By my own appraisals, the paramount topic of this treatise is its value theory—which thereby incorporates meta-ethical appraisals of good and bad among myriad other values.
To obtain certainties of optimal strength concerning value, Volume One’s themes of awareness, will, and mind will be essential prerequisites. Likewise will be required Volume Two’s metaphysical appraisals of formal determinacy and objectivity.
Once this treatise' value theory is obtained within Volume Two, Volume Three then addresses some of the consequences resulting from all that was previously established.
Briefly expressed, the philosophy here espoused is one of non-physicalism which, nevertheless, gives justifications for objective physicality—such that metaphysically free will is deemed compatible with an imperfect form of causal determinism to which it is bound. The philosophy might be construed as a form of objective idealism or, alternatively, as a form of neutral monism yet, irrespective of this, facilitates the possibility of a non-Cartesian duality between awareness per se and the information from which both mind and matter are alike composed.