Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt: Difference between revisions

Because this chapter intends a comprehensive account of its subject matter as a foundation to all that follows, it will be significantly larger than average. However, only three sections are requisite to the remaining portions of this work: [[Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt#1.1._Definitions_and_Concepts|§1.1]], which gives preliminary definitions and concepts, [[Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt#1.2.1._First_Distinction:_Ontic_.26_Subjective_Certainties|§1.2.1]], which addresses the distinction between ontic certainties and subjective certainties, and [[Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt#1.2.5._Fourth_Distinction:_Infallible_.26_Unfalsified_Alternative-Devoid_Certainties|§1.2.5]], which details the two epistemic certainties just mentioned. If brevity is desired, the three sections just specified may be read while overlooking the other contents of this chapter.  

# '''psychological certainty''': a consciously held certainty that holds the potential to be validly contested by anyone other or, else, by the bearer at some future point in time.

# '''noncredible alternative''': a justifiable alternative that is nevertheless not credible to those in question; e.g., the alternative that the weather will not be sunny at any point within the upcoming year (in relation to the alternative that it will be) shall likely not be deemed credible by most individuals. This will be so even though one could justify as a logical possibility—however unlikely the possibility might be—that it will not be sunny at any point within the upcoming year; for example, this due to the possibility of some cataclysmic occurrence on Earth resulting in the blockage of all sunlight.

In the broadest sense applicable to all proposed categories, certainty will be defined as ''the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence''.  

[[File:1-1.png|500px|thumb|right|'''Figure 1-1.''' A taxonomy of certainty.]]

Certainty is first categorized as being either ontic or subjective—thereby addressing a distinction between a) that which factually was, is, or will be and b) that which is appraised by awareness to have factually been, to currently be, or to be in the future.  

[[Chapter_1:_Demarcating_Certainty,_Uncertainty,_and_Doubt#Appendix_1-1:_The_Term_Certain_when_Referencing_Indefinite_Givens|Appendix 1-1]] shall use definitions of subjective certainty to explain the term ''certain'' when it is used to address indefinite and, hence, indeterminate givens—such as in the expression, “Certain readers might find this specious discrepancy in denotations to be of interest.”  

Subjective certainty will next be categorized into either unconscious or conscious certainties.  

Please see [[Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt#Appendix_1-2:_Concerning_Gradations_of_Certainty_and_Uncertainty|Appendix 1-2]] for discussion regarding gradations of certainty and uncertainty.  

Conscious certainty will next be subcategorized into alternative-endowed and alternative-devoid certainties.  

As with psychological certainties, epistemic certainties may be discerned via intuition, attribution, implicational arguments, and may be upheld to be axiomatic. Notwithstanding, unlike psychological certainties, all infallible certainties and unfalsified certainties shall be incomparable in strength of certainty when contrasted to certainties of a like type. Otherwise expressed, infallible certainty A and infallible certainty B shall be of equal strength of certainty regardless of means by which each was obtained or of what they each specify; the same likewise applies to different instances of valid unfalsified certainty.  

Intuitive psychological certainty shall consist of alternative-endowed certainties for which one does not hold conscious justifications at the time they manifest. The gut-feeling of sureness regarding a consciously apprehended, ontic certainty shall serve as one example of intuitive psychological certainty. One here intuitively apprehends that which is—this without holding conscious justifications for so appraising—while one likewise acknowledges that there can occur justifiable, though noncredible, alternatives to the certitude one consciously maintains. As a further example, that what one perceives to be  is as one perceives it to be, when not consciously justified but instead immediately experienced, will be an intuitive psychological certainty—with noncredible alternatives for this certainty including that of the perception being an illusion. Arguably, the majority of all conscious certainties typically held at any particular time will be intuitive psychological certainties. Because intuitive psychological certainties shall occur without conscious reasoning, they shall be classified as noninferential.  

Axiomatic psychological certainties shall be classified as inferential due to being established by means of conscious reasoning.  

Alternative-devoid, aka epistemic, certainties shall consist of those conscious certainties for which no justifiable alternative can be discerned—irrespective of whether the justifiable alternative is deemed to be credible or noncredible.  

The extent to which doubts are required for substantiating the status of unfalsified certainties shall be addressed at the end of this chapter in [[Chapter_1:_Demarcating_Certainty,_Uncertainty,_and_Doubt#1.6._Doubts_in_Relation_to_Unfalsified_Certainties|§1.6]], this after a distinction is made between affective and inferential doubts in [[Chapter_1:_Demarcating_Certainty,_Uncertainty,_and_Doubt#1.5._Affective_Certainties_and_Uncertainties|§1.5]].  

The only category of subjective certainty that is guaranteed to accurately depict ontic certainty will be that of infallible certainty—and this certainty can only be demonstrated when, or if, unassailable certainties are proven to be.  

Because of this, all subjective certainties which have not been demonstrated to be unassailable will furthermore be collectively classified as ''fallible certainties''—here fully including all unfalsified certainties, despite these being epistemic certainties.  

In the broadest sense applicable to all proposed categories, uncertainty will be defined as ''the state, or an instance, of givens that compete with alternative givens and thereby hold some measure of indeterminacy in respect to what was, is, or will be''.  

[[File:1-2.png|500px|thumb|right|'''Figure 1-2.''' A taxonomy of uncertainty.]]

At its most general, uncertainty will first be differentiated into ontic and subjective uncertainty.  

It is reasonable to conclude that the factual presence of subjective uncertainties will of itself be ontically certain. However, in part because the ontological relation between ontic certainties, ontic uncertainties, and subjective uncertainties might vary based on presupposed ontologies, this ontological relation will currently be left open-ended. Furthermore, the delimitations of subjective uncertainties which follow will not depend upon such an ontological relation being here established.  

Subjective uncertainty can next be categorized into unconscious and conscious uncertainties.  

Please see [[Chapter 1: Demarcating Certainty, Uncertainty, and Doubt#Appendix_1-2:_Concerning_Gradations_of_Certainty_and_Uncertainty|Appendix 1-2]] for discussion regarding gradations of certainty and uncertainty.  

   

Two forms of conscious uncertainty shall be distinguished: intuitive and attributive.  

Attributive uncertainty shall consist of conscious uncertainty that is maintained through deliberation—therefore, of conscious uncertainty that is obtained due to the conscious attribution of credibility to alternatives. As one example, a reasoned questioning of whether or not plants breath can equate to an attributive uncertainty via the following set of justifications: plants do not have lungs with which to respire—so it is a credible alternative that plants do not breath; but many of their cells do engage in photosynthesis—which is a process by which gases are exchanged with those of the environment in order to produce chemical energy—and, because this cellular process of gas exchange is that of respiration (this applicable to plants just as much as it is to lung-endowed animals), it stands as a credible alternative that plants (and not just their individual cells) do in fact respire and, therefore, breath. Because attributive uncertainty will be a product of reasoning, it shall be classified as inferential.  

Five subsets of conscious uncertainty shall be further mentioned for greater specificity. Each can pertain to either intuitive uncertainty or to attributive uncertainty. The five examples of conscious uncertainty are here termed ''tranquil uncertainty'', ''disinterested uncertainty'', ''anxious uncertainty'', ''aversive uncertainty'', and ''near-nonbelief (aka skeptical) uncertainty''.  

Lastly addressed will be the special case of near-nonbelief uncertainty, aka near-certainty disbelief, aka skeptical uncertainty—which conforms to the commonly understood semantics of ''being skeptical about''. Here, let ''nonbelief'' be understood as the conscious certainty that some specified belief(s) X are erroneous. A near-nonbelief will then specify a state of mind in which one is close to holding a certainty that some given belief X is erroneous but, importantly, is not yet certain of this. Hence, near-nonbelief uncertainty will consist of a typically comfortable near-certainty that something is not the case. It entails that the verdict of belief X being erroneous, while being the preferred credible alternative, nevertheless does compete to some degree within one’s mind with the credible (and not merely justifiable) alternative verdict that belief X might in fact be correct. The following serves as an extravagant example of near-nonbelief uncertainty: Sam affirms that he is skeptical of—hence uncertain about—five-legged, telepathic, ghost-unicorns capable of telekinesis which have been teleported by means of advanced science to planet Earth from off of artificially intelligent UFOs that have traveled back in time from distant parallel universes. In this extravagant hypothetical, were Sam’s honest outlook to indeed be that of near-nonbelief uncertainty, Sam would then earnestly uphold that it is somehow credible that the described being might be possible—this though his currently favored position is that the described being is impossible. It is emphasized that earnest near-certainty disbelief, aka skeptical uncertainty, necessarily entails the occurrence of credible alternatives regarding that which is almost fully believed to not be the case—otherwise, "to be skeptical about" would semantically denote "being certain that that addressed is erroneous", and could therefore not be appraised as a form of uncertainty (and, as will be next discussed, a form of doubt).   

Uncertainty can be understood by some as unconditionally equivalent to, and hence fully synonymous with, doubt. However, in examples such as those that follow this understanding will be found wanting: When one affirms that the future is uncertain one does not by this intend to imply that the future is doubtful. As a second example, when Ted is interested to learn more about why ''E = mc²'' strictly out of a general curiosity for the subject matter, Ted will be uncertain about the answers till the time they are discovered by him, but this does not imply that Ted thereby doubts these as of yet undiscovered answers.  

[[File:1-3.png|500px|thumb|right|'''Figure 1-3.''' An outline of doubt and doubt-devoid uncertainty.]]

Doubts can either be uncomfortable or, less commonly, comfortable.  

Near-nonbelief uncertainty will typically, if not always, serve as an example of comfortable doubt. In review, one is here nearly certain (but not yet certain) that some preestablished conscious certainty is wrong. Because this uncertainty type always addresses preestablished certainties, near-nonbelief uncertainty will always consist of doubts. And, again, these doubts are typically experienced to be comfortable. Examples can include a materialist’s skepticism (with skepticism here strictly meaning dubiousness) that anything spiritual is true and a Young-Earth creationist’s skepticism (here again strictly meaning dubiousness) that biological evolution is true.  

In contrast to near-nonbelief uncertainty, anxious uncertainties and aversive uncertainties will most often be examples of uncomfortable doubt.  

Doubts taking the form of anxious uncertainties will typically be identical to those taking the form of aversive uncertainty in all respects but one: namely, that the individual to whom the aversive uncertainty pertains will be averse to discovering what the case in fact is.  

The very act of honestly questioning, investigating, enquiring, or researching (to the extent these are differentiable) will entail some degree of cognitive indeterminacy in relation to that questioned, investigated, enquired into, or researched. Otherwise stated, these four activities will be contingent upon conscious uncertainty in relation to that regarded.  

Where mutually exclusive credible possibilities do not incorporate doubts, disinterested uncertainty will itself be a manifestation of comfortable doubt-devoid uncertainty. For example, one may be uncertain of the number of planets the universe contains—this without needing to doubt someone else’s best guess—and, if one holds a disinterested uncertainty concerning the matter, one will likely also not find discomfort in one's given uncertainty.  

In contrast to comfortable doubt-devoid uncertainties, it stands to reason that uncomfortable doubt-devoid uncertainties will consist of unconscious uncertainties.  

To the extent that—for example—unwanted tongue-tied speech, states of anxiety whose reason for being is unknown, and indeterminacy in one’s willed bodily action that results in clumsiness are products of the unconscious mind, these outcomes can then likewise be argued to be products of competing, alternative, unconsciously maintained beliefs or intentions. Where this is so, these uncomfortable outcomes will be brought about by unconsciously manifesting uncertainties. Because these uncertainties are unconscious, no doubt on the part of the conscious self shall manifest during the occurrence of these unconscious uncertainties. These uncertainties will thereby be both uncomfortable to experience as well as doubt-devoid.  

Though it can be common to interpret all uncertainties as doubts, previous examples have shown this to not be the case. Furthermore, while it might be common to ascribe only unpleasant attributes to doubt and to uncertainty in general, our experiences illustrate that some doubts and many forms of doubt-devoid uncertainty are not only comfortable but, at times, pleasant to experience. Lastly, comfortable doubt-devoid uncertainties can be argued to be of great importance to the health and growth of, minimally, all human minds—for states such as those of inquisitiveness and wonder are often, if not always, dependent on the presence of doubt-devoid uncertainties.   

The manifestation of those subjective certainties and uncertainties—including the latter’s subcategory of doubts—that are noninferential will, again, not rely upon conscious reasoning. Because of this, such certainties and uncertainties will be here further classified as ''affective''—i.e. relating to any aspect of emotions, moods, or feelings.

All subjective certainties and uncertainties—including the latter’s subcategory of doubts—mentioned in this chapter that are neither unconscious nor intuitive shall be inferential, and shall not be here classified as affective (even though they can be argued to at least in part be governed by those certainties and uncertainties that are affective).  

In review, even though an unfalsified certainty might hold justifiable alternatives in principle (this just as readily as it might not), these alternatives (if they do exist in principle) cannot ever be demonstrated in practice for as long as the certainty remains unfalsified. Furthermore, the possibility that an unfalsified certainty might at a future time be falsified via the provision of justifiable alternatives will not, of itself, serve as a means by which to falsify these certainties. This is so because, again, the possibility that an unfalsified certainty might hold justifiable alternatives in principle is an intrinsic component of all unfalsified certainties by definition.  

In summation, all validly upheld unfalsified certainties will be inferentially indubitable while yet remaining affectively dubitable—thereby remaining perpetually open to doubts.  

As it has been defined, certainty will in all instances reference that which is either ontically or cognitively determinate. However, the term ''certain'' can, in some situations, address indefinite givens and, in this means, address givens whose properties are in some way indeterminate.  

Again, is it proposed that the use of ''certain'' to specify indefinite givens will specify an implicit meta-certainty governing the addressed indefinite given. In this manner, this use of the term ''certain'' will address a determinate state of affairs (i.e., a certainty) whose explicitly mentioned particulars yet remain indefinite and, hence, indeterminate (i.e., uncertain).

There can be found a comparative gradation between psychological certainties and conscious uncertainties—one that nevertheless obtains a quantum leap between the two just specified categories.  

It is noteworthy that gradations can only apply to psychological certainties and to conscious uncertainties. Only these shall hold consciously discerned alternatives—be they deemed noncredible or credible—via whose deemed likelihood of being correct can be established comparable strengths of either certainty or uncertainty. Gradations of strength cannot apply to epistemic certainties because these are in all cases devoid of known justifiable alternatives. Neither can they apply to unconscious certainties and unconscious uncertainties because these will occur without any conscious apprehension of the respective verdicts or the respective alternatives involved.  

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