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Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions: Difference between revisions

(Created page with " This chapter investigates conceivable ultimate telostases to the prototelos, which are to be termed ''teleions''. It will be upheld as unfalsifiedly certain that only the five teleions to be here specified can be validly conceptualized by anyone here concerned—thereby making these five teleions collectively exhaustive. Four of these will address the ultimate syntelostasis of the prototelos, which by entailment will be an eventual outcome in which absolutely no dystel...")
 
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Hence, a) if neither physicalism nor materialism depicts that which in fact is ontically certain and b) it is nevertheless ontically certain that the protocept sans allocepts cannot in any way occur, hence be, then the nonmaterialistic nihilon will by entailment be ontically certain were all allocepts to cease occurring. This scenario of nonmaterialistic nihilonism too cannot currently be evidenced incorrect with epistemic certainty.
Hence, a) if neither physicalism nor materialism depicts that which in fact is ontically certain and b) it is nevertheless ontically certain that the protocept sans allocepts cannot in any way occur, hence be, then the nonmaterialistic nihilon will by entailment be ontically certain were all allocepts to cease occurring. This scenario of nonmaterialistic nihilonism too cannot currently be evidenced incorrect with epistemic certainty.


The possibility of the nonmaterialistic nihilon will be further addressed in §14.2.1.4.1.1.
The possibility of the nonmaterialistic nihilon will be further addressed in [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4.1.1. As Intention-Devoid (aka, Static), as Non-Spatiotemporally Intentioning (aka, Dynamic), or as Absolute Nonbeing (aka, Nihilonic)|§14.2.1.4.1.1]].


==== 14.2.1.1.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion ====
==== 14.2.1.1.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion ====
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Due to the aforementioned, whether the nihilon is the euteleion or else a pseudoteleion currently remains less than unfalsifiedly certain and, hence, cannot be demonstrated with infallible certainty.
Due to the aforementioned, whether the nihilon is the euteleion or else a pseudoteleion currently remains less than unfalsifiedly certain and, hence, cannot be demonstrated with infallible certainty.


It is to be noted that the materialistic nihilon, were it to be the euteleion, would necessarily be personal—rather than necessarily being globally applicable by entailment. However, the nonmaterialistic nihilon, as it will be addressed in §14.2.1.4.1.1 and were it to be the euteleion, will in contrast necessarily be globally applicable by entailment.
It is to be noted that the materialistic nihilon, were it to be the euteleion, would necessarily be personal—rather than necessarily being globally applicable by entailment. However, the nonmaterialistic nihilon, as it will be addressed in [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4.1.1. As Intention-Devoid (aka, Static), as Non-Spatiotemporally Intentioning (aka, Dynamic), or as Absolute Nonbeing (aka, Nihilonic)|§14.2.1.4.1.1]] and were it to be the euteleion, will in contrast necessarily be globally applicable by entailment.


Furthermore, were the materialistic nihilon to be the valid euteleion, then all other conceivable teleions yet to be specified would then by entailment be necessary pseudoteleions. Why these same pseudoteleions should then at all occur—or, for that matter, why anyone should then hold any trepidation regarding the actualized nihilon—will, within any system of materialistic nihilonism, remain unexplainable in full given the strict set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this treatise.
Furthermore, were the materialistic nihilon to be the valid euteleion, then all other conceivable teleions yet to be specified would then by entailment be necessary pseudoteleions. Why these same pseudoteleions should then at all occur—or, for that matter, why anyone should then hold any trepidation regarding the actualized nihilon—will, within any system of materialistic nihilonism, remain unexplainable in full given the strict set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this treatise.
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Unlike with the materialistic nihilon (or any system of nihilonism wherein the nihilon is immediately obtained upon one’s corporeal death) and the permanon, the turannon can only be a globally manifesting synteleion: In order to be actualized by any one eidem, everything other relative to the eidem will need to conform to the given eidem’s will in absolute manners—hence entailing that the cosmos in full together with all aspects of it regardless of how miniscule be fully conformant to that which the turannon-actualized eidem desires them to be. This, in turn, necessitates that the turannon, where it to be a valid euteleion, can only be globally manifesting. For one example, were there to hypothetically only be two equally turannon-proximate eidems that in any way interact, neither eidem would obtain a synteleion wherein all of its dystelostases completely cease; then, for the turannon as eusynteleion to be obtained, one of the two given eidems would need to conquer the other in manner that allow it to actualize the turannon at the expense of all the other’s proximity to the turannon.
Unlike with the materialistic nihilon (or any system of nihilonism wherein the nihilon is immediately obtained upon one’s corporeal death) and the permanon, the turannon can only be a globally manifesting synteleion: In order to be actualized by any one eidem, everything other relative to the eidem will need to conform to the given eidem’s will in absolute manners—hence entailing that the cosmos in full together with all aspects of it regardless of how miniscule be fully conformant to that which the turannon-actualized eidem desires them to be. This, in turn, necessitates that the turannon, where it to be a valid euteleion, can only be globally manifesting. For one example, were there to hypothetically only be two equally turannon-proximate eidems that in any way interact, neither eidem would obtain a synteleion wherein all of its dystelostases completely cease; then, for the turannon as eusynteleion to be obtained, one of the two given eidems would need to conquer the other in manner that allow it to actualize the turannon at the expense of all the other’s proximity to the turannon.


Also—in stark contrast to the apeiroson, which, as another globally applicable synteleion, can only take a singular global form (see §14.2.1.4 for more information regarding this)—the turannon’s actualization can take an indefinite number of forms, each of these being fully contingent on the character traits and respective whims of the specific eidem which would actualize the turannon as synteleion. Otherwise expressed, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, benevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively benevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. On the other hand, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, malevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively malevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. Because of this, each hypothesized turannonist’s ultimate ideal of an actualized turannon will entail a resulting cosmos as unique as is the individual eidem which so intends—thereby further entailing one of an indefinite number of different possible cosmoses upon the turannon’s actualization and, thereby, an indefinite quantity of forms that the actualized turannon could itself take.
Also—in stark contrast to the apeiroson, which, as another globally applicable synteleion, can only take a singular global form (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4. The Apeiroson|§14.2.1.4]] for more information regarding this)—the turannon’s actualization can take an indefinite number of forms, each of these being fully contingent on the character traits and respective whims of the specific eidem which would actualize the turannon as synteleion. Otherwise expressed, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, benevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively benevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. On the other hand, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, malevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively malevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. Because of this, each hypothesized turannonist’s ultimate ideal of an actualized turannon will entail a resulting cosmos as unique as is the individual eidem which so intends—thereby further entailing one of an indefinite number of different possible cosmoses upon the turannon’s actualization and, thereby, an indefinite quantity of forms that the actualized turannon could itself take.


The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the turannon’s actualization can be furthermore specified as “the Will to absolute control over other”.
The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the turannon’s actualization can be furthermore specified as “the Will to absolute control over other”.
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As possible euteleion, the turannon can take one of two broad forms: as being already actualized by some eidem who singularly brings about all there is or, otherwise, as not being yet actualized by any eidem.
As possible euteleion, the turannon can take one of two broad forms: as being already actualized by some eidem who singularly brings about all there is or, otherwise, as not being yet actualized by any eidem.


As to the first scenario, in stark contrast to possible apeirosonic interpretations of Divinity (see §14.2.1.4.1 for some examples of these), any notion of the total cosmos being the fully creation of a singular incorporeal and supernal eidem which holds absolute control over all that was, is, and will be shall, then, be a turannonist explanation for all that is—which will itself be founded in the supposition of a preexisting turannon-actualized eidem. Within such system of turannonism (this being that worldview wherein the turannon is upheld as eusynteleion), to every conceivable question can be given the here primordially valid answer that the turannon-actualized eidem so did it. This singular creator eidem of all that is will, within turannonism, by entailment then necessarily be the creator of not only all realities (to fully include all aspects of the physical cosmos) but also of all truths—be the latter either personal or impersonal, this where ''truth'' is tentatively understood to be “conformity to that which is real”—as well as the creator of justice and of goodness itself. This singular absolute-creator eidem shall then necessarily dwell as eidem beyond truths, beyond justice, and beyond goodness—instead being their creator in full, rather than being in any way subject to any semblance of truth, or justice, or goodness to which it is in any manner constrained. All this while, again, necessarily remaining an eidem and, hence, a mesocept-endowed protocept which can thereby apprehend allocepts.
As to the first scenario, in stark contrast to possible apeirosonic interpretations of Divinity (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4.1. As Possible Euteleion|§14.2.1.4.1]] for some examples of these), any notion of the total cosmos being the fully creation of a singular incorporeal and supernal eidem which holds absolute control over all that was, is, and will be shall, then, be a turannonist explanation for all that is—which will itself be founded in the supposition of a preexisting turannon-actualized eidem. Within such system of turannonism (this being that worldview wherein the turannon is upheld as eusynteleion), to every conceivable question can be given the here primordially valid answer that the turannon-actualized eidem so did it. This singular creator eidem of all that is will, within turannonism, by entailment then necessarily be the creator of not only all realities (to fully include all aspects of the physical cosmos) but also of all truths—be the latter either personal or impersonal, this where ''truth'' is tentatively understood to be “conformity to that which is real”—as well as the creator of justice and of goodness itself. This singular absolute-creator eidem shall then necessarily dwell as eidem beyond truths, beyond justice, and beyond goodness—instead being their creator in full, rather than being in any way subject to any semblance of truth, or justice, or goodness to which it is in any manner constrained. All this while, again, necessarily remaining an eidem and, hence, a mesocept-endowed protocept which can thereby apprehend allocepts.


In considering the possibility of such a ready-established (if not eternally-established) turannon-actualized eidem, as humans we can then possibility seek to be in this turannon-actualized eidem’s best regards so as to either a) possibly further approach the turannon’s actualization ourselves and either i) attempt to overtake the current turannon-actualized eidem’s position so that we can ourselves become the singular turannon-actualized eidem or, else, ii) somehow fully unify with the already turannon-actualized eidem so as to completely and perfectly become one with the turannon-actualized eidem or, otherwise, so as to b) eventually find ourselves in a reality ready-established by the turannon-actualized eidem wherein we might obtain the permanon’s actualization for ourselves (with scenario (b) entailing that oneself as eidem never actualizes the eusynteleion of the turannon but, instead, holds the possibility of actualizing the eusynteleion of the permanon via the turannon-actualized eidem’s will).
In considering the possibility of such a ready-established (if not eternally-established) turannon-actualized eidem, as humans we can then possibility seek to be in this turannon-actualized eidem’s best regards so as to either a) possibly further approach the turannon’s actualization ourselves and either i) attempt to overtake the current turannon-actualized eidem’s position so that we can ourselves become the singular turannon-actualized eidem or, else, ii) somehow fully unify with the already turannon-actualized eidem so as to completely and perfectly become one with the turannon-actualized eidem or, otherwise, so as to b) eventually find ourselves in a reality ready-established by the turannon-actualized eidem wherein we might obtain the permanon’s actualization for ourselves (with scenario (b) entailing that oneself as eidem never actualizes the eusynteleion of the turannon but, instead, holds the possibility of actualizing the eusynteleion of the permanon via the turannon-actualized eidem’s will).
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However, if solipsism is false—this as this treatise shall sternly uphold—then one as empirical-self-endowed protoceptual self shall be one aspect of the fractiprotocepture at large. As such, one will inhabit a cosmos together with other protoceptual selves, each endowed with its own prototelos, its own empirical selfhood, its own unique poietural contexts and environments, and its own freely chosen teloi to pursue. Hence, via their own free will capacities, which will be necessarily conjoined to their own empirical self of poieture, these other protoceptual selves will, just as yourself, gravitate toward any one of the four synteleions mentioned in this chapter in what they choose—thus gravitating either with conscious awareness of the alternative synteleions or else via unconscious predilections regarding any one of the same four synteleions. Where conflict results from two or more protoceptual selves intending different synteleions—again, either consciously or unconsciously (such as strictly emotively without any conscious apprehension of why)—not only will volitional suffering be likely to result on the part of at least one, if not all, parties involved but this will prevent, when abstractly appraised, the fractiprotocepture’s closer proximity to the apeiroson, of which one as protocept is a part. Though the complexities which could potentially be further addressed here are many, within a non-solipsistic apeirosonism, for the apeiroson to be at last actualized all coexistent protocepts in the cosmos will, firstly, then need to intend the apeiroson’s actualization and, secondly, thereby in some manner together actualize the apeiroson—and in the process do away will all poieture (with all forms of what in ultimate terms is here protocept-dividing illusion: including all intrareal ultimate illusions, all interreal ultimate illusions, and all equireal ultimate illusions) which, as poieture, again perpetually partitions individual protoceptual selves from each other. Here, then, while one cannot logically actualize the apeiroson via meditation on one’s own, it is at least conceivable that one can both obtain awareness of the apeiroson via meditation and closer proximity, however transient this proximity might be, to the apeiroson via meditation.
However, if solipsism is false—this as this treatise shall sternly uphold—then one as empirical-self-endowed protoceptual self shall be one aspect of the fractiprotocepture at large. As such, one will inhabit a cosmos together with other protoceptual selves, each endowed with its own prototelos, its own empirical selfhood, its own unique poietural contexts and environments, and its own freely chosen teloi to pursue. Hence, via their own free will capacities, which will be necessarily conjoined to their own empirical self of poieture, these other protoceptual selves will, just as yourself, gravitate toward any one of the four synteleions mentioned in this chapter in what they choose—thus gravitating either with conscious awareness of the alternative synteleions or else via unconscious predilections regarding any one of the same four synteleions. Where conflict results from two or more protoceptual selves intending different synteleions—again, either consciously or unconsciously (such as strictly emotively without any conscious apprehension of why)—not only will volitional suffering be likely to result on the part of at least one, if not all, parties involved but this will prevent, when abstractly appraised, the fractiprotocepture’s closer proximity to the apeiroson, of which one as protocept is a part. Though the complexities which could potentially be further addressed here are many, within a non-solipsistic apeirosonism, for the apeiroson to be at last actualized all coexistent protocepts in the cosmos will, firstly, then need to intend the apeiroson’s actualization and, secondly, thereby in some manner together actualize the apeiroson—and in the process do away will all poieture (with all forms of what in ultimate terms is here protocept-dividing illusion: including all intrareal ultimate illusions, all interreal ultimate illusions, and all equireal ultimate illusions) which, as poieture, again perpetually partitions individual protoceptual selves from each other. Here, then, while one cannot logically actualize the apeiroson via meditation on one’s own, it is at least conceivable that one can both obtain awareness of the apeiroson via meditation and closer proximity, however transient this proximity might be, to the apeiroson via meditation.


While the details of how the apeiroson’s actualization might be accomplished in a non-solipsistic world shall be further enquired into in Volume II of this work, for now let it suffice to say that, were the apeiroson to in fact be the euteleion, then the apeiroson will—much the same as the turannon—necessarily be a global euteleion. In the case of apeirosonism, the apeiroson is a globally applicable euteleion that can only be actualized upon the absolute union of all globally coexistent, individual protoceptual selves into an infinite protoceptual being perfectly devoid of any and all poieture. Unlike the case for the turannon—wherein what the actualized turannon consist of will be fully contingent upon the specific character and will of the given turannon-actualized eidem, aka ego—in the case of the actualized apeiroson, despite its particular nature being fathomable in distinctly different manners (see §14.2.1.4.1.1 for more information on this), the actualized apeiroson can nevertheless only take one singular identity, or, when thus interpreted, one singular form: that of a poietureless infinity of protoceptual essence wherein all egos cease to occur.
While the details of how the apeiroson’s actualization might be accomplished in a non-solipsistic world shall be further enquired into in Volume II of this work, for now let it suffice to say that, were the apeiroson to in fact be the euteleion, then the apeiroson will—much the same as the turannon—necessarily be a global euteleion. In the case of apeirosonism, the apeiroson is a globally applicable euteleion that can only be actualized upon the absolute union of all globally coexistent, individual protoceptual selves into an infinite protoceptual being perfectly devoid of any and all poieture. Unlike the case for the turannon—wherein what the actualized turannon consist of will be fully contingent upon the specific character and will of the given turannon-actualized eidem, aka ego—in the case of the actualized apeiroson, despite its particular nature being fathomable in distinctly different manners (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4.1.1. As Intention-Devoid (aka, Static), as Non-Spatiotemporally Intentioning (aka, Dynamic), or as Absolute Nonbeing (aka, Nihilonic)|§14.2.1.4.1.1]] for more information on this), the actualized apeiroson can nevertheless only take one singular identity, or, when thus interpreted, one singular form: that of a poietureless infinity of protoceptual essence wherein all egos cease to occur.


The remaining portions of this chapter will strictly address the apeiroson as euteleion (or else as pseudoteleion) within a non-solipsistic cosmos.
The remaining portions of this chapter will strictly address the apeiroson as euteleion (or else as pseudoteleion) within a non-solipsistic cosmos.
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When interpreted in conjunction with Buddhist tenets, the actualized apeiroson can be equated to the actualization of “Nirvana without remainder”.  When viewed from a Buddhist perspective, when being is contemplated from the stance of ultrareality there in fact is no-self, this being the doctrine of Anatta, for all I-ness only occurs due to the poieture, which is again deemed illusory in an ultimate sense, and which can itself be here further conformant to what is termed ''saṃsāra''.
When interpreted in conjunction with Buddhist tenets, the actualized apeiroson can be equated to the actualization of “Nirvana without remainder”.  When viewed from a Buddhist perspective, when being is contemplated from the stance of ultrareality there in fact is no-self, this being the doctrine of Anatta, for all I-ness only occurs due to the poieture, which is again deemed illusory in an ultimate sense, and which can itself be here further conformant to what is termed ''saṃsāra''.


In Chinese philosophy, there occurs the concept of ''wuji'', which originally referenced infinity. This term first appeared in the Tao Te Ching in the context of returning to one’s true nature<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2024, April 1). Wuji (philosophy). In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 04:28, April 21, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wuji_(philosophy)&oldid=1216747059</ref>:<blockquote>“Know whiteness, Maintain blackness, and be a model for all under heaven. By being a model for all under heaven, Eternal integrity will not err. If eternal integrity does not err, You will return to infinity [aka, wuji].”</blockquote>In so being addressed, the wuji as contextualized by the just mentioned Taoist quote conforms to the apeiroson being the euteleion.
In Chinese philosophy, there occurs the concept of ''wuji'', which originally referenced infinity. This term first appeared in the Tao Te Ching in the context of returning to one’s true nature<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2024, April 1). Wuji (philosophy). In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 04:28, April 21, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wuji_(philosophy)&oldid=1216747059</ref>:<blockquote>“Know whiteness, Maintain blackness, and be a model for all under heaven. By being a model for all under heaven, Eternal integrity will not err. If eternal integrity does not err, You will return to infinity [aka, wuji].”<ref>Mair, Victor H., ed. (1990), ''Tao Te Ching: The Classic Book of Integrity and the Way'', New York, NY: Bantam Books, ISBN 978-0-307-43463-0</ref></blockquote>In so being addressed, the wuji as contextualized by the just mentioned Taoist quote conforms to the apeiroson being the euteleion.


The Tao Te Ching furthermore states that “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.” This can well make sense were the term ''Tao'' as here addressed to refer to the pure protocepture—be it either as an actualized apeiroson or in fragmented form—for the pure protocepture of itself can only be nonpoietural in full, whereas all that can be said can only be poietural in nature. (Given apeirosonism, the same reasoning can also viably apply to the proposed ineffability of “G-d”.)
The Tao Te Ching furthermore states that “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.” This can well make sense were the term ''Tao'' as here addressed to refer to the pure protocepture—be it either as an actualized apeiroson or in fragmented form—for the pure protocepture of itself can only be nonpoietural in full, whereas all that can be said can only be poietural in nature. (Given apeirosonism, the same reasoning can also viably apply to the proposed ineffability of “G-d”.)
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The last, and likely most unpleasant, of the three here fathomable scenarios regarding the apeiroson’s actualization will be as follows:
The last, and likely most unpleasant, of the three here fathomable scenarios regarding the apeiroson’s actualization will be as follows:


In review, the apeiroson’s actualization—wherein a fully unified protocepture obtains and all poieture disappears such that what remains is literally of zero volume and infinite protoceptual energy—can only be a complete annihilation of all cosmically coexistent egos (I-nesses), this irrespective of whether the I-nesses are corporeal or incorporeal. Given this entailed aspect of the apeiroson’s actualization, it then becomes possible to conceive that the actualized apeiroson fully equates to the actualization of the nonmaterialistic nihilon (as described in §14.2.1.1.1.2). For this to be the ontically certain state of the actualized apeiroson, however, it then becomes necessary that oneself as pure autoceiving protocept which is an aspect of the protocepture at large is, in fact, quite literally a fragment of an indefinite nothingness in full—such that one’s being as a protocept-endowed eidem is fully contingent on the poieture which the fractiprotocepture (here, as the literal fragments of indefinite nothingness when addressed in their totality) brings about, this, ultimately, from indefinite nothingness. As a reminder, however, the eidemic protocept is that aspect of the eidem which auto-senceptually apprehends, and thereby comprehends, all allocepts obtained via its mesocepts. That that which apprehends is in ontic fact pure ontic nothingness then at least seems very implausible. Notwithstanding this observation, there currently is no epistemic certainty (be it either unfalsified or infallible) to the effect that the protocepture is in fact not pure ontological nothingness—thereby currently mandating the feasability of the possibility that the actualized apeiroson (rather than being unimaginably infinite autoceptual bliss) in fact fully equates to the actualization of a complete and perfect nothingness, i.e. to a complete and perfect absence of being. This very possibility—which again is currently not possible to evidence wrong with any epistemic certainty—can of itself be deemed by many aspects of the fractiprotocepture unpleasant enough to warrant an opposition to the apeiroson’s actualization despite it being deemed the euteleion. Let this last of the three fathomable possibilities regarding what in fact shall occur upon the apeiroson’s actualization—here assuming any system of apeirosonism—be then termed the ''absolute nonbeing apeiroson'' or, maybe more properly, the ''nihilonic apeiroson''.
In review, the apeiroson’s actualization—wherein a fully unified protocepture obtains and all poieture disappears such that what remains is literally of zero volume and infinite protoceptual energy—can only be a complete annihilation of all cosmically coexistent egos (I-nesses), this irrespective of whether the I-nesses are corporeal or incorporeal. Given this entailed aspect of the apeiroson’s actualization, it then becomes possible to conceive that the actualized apeiroson fully equates to the actualization of the nonmaterialistic nihilon (as described in [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.1.1.2. The Nonmaterialistic Nihilon|§14.2.1.1.1.2]]). For this to be the ontically certain state of the actualized apeiroson, however, it then becomes necessary that oneself as pure autoceiving protocept which is an aspect of the protocepture at large is, in fact, quite literally a fragment of an indefinite nothingness in full—such that one’s being as a protocept-endowed eidem is fully contingent on the poieture which the fractiprotocepture (here, as the literal fragments of indefinite nothingness when addressed in their totality) brings about, this, ultimately, from indefinite nothingness. As a reminder, however, the eidemic protocept is that aspect of the eidem which auto-senceptually apprehends, and thereby comprehends, all allocepts obtained via its mesocepts. That that which apprehends is in ontic fact pure ontic nothingness then at least seems very implausible. Notwithstanding this observation, there currently is no epistemic certainty (be it either unfalsified or infallible) to the effect that the protocepture is in fact not pure ontological nothingness—thereby currently mandating the feasability of the possibility that the actualized apeiroson (rather than being unimaginably infinite autoceptual bliss) in fact fully equates to the actualization of a complete and perfect nothingness, i.e. to a complete and perfect absence of being. This very possibility—which again is currently not possible to evidence wrong with any epistemic certainty—can of itself be deemed by many aspects of the fractiprotocepture unpleasant enough to warrant an opposition to the apeiroson’s actualization despite it being deemed the euteleion. Let this last of the three fathomable possibilities regarding what in fact shall occur upon the apeiroson’s actualization—here assuming any system of apeirosonism—be then termed the ''absolute nonbeing apeiroson'' or, maybe more properly, the ''nihilonic apeiroson''.


While none of the five teleions can in this philosophy be demonstrated either false or valid with infallible certainty, via analysis—such as that regarding each teleion’s explanatory powers relative to all others—one can establish justifications for upholding one teleion as being the euteleion and the others then being pseudoteleions. This, then, minimally results in the possibility of holding justified belief as to which of the five teleions is the real euteleion.
While none of the five teleions can in this philosophy be demonstrated either false or valid with infallible certainty, via analysis—such as that regarding each teleion’s explanatory powers relative to all others—one can establish justifications for upholding one teleion as being the euteleion and the others then being pseudoteleions. This, then, minimally results in the possibility of holding justified belief as to which of the five teleions is the real euteleion.
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It is further conceivable that while the apeiroson is the euteleion, existence has experienced numerous Big Breakups in which new cosmoses were brought abought prior to the manifestation of the stable cosmos we currently find ourselves as eidems to be inhabiting—this replete with all its presently known or else inferred histories. This scenario can generally cohere to that of a Big Bounce universe—one of many conceivable cosmological models regarding the universe as it is known within modern physics—wherein the cosmos, or universe, progressively evolves toward a state of zero volume and infinite energy (this, within apeirosonism, interpreted as being either the actualized apeiroson or, else, an equireal representation of it) but has so far undergone what has here been coined Big Breakups. In this outlook, then, is found an eternal return toward the apeiroson via apeirosonesis that, as euteleion, can only be actualized in the complete absence of any Big Breakup. A more in-depth discussion of this conceivable ontological model shall be addressed in Volume III. Yet for the time being, considering that this cosmological interpretation makes the very actualization of the apeiroson exceedingly daunting if not highly improbable (though not yet technically impossible), it then gives good reason for any individual eidem to shun the apeiroson as euteleion to be pursued. For emphasis, the just expressed is a cosmological scenario of apeirosonism, one wherein the apeiroson is deemed to be the ontically certain euteleion, and, thereby, wherein the apeiroson is acknowledged to not be a pseudoteleion. Informally addressed, here the prevailing theme might be that one must “try and try again till one gets it perfect”—and the very challenge to so doing and possibly once again failing might well be sufficient reason for many to not partake in so attempting.
It is further conceivable that while the apeiroson is the euteleion, existence has experienced numerous Big Breakups in which new cosmoses were brought abought prior to the manifestation of the stable cosmos we currently find ourselves as eidems to be inhabiting—this replete with all its presently known or else inferred histories. This scenario can generally cohere to that of a Big Bounce universe—one of many conceivable cosmological models regarding the universe as it is known within modern physics—wherein the cosmos, or universe, progressively evolves toward a state of zero volume and infinite energy (this, within apeirosonism, interpreted as being either the actualized apeiroson or, else, an equireal representation of it) but has so far undergone what has here been coined Big Breakups. In this outlook, then, is found an eternal return toward the apeiroson via apeirosonesis that, as euteleion, can only be actualized in the complete absence of any Big Breakup. A more in-depth discussion of this conceivable ontological model shall be addressed in Volume III. Yet for the time being, considering that this cosmological interpretation makes the very actualization of the apeiroson exceedingly daunting if not highly improbable (though not yet technically impossible), it then gives good reason for any individual eidem to shun the apeiroson as euteleion to be pursued. For emphasis, the just expressed is a cosmological scenario of apeirosonism, one wherein the apeiroson is deemed to be the ontically certain euteleion, and, thereby, wherein the apeiroson is acknowledged to not be a pseudoteleion. Informally addressed, here the prevailing theme might be that one must “try and try again till one gets it perfect”—and the very challenge to so doing and possibly once again failing might well be sufficient reason for many to not partake in so attempting.


Secondly, an eidem’s dislike of any fathomable alternative outlined in §14.2.1.4.1.1—such as an eidem’s disliking the notion of becoming ever more egoless till the time all ego vanishes and, maybe most especially, it’s disliking that possibility specified as the nihilonic apeiroson—will then of itself be likely sufficient reason for the given eidem to not partake in attempting to further approach the apeiroson despite the apeiroson being yet assumed to be the euteleion.
Secondly, an eidem’s dislike of any fathomable alternative outlined in [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.1.4.1.1. As Intention-Devoid (aka, Static), as Non-Spatiotemporally Intentioning (aka, Dynamic), or as Absolute Nonbeing (aka, Nihilonic)|§14.2.1.4.1.1]]—such as an eidem’s disliking the notion of becoming ever more egoless till the time all ego vanishes and, maybe most especially, it’s disliking that possibility specified as the nihilonic apeiroson—will then of itself be likely sufficient reason for the given eidem to not partake in attempting to further approach the apeiroson despite the apeiroson being yet assumed to be the euteleion.


==== 14.2.1.4.4. Culminating Remarks ====
==== 14.2.1.4.4. Culminating Remarks ====
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The apeiroson, again, will necessarily be a global euteleion: its actualization will necessitate global participation by, and will affect all globally cooccurring, protoceptual selves.
The apeiroson, again, will necessarily be a global euteleion: its actualization will necessitate global participation by, and will affect all globally cooccurring, protoceptual selves.


Lastly here addressed, were the apeiroson to be the euteleion, then this would of itself logically necessitate that all four other teleions—namely, the nihilon, the permanon, the turannon, and the dysteleion (see §14.2.2)—can only be pseudoteleions. Within apeirosonism, the reason for the cooccurring four pseudoteleions—together with all potential or actual trepidations as concerns apeirosonic heuristics which would bring one into closer proximity to the apeiroson—will all result from a) eidems’ dislike of what the actualized apeiroson entails (namely, a complete disappearance of all ego), b) from fear of the apeiroson being in any way false and, hence, a pseudoteleion (thereby that furthered proximity to it will necessarily result in dystelostases and, hence, volitional suffering), or else, as previously discussed, c) these aversions would instead result from eidems’ dislike of the effort involved when considering factors such as the possibility—but not inevitability—of what could potentially be yet another Big Breakup from apeirosonic proximity (to not here specify the many various examples of microcosmic occurrences wherein apeirosonic proximity within or among individual eidems ends up being followed by any manner of incurred volitional suffering due to opposition from non-apeiroson-driven interests). More succinctly expressed, within any system of apeirosonism, all pseudoteleions will via one means or another result from eidem’s fear of the apeiroson. (Given that the actualized apeiroson will be the obtainment of absolute love when “love” is broadly understood to always consist of a unity of protoceptual being, this then in some ways generally conforms to views both ancient and more recent which simplify ethics into consisting of either love or a fear of love.)
Lastly here addressed, were the apeiroson to be the euteleion, then this would of itself logically necessitate that all four other teleions—namely, the nihilon, the permanon, the turannon, and the dysteleion (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.2.2. The Dysteleion|§14.2.2]])—can only be pseudoteleions. Within apeirosonism, the reason for the cooccurring four pseudoteleions—together with all potential or actual trepidations as concerns apeirosonic heuristics which would bring one into closer proximity to the apeiroson—will all result from a) eidems’ dislike of what the actualized apeiroson entails (namely, a complete disappearance of all ego), b) from fear of the apeiroson being in any way false and, hence, a pseudoteleion (thereby that furthered proximity to it will necessarily result in dystelostases and, hence, volitional suffering), or else, as previously discussed, c) these aversions would instead result from eidems’ dislike of the effort involved when considering factors such as the possibility—but not inevitability—of what could potentially be yet another Big Breakup from apeirosonic proximity (to not here specify the many various examples of microcosmic occurrences wherein apeirosonic proximity within or among individual eidems ends up being followed by any manner of incurred volitional suffering due to opposition from non-apeiroson-driven interests). More succinctly expressed, within any system of apeirosonism, all pseudoteleions will via one means or another result from eidem’s fear of the apeiroson. (Given that the actualized apeiroson will be the obtainment of absolute love when “love” is broadly understood to always consist of a unity of protoceptual being, this then in some ways generally conforms to views both ancient and more recent which simplify ethics into consisting of either love or a fear of love.)


== 14.2.2. The Dysteleion ==
== 14.2.2. The Dysteleion ==
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Here, all life-affirming or else life-benefiting meaning, knowledge, value, ethics or morality, intentioning, and the like, will be not only transient in full but also fully pointless: In this worldview, not only will all these inevitably end in an absolute nonbeing upon corporeal death but all these will likewise be counterproductive to that which we all innately strive for: the optimal fulfillment of our prototelos which, in the supposition that the materialistic nihilon is in fact the euteleion, can only occur via our actualizing the materialistic nihilon and, thereby, our own absolute nonbeing via our own corporeal death. Materialistic nihilonism thereby makes all life-affirming or else life-benefiting givens technically irrational—thereby again resulting in a nihilist worldview.
Here, all life-affirming or else life-benefiting meaning, knowledge, value, ethics or morality, intentioning, and the like, will be not only transient in full but also fully pointless: In this worldview, not only will all these inevitably end in an absolute nonbeing upon corporeal death but all these will likewise be counterproductive to that which we all innately strive for: the optimal fulfillment of our prototelos which, in the supposition that the materialistic nihilon is in fact the euteleion, can only occur via our actualizing the materialistic nihilon and, thereby, our own absolute nonbeing via our own corporeal death. Materialistic nihilonism thereby makes all life-affirming or else life-benefiting givens technically irrational—thereby again resulting in a nihilist worldview.


In contrast, nonmaterialistic nihilonism will inevitably equate to an apeirosonism—fully including the position of apeirosonic immortality (see §4.3.4.1)—which however happens to hold faith in the nihilonic apeiroson and, thereby, maintains the faith-based conviction that upon the apeiroson’s actualization the nonmaterialistic nihilon would be obtained as euteleion. Yet, maybe importantly, given the vast quantity of eidems that would be in opposition to this outcome as held by any nonmaterialistic nihilonist, it seems reasonable to conclude that this very faith-based conviction in the nihilonic apeiroson would need to itself fully dissolve for the apeiroson to stand any chance of being actualized—paradoxically, this irrespective of whether it might in fact be the nonmaterialistic nihilon.
In contrast, nonmaterialistic nihilonism will inevitably equate to an apeirosonism—fully including the position of apeirosonic immortality (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.3.4.1. Apeirosonic Immortality|§4.3.4.1]])—which however happens to hold faith in the nihilonic apeiroson and, thereby, maintains the faith-based conviction that upon the apeiroson’s actualization the nonmaterialistic nihilon would be obtained as euteleion. Yet, maybe importantly, given the vast quantity of eidems that would be in opposition to this outcome as held by any nonmaterialistic nihilonist, it seems reasonable to conclude that this very faith-based conviction in the nihilonic apeiroson would need to itself fully dissolve for the apeiroson to stand any chance of being actualized—paradoxically, this irrespective of whether it might in fact be the nonmaterialistic nihilon.


In terms of ontology, it is currently unimaginable to the author how any version of nihilonism wherein we instantly obtain the nihilon upon our corporeal death to this world can be in any way used to meaningfully derive anything regarding ontology, fully including the occurrence of a physical world—this especially given the limited set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work.
In terms of ontology, it is currently unimaginable to the author how any version of nihilonism wherein we instantly obtain the nihilon upon our corporeal death to this world can be in any way used to meaningfully derive anything regarding ontology, fully including the occurrence of a physical world—this especially given the limited set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work.
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In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one will then value the permanonic preservation of all upon which one’s self is dependent on—for its permanonic stability will then facilitate one’s own optimal permanonic stability as an eidem. From this permanonist vantage, most, if not all, doctrines which uphold a complete changelessness in that upon which one’s own self is dependent will be favored and thereby be likely upheld. These doctrines, then, can include those maintaining an absolute permanency of natural laws to, for example, the doctrine of eternalism (sometimes referred to as the “block universe” model of spacetime wherein spacetime is interpreted as an unchanging four-dimensional “block”).
In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one will then value the permanonic preservation of all upon which one’s self is dependent on—for its permanonic stability will then facilitate one’s own optimal permanonic stability as an eidem. From this permanonist vantage, most, if not all, doctrines which uphold a complete changelessness in that upon which one’s own self is dependent will be favored and thereby be likely upheld. These doctrines, then, can include those maintaining an absolute permanency of natural laws to, for example, the doctrine of eternalism (sometimes referred to as the “block universe” model of spacetime wherein spacetime is interpreted as an unchanging four-dimensional “block”).


In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one can furthermore project upon other aspects of the cosmos exhibiting optimal proximity to the permanon either a superlative value of being or as close to such as can be obtained. This, for example, can be found exhibited in Richard Dawkin’s book ''The Selfish Gene''—wherein genes are assumed to be nearly, if not fully, permanonically immortal (see §14.3.2.1 for further description of permanonic immortality) and are thereby granted superlative importance to life; such that, for one example, the purpose of a lifeform is therein assumed to be its ability to propagate the very same selfish and immortal genes by which it is as lifeform is manipulated into propagating.
In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one can furthermore project upon other aspects of the cosmos exhibiting optimal proximity to the permanon either a superlative value of being or as close to such as can be obtained. This, for example, can be found exhibited in Richard Dawkin’s book ''The Selfish Gene''—wherein genes are assumed to be nearly, if not fully, permanonically immortal (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.3.2.1. Permanonic Immortality|§14.3.2.1]] for further description of permanonic immortality) and are thereby granted superlative importance to life; such that, for one example, the purpose of a lifeform is therein assumed to be its ability to propagate the very same selfish and immortal genes by which it is as lifeform is manipulated into propagating.


Also here tersely appraised, permanonism, when applied to the structure of society in general, can be deemed to value the unending permanency of any societal status quo irrespective of the quality of the status quo being maintained.
Also here tersely appraised, permanonism, when applied to the structure of society in general, can be deemed to value the unending permanency of any societal status quo irrespective of the quality of the status quo being maintained.
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And, in terms of identity, a permanonist shall equate their own essential personal identity to those aspects of their empirical self which they cherish and which they desire to remain never-ending in unaltered manners.  
And, in terms of identity, a permanonist shall equate their own essential personal identity to those aspects of their empirical self which they cherish and which they desire to remain never-ending in unaltered manners.  


=== 13.3.2.1. Permanonic Immortality ===
=== 14.3.2.1. Permanonic Immortality ===
In short, permanonism entails permanonic immortality as its euteleion—this as distinct from either turannonic immortality or apeirosonic immortality—such that permanonic immortality shall consist of an unchaining self (comprised of both the protoceptual self and the empirical self) within a cosmos that can otherwise be everchanging.
In short, permanonism entails permanonic immortality as its euteleion—this as distinct from either turannonic immortality or apeirosonic immortality—such that permanonic immortality shall consist of an unchaining self (comprised of both the protoceptual self and the empirical self) within a cosmos that can otherwise be everchanging.


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Whereas the rights of individual subjects will within turannonism be provided by the turannon-proximate or else actualized eidem, within any system of apeirosonism the rights of individual subjects will always be ultimately provided by the requirements of actualizing the apeiroson and, hence, by the requirements of further approaching the apeiroson—in essence, by the apriroson itself.  
Whereas the rights of individual subjects will within turannonism be provided by the turannon-proximate or else actualized eidem, within any system of apeirosonism the rights of individual subjects will always be ultimately provided by the requirements of actualizing the apeiroson and, hence, by the requirements of further approaching the apeiroson—in essence, by the apriroson itself.  


As previously touched upon, although the telosial (aka teleological) system of ethics this philosophy will make use of (see §14.6 for a synopsis of this) will ultimately be one of consequentialism—such that the eusynteleion (whichever synteleion it might be) shall be the ultimate consequence for which right, or correct, or good means are to be employed—within any system of apeirosonism this very apeiroson-intending consequentialism can likewise take on the form of deontological ethics. In the latter interpretation, one can be affirmed to have a duty to always act in that manner one would want all other protoceptual selves to act were they to be embodied as a protoceptual self in the exact same poieture (to include one’s empirical self and its context(s) of otherness) one oneself is at the given juncture in which the respective act is to be taken. Yet, again, when upholding this very duty within any apeirosonist system, one will inevitably then make choices which shall bring both oneself and one’s environment into closer proximity to the apeiroson.
As previously touched upon, although the telosial (aka teleological) system of ethics this philosophy will make use of (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.6. Regarding Metaethics and the Problem of Evil|§14.6]] for a synopsis of this) will ultimately be one of consequentialism—such that the eusynteleion (whichever synteleion it might be) shall be the ultimate consequence for which right, or correct, or good means are to be employed—within any system of apeirosonism this very apeiroson-intending consequentialism can likewise take on the form of deontological ethics. In the latter interpretation, one can be affirmed to have a duty to always act in that manner one would want all other protoceptual selves to act were they to be embodied as a protoceptual self in the exact same poieture (to include one’s empirical self and its context(s) of otherness) one oneself is at the given juncture in which the respective act is to be taken. Yet, again, when upholding this very duty within any apeirosonist system, one will inevitably then make choices which shall bring both oneself and one’s environment into closer proximity to the apeiroson.


Likewise from an apeirosonist vantage, many, if not all, turannon-aspiring egos will either unconsciously or consciously hold a desire to obtain the very powers which the apeiroson itself can be abstractly stated to wield over all as the eusynteleion—but, in contrast to the apeiroson which is literally egoless, the turannonist will desire to hold these same powers over others as an occuring ego. As one here briefly mentioned example, a mass-murderer’s pleasure in committing murders (else, even an abused child’s pleasure in burning ants with a magnifying glass) can from within apeirosonism be deemed at least in part intimately entwined with a) the egos dislike and possible fear of mandatorily needing to eventually perish as ego to the world (as can be deemed established by the apeiroson, which, again, brings about the equireal world we share from the fractiprotocepture as foundational essence) and b) the ego’s strong desire to overcome (a) by itself holding the same unmitigated power of life and death over others—thereby, within apeirosonist perspectives, having this same ego approach the pseudoteleion of the turannon to the detriment of other aspects of the fractiprotocepture and, hence, to the detriment of apeirosonic proximity.  
Likewise from an apeirosonist vantage, many, if not all, turannon-aspiring egos will either unconsciously or consciously hold a desire to obtain the very powers which the apeiroson itself can be abstractly stated to wield over all as the eusynteleion—but, in contrast to the apeiroson which is literally egoless, the turannonist will desire to hold these same powers over others as an occuring ego. As one here briefly mentioned example, a mass-murderer’s pleasure in committing murders (else, even an abused child’s pleasure in burning ants with a magnifying glass) can from within apeirosonism be deemed at least in part intimately entwined with a) the egos dislike and possible fear of mandatorily needing to eventually perish as ego to the world (as can be deemed established by the apeiroson, which, again, brings about the equireal world we share from the fractiprotocepture as foundational essence) and b) the ego’s strong desire to overcome (a) by itself holding the same unmitigated power of life and death over others—thereby, within apeirosonist perspectives, having this same ego approach the pseudoteleion of the turannon to the detriment of other aspects of the fractiprotocepture and, hence, to the detriment of apeirosonic proximity.  
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This topic too will be revisited with greater specificity within Volume II of this work. Here, only a generalized overview will be provided.
This topic too will be revisited with greater specificity within Volume II of this work. Here, only a generalized overview will be provided.


In a simplified analysis wherein no Big Breakup occurs, the closer the fractiprotocepture-resultant cosmos (or any aspect of it) approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the more all non-apeirosonic intentions will necessarily vanish from the fractiprotocepture of the cosmos (or from that apeiroson-proximate aspect of it). By entailment, then, the closer the cosmos approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the greater the proportion of currently occurring turannonical intentions—be they in service of obtaining either the permanon or the turannon (see §14.4 for further discussion)—will progressively vanish from the cosmos’s fractiprotocepture. This such that only more apeirosonic selves shall then remain. Given that the apeiroson is the euteleion, this same increase of apeirosonic intentions and reduction of non-apeirosonic intentions shall progress until all apeiroson-proximate selves finally dissolve their remaining egos in the actualization of the apeiroson.  
In a simplified analysis wherein no Big Breakup occurs, the closer the fractiprotocepture-resultant cosmos (or any aspect of it) approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the more all non-apeirosonic intentions will necessarily vanish from the fractiprotocepture of the cosmos (or from that apeiroson-proximate aspect of it). By entailment, then, the closer the cosmos approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the greater the proportion of currently occurring turannonical intentions—be they in service of obtaining either the permanon or the turannon (see [[Chapter 14: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part III—Teleions#14.4. Cosynteleionism|§14.4]] for further discussion)—will progressively vanish from the cosmos’s fractiprotocepture. This such that only more apeirosonic selves shall then remain. Given that the apeiroson is the euteleion, this same increase of apeirosonic intentions and reduction of non-apeirosonic intentions shall progress until all apeiroson-proximate selves finally dissolve their remaining egos in the actualization of the apeiroson.  


Till the apeiroson’s actualization, then, those apeirosonic aspects of current selves which are more apeirosonic than not (as a possible rule of thumb, being apeirosonic in their thoughts, words, and deeds 60% of the time and non-apeirosonic in such 40% of the time) will forever become more apeirosonic poieture-embodied egos, hence I-nesses—conceivably this via a) progressive evolutions of personal being within incorporeal-poieture-endowed supernal realms that are far more apeiroson-proximate by comparison to equireality as it is currently known, b) via perpetual reincarnations of protoceptual selves in what would then become a progressively more apeirosonic equireal world, or c) via some combination of the two—this granting their overall and persisting intent upon closer proximity to the apeiroson, if not also upon the apeiroson’s actualization in full. The progressive evolution of apeirosonical selves just specified will then again occur until the time the apeiroson is actualized, at which point all I-nesses in the cosmos vanish and our illusion-devoid and literally egoless, poietureless and genuine self (else expressed, genuine being) is actualized.
Till the apeiroson’s actualization, then, those apeirosonic aspects of current selves which are more apeirosonic than not (as a possible rule of thumb, being apeirosonic in their thoughts, words, and deeds 60% of the time and non-apeirosonic in such 40% of the time) will forever become more apeirosonic poieture-embodied egos, hence I-nesses—conceivably this via a) progressive evolutions of personal being within incorporeal-poieture-endowed supernal realms that are far more apeiroson-proximate by comparison to equireality as it is currently known, b) via perpetual reincarnations of protoceptual selves in what would then become a progressively more apeirosonic equireal world, or c) via some combination of the two—this granting their overall and persisting intent upon closer proximity to the apeiroson, if not also upon the apeiroson’s actualization in full. The progressive evolution of apeirosonical selves just specified will then again occur until the time the apeiroson is actualized, at which point all I-nesses in the cosmos vanish and our illusion-devoid and literally egoless, poietureless and genuine self (else expressed, genuine being) is actualized.
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= 14.7. Regarding the Purpose of Life =
= 14.7. Regarding the Purpose of Life =
As interpreted via the stipulations of this chapter, the often enough mused about purpose of life will—form the vantage of this philosophy—quite literally be to fully satisfy one’s prototelos via the obtainment of the eusynteleion—this if the dysteleion is false—although which synteleion is the ontically certain teleion cannot be evidenced with epistemic certainty (but, again, can potentially be justified via the respective synteleions explanatory power in comparison to others). Otherwise, if the dysteleion happens to be ontically certain, the purpose of life would then be to forever be Sisyphean in intentionally approaching and then unintentionally furthering away from what would then be any one of the four pseudosynteleions.  
As interpreted via the stipulations of this chapter, the often enough mused about purpose of life will—from the vantage of this philosophy—quite literally be to fully satisfy one’s prototelos via the obtainment of the eusynteleion—this if the dysteleion is false—although which synteleion is the ontically certain teleion cannot be evidenced with epistemic certainty (but, again, can potentially be justified to be ontically certain via the respective synteleion's explanatory power in comparison to others). Otherwise, if the dysteleion happens to be ontically certain, the purpose of life would then be to forever be Sisyphean in intentionally approaching and then unintentionally furthering away from what would then be any one of the four pseudosynteleions.
 
Within apeirosonism, for example, the purpose of life will be to approach, and eventually actualize, the apeiroson.  


= 14.8. Concluding Remarks =
= 14.8. Concluding Remarks =
Despite this chapters lengthy (yet still superficial) presentations, the only unfalsified certainties which this chapter shall uphold will be as follows: a) the prototelos logically necessitates what has been termed teleions, b) no one here concerned can conceive of a synteleion (this being a conceivable teleion wherein the prototelos becomes fully satisfied) which i) which has not been presented in this chapter but ii) which is fully accordant to all unfalsified certainties previously established in this work, c) we can also conceive of that possibility wherein no synteleion is possible to actualize, here termed the dysteleion and, d) out of the four conceivable synteleions and the dysteleion, at least one of these teleions will necessarily be an ontically certain euteleion for oneself as an eidemic protocept.
Despite this chapters lengthy (yet still superficial) presentations, the only unfalsified certainties which this chapter shall uphold will be as follows: a) the prototelos logically necessitates what has been termed teleions, b) no one here concerned can conceive of a synteleion (this being a conceivable teleion wherein the prototelos becomes fully satisfied) which i) has not been presented in this chapter but which ii) is fully accordant to all unfalsified certainties previously established in this work, c) we can also conceive of that possibility wherein no synteleion is possible to actualize, here termed the dysteleion and, d) out of the four conceivable synteleions and the dysteleion, at least one of these teleions will necessarily be an ontically certain euteleion for oneself as an eidemic protocept.
 
The four synteleions this chapter presents will then serve as the ultimate constrains to what we as eidems can become or else be—with a formalized ontology to be itself in large part derived in later portions of this work from these same four ultimate constrains to protoceptual being.  
 
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