible former intentions, the imagined intentions will not of themselves be phainological.
5.5.2. The Epistemic Certainty of Phainoawareness
The occurrence of just one type of phainoawareness in all eidems here concerned will be sufficient to obtain the epistemic certainty that all eidems here concerned are endowed with the general faculty of phainoawareness.
To this effect, relative to all those here concerned, because we all can perceptually apprehend at least some past events through which we lived (which we once physioceived, but which we no longer physioceive), because our perceptual awareness of these memories will thereby not be physiologic but phainologic, and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences, our being endowed with the faculty of phainoawareness will to us be of unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty.
5.5.3. Further Comments
Hallucinations and illusion regarding the physical world will not be properly classified phainological, for these will not be discerned at the time experienced to be phainological by the eidems so experiencing them—these will, instead, be experienced to be physiological at the moment(s) experienced. Such hallucinations and illusions will then constitute forms of what in this treatise will be classified as false cognita, and will thereby be termed pseudological cognita or, more succinctly, pseudocognita. Pseudocognita can then further include hallucinatory phainocepts (such as when a phainological, inner voice is falsely discerned to pertain to some supernatural being)—this standing in contrast to hallucinatory physiocepts (wherein, for example, an eidem can falsely physiologically hear voices that in fact do not occur in the physical world)—as well as including delusions (which, due to being comprised of false beliefs, will arguably consist of false sencepts rather than false percepts).
Likewise here noted, percepts which the eidem obtains during its dreams of sleep—in contrast to daydreams, for one example—will also be differentiated from phainocepts within this treatise. This treatise will then classify the former as somniological cognita or, more succinctly, somniocognita.
Lastly here mentioned for the sake of a more comprehensive appraisal, were out of body perceptual experiences to be considered real, such non-pseudological experiences would themselves be phainological. Moreover, were incorporeal beings (e.g., deities, angels, or ghosts) to be considered real, their own incorporeal perceptions (be it of the physical world and its givens or of themselves and the so-termed spiritual realms they inhabit) would likewise be properly classified as phainological—this due to entailment of such not being endowed with physiological bodies via which physioception could occur.
5.6. Ennoological Awareness
The prefix ennoo- has been adopted from the Greek verb εννοώ (ennoó)—here in the sense of “to mean, to signify” and “to understand”—with its morphology consisting of εν- (“in”) + νοώ (“think, understand”).
Objects of awareness termed ennoologic will be here defined as non-sensory cognita (i.e., sencepts) that, at the moment of their obtainment, are tacitly or explicitly discerned to be other than the eidem which obtains them by the eidem which obtains them. Ennoologic objects of awareness can be further specified as ennoologic sencepts or, more succinctly, as ennoocepts. The process of their obtainment can be specified as ennoologic senception or, more succinctly, ennooception. And ennoologic awareness can be more succinctly termed ennooawareness.
Apprehended concepts, awareness of one’s conscience, and the apprehended value of items can each serve to exemplify ennoocepts in relatively straightforward manners. Likewise, the faculty of understanding can, at least in certain cases, exemplify one specific form of ennooception. Each of these will next be briefly elaborated upon.
What abstractions are is currently a contentious subject within fields of philosophy. To minimize the potential for ambiguity, concepts—here understood in the strict sense of generalized ideas—will be addressed instead. When thus understood as generalized ideas, concepts of which we are aware will be cognita that cannot be fully, and thereby accurately, represented by a singular percept—this if the concept in question can in fact hold any perceptual examples. For instance, the concept of animal—which can hold a plethora of perceptual examples—shall commonly be deemed to minimally encompass mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and insects. In order to provide an accurate demarcation of the concept animal via a singular percept, a perceptual representation of each type of animal the concept encompasses would need to manifest at the same time and in the same respect—but so attempting to depict would entail contradictory perceptual properties manifesting within a singular percept. For example, a percept which has four legs, two legs, and no legs—among other quantities of legs—at the same time and in the same respect would need to be perceived in order for one’s cognizance of the one concept of animal to be perceptual. However, no one here concerned is capable of experiencing a percept with such contradictory perceptual properties. Furthermore, each specific type of animal encompassed by the concept of animal would itself, as a narrower concept, be in need of being perceptually represented via all varieties that can occur within that particular type of animal, this for its accurate demarcation as concept to obtain via a singular percept—again entailing percepts of contradictory perceptual properties. For example, a cat that is both long haired and short haired, that is both large and small, that is both fully white and not fully white, this is both fat and lean, etc., would need to be perceptually apprehended at the same time and in the same respect via a singular percept that would thereby accurately demarcate the concept of cat. However, again, no one here concerned will be capable of obtaining a percept with such contradictory perceptual properties.
Alternatively appraised, any particular percept, be it physiological or phainological, will hold specific perceptual properties: for example, a seen tree and a visually imagined tree will each hold some specific form—be it that of a pine tree, an oak tree, a fern tree, or some other—some specific color to things such as stem or trunk and leaves, some particular girth and height, etc. The very nature of generalized ideas, however, precludes that the cognita in question be comprised of particular perceptual qualities: Being generalized, the generalized idea shall by its very nature encompass a multitude of otherwise specific perceptual properties while not being itself defined by the properties of any one particular percept. Hence, for example, the generalized idea of tree shall encompass pine tree forms, oak tree forms, fern tree forms, and fruit tree forms of various hues and sizes while not being defined by any specific perceptual property that applies to any particular example.
Then, relative to all those here concerned, because no concept (no generalized idea) can be accurately depicted via the specific perceptual properties of any one percept; and because we do not cognize concepts by perceiving all the perceptual examples they encompass at the same time and in the same respect (given that the concept can hold the capacity of being perceptually exemplified); it is thereby evidenced that our awareness of generalized ideas—i.e. of concepts thus understood—will not of itself be perceptual. Because our awareness of concepts will not of itself be perceptual, it will instead be properly classified senceptual.
Because we will tacitly, if not explicitly, deem the concepts we cognize to be other than ourselves as the eidems which so cognize concepts, our awareness of these concepts we differentiate from ourselves as eidems will then be ennoologic. This thereby signifies that those concepts we cognize as other relative to us as eidems at any given moment will to us be ennoocepts.
It might be worth rearticulating that unlike the concept of animal, which holds a plethora of perceptual examples, some concepts will not hold easily recognized perceptual exemplifications, if any; these, for example, include the concepts of progress, of arbitrariness, and the very concept of concepts.
5.6.2. One’s Conscience
Awareness of one’s conscience will comprise awareness of what one’s conscience informs one as an eidem to be appropriate. At times, for some, this awareness might take on the phainological properties of one’s inner voice. At other times, this awareness of what one’s conscience conveys to oneself as an eidem will occur strictly via means not constituted of sensory information. In such latter cases, one as eidem does not phainologically hear one’s conscience—nor, for that matter, does one perceive one’s conscience via sight, smell, touch, taste, proprioception, or any of the other perceptual senses. In such latter cases, then, awareness of one’s own conscience will be fully non-perceptual, instead being strictly senceptual.
Furthermore, whenever one senceives one’s conscience, one will senceive intentions that stand apart from, and are thereby other than, those which one as eidem momentarily entertains. Awareness of one’s conscience will thereby be constituted from an awareness of intentions that are momentarily other in relation to one’s own momentarily entertained intentions as an eidem. Because of this, one’s conscience will be tacitly, if not explicitly, discerned by oneself as eidem to not be identical to oneself as eidem.
Therefore, in cases where one is aware of one’s own conscience strictly via non-perceptual means, awareness of one’s own conscience will strictly occur via faculties of ennooception—with one’s conscience as object of awareness being an ennoocept (rather than either a physiocept or phainocept).
5.6.3. An Item’s Value
Value can hold multiple related meanings. For the purposes of this chapter, let an item’s value be tentatively understood to be the cognized notion of the item’s benefit to some party. Hence, if A’s held notion is that X is of great benefit to A, A will then maintain X to be of great value to A. Likewise, if A’s held notion is that X is of great benefit to some other party B, A will then maintain X to be of great value to B.
Thus understood, value can either be inferred by an eidem via deliberation or, else, can be immediately cognized by an eidem in non-deliberative manners. In the latter case, one simply senses the value of some given. This section will strictly addressed the cognizing of an item’s value in manners devoid of the respective eidem’s deliberation.
To commence via an example, a person comes across a painting in a store and immediately cognizes its value to be greater than that of a statue placed next to it—this despite both items being of the same asking price—for to him the painting is more aesthetic than the statue. The person so cognizes the value of the painting relative to the statue while being joyous on account of recent news regarding a likely promotion at work. Shortly thereafter in the same store, the person is informed by phone call that he has not been given the promotion and becomes upset. Despite the differences in introspective awareness of bodily states of being—this relative to the time he was joyous and the time he is upset—the person yet finds the same value to the painting in relation to the statue. Here, the cognized value of the painting in relation to the statue is removed from, and thereby occurs independently of, the person’s cognized interoceptions of his own bodily states of being.
Furthering the example, the store manager eventually informs the person that while the statue is the genuine work of a renowned artist, the painting was haphazardly composed by the sore manager’s preadolescent child who has since then never touched a paintbrush. Upon so learning, the person then finds his initially held value of the two items to now be reversed—such that he now cognizes the statue to be of greater value that the painting—this on account of the now projected future monetary returns that can be gained by reselling each. However, despite this inversion of cognized value, he nevertheless sees the same perceptual properties in the painting and statue which he first saw: the painting remains of the same colors and forms while the statue remains of the same shape and height, and so forth. Therefore, in this case, the cognized value of the painting in relation to the statue is obtained independently of the perceptual attributes the two items are cognized to hold.
In all cases resembling that just mentioned, the cognized value of items will not be obtained either via one’s interoceptive or exteroceptive senses—and will thereby not be perceptual (as perception has been defined in this chapter)—this despite one’s cognition of the items in question being perceptual. Expressed in greater detail, in cases resembling that just exemplified, one does not obtain a cognizance of an item’s value via interoceptive perceptions—for the cognized value of items can at times remain unchanged despite drastic changes in one’s interoceptive percepts. Likewise in such cases, were the cognized value of items to change over time, this change of cognized value will not be the result of corresponding changes in the perceptual properties of the items one perceives via exteroception—for the perceptual properties of the items in question shall remain unchanged despite changes in their appraised value.
Furthermore, the quality and degree of value which one cognizes an item to hold will not be something that can be represented via sensory information: As one example of this, one cannot depict via any visual illustration the quality and degree of value which an item is cognized to hold, for the cognized value’s quality and degree will have no given look. In cases such as that previously exemplified, neither will the cognized value’s quality and degree have a given sound, smell, tactile feel, taste, vestibular property, nor any particular interoceptive attribute (such that the cognized value’s quality and degree is necessarily conjoined to one or more particular interoceptive perceptions).
Due to this, it is concluded that at least in some cases, the cognized value of certain items shall not, as a cognitum of value, be constituted of sensory information.
This then entails that in at least some cases, the cognized value of an item will not of itself be a percept (although the item in question to which this value pertains will be perceptual). Notwithstanding, since one cognizes the item’s respective value, the value in question shall be a given which one as eidem is aware of. In so being, the value of an item will, as value, again be a cognitum. Hence, in all cases where the cognitum of value is not perceptual, it will then instead be senceptual: thereby being a sencept, rather than a percept.
Because the sencept of a perceived item’s value will be tacitly, if not also explicitly, discerned to be an attribute of the item in question—rather than an attribute of the respective eidem’s momentary being—the sencept of an item’s value will moreover be ennoological: for it will be other than the eidem which cognizes it.
Hence, in all cases where an item’s value is senceptually apprehended by an eidem, the given value as cognitum will be an ennoocept.
5.6.4. Conceptual Understanding
For the purposes of this chapter, let conceptual understanding be defined as an eidem’s awareness of the concepts which percepts convey.
It will be observed that linguistic signs—i.e., the visual, auditory, or (in the case of braille) tactile percepts via which linguistic concepts are conveyed—are not the only percepts which can convey concepts. As one example of this, under certain conditions the color red can to people of western cultures signify, and thereby convey the concept of, love (as in a red rose or a red heart) and, under other conditions, the concept of rage (as in the expression of “seeing red”)—this possibly due to the color’s association with blood and, by extension, passion (as the color red can be found to generally signify in the expression, “painting the town red”). In contrast, the color blue—commonly associated with endless sky and large bodies of water—can signify tranquil calmness, can alternatively signify cold indifference, and, likely by extension, can likewise signify being of an aristocratic standing in the expression “blue blood,” or in a state of passionless sorrow, as in the expressions “being blue” and that of “having the blues”.
Then, for example, in apprehending that a red colored rose can signify love, one here holds awareness of the concept love which, though conveyed by a visually perceived item, nevertheless is of itself as concept not perceptual but senceptual. Expressed in greater detail, the concept of love which is conveyed by a red colored rose is not the visual percept itself but, instead, will be a generalized idea that, as such, can hold no accurate representation via any particular percept—being, instead, an ennoocept. Therefore, one’s apprehension that the red rose one for example gave, or else received, on a first date was intended to convey the concept of love will be an apprehension of ennoocepts that were intended to be conveyed via particular perceptual givens. This awareness of the concept of love which is conveyed by a red colored rose—because it will be one or more eidems’ awareness of concepts which percepts convey—will, then, take the form of conceptual understanding.
The same relation between ennoocepts and percepts can be applied to linguistic signs, such as that of “love” as a perceived linguistic sign: While the sign “love” will be a percept and thereby perceptually apprehended, the concept one understands by perceiving the linguistic sign of “love” will be an ennoocept that one ennooceives. One’s ennooawareness of the concept of love which is conveyed by the perceived linguistic sign “love” will then, as ennooawareness, take the specific form of conceptual understanding. Hence, one conceptually understands by the written linguistic sign of “love” the concept of love which one ennoologically apprehends.
In short, when one is aware of concepts conveyed by percepts, because these concepts will be senceptual rather than perceptual, and because these sencepts will be other relative to the eidem which is so aware of them, one will then be actively utilizing a particular form of ennooception in grasping these concepts. This particular form of ennooception that grasps concepts via the apprehension of percepts will then be that of conceptual understanding.
In review, conceptual understanding will exemplify one particular type of ennooception—this instead of perception, be the latter either physiological or phainological.
5.6.5. The Epistemic Certainty of Ennooawareness
The occurrence of just one specific form of ennooawareness in all eidems here concerned will be sufficient to obtain the epistemic certainty that all eidems here concerned are endowed with a general faculty of ennooawareness.
To this effect, relative to all those here concerned, because we can all apprehend generalized ideas, such as the generalized idea of idea; because (as was evidenced in §5.6.1) we cannot accurately experience any generalized idea we cognize, and are thereby aware of, to of itself be a particular instantiation of sensory information and, therefore, a particular percept; because many of the generalized ideas we cognize are experienced to be differentiable from—and thereby other relative to—ourselves as the eidems which so cognize generalized ideas; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences; our being endowed with the general faculty of ennooawareness will to us be of unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty.
5.6.6. Further Comments
It can be observed that most, if not all, percepts of which we as adult human eidems become aware will be entwined with sencepts: While some ennoocepts can be apprehended in manners devoid of respective sensory information (awareness of one’s conscience’ intentions as example), most, if not all, percepts of which we as eidems become aware shall be minimally entwined with 1) one’s conceptual understanding of what one is perceiving which, as conceptual understanding, will be senceptual—such as when one understands that what is being seen is (one example of) a tree (as generalized idea) when looking at something with a wooden trunk from which branches stem—and 2) a senceptual awareness of the given’s value to oneself—this where its value is understood as the degree to which it is of benefit to oneself, detrimental to oneself, of mixed importance to oneself, or of neutral importance to oneself.
Differently expressed, it can well be argued that if a percept is in any way meaningful to us, the percept's meaning will be a senception embedded within the percept as an intrinsic property of our so perceiving the percept.
In short—while we can experience sencepts not entwined with percepts, such as with our experiencing of our own conscience—most, if not all, percepts we experience will arguably be entwined with sencepts as intrinsic aspects of that which we perceive.
5.7. Autological Awareness
The prefix auto- has been adopted from the Ancient Greek αὐτός (autós), with the meaning of “self”. As the prefix will be here employed, it will strictly reference the respective eidem—but will not reference the respective eidem’s body (which the eidem can discern via its physioawareness) nor will it reference the respective eidem’s mind (which the eidem can discern via its phainologic and ennoologic awareness).
An autological cognitum will then be that of which an eidem is noninferentially aware which, as cognitum, pertains to the very eidem which is directly aware of the given cognitum. Differently expressed, an autological cognitum will be that which an eidem is directly aware of in its momentary self-referential awareness of itself as eidem.
For any autological cognitum, then, at the moment(s) the autological cognitum is experienced, there will not be experientially found any duality between the subject of awareness (the eidem) and the autological object of awareness (the autological cognitum) of which the subject of awareness is aware.
To illustrate this, if one as eidem experientially knows oneself as eidem to be cheerful, one as eidem will experientially know this via a self-referential awareness of so being cheerful as eidem. One’s self-referential awareness of being cheerful as an eidem shall then be one’s awareness as an eidem of an autological cognitum—namely, the cognitum of being cheerful as an eidem. Here, then, there will be found no experienced duality between the eidem which is self-referentially aware of being cheerful (this being the subject of awareness) and the state of being cheerful which pertains to the same eidem aware of so being (this being the autological object of awareness). The eidem’s state of being momentarily cheerful is not something that the eidem apprehends or grasps but, instead, is what the eidem momentarily is and, in so being, is what the respective eidem autologically cognizes itself to momentarily be.
It is emphasized that, because of the lack of experienced duality between the eidem and its autological cognita, and because apprehension denotes a duality between that which apprehends and that which is apprehended, no autological cognitum will be properly expressed as being apprehended (or grasped) by an eidem. Instead, in keeping with the definitions so far provided, one as eidem can be expressed to obtain some particular autological cognitum—i.e., to obtain some particular state of being which is experientially known to oneself via autological awareness.
It will be found that autological cognita can obtain via interoceptive perceptions—such as with awareness of being physically tired as an eidem, this being an awareness obtained via one’s physiological interoception of one’s own body—or, else, via purely senceptual means—such as with autological awareness of being of a clear conscience as an eidem, wherein one’s own clear conscience as an eidem is the autological cognitum one is autologically aware of. (For emphasis, such autologically senceived clear conscience can manifest irrespective of one’s interoceptive perceptions. For example, one can autologically know oneself to be of clear conscience despite also being in extreme physiological pain as a result of physical retaliation for having told some truth). For brevity of expression, regardless of how they are obtained, autological cognita will be more succinctly specified as autocepts. Where needed, autocepts can then be qualified as either perceptual or senceptual. Likewise for brevity of expression, the obtainment of autocepts will be herein succinctly specified as autoception—such that an eidem will autoceive its given autocept. Lastly, autological awareness can be more succinctly termed autoawareness—such that “an eidem’s being autoaware of X” and “an eidem’s autoceiving X” will be fully interchangeable phrases.
An eidem’s awareness of its own intentions and of the transient emotive states in which it finds itself to be can exemplify facets of an eidem’s autoawareness. Both these examples of autoawareness will next be briefly attended.
5.7.1. An Eidem's Intentions
Regardless of the ontological properties one might ascribe to one’s faculty of volition—such as that of volition being fully illusory on grounds of causal determinism or, else, of it not so being—we experientially find ourselves capable of discerning between what are for us voluntary and involuntary acts.
To address one example of this, if one as eidem intends to express the concept of up and says the term “up” one will discern oneself as eidem to engage in a voluntary act—and the speech outcome will be discerned to be the result of one’s own volition as eidem. If, however, one as eidem intends to express the concept of up and says the term “down”, one as eidem will at such juncture discern one’s saying “down” to be an involuntarily produced outcome—one that thereby does not directly result from one’s volition as eidem. In this example of speech, the primary distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts will involve one’s intentions as eidem regarding what is to be said: if what is said is accordant to one’s intentions, what is said will be deemed a voluntary outcome relative to one’s own volition as eidem; and if what is said is discordant to one’s intentions, it will be deemed an involuntary outcome relative to one’s own volition as eidem. Hence, when one intends to say “up” but instead says “down” (and furthermore recognizes the disparity between what was intended to be said and what was in fact said upon so saying) one will then experientially know that what was said was not what one as eidem intended to say.
Of primary import in this is that, in addition to the outcomes of speech which we apprehend via our physioception, we as eidems also hold a distinct awareness of what we as eidems intend (such that we can become aware of when our spoken words are accordant to our intentions and of when they are not). Our own intentions, then, will of themselves be cognita of which we are aware.
Firstly, an eidem’s intention will not of itself consist of sensory information—neither physiological nor phainological. Our intention of, for example, saying “up” rather than “down” does not result from any particular interoceptive perception of our body’s states of being of which we as eidems are aware. One could be fatigued or energetic, thirsty or quenched, in a state of physical comfort or in a state of intense physical pain, and so forth, without any of these interoceptions playing a role in one’s cognizance of one’s own intention to say “up” rather than “down”. Hence, because our experientially known intentions as eidems are not discerned by us to consist of any sensory information of which we are aware, they will not be classified to be percepts but, instead, sencepts.
More importantly, any intention we are senceptually aware of momentary having will not to us be differentiable from ourselves as eidems at the moment(s) these intentions are engaged in. For instance, one’s current, momentary intention to read the entirety of this sentence (if held) will not be something that in any way stands apart from oneself as eidem. Because the eidem (the subject of awareness) and its own momentary intention(s) (the cognita which it is here aware of) are found to not stand apart in any way (to not hold an experientially evidenced duality) by the very eidem to which the intentions pertain, the cognita of one’s own momentary intentions as eidem will then be classified autological. Otherwise expressed, the momentary intention(s) one as eidem engages in will be autoceived by oneself as eidem, and will thereby be one’s momentary autocept(s). Yet differently expressed, one will be autoaware of one’s own momentarily intentions as an eidem.
An eidem’s autoceived intentions will then be experienced as standing apart from, for examples, the intentions it senceives to result from what it conceptualizes to be its conscience. This such that while an eidem’s intentions to, for example, take a shortcut will be autological, its conscience’s simultaneously present intentions that the shortcut should not be taken will at the moments experienced be non-autological relative to the eidem—instead being ennoological relative to the eidem which is so aware of its conscience via these ennooceived intentions.
5.7.2. An Eidem’s Transient States of Emotive Being
When one is either happy or sad as an eidem, one will know this—not via one’s conceptual inferences regarding what one’s momentary emotive state of being as an eidem is—but via one’s direct awareness of what one’s own emotive state of being as eidem momentarily is. When one is for example sad, one is aware of one’s own momentary emotive state of being with no duality between oneself as eidem and the emotive state of being one is aware of momentarily undergoing. Because of this, the emotive state of being one is momentarily aware of undergoing will be classified as an autocept which one as eidem autoceives. Hence, when one is sad, the (autological) sorrow experienced will be the very autocept which one as eidem is autoaware of momentarily being.
In like manner, when one as eidem is angry or calm, confident or unsure, hopeful or pessimistic, not attracted or attracted, and so forth, these transient, emotive states of being will be known to oneself via ones autoawareness of one’s own state of being as eidem. Furthermore, as example, the autocept of one’s own anger as eidem will differ from the autocept of one’s own calmness as eidem—although one will deem oneself to be the same eidem which has previously autologically experienced both these autocepts.
So understanding the autological experiences of an eidem will then minimally hold the following outcome: There can be found a qualitative distinction between autological emotions one experiences (such that these directly pertain to one’s momentary constituency as eidem) and the non-autological emotions which one experiences (such that these do not directly pertain to one’s momentary constituency as eidem but, instead, to one’s total being of mind and body which one as eidem apprehends, this either perceptually or in solely senceptual manners). As one example of this, one as eidem can autoceive oneself as eidem to be envious—in which case one as eidem will behave in envious manners without qualms on the part of oneself as eidem in so doing: for, again, one at such junctures will simply be envious as an eidem. Here, then, the envy one experiences will be autological—for it will momentarily be indifferentiable from the eidem which is (autologically) aware of so being. In contrast to this, one as eidem can experience pangs of envy which one as eidem disavows on the grounds of being improper—in which case one will at such junctures not be envious as an eidem but, instead, will as eidem be in emotive states of being which are opposed to the pangs of envy one experiences within one’s total being of mind and body. Then, in this latter case, the envy one experiences will not be autological—for it will be differentiable from the eidem which is aware of it: it will instead be experienced as something other than oneself as the eidem which actively denounces the pangs of envy one experiences within one’s total being of mind and body.
We can linguistically express our autological states of being via expressions of what we (momentarily) are; in the example of envy, one can thereby express, “I am envious”. In contrast, those emotions pertaining to our total being of mind and body which we apprehend but do not autologically hold can be linguistically expressed as what we as eidems feel (in non-tactile manners) ourselves (as total beings of mind and body) to be. Hence, in the example of envy, one can thereby express, “I (as eidem) feel myself (as total being of mind and body) being envious (but might or might not be envious as eidem while so apprehending pangs of envy within me as total being of body and mind).” Whereas the expression, “I am envious,” makes it clear that the eidem in question is itself envious and autoaware of so being, the expression of, “I feel myself being envious,” or, more succinctly, "I feel envious," leaves the eidem's emotive state of being open-ended, this while making it clear that the same eidem apprehends envy within its total being of mind and body. Whereas what the eidem momentarily is will be autological, what the same eidem momentarily apprehends as pangs of envy affecting it as eidem will, relative to the eidem in question, not be autological.
In review of this section, where there are emotions experienced by an eidem such that the eidem cannot differentiate between the experienced emotion and its own momentary self as eidem, these emotions will be classified as autocepts of which the respective eidem is autoaware.
5.7.3. The Epistemic Certainty of Autoawareness
The occurrence of just one specific form of autoawareness in all eidems here concerned will be sufficient to obtain the epistemic certainty that all eidems here concerned are endowed with a general faculty of autoawareness.
To this effect, relative to all those here concerned, because we can be aware of the intentions we momentarily engage in (such that we can discern, for example, voluntary outcomes of speech from involuntary outcomes of speech via our awareness of our own momentary intentions as eidems), because we do not experience any differentiation between ourselves as eidems and the momentarily intentions we engage in as eidems, and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences, our being endowed with the general faculty of autoawareness will to us be of unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty.
5.7.4. Further Comments
Arguably, autological awareness might upon further enquiry be discovered to be the most difficult mode of awareness to properly conceptualize—this relative to the other three modes of awareness aforementioned. As one reason for this, autoawareness will not be ennoological, though our conceptualizations of it shall be ennoological. This complexity of autoawareness can in part be further illustrated by the following: One as eidem can recall previously experienced autocepts—such that one’s momentarily enactive autoception includes awareness of a previously lived through autoception and, potentially, an autological cognizance that the recalled autocept is not the momentarily enactive autocept (e.g., such as when recalling one’s previously engaged in intentions via one’s momentarily enactive intentions with awareness that one’s momentarily enactive intentions are not identical to those previously lived through).
Notwithstanding these and other complexities to autoawareness—and as was the case with physioawareness, phainoawareness, and ennooawareness—here is not intended a comprehensive enquiry into the mode of awareness addressed but, instead, solely a preliminary evidencing that the respective mode of awareness’s occurrence is of epistemic certainty to all those here concerned.
5.8. Concluding Remarks
Although the examples so far provided for our four modes of awareness are by no means comprehensive, this chapter has served to evidence the following: Relative to all those here concerned, it is epistemically certain that we are minimally endowed with the four modes of awareness here termed physioawareness, phainoawareness, ennooawareness, and autoawareness.
Entailed in this epistemic certainty is the epistemic certainty that we can hold perceptual awareness just as we can hold strictly senceptual awareness.
These epistemic certainties will next be used to obtain an epistemic certainty of the three strata of awareness from which our cognizance is comprised.
- Rosen, Gideon, "Abstract Objects", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/abstract-objects/>.