Chapter 6: Our Three Strata of Awareness as Eidems and Chapter 9: Three Metaphysical Classifications for Causes: Difference between pages

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Here will be here evidenced our three strata of awareness as eidems. Briefly summarized, these strata will consist of 1) that which an eidem cognizes to be other than itself as eidem, 2) an eidem’s autoceptually cognized modes of awareness via which (1) is cognized, and 3) that autological aspect of the eidem which cognizes both (1) and (2).  
As addressed in [[Chapter 8: Concerning Determinacy|Chapter 8]], causes in this treatise will not be equated to telosial, constitutional, or formational determinants—but only to genesial determinants. This will hold despite genesial determinants—i.e., causes—being themselves determinate as kentrons possibly on account of being so determined genesially, telosially, constitutionally, formationally, or via any combination of these.


== 6.1. An Overview of the Proposed Three Strata ==
This chapter, then, presents three metaphysical categorizations for all conceivable causes thus understood.


The prefix ''allo''- will be used to signify “other”. ''Allological cognita'', i.e. ''allocepts'', will be cognita that are tacitly if not explicitly discerned by an eidem to be other relative to itself as eidem. In other words, allocepts will be all non-autological cognita, be such perceptual or senceptual.  
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all conceivable types of causes which anyone here concerned can envision—however else they might happen to be classified—will necessarily be in part defined by the three categorizations and respective subcategories which this chapter lists.  


''Allological awareness''—an eidems awareness of what it discerns to be other relative to itself as eidem—i.e., ''alloawareness'', will then constitute one of the three strata of an eidem’s trifold awareness.  
Those conceptions of causes which are found logically contradictory will be deemed inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic.


All cognita that are not allological will then be autological. Autoawareness can, in turn, be itself discerned as constituted of the following two strata of awareness:
Those conceptions of causes which are not at this time found logically contradictory will be entertained as possibilities of what can be ontic in forthcoming portions of this work.


The prefix ''meso''- will be used to signify “intermediate”. ''Mesological cognita'', i.e., ''mesocepts'', will be the autologically experienced modes of awareness via which allocepts are cognized by the eidem. One’s personally experienced sight and hearing as an eidem can serve as examples of two mesocepts.  
== 9.1. A Cause’s Status of Embeddedness ==
This section classifies conceivable types of causes via the metric of whether they are themselves the effects of causes.  


''Mesological awareness''—an eidem’s autological awareness of the modes of awareness via which it apprehends allocepts—i.e., ''mesoawareness'', will then constitute a second strata of an eidem’s trifold awareness.  
This section’s classification serves to better address the subsequent classifications listed.  


The prefix ''proto''- will be used to signify “first” or “primary”. ''The protological cognitum'', i.e. ''the protocept'', will be that autologically experienced aspect of the eidem which is aware of both allocepts and mesocepts.  
It, again, will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of the two subcategories here outlined.  


''Protoceptive awareness''—an eidem’s autological awareness of itself as that which apprehends allocepts via its multiple mesocepts—i.e. ''protoawareness'', will then constitute the last of the three strata of an eidem’s trifold awareness.  
=== 9.1.1. Embedded Causes ===


Figure 6-1 provides an outline of the trifold awareness that is to be elaborated on.  
Let ''an embedded cause'' be understood to be a cause generated as effect by one or more causes—such that the embedded cause will be causally originated within, and thereby embedded within, a system of causation.  


[[File:6-1.png|500px|thumb|right|'''Figure 6-1.''' An outline of the proposed trifold awareness of eidems.]]
=== 9.1.2. Nonembedded Causes ===


== 6.2. Alloawareness ==
Let ''a nonembedded cause'' be understood to be a cause not generated as effect by one or more causes—such that the nonembedded cause will not be causally originated within, and thereby will not be embedded within, a system of causation.


All that an eidem experiences which is tacitly if not also explicitly discerned to be differentiable from, and thereby in some way other than, the given eidem—i.e., all non-autological cognita—will constitute an eidem’s alloawareness.  
Possible examples of nonembedded causes can include certain notions of nothingness and certain notions of God wherein the specified nonembedded cause is deemed to be the first cause of everything which is.  


Alloawareness can thereby include the following: exteroceptive physiocepts; those interoceptive physiocepts which are not fully autological at the moments experienced (e.g., the feeling of having butterflies in one’s stomach—such that this physioawareness of one’s body is differentiable from and thereby other relative to the eidem which is aware of it); exteroceptive phainocepts (e.g., visually remembering a friend); those interoceptive phainocepts which are not fully autological at the moments experienced (e.g., sympathetically imagining what it would be like to have a ghost limb—this contrasted to the possibility of obtaining fully autological interoceptive phainocepts, such as with imagining oneself to be thirsty to such extent that one autoceives oneself as eidem to be thirsty); and ennoocepts, including those of apprehended concepts,  awareness of one’s mind’s non-autological intentions (e.g., those pertaining to one’s conscience), felt emotions that are not autological (e.g., experienced pangs of attraction for someone which one as eidem attempts to dispel), and the cognized value of items.
== 9.2. A Cause’s Status of Being Omni-, Nega-, or Semideterminate ==


Such allological cognita will be more succinctly specified as allocepts.  
This section classifies conceivable types of causes via their status of being either omnideterminate, negadeterminate, or semideterminate.  


To simplify the vast array of possible allocepts, one can distinguish between those allocepts discerned to take place outside one’s total being of mind and body—and qualify these as ''exological''—and those allocepts discerned to take place within one’s total being of mind and body—and qualify these as ''endological''.  
Among other uses, a portion of this section’s classification will be utilized in addressing what this treatise specifies by free will.  


Whereas the exteroceptive-interoceptive dichotomy will apply strictly to percepts, the exological-endological dichotomy can apply to both percepts and sencepts. As one example of the latter, inspirations will be addressed. Inspirations will be differentiable from, and thereby other than, the eidem which is influenced by them, and will thereby be allocepts. Because inspirations thus understood will not be perceptually apprehended, they will be sencepts. That said, inspirations can be dichotomized into exological inspirations (e.g. another person’s speech serving as an inspiration to oneself to exercise more often) and endological inspirations (e.g., after not being able to resolve a problem, experiencing an eureka-moment in which one cognizes a novel idea—itself the product of one’s own mind—that resolves the given problem).
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of the three subcategories here outlined.  


Enquiry into the wide variety of allocepts can be both expansive and complex. The complexities can in part result from the possibility of multiple types of cognita being bound together in one’s experience of some, if not all, allocepts. One’s visual physiocept of another person’s photograph (which will be an allocept) can, for example, bind together a) physioceptual data such as that of colors and shapes, b) the conceptual, and thereby ennoological, understanding that what is being seen is a person one has known, and c) a particular emotive state of being which is autologically experienced—thereby resulting in the experience of seeing a loved one’s photograph.  
Because these subcategories will be of primary importance to forthcoming chapters, new terminology will be introduced where appropriate to make their expression more readable.  


Extending the just mentioned possibility, it might furthermore be the case that senceptions play a crucial role in our cognizance of multiple allocepts. One could, for instance, fathom perceptual experiences to be a homogenous spectrum of meaningless data were it not for an eidem’s senceptions of how this same data is allocated so as to belong to heterogeneous parts—to individual givens—each with their own properties.  
=== 9.2.1. Omnideterminate (aka Closed) Causes ===


These complexities further escalate when considering the following: The threshold between one’s endological allocepts and one’s momentary autoawareness as eidem is often dynamic, rather than static. As one example, there can be found a qualitative difference between the physiological feel of an endo-allological pain—such as with feeling physiological pain located in one’s fingertip on account of a thorn—and the autological experience of being in pain as an eidem due to some interoceptively perceived physiological pain—for instance, on account great pressure being placed on the same fingertip which has a thorn lodged in it. Whereas in the former experience one as eidem can feel one’s body’s physiological pain as something differentiable from oneself as the eidem so aware of it, in the latter experience the eidem in question will momentarily find the physiological pain indifferentiable from itself as eidem. Furthering this example, transitions from allological to autological physio-pain—and vice versa—can often be fluid: one can experience allological pain progressively becoming autological pain (which, if intense enough, might drown out one’s awareness of allological pain within one’s body); conversely, one’s autological pain can progressively become an allological pain that is eventually no longer felt autologically.
Let ''an omnideterminate genesial determinant'', i.e. an omnideterminate cause, be understood to be an ontically all-determinate cause, such that all of the cause’s possible, ontic limits or boundaries are set in full—thereby signifying that the cause does not consist of any degree of ontic nondeterminacy.  


The same fluidity of change between endo-allocepts and autocepts—and vice versa—can also be experienced for givens such as emotive states of being. For example, one can at first experience an allological pang of desire to obtain some given item (e.g., an ennooceived impetus conveying that purchasing some musical instrument will be beneficial to oneself) which fluidly then becomes an autological desire to obtain the given item (e.g., one then as eidem autologically holds the conviction that purchasing the musical instrument will be beneficial to oneself). Or, vice versa, one as eidem might change one’s mind about obtaining some item—and thereby no longer hold an autological desire to obtain the item—while yet experiencing pangs of desire as an eidem that obtaining this item would be beneficial and that one as eidem should proceed to do so.  
Omnideterminate causes will thereby not hold any freedom from set limits or boundaries in what they are and what they do—be these set limits or boundaries obtained via genesial, telosial, constitutional, formational, some other, or all ontically occurring determinacy types (both those herein observed, if ontically occurrent, and those not herein observed, if ontically occurrent). Else expressed, omnideterminate causes will in all respects be completely fixed in what they are and what they do.  


Notwithstanding these complexities, we can nevertheless experientially differentiate at any given moment between those cognita which are autological and those cognita which are not.  
Because of their complete lack of freedom from limits and boundaries, omnideterminate causes cannot generate different effects in a selfsame situation. This thereby entails that only one possible future can result from their genesial determination(s).


=== 6.2.1. The Epistemic Certainty of Our Alloawareness as Eidems ===
For easier readability, because omnideterminate causes can be deemed closed off to all freedom from set limits or boundaries, omnideterminate causes will also be specified in this work as ''closed causes''.  


Relative to all those here concerned, because we can all tacitly, if not also explicitly, differentiate at any given moment between what we as eidems autologically experience and what we as eidems experience to not be identical to ourselves as eidems; and because no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of this experienced differentiation can be discerned by us in practice; we hold an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty that we are endowed with alloawareness as eidems.  
A cosmos fully comprised of closed causes will therefore be one wherein no ontic uncertainty, hence no ontic randomness, occurs.  


== 6.3. Mesoawareness ==  
=== 9.2.2. Negadeterminate Causes—Inadmissible ===  


The notion of “personally experienced modes of awareness”, though itself a communicated concept, will here intend our pre-conceptually experienced modes of awareness that facilitate our awareness of allocepts—and from whose personally experienced usage we can furthermore derive concepts concerning such modes of awareness. Any such non-conceptual, personally experienced mode of awareness will be addressed as a mesocept—and our pre-conceptual awareness of our personal mesocepts will be termed our mesoawareness.  
Let ''a negadeterminate genesial determinant'', i.e. a negadeterminate cause, be understood to be a cause that is fully, or perfectly, nondeterminate ontically, such that the cause has absolutely no ontic limits or boundaries—be these imposed by genesial determinants, telosial determinants, constitutional determinants, formational determinants, or any here unaddressed type of determinant—thereby entailing that the cause does not consist of any ontic determinacy (and, hence, ontic delimitation) while yet holding the ontically determinate (and, hence, ontically delimited) state of being a cause, this at the same time and in the same respect.  


Among our most generalized mesocepts will be our physioawareness (e.g., of givens physiologically seen), phainoawareness (e.g., of givens visually imagined), and ennooawareness (e.g., of concepts which we understand). One, for example, could simultaneously physio-see a child, phaino-see the same child grown into an adult, and ennoo-understand that in-between being a child and an adult this person will hold myriad experiences—while holding the tacit capacity to differentiate between one’s sight, imagination, and understanding as three distinct modes of awareness, this while these three modes of awareness co-occur.  
One possible example of such negadeterminate cause which some of us might be capable of envisioning can be that of nothingness—this when understood as absolute nonbeing (rather than any state of being—which, for emphasis, is the opposite of nonbeing—wherein there occurs no entities and, hence, no things; with the quantum vacuum being a possible example of the latter)—that, as absolute nonbeing, is a nonembedded cause of existence itself or, else, of some original aspect of existence (e.g., with absolute nonbeing having once generated the gravitational singularity form which the Big Bang is inferred to have commenced).  


More specific mesocepts can be further discerned. One’s physiological sight, smell, and touch will, for example, be differentiable to oneself—such that one changes the physiology of one’s eyes to better see, takes deeper breaths to better smell, and moves one’s body so as to better touch (rather than, for example, changing the physiology of one’s eyes so as to better smell or touch).  
Another possible example of such negadeterminate cause which some of us might be capable of envisioning can be that of an absolutely, and hence perfectly, infinite being—hence a being absolutely devoid of all finitudes (including those that can be enacted by genesial, telosial, constitutional, and formational determinacies), therefore a being absolutely devoid of all limits or boundaries, be these spatial, temporal, or of any other type—that, as the absolutely infinite being, is a nonembedded cause of all finite existents or, else, some original subset of these (e.g., with the absolutely infinite being having once generated the first instantiation of man and woman from which all people subsequently came to be).  


All mesocepts will hold at least the following three qualities: Firstly, mesocepts will be known via direct personal experience, rather than being known inferentially. Secondly, mesocepts will be autologically experienced and will thereby be specific types of autocepts, rather than being experienced as allocepts. And thirdly, mesocepts will be pre-conceptually experienced with or without known concepts describing them—and will be that from which our cognized generalized ideas concerning our personal modes of awareness are derived. These properties will be next addressed in turn.   
Notwithstanding the possible conceivability of such examples, the notion of negadeterminate causes will, again, specify that a kentron will, at the same time and in the same respect, both a) not be in any way whatsoever ontically limited or bounded and b) be ontically limited or bounded to the condition of being a nonembedded cause.   


=== 6.3.1. Mesocepts Will Be Experiential ===
Due to this logical contradiction, the notion of negadeterminate causes will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.


A dichotomy can be made between experienced modes of awareness and inferred modes of awareness.  
=== 9.2.3. Semideterminate (aka Open) Causes ===


As humans we inferentially know that certain lifeforms are endowed with physiological senses we humans lack. An example of such non-human physio-sense is magnetoception—i.e. the ability to discern one’s direction relative to Earth’s magnetic fields—as it occurs in at least some species of birds. Implied in the inferred physiological sense of magnetoception is that at least certain lesser animals can experience Earth’s magnetic fields as allocepts.  
Let ''a semideterminate genesial determinant'', i.e. a semideterminate cause, be understood to ontically be a partly determinate and partly nondeterminate cause, such that only some of the cause’s possible limits or boundaries are set while other possible limits or boundaries remain unset.  


As humans, however, we hold no direct experience of what it is like to experience the Earth’s magnetic fields via magnetoception. We as humans, in other words, do not hold any mesocept described by the inferentially known physio-sense of magnetoception.  
Semideterminate causes will thereby always hold some—but never complete, or absolute—freedom from set limits or boundaries in what they are and what they do; they thereby always remaining to some extent partly determined by genesial, telosial, constitutional, formational, some other, or all determinacy types (both those herein observed and, if applicable, those not herein observed—if ontically occurrent). Else expressed, semideterminate causes will in all instances be partly free and partly fixed in what they are and what they do.  


Similarly, a colorblind person can hold some degree of understanding regarding what it is like for a non-colorblind person to see—this via inference and imagination—but will not, however, hold a direct experience of what the non-colorblind person’s physiological sense of sight is like. Here, the colorblind person will apprehend the concept of non-colorblind sight without holding a mesocept of non-colorblind sight. And the same can be said for a non-colorblind person’s awareness of some given type of colorblindness.  
Therefore, because of their partial freedom from limits and boundaries, semideterminate causes can at least in principle generate different effects in a selfsame situation. This thereby entails that more than one possible future can result from their genesial determination(s).  


In contrast, we as individual eidems will hold a direct experience of what our own, personally held, modes and sub-modes of awareness are like qualitatively—including our personally experienced physio-touch via which we physiologically feel exo-allocepts, our personally experienced phaino-hearing via which we phainologically hear the endo-allocept of our own inner voice while introspectively questioning, and our personally experienced ennoo-understanding via which we can grasp certain senceptual allocepts, such as the concept of ''tree''.  
For easier readability, and because semideterminate causes can be deemed open in respect to some measure of freedom from set limits or boundaries, semideterminate causes will also be specified in this work as ''open causes''.  


What our own personal physio-touch, phaino-hearing, and ennoo-understanding is like to us will to us be experientially known—rather than being modes of awareness which we know of only inferentially, such as can be said of magnetoception. And these personally held modes of awareness will be so experientially known whether or not we have terminology via which to adequately communicate what they are qualitatively like to us. One, for example, might have a difficult time in expressing what physio-hearing is like to someone who has been fully deaf since birth.  
The ontically partial determinacy of an open cause could in principle fluctuate between being nearly omnideterminate (entailing a near lack of freedom from limits or boundaries) or nearly negadeterminate (entailing a near total freedom from limits or boundaries)—yet, due to not fully being either of the latter but instead holding some degree of partial determinacy coexisting with partial nondeterminacy, all such causes will nevertheless remain properly classified as semideterminate, aka open.  


We hence know that we are not endowed with magnetoception, first and foremost, due to our own personal experiences as eidems being cognized by us as eidems to be devoid of this specific mode of awareness—rather than  on account of conceptual inferences that conclude in this being the case.  
One possible example of open causes will be that of a human consciousness making, hence generating, a decision between alternatives during times of conscious deliberation, such that different decisions given the same alternatives, and the same context to these, could be effected in a selfsame situation by the human consciousness. Likewise could be potentially exemplified as possible candidates for open causation most, if not all, sentience—be it corporeal (e.g., mammals, fish, insects, etc.) or, if such were to exist, incorporeal (e.g., deities, angels, ghosts, etc.).  


Then, relative to all those here concerned: Because we can each discern between a) modes of awareness we are ourselves endowed with (e.g., the mode of awareness which facilitates our experiencing the phainological sounds of the inner voice with which we introspectively question) and b) modes of awareness we are not personally endowed with (e.g., any mode of awareness that facilitates a direct physioception of the Earth’s magnetic fields); because this personally experienced discernment between (a) and (b) is itself experienced by each of us to result from our own cognizance of the modes of awareness with which we are personally endowed (rather than, for example, from conceptual inferences regarding which personal modes of awareness we hold as eidems); and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these aforementioned experiences; we each thereby obtain an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty that we can discern between (a) and (b) due to our cognizance of the personal modes of awareness we are endowed with.
These examples of sentience mentioned, it at this juncture in the work also remain conceivable and noncontradictory that most if not all inanimate, physical existents might be open causes (this rather than closed causes)—such that different inanimate, physical existents might hold vastly different degrees of freedom from limits or boundaries while yet all being open causes. For example, the inanimate, physical entities which surround our everyday lives (e.g., chairs, coffee mugs, rocks, etc.) can with relative ease be conceived of holding virtually no freedom from set limits or boundaries while yet technically remaining open causes whereas the physical entities studied by quantum physics from which these former entities are constituted (e.g., atoms, protons, electrons, etc.) might hold very large degrees of freedom from set limits or boundaries as open causes, this at least by comparison to the former.


Our personal modes of awareness as eidems of which we hold direct cognizance as eidems will, again, be to each of us our own personal mesocepts.  
Two distinct types of open causes can be distinguished when taking telosial determinacy into consideration (this without further taking into direct consideration the roles which constitutional, formational, and previous genesial determinacies might also play in determining the nature of the open cause at any given time).


=== 6.3.2. Mesocepts Will Be Autological ===
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that those here concerned cannot envision any additional general variant of open causes not specified in the following two subcategories when open causes are addressed in respect to telosial determinacy.


It will first be observed that we do not experience allocepts in the absence of respective mesocepts and, conversely, that we do not experience mesocepts in the absence of respective allocepts.  
==== 9.2.3.1. Telosially Determined Open Causes (aka Poietic Causes) ====


We, for example, can only see things when our faculty of sight is active; and we can only experience our faulty of sight when seeing things. The same will likewise apply to our hearing, our smell, our tactile feel, our faculty of understanding concepts, and so forth.  
Let ''a telosially determined open cause'' be understood to be an open cause that is to any extent (partly) determined by one or more teloi.  


Then, relative to all those here concerned, because we can only experience allocepts in the presence of one or more respective mesocepts; because we can only experience mesocepts in the presence of one or more respective allocepts; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences; we hold an unfalsified, and thereby epistemic, certainty that the mesocepts we experience are intwined with the allocepts we experience and vice versa.  
Derived from the Ancient Greek ''ποιέω'' (''poiéō'', “to make; to create”), ''poiesis'' (for which ''poietic'' is the adjectival form) signifies “the act or process of creation”. In part because the making or creating of some kentron will at the very least connote intended causation—hence, the causation of one or more effects for the sake of fulfilling one or more teloi (hence, for some purpose)—and because this implies that the making or creating of some kentron will hence always be a telosially determined causation, it has been deemed beneficial for the sake of readability to also address telosially determined open causes as ''poietic causes''.  


That stated, any given mesocept, in being an experienced mode of our personal awareness as eidems, will nevertheless be an intrinsic aspect of ourselves as eidems. In so being, mesocepts will not of themselves be experienced to be allocepts. Instead, mesocepts will be autological—hence entailing that a mesocept will be a specific type of autocept that is autoceived by the respective eidem.  
It will first be observed that individual poietic causes cannot hold random effects—here to be understood as effects that are in no manner predictable even in principle were all ontic factors to be known, this due to all the cause’s possible effects being equally probable. Despite the partial nondeterminacy in what they generate, because they are to some degree telosially determined, poietic causes shall always genesially determine effects in manners that best fulfill the one or more teloi they are driven by—hence, telosially determined by. This, in turn, signifies that poietic causes shall always minimally hold an underlying, telosial reason for their genesial determinacies. Hence, were their telos or teloi to be known together with their situational context, one could accurately predict that those possible effects which do not serve to fulfill the respective telos or teloi will not be genesially determined by the poietic cause—although, notwithstanding, one might not be able to likewise accurately predict which of the remaining possible effects that can fulfill the telos or teloi shall be in fact generated.  


For example, we do not experience ourselves to see our faculty of sight as a visual allocept. Our faculty of sight does not stand as one visual allocept among other visual allocepts which we visually discern. Instead, all visually discerned allocepts will be so discerned via our personally experienced faculty of sight which, in not being of itself an allocept, will instead be autologically experienced as an intrinsic aspect of our momentary constituency as eidems. In other words, our mesocept of sight will be autologically experienced as an aspect of what we as eidems actively do—rather than that which is apprehended via this given, autologically experienced, cognitive activity.  
Else expressed, although poietic causes can effect different outcomes in a selfsame situation, what they do cause—despite not being completely predictable—can always be accurately predicted to be an effect that best fulfills (or, in the case of all sentient poietic causes, an effect that is deemed by the respective eidem to best fulfill) the one or more teloi by which the poietic cause is telosially determined.  


As another example, while we can ennooceive (more specifically, conceptually understand) the concept of ''conceptual understanding''—thereby allowing us to analyze the attributes of this generalized idea as that which stands apart from, and is thereby other relative to, us as the eidems which so analyze—our very ennooception of this concept will not of itself be experienced by us to be other relative to ourselves as eidems. Reexpressed, our immediately experienced faculty of conceptual understanding will be experienced by us as eidems as that cognitive activity which we as eidems are engaged in doing, rather than the concept(s) apprehended via this doing. In so being, our mesocept of conceptual understanding will be a specific type of autocept—a momentarily intrinsic aspect of ourselves as eidems—whereas the concept of ''conceptual understanding'' which we can conceptually understand will be an allocept relative to us as eidems.
Because of this, it then becomes impossible that poietic causes generate their effects randomly—despite nevertheless remaining open, rather than closed, causes. (This topic will be further explored in latter portions of this work.)


Then, relative to all those here concerned, because we can only experience our mesocepts to be autological (rather than allological); and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences; we hold an unfalsified, and thereby epistemic, certainty that our mesocepts are autologically experienced by us as eidems.  
With that mentioned, it will nevertheless be further observed that interaction between two or more poietic causes (or cohorts of such) where each is telosially determined by a competing telos can lead to ontically random outcomes. As one relatively simple example of this, when presuming that—in simplistic terms—we humans are the (sapient) poietic causes of our own actions, and when entertaining a situation in which two cohorts of humans of relatively equal ability are to be involved in, for example, a fair game of soccer—and, thus, where each team holds the common telos that they rather the other team shall be the winner of the game via the effects which the team-members together generate—the outcome of the game, as an effect produced by all parties concerned, can be deemed ontically random prior to its commencement: prior to the game’s commencement, which of the two teams will win the game might in this example not be predictable even in principle, this due to both possible outcomes potentially being equally probable.


In review, though our mesocepts are entwined with respective allocepts and vice versa, our mesocepts will nevertheless be autocepts—rather than allocepts. Therefore, an eidem’s enactively experienced mesocepts will be constituent aspects of the respective eidem.  
==== 9.2.3.2. Non-Telosially-Determined Open Causes (aka Tychistic Causes) ====


=== 6.3.3. Mesocepts Will Be Non-Conceptual ===
We can conceive of individual open causes that generate random effects. Such cases can be invoked in arguments against the possibility of free will: wherein humans as agential causes (who in such examples are implicitly understood to neither be an omnideterminate causes nor negadeterminate causes, and to thereby be open causes by default) are said to possibly make choices randomly (cf., O’Connor and Franklin, 2022, Section #3.1)<ref>O’Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin, "Free Will", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/freewill/>.</ref>.


A concept will again be strictly understood as a generalized idea—which, as such, cannot be perceived but only senceived; which will be other relative to ourselves as the eidems which so cognize generalized ideas; and which we thereby cognize via a faculty of ennooception. This specific faculty of ennooception will, again, be addressed as our faculty of conceptual understanding.  
In review, individual open causes whose effects are ontically random cannot be telosially determined. If they were, they would telosate the fulfillment of one or more teloi in their generation of effect(s), entailing that their generation of effect(s) will be determined by that telos which is telosated by the open cause—thereby signifying that the generated effects hold an underlying, telosial reason for their being so generated (such that were their telos or teloi to be known, this together with their situational context, their causation of effects could be at least to some measure predicted by us). This will stand in contrast to effects being generated in literally random manners, hence generated for no reason whatsoever, and hence generated in manners not possible in principle to even slightly predict were all ontic factors to be known.  


Then, relative to all those here concerned, because we can only autologically experience mesocepts, thereby making a mesocept a specific form of autocept; because the concepts which we cognize will be allologically experienced by us as ennoocepts, thereby making a concept a specific form of allocept; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to these experiences; we thereby hold an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty that—though we can develop concepts, i.e. generalize ideas, of mesocepts—our autological mesocepts will not of themselves be allological concepts (but can only be non-conceptual instantiations of what certain concepts specify).
Hence, our conception of open causes with ontically random effects can only consist of open causes wholly devoid of telosial determinacy—i.e., of non-telosially-determined open causes.  


Having offered this epistemic certainty that mesocepts are non-conceptual, the following can also be appraised:  
For more concise language, ontic randomness, and, hence, ontic chance when thus interpreted, shall within this treatise be specified via the adjective ''tychistic''—where ''tychistic'' (from the Ancient Greek ''τύχη'' (''túkhē'', “chance”)) is also deemed the adjectival form of ''tychism'', a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce to specify the doctrine that chance has an objective status in the world (Burch, 2022, Section #5)<ref>Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/peirce/>.</ref>.


Concepts pertaining to mesocepts can be derived from our own personal mesocepts in conjunction with those mesocepts we believe other eidems to be endowed with. The concept of physiological sight will serve as one example. Both those humans and lesser animals endowed with vision will be conceptually understood as endowed with the faculty of sight. As concept, the faculty of sight will be singular, and universally applicable to all individual eidems (human and non-human) which can visually apprehend allocepts. This, however, does not entail that all eidems endowed with sight will hold the same mesocept of sight. For example, while we can conceptually infer that an eight-eyed jumping spider with near 360-degree vision is endowed with sight, we will hold no accurate impression of what such arachnid’s near 360-degree vision is like. Nor, as additional examples, will we hold an accurate impression of what a cat’s night vision is like or of what and eagle’s visual acuity is like. Our own mesocept of sight, that of a jumping spider’s, that of a cat’s, and that of an eagle’s will thereby be significantly different in respect to themselves. Notwithstanding, all these will serve as instantiations of the one generalized idea of physiological sight we as humans alloceptually cognize.  
Hence, non-telosially-determined open causes shall in this work be more succinctly specified as ''tychistic causes''.  


Given that our mesocepts are pre-conceptually experienced, it can also be proposed that we do not need to hold concepts regarding our mesocepts in order to autologically experience such—and, furthermore, in order to autologically cognize in non-reflective manners that we so experience.  
With tychistic causes having been mentioned, tychistic events—and tychism in general—were these to ontically occur, could then currently be explained either via the occurrence of tychistic cause(s) or, else, via the interactions of two or more poietic causes (or of two or more cohorts of such) that hold competing teloi.  


As one example of this, we can autologically differentiate between our ennooceiving the concept of ''conscience'' and our ennooceiving what our conscience wants. Both these modes of awareness will be ennoological. However, while we can conceptualize the first mode of awareness as “conceptual understanding”, we so far hold no readily available conceptualization for that ennoological mode of awareness which facilitates our apprehension of what our conscience wants us to do. Despite this, we experientially know that our awareness of our conscience as concept is significantly different from our awareness of what our conscience desires. Our autoawareness of what our conscience desires then exemplifies at least one instance in which we experientially know of a mesocept despite not having a ready formed concept regarding it.
Whereas the generation of effects by a closed cause will be explainable in principle by such cause’s omnideterminate state of being were all its ontic determinants to be known, and the generation of effects by a poietic cause will in principle be minimally explainable (at least in part) by such cause’s specific telos or teloi, the question is placed: What could in principle determine, and thereby give grounds to explain, a tychistic cause’s generation of effects? Why generate this effect rather than that effect at this time rather than that time—or, for that matter, why generate any effect at all so as to be defined as a cause in the first place?


=== 6.3.4. The Epistemic Certainty of Our Mesoawareness as Eidems ===
This question will for now remain open ended.  


Relative to all those here concerned, because each allocept we experience as eidems will be experienced by us via one or more modes of awareness we as eidems likewise experience (this irrespective of whether we hold generalized ideas for these experienced modes of cognizing allocepts); because we experience these personally experienced modes of awareness of cognizing allocepts to be intrinsic aspects of ourselves as eidems; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences; the following is concluded to be an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty: we hold an autological awareness of our own personal modes of awareness via which we cognize allocepts—i.e., we are autoaware of our personal mesoawareness.
== 9.3. A Cause’s Status of Being Self-Generated (aka Self-Caused; aka ''Causa Sui'') ==


=== 6.3.5. The Epistemic Certainty That Our Mesocepts Are Synchronically Differentiable ===
Let ''a self-generated cause'' be understood to be a genesial determinant which genesially determined itself at a former time.  


Revisiting a previously given example, when seeing a child, simultaneously imagining what the child will look like as an adult, and simultaneously conceptualizing that between the child’s current state of being and that of becoming an adult this child will undergo a vast array of experiences—again, with these three allocepts (that of the seen child, of the imagined adult, and of the generalized idea regarding yet to be undergone experiences) occurring at the same time—one will be able to differentiate between one’s physio-sight, one’s phaino-sight, and one’s ennoo-understanding.  
This section’s classification is in part provided to make explicit those categories of self-generated causes which can currently be found contradictory and, thereby, inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic. Notwithstanding, because the currently admissible categories of this section’s classification will not be paramount to the overall work, coinage of more concise terminology for the categories specified will not be here provided.  


Then, relative to all those here concerned, because we as eidems can synchronically differentiate between at least some of our mesocepts; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences in which we can synchronically differentiate between our mesocepts; we thereby also hold an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty that we can synchronically differentiate between at least some of our mesocepts.  
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of this section’s subcategories.  


== 6.4. Protoawareness ==  
=== 9.3.1. Non-Self-Generated Nonembedded Causes ===  


In the hopes of more easily establishing protoawareness with epistemic certainty, this section will be minimally descriptive.
Let ''a non-self-generated nonembedded cause'' be understood to be a nonembedded cause whose occurrence as such was not generated, hence caused, by itself.  


Given that allocepts are what is being apprehended by an eidem, and given that mesocepts are those autological aspects of an eidem which facilitate the apprehension of allocepts, then the protocept will be that autological aspect of an eidem which apprehends allocepts via mesocepts. Furthermore, whereas mesocepts are autologically experienced as synchronically differentiable autocepts, the protocept will be autologically experienced as a synchronically undifferentiable, and thereby singular, autocept.  
Currently, the category of non-self-generated nonembedded causes will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.  


For instance, that aspect of oneself as eidem which sees a child, imagines what the child will look like as an adult, and which conceptualizes the child’s yet to be undergone experiences of joy and sorrow between these two states of its being—this, for further example, while autologically experiencing a state of nostalgia in so doing—will be what is here termed the protocept: again, that which experiences allocepts via its synchronically differentiable mesocepts as a synchronically undifferentiable, and thereby singular, autocept.  
=== 9.3.2. Self-Generated Nonembedded-Causes—Inadmissible ===


=== 6.4.1. The Epistemic Certainty of Our Protoawareness as Eidems ===
Let ''a self-generated nonembedded cause'' be understood to be a nonembedded cause whose occurrence as such was generated, hence caused, by itself.  


As individual eidems, we can autologically experience multiple mesocepts at the same time—just as we can experience multiple allocepts thereby obtained at the same time. Yet, relative to ourselves as individual eidems, we autologically experience ourselves as that which apprehends these multiple allocepts via multiple mesocepts to be singular and synchronically undifferentiable. Our momentary autoawareness of being that which apprehends will, again, be an autoawareness of being a singular autocept—rather than being a plurality of diverse, autologically experienced, mesocepts. This singular and synchronically undifferentiable aspect of ourselves as eidems will, again, be termed the protocept.  
This category entails the following contradiction: prior to the initial occurrence of a self-generated nonembedded-cause, the given cause will at the same time and in the same respect both a) not have occurred as a genesial determinant (for it will at this point not have in any way yet caused itself into being as a nonembedded cause) and b) will have occurred as a genesial determinant (as is required by its causing itself into being as a nonembedded cause).


No attention will be here given to the ontological relation between protocepts and their respective mesocepts. Instead, here is strictly intended an evidencing that, relative to all those here concerned, we as eidems will at any given juncture be constituted of multiple mesocepts and a singular protocept.  
Additionally, this category also entails a second contradiction: as a self-generated, initially occurring nonembedded cause, it will at the same time and in the same respect, both a) not be the effect of any cause and b) be the effect of itself as cause.  


Then, relative to all those here concerned, because we can synchronically experience multiple mesocepts and multiple allocepts thereby obtained; because these experiences are further experienced to pivot around a singular and synchronically undifferentiable autocept which we autoceive to be our own being (that singular autocept which we reference by the pronoun “I”) to which both allocepts and mesocept pertain; and because we in practice can find no justifiable alternative to the occurrence of these experiences; we then hold an unfalsified, and hence epistemic, certainty that we as individual eidems autologically experience ourselves to be in part constituted of a singular protocept (which autologically experiences its own mesocepts as additional aspects of itself as an eidem that experiences allocepts).  
Due to these two contradictions, the notion of a self-generated nonembedded cause will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.


It is emphasized that—just as we do not experience allocepts in the absence of mesocepts—neither do we experience mesocepts in the absence of our protoawareness, of ourselves as the protocept to which mesocepts belong.  
=== 9.3.3. Non-Self-Generated Embedded Causes ===


It also bears note that the protocept, in addition to being aware of allocepts and mesocepts, will also be experienced as that which is autoaware of its own emotive state of being (such as that of nostalgia) and cognitive activity (such as that of volition).  
Let ''a non-self-generated embedded cause'' be understood to be an embedded cause whose occurrence as such was in no way generated, hence caused, by itself at a former time.  


== 6.5. Concluding Remarks ==
Currently, the category of non-self-generated embedded causes will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.
=== 9.3.4. Self-Generated Embedded Causes ===


Because we in practice cannot discern any justifiable alternative to our experiences of allocepts, to our autologically experienced mesocepts as eidems, and to our own autoawareness as a protocept, the occurrence of our alloawareness, mesoawareness, and protoawareness will to us be of epistemic certainty.  
Let ''a self-generated embedded cause'' be understood to be an embedded cause—hence, a cause which is thereby the effect of causes—which was in some way caused by itself at a former time.


Furthermore, because we as eidems are constituted of a protocept and of multiple mesocepts, and because mesocepts only obtain wherever allocepts are apprehended, our awareness as eidems shall perpetually be constituted of all three strata of awareness just mentioned. Hence, our awareness as eidems will always in part consist of a duality between ourselves as eidems and that which is other.  
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of self-generated embedded-causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of this section’s two, general subcategories.  


The numerous complexities which can then unfold—such as regarding a protocept’s remembrances of mesocepts previously experienced that are however no longer experienced in the present moment (such as can occur when a non-blind person is blindfolded)—will be here overlooked. It is worth mentioning, however, that, granting the validity of the epistemic certainties this chapter has presented, such complexities will not mitigate the threefold awareness of an eidem which has been here presented.  
==== 9.3.4.1. Omni-Self-Generated Embedded Causes—Inadmissible ====


That having been said, due to the following possibility’s pertinence to the overall treatise, it will be here tangentially addressed in brief:
Let ''an omni-self-generated embedded cause'' be understood to be an embedded cause that is fully (that is all, or completely) self-generated—thereby necessitating that it as an embedded cause was ultimately self-generated by its former self as a self-generated nonembedded cause.


We cannot presently establish with epistemic certainty that a perfectly non-dualistic awareness is impossible to obtain. In contemplating this hypothetical, however, it can be established that were such perfectly non-dualistic awareness to obtain, it could not be that of an eidem’s—for, as has been heretofore established, all those here concerned will, as eidems, be constituted of both a protocept and mesocepts, and will thereby always be aware of allocepts, hence of other, via the mesocepts experienced. Instead, such hypothesized non-dualistic awareness could solely be constituted of a protoawareness devoid of any allocepts and, therefore, devoid of any mesocepts. Moreover, because there would be no other or otherness via which the given protocept could find limits, this pure protocept would then technically consist of a limitless autoawareness that, in not being bounded by anything, would then be literally selfless.
Because an omni-self-generated embedded cause is contingent on the occurrence of a self-generated nonembedded cause, due to the contradictions provided in [[Chapter_9:_Three_Metaphysical_Classifications_for_Causes#9.3.2._Self-Generated_Nonembedded-Causes—Inadmissible|§9.3.2]] for the latter, an omni-self-generated embedded cause will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.


For contextualization, it might be worth noting that such selfless, thereby formless, and limitless, thereby infinite, autoawareness can—dependent on culture and on disposition—be interpreted as for example pertaining to Nirvana, Brahman, Ein Sof, or God.
==== 9.3.4.2. Semi-Self-Generated Embedded-Causes ====


Furthering this same hypothetical, in at least one possible interpretation of it, the protocept of each eidem can be inferred as being an individuated, and thereby finite, aspect, or fragment, of an otherwise non-dualistic, limitless, and selfless protoawareness. Even when so interpreted, however, the protocept of each eidem will nevertheless yet persist in being individualized as a self in part via its autoceived mesocepts and the respective allocepts it thereby stands in contrast to and apprehends (and, as will be addressed in later portions of this work, will be furthermore individualized by its volitions as protocept).  
Let ''a semi-self-generated embedded cause'' be understood to be an embedded cause that is only partly self-generated—thereby necessitating that it as an embedded cause was not self-generated by a self-generated nonembedded cause.  


Having briefly addressed this hypothetical—and regardless of whether a perfectly non-dualistic (auto)awareness is possible—it will remain the case that for as long as a protocept will be endowed with mesocepts it shall be an eidem and, as such, shall hold a dualistic relation to allocepts—thereby being a self minimally demarcated, and hence limited, by its relations to other.  
The possible to conceive, metaphysical variations of semi-self-generated embedded causes are many—for one example, including that of an embedded cause being self-generated by its former self as non-self-generated nonembedded cause; for another example, including that all cooccurring embedded causes being self-generated by their former selves as either one singular non-self-generated nonembedded cause or a plurality of the latter. A thorough investigation into the admissibility of all such possible to conceive of variations will be beyond the scope of this chapter.
Here, instead, will solely be addressed one such type of semi-self-generated embedded cause: namely, that of an embedded cause only partly self-generated from its former self as embedded cause (this irrespective of whether there might in fact be such a thing as nonembedded cause(s) from which all embedded causes would have commenced).


This addressed duality shall, again, be entailed in an eidem’s trifold awareness of alloceptual, mesoceptual, and protoceptual cognizance.
One example of such is the relatively commonsense notion that an adult human as kentron was in part genesially determined—and thereby partly formed—by the same human’s former activities and choices.
 
As one physiological example of this, an adult human’s type of facial wrinkles can be deemed to have been in part caused by the same human’s previously enacted facial expressions—such that if the human had most always frowned in life, the facial wrinkles that now appear on the adult human’s face will in part be indicative of this habit of frowning, and will thereby differ from the wrinkles that would have otherwise accumulated in part from the same person most always smiling.
 
Alternatively, as one psychological example of the same, consider a person who at one point in their lives was ignorant of literary business practices. At this former juncture in their lives, the person caused their decisions regarding the writing of a novel for financial profit in manners ignorant of what would be able to sell in the marketplace—and, consequently, was unable to generate a substantial living from their writing of novels. This same person then genesially determined their decision to become familiarized with literary business practices. In so effecting, the person then became familiar with literary business practices—and, consequently, began writing novels for a satisfactory financial profit. In this hypothetical, the change in the human from being ignorant of literary business practices to now being knowledgeable of literary business practices—with the latter now in part defining who the person currently is as a genesial determinant of their presently made choices—was itself in part caused by the said person at a former time, this via a former choice the person genesially determined.
 
In these and like examples, there will be a person who is an embedded cause of effects whose effects in part determine the changed attributes of the same person at later times—thereby signifying that the later person is a semi-self-generated embedded cause. 
 
Currently, the category of semi-self-generated embedded causes—minimally taking the form of an embedded cause partly self-generated by its former self as an embedded cause—will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.
 
== 9.4. Concluding Remarks ==
 
This chapter has outlined three metaphysical categories of causes which shall be in part, and to differing extents, implemented to evidence the reality of our free will as eidems—this where the free will addressed shall be equated to an eidem’s poietic causation of those effects which take the form of made choices.
 
In review, causes can only be a) either embedded or nonembedded; b) either closed, poietic, or tychistic, and c) either non-self-generated or else semi-self-generated and embedded—with all other conceivable alternatives, where applicable, pertaining to the classifications this chapter addresses being inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic.
 
Were all proposed unfalsified certainties in this chapter to be so evidenced upon scrutiny, this would then next facilitate the derivation of Chapter 10’s principle unfalsified certainty: namely, that of our dwelling with a causally semideterminate world.  
 
== • References ==
<references />


== • Navigation ==
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Revision as of 17:47, 9 January 2024

As addressed in Chapter 8, causes in this treatise will not be equated to telosial, constitutional, or formational determinants—but only to genesial determinants. This will hold despite genesial determinants—i.e., causes—being themselves determinate as kentrons possibly on account of being so determined genesially, telosially, constitutionally, formationally, or via any combination of these.

This chapter, then, presents three metaphysical categorizations for all conceivable causes thus understood.

It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all conceivable types of causes which anyone here concerned can envision—however else they might happen to be classified—will necessarily be in part defined by the three categorizations and respective subcategories which this chapter lists.

Those conceptions of causes which are found logically contradictory will be deemed inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic.

Those conceptions of causes which are not at this time found logically contradictory will be entertained as possibilities of what can be ontic in forthcoming portions of this work.

9.1. A Cause’s Status of Embeddedness

This section classifies conceivable types of causes via the metric of whether they are themselves the effects of causes.

This section’s classification serves to better address the subsequent classifications listed.

It, again, will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of the two subcategories here outlined.

9.1.1. Embedded Causes

Let an embedded cause be understood to be a cause generated as effect by one or more causes—such that the embedded cause will be causally originated within, and thereby embedded within, a system of causation.

9.1.2. Nonembedded Causes

Let a nonembedded cause be understood to be a cause not generated as effect by one or more causes—such that the nonembedded cause will not be causally originated within, and thereby will not be embedded within, a system of causation.

Possible examples of nonembedded causes can include certain notions of nothingness and certain notions of God wherein the specified nonembedded cause is deemed to be the first cause of everything which is.

9.2. A Cause’s Status of Being Omni-, Nega-, or Semideterminate

This section classifies conceivable types of causes via their status of being either omnideterminate, negadeterminate, or semideterminate.

Among other uses, a portion of this section’s classification will be utilized in addressing what this treatise specifies by free will.

It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of the three subcategories here outlined.

Because these subcategories will be of primary importance to forthcoming chapters, new terminology will be introduced where appropriate to make their expression more readable.

9.2.1. Omnideterminate (aka Closed) Causes

Let an omnideterminate genesial determinant, i.e. an omnideterminate cause, be understood to be an ontically all-determinate cause, such that all of the cause’s possible, ontic limits or boundaries are set in full—thereby signifying that the cause does not consist of any degree of ontic nondeterminacy.

Omnideterminate causes will thereby not hold any freedom from set limits or boundaries in what they are and what they do—be these set limits or boundaries obtained via genesial, telosial, constitutional, formational, some other, or all ontically occurring determinacy types (both those herein observed, if ontically occurrent, and those not herein observed, if ontically occurrent). Else expressed, omnideterminate causes will in all respects be completely fixed in what they are and what they do.

Because of their complete lack of freedom from limits and boundaries, omnideterminate causes cannot generate different effects in a selfsame situation. This thereby entails that only one possible future can result from their genesial determination(s).

For easier readability, because omnideterminate causes can be deemed closed off to all freedom from set limits or boundaries, omnideterminate causes will also be specified in this work as closed causes.

A cosmos fully comprised of closed causes will therefore be one wherein no ontic uncertainty, hence no ontic randomness, occurs.

9.2.2. Negadeterminate Causes—Inadmissible

Let a negadeterminate genesial determinant, i.e. a negadeterminate cause, be understood to be a cause that is fully, or perfectly, nondeterminate ontically, such that the cause has absolutely no ontic limits or boundaries—be these imposed by genesial determinants, telosial determinants, constitutional determinants, formational determinants, or any here unaddressed type of determinant—thereby entailing that the cause does not consist of any ontic determinacy (and, hence, ontic delimitation) while yet holding the ontically determinate (and, hence, ontically delimited) state of being a cause, this at the same time and in the same respect.

One possible example of such negadeterminate cause which some of us might be capable of envisioning can be that of nothingness—this when understood as absolute nonbeing (rather than any state of being—which, for emphasis, is the opposite of nonbeing—wherein there occurs no entities and, hence, no things; with the quantum vacuum being a possible example of the latter)—that, as absolute nonbeing, is a nonembedded cause of existence itself or, else, of some original aspect of existence (e.g., with absolute nonbeing having once generated the gravitational singularity form which the Big Bang is inferred to have commenced).

Another possible example of such negadeterminate cause which some of us might be capable of envisioning can be that of an absolutely, and hence perfectly, infinite being—hence a being absolutely devoid of all finitudes (including those that can be enacted by genesial, telosial, constitutional, and formational determinacies), therefore a being absolutely devoid of all limits or boundaries, be these spatial, temporal, or of any other type—that, as the absolutely infinite being, is a nonembedded cause of all finite existents or, else, some original subset of these (e.g., with the absolutely infinite being having once generated the first instantiation of man and woman from which all people subsequently came to be).

Notwithstanding the possible conceivability of such examples, the notion of negadeterminate causes will, again, specify that a kentron will, at the same time and in the same respect, both a) not be in any way whatsoever ontically limited or bounded and b) be ontically limited or bounded to the condition of being a nonembedded cause.

Due to this logical contradiction, the notion of negadeterminate causes will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.2.3. Semideterminate (aka Open) Causes

Let a semideterminate genesial determinant, i.e. a semideterminate cause, be understood to ontically be a partly determinate and partly nondeterminate cause, such that only some of the cause’s possible limits or boundaries are set while other possible limits or boundaries remain unset.

Semideterminate causes will thereby always hold some—but never complete, or absolute—freedom from set limits or boundaries in what they are and what they do; they thereby always remaining to some extent partly determined by genesial, telosial, constitutional, formational, some other, or all determinacy types (both those herein observed and, if applicable, those not herein observed—if ontically occurrent). Else expressed, semideterminate causes will in all instances be partly free and partly fixed in what they are and what they do.

Therefore, because of their partial freedom from limits and boundaries, semideterminate causes can at least in principle generate different effects in a selfsame situation. This thereby entails that more than one possible future can result from their genesial determination(s).

For easier readability, and because semideterminate causes can be deemed open in respect to some measure of freedom from set limits or boundaries, semideterminate causes will also be specified in this work as open causes.

The ontically partial determinacy of an open cause could in principle fluctuate between being nearly omnideterminate (entailing a near lack of freedom from limits or boundaries) or nearly negadeterminate (entailing a near total freedom from limits or boundaries)—yet, due to not fully being either of the latter but instead holding some degree of partial determinacy coexisting with partial nondeterminacy, all such causes will nevertheless remain properly classified as semideterminate, aka open.

One possible example of open causes will be that of a human consciousness making, hence generating, a decision between alternatives during times of conscious deliberation, such that different decisions given the same alternatives, and the same context to these, could be effected in a selfsame situation by the human consciousness. Likewise could be potentially exemplified as possible candidates for open causation most, if not all, sentience—be it corporeal (e.g., mammals, fish, insects, etc.) or, if such were to exist, incorporeal (e.g., deities, angels, ghosts, etc.).

These examples of sentience mentioned, it at this juncture in the work also remain conceivable and noncontradictory that most if not all inanimate, physical existents might be open causes (this rather than closed causes)—such that different inanimate, physical existents might hold vastly different degrees of freedom from limits or boundaries while yet all being open causes. For example, the inanimate, physical entities which surround our everyday lives (e.g., chairs, coffee mugs, rocks, etc.) can with relative ease be conceived of holding virtually no freedom from set limits or boundaries while yet technically remaining open causes whereas the physical entities studied by quantum physics from which these former entities are constituted (e.g., atoms, protons, electrons, etc.) might hold very large degrees of freedom from set limits or boundaries as open causes, this at least by comparison to the former.

Two distinct types of open causes can be distinguished when taking telosial determinacy into consideration (this without further taking into direct consideration the roles which constitutional, formational, and previous genesial determinacies might also play in determining the nature of the open cause at any given time).

It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that those here concerned cannot envision any additional general variant of open causes not specified in the following two subcategories when open causes are addressed in respect to telosial determinacy.

9.2.3.1. Telosially Determined Open Causes (aka Poietic Causes)

Let a telosially determined open cause be understood to be an open cause that is to any extent (partly) determined by one or more teloi.

Derived from the Ancient Greek ποιέω (poiéō, “to make; to create”), poiesis (for which poietic is the adjectival form) signifies “the act or process of creation”. In part because the making or creating of some kentron will at the very least connote intended causation—hence, the causation of one or more effects for the sake of fulfilling one or more teloi (hence, for some purpose)—and because this implies that the making or creating of some kentron will hence always be a telosially determined causation, it has been deemed beneficial for the sake of readability to also address telosially determined open causes as poietic causes.

It will first be observed that individual poietic causes cannot hold random effects—here to be understood as effects that are in no manner predictable even in principle were all ontic factors to be known, this due to all the cause’s possible effects being equally probable. Despite the partial nondeterminacy in what they generate, because they are to some degree telosially determined, poietic causes shall always genesially determine effects in manners that best fulfill the one or more teloi they are driven by—hence, telosially determined by. This, in turn, signifies that poietic causes shall always minimally hold an underlying, telosial reason for their genesial determinacies. Hence, were their telos or teloi to be known together with their situational context, one could accurately predict that those possible effects which do not serve to fulfill the respective telos or teloi will not be genesially determined by the poietic cause—although, notwithstanding, one might not be able to likewise accurately predict which of the remaining possible effects that can fulfill the telos or teloi shall be in fact generated.

Else expressed, although poietic causes can effect different outcomes in a selfsame situation, what they do cause—despite not being completely predictable—can always be accurately predicted to be an effect that best fulfills (or, in the case of all sentient poietic causes, an effect that is deemed by the respective eidem to best fulfill) the one or more teloi by which the poietic cause is telosially determined.

Because of this, it then becomes impossible that poietic causes generate their effects randomly—despite nevertheless remaining open, rather than closed, causes. (This topic will be further explored in latter portions of this work.)

With that mentioned, it will nevertheless be further observed that interaction between two or more poietic causes (or cohorts of such) where each is telosially determined by a competing telos can lead to ontically random outcomes. As one relatively simple example of this, when presuming that—in simplistic terms—we humans are the (sapient) poietic causes of our own actions, and when entertaining a situation in which two cohorts of humans of relatively equal ability are to be involved in, for example, a fair game of soccer—and, thus, where each team holds the common telos that they rather the other team shall be the winner of the game via the effects which the team-members together generate—the outcome of the game, as an effect produced by all parties concerned, can be deemed ontically random prior to its commencement: prior to the game’s commencement, which of the two teams will win the game might in this example not be predictable even in principle, this due to both possible outcomes potentially being equally probable.

9.2.3.2. Non-Telosially-Determined Open Causes (aka Tychistic Causes)

We can conceive of individual open causes that generate random effects. Such cases can be invoked in arguments against the possibility of free will: wherein humans as agential causes (who in such examples are implicitly understood to neither be an omnideterminate causes nor negadeterminate causes, and to thereby be open causes by default) are said to possibly make choices randomly (cf., O’Connor and Franklin, 2022, Section #3.1)[1].

In review, individual open causes whose effects are ontically random cannot be telosially determined. If they were, they would telosate the fulfillment of one or more teloi in their generation of effect(s), entailing that their generation of effect(s) will be determined by that telos which is telosated by the open cause—thereby signifying that the generated effects hold an underlying, telosial reason for their being so generated (such that were their telos or teloi to be known, this together with their situational context, their causation of effects could be at least to some measure predicted by us). This will stand in contrast to effects being generated in literally random manners, hence generated for no reason whatsoever, and hence generated in manners not possible in principle to even slightly predict were all ontic factors to be known.

Hence, our conception of open causes with ontically random effects can only consist of open causes wholly devoid of telosial determinacy—i.e., of non-telosially-determined open causes.

For more concise language, ontic randomness, and, hence, ontic chance when thus interpreted, shall within this treatise be specified via the adjective tychistic—where tychistic (from the Ancient Greek τύχη (túkhē, “chance”)) is also deemed the adjectival form of tychism, a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce to specify the doctrine that chance has an objective status in the world (Burch, 2022, Section #5)[2].

Hence, non-telosially-determined open causes shall in this work be more succinctly specified as tychistic causes.

With tychistic causes having been mentioned, tychistic events—and tychism in general—were these to ontically occur, could then currently be explained either via the occurrence of tychistic cause(s) or, else, via the interactions of two or more poietic causes (or of two or more cohorts of such) that hold competing teloi.

Whereas the generation of effects by a closed cause will be explainable in principle by such cause’s omnideterminate state of being were all its ontic determinants to be known, and the generation of effects by a poietic cause will in principle be minimally explainable (at least in part) by such cause’s specific telos or teloi, the question is placed: What could in principle determine, and thereby give grounds to explain, a tychistic cause’s generation of effects? Why generate this effect rather than that effect at this time rather than that time—or, for that matter, why generate any effect at all so as to be defined as a cause in the first place?

This question will for now remain open ended.

9.3. A Cause’s Status of Being Self-Generated (aka Self-Caused; aka Causa Sui)

Let a self-generated cause be understood to be a genesial determinant which genesially determined itself at a former time.

This section’s classification is in part provided to make explicit those categories of self-generated causes which can currently be found contradictory and, thereby, inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic. Notwithstanding, because the currently admissible categories of this section’s classification will not be paramount to the overall work, coinage of more concise terminology for the categories specified will not be here provided.

It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of this section’s subcategories.

9.3.1. Non-Self-Generated Nonembedded Causes

Let a non-self-generated nonembedded cause be understood to be a nonembedded cause whose occurrence as such was not generated, hence caused, by itself.

Currently, the category of non-self-generated nonembedded causes will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.3.2. Self-Generated Nonembedded-Causes—Inadmissible

Let a self-generated nonembedded cause be understood to be a nonembedded cause whose occurrence as such was generated, hence caused, by itself.

This category entails the following contradiction: prior to the initial occurrence of a self-generated nonembedded-cause, the given cause will at the same time and in the same respect both a) not have occurred as a genesial determinant (for it will at this point not have in any way yet caused itself into being as a nonembedded cause) and b) will have occurred as a genesial determinant (as is required by its causing itself into being as a nonembedded cause).

Additionally, this category also entails a second contradiction: as a self-generated, initially occurring nonembedded cause, it will at the same time and in the same respect, both a) not be the effect of any cause and b) be the effect of itself as cause.

Due to these two contradictions, the notion of a self-generated nonembedded cause will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.3.3. Non-Self-Generated Embedded Causes

Let a non-self-generated embedded cause be understood to be an embedded cause whose occurrence as such was in no way generated, hence caused, by itself at a former time.

Currently, the category of non-self-generated embedded causes will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.3.4. Self-Generated Embedded Causes

Let a self-generated embedded cause be understood to be an embedded cause—hence, a cause which is thereby the effect of causes—which was in some way caused by itself at a former time.

It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all types of self-generated embedded-causes we can envision will necessarily be defined by one of this section’s two, general subcategories.

9.3.4.1. Omni-Self-Generated Embedded Causes—Inadmissible

Let an omni-self-generated embedded cause be understood to be an embedded cause that is fully (that is all, or completely) self-generated—thereby necessitating that it as an embedded cause was ultimately self-generated by its former self as a self-generated nonembedded cause.

Because an omni-self-generated embedded cause is contingent on the occurrence of a self-generated nonembedded cause, due to the contradictions provided in §9.3.2 for the latter, an omni-self-generated embedded cause will be deemed inadmissible as possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.3.4.2. Semi-Self-Generated Embedded-Causes

Let a semi-self-generated embedded cause be understood to be an embedded cause that is only partly self-generated—thereby necessitating that it as an embedded cause was not self-generated by a self-generated nonembedded cause.

The possible to conceive, metaphysical variations of semi-self-generated embedded causes are many—for one example, including that of an embedded cause being self-generated by its former self as non-self-generated nonembedded cause; for another example, including that all cooccurring embedded causes being self-generated by their former selves as either one singular non-self-generated nonembedded cause or a plurality of the latter. A thorough investigation into the admissibility of all such possible to conceive of variations will be beyond the scope of this chapter.

Here, instead, will solely be addressed one such type of semi-self-generated embedded cause: namely, that of an embedded cause only partly self-generated from its former self as embedded cause (this irrespective of whether there might in fact be such a thing as nonembedded cause(s) from which all embedded causes would have commenced).

One example of such is the relatively commonsense notion that an adult human as kentron was in part genesially determined—and thereby partly formed—by the same human’s former activities and choices.

As one physiological example of this, an adult human’s type of facial wrinkles can be deemed to have been in part caused by the same human’s previously enacted facial expressions—such that if the human had most always frowned in life, the facial wrinkles that now appear on the adult human’s face will in part be indicative of this habit of frowning, and will thereby differ from the wrinkles that would have otherwise accumulated in part from the same person most always smiling.

Alternatively, as one psychological example of the same, consider a person who at one point in their lives was ignorant of literary business practices. At this former juncture in their lives, the person caused their decisions regarding the writing of a novel for financial profit in manners ignorant of what would be able to sell in the marketplace—and, consequently, was unable to generate a substantial living from their writing of novels. This same person then genesially determined their decision to become familiarized with literary business practices. In so effecting, the person then became familiar with literary business practices—and, consequently, began writing novels for a satisfactory financial profit. In this hypothetical, the change in the human from being ignorant of literary business practices to now being knowledgeable of literary business practices—with the latter now in part defining who the person currently is as a genesial determinant of their presently made choices—was itself in part caused by the said person at a former time, this via a former choice the person genesially determined.

In these and like examples, there will be a person who is an embedded cause of effects whose effects in part determine the changed attributes of the same person at later times—thereby signifying that the later person is a semi-self-generated embedded cause.

Currently, the category of semi-self-generated embedded causes—minimally taking the form of an embedded cause partly self-generated by its former self as an embedded cause—will be deemed admissible as a possibility of what is or can be ontic.

9.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined three metaphysical categories of causes which shall be in part, and to differing extents, implemented to evidence the reality of our free will as eidems—this where the free will addressed shall be equated to an eidem’s poietic causation of those effects which take the form of made choices.

In review, causes can only be a) either embedded or nonembedded; b) either closed, poietic, or tychistic, and c) either non-self-generated or else semi-self-generated and embedded—with all other conceivable alternatives, where applicable, pertaining to the classifications this chapter addresses being inadmissible as possibilities of what is or can be ontic.

Were all proposed unfalsified certainties in this chapter to be so evidenced upon scrutiny, this would then next facilitate the derivation of Chapter 10’s principle unfalsified certainty: namely, that of our dwelling with a causally semideterminate world.

• References

  1. ↑ O’Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin, "Free Will", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/freewill/>.
  2. ↑ Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/peirce/>.

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