Here is to be addressed what will be termed the prototelos, this being the predominant and foundational telos relative to all that we as eidems might otherwise intend. It is to be understood as ubiquitous to all those here concerned; as metaphysically fixed and hence impossible to in any way alter, this very much including via our free will capacities; and, due to the just mentioned, as a requisite entailed in any eidem’s freely willed choice making that once was enacted, is being enacted, or will be enacted.

13.1. Evidencing the Prototelos

As was in part illustrated in Chapter 12, at least some of us can at times vacillate between multiple wants that contradict each other; yet, such occasional complexities of mind will however at all times still be partitionable into a) an eidem’s own momentarily held pullward wants (hence, wants that actively pull one toward the telos of one’s wants’ gratification), which, as such, will themselves be the eidem’s pullward (and, hence, autological) intentions, with the total of these intentions in turn constitutionally determining the eidem’s own pullward volition and b) all aspects of a total self—more specifically, of a total mind—which are not (a) and can thereby be pushward influences (irrespective of their degree or else type of force) which the eidem experiences internal to its own total self’s being.

The following arguments, then, will strictly concern any eidem’s own momentary held pullward (and, hence, autological) drives—to include the eidem’s autological intentioning and, hence, autological volition as well as any intent from which the former might be comprised. Anything by which the eidem could be pushwardly driven—irrespective of the degree of force, of the type, or else of the transiency applicable to such pushward drive, and irrespective of whether such pushward drive is endological or exological—will hence here be completely irrelevant to the arguments that ensue.

Following is a list of upheld unfalsified certainties which will be deemed to culminate in an evidencing the of the prototelos’s unfalsified certainty (in this list, brevity has been preferred to in-depth analysis):

When an agency pullwardly intends some telos X, by entailment the agency will then intend telos X’s fulfilment.
Because a syntelostasis is that outcome of a telosation in which the telos becomes fulfilled, an agency’s pullwardly intending telos X’s fulfilment will always be fully equivalent to the given agency’s pullwardly intending telos X’s syntelostasis.
Moreover, because it will be a logical contradiction, the following will then be inadmissible as possibility: that an agency can simultaneously and in the same respect both a) pullwardly intend that a telos X results in a syntelostasis and b) pullwardly intend that the same telos X does not result in a syntelostasis. Otherwise expressed, it will be impossible for an agency to simultaneously and in the same respect pullwardly intend that telos X results in both a syntelostasis and a dystelostasis.
Because the outcome of a dystelostasis (i.e., of a telostasis in which the intended telos is not fulfilled) in respect to a pullwardly intended telos X will not agree with an agency’s pullward intention that telos X is fulfilled, the outcome of a dystelostasis will then not conform to—i.e., will disagree with, and will thereby be disagreeable with—that which an intentioning agency intends.
Via the sum of our own personal experiences, all those here concerned will be aware that that which is disagreeable to what we pullwardly intend—hence disagreeable to what we pullwardly want and, thereby, disagreeable to our momentary being as (autological) eidems—will always at the same juncture be experienced by us as displeasing, this to some extent and in some respect.
Because of (1) through (5), all those here concerned will as eidems necessarily experience displeasure of some type and measure whenever our pullward intentions as eidems either a) result in dystelostases or else b) are believed by us to result at some future time in dystelostases.
All things being equal, all those here concerned will to some degree and in some respect disfavor—and, hence, will to some degree dislike, hold antipathy for, and hence aversion toward—that which we deem displeasing.
Because of (7), all those here concerned will then be in some way and to some degree averse to experiencing the dystelostases of our own pullward intentions’ as eidems—this irrespective of what we pullwardly intend at the stated juncture or else of the time frame in which the intent might either be foreseen or desired to result in a syntelostasis.
Because of (8), all those here concerned can as eidems only then be at all times pullwardly driven by a background, general intent to optimally minimize our incurred dystelostases—this irrespective of what intents we freely choose to pursue among alternatives whenever such alternatives are available to us.
The ideal optimal minimization of incurred dystelostases will be equivalent to no dystelostasis being ever incurred.
Hence, we are all telosially driven by a perpetually occurring background intent which is of itself not of our choosing but which in part telosially determines all that we choose: namely, the intent that our dystelostases are optimally minimized, such that, were it to be at all possible, we would not incur any dystelostasis whatsoever. This perpetually occurring background intent will be herein coined the prototelos.

Although cumbersome in expression by comparison to other similar phrases (such as those of the Will to life, the Will to power, and the Will to meaning), the prototelos could then be alternatively expressed in the following more succinct manner: the Will to a lack of incurred dystelostases.

For emphasis, were it to be hypothetically affirmed that a person intends (and in this manner alone wants) that their own will shall end in a dystelostasis, this could only equate to one of the following three affirmations: a) it could equate to the logical contradiction previously expressed in §13.1.3 which, as such, will thereby be inadmissible as both logical and ontological possibility; b) it could equate to the respective eidem pullwardly intending that it’s total self’s non-autological volition(s) not be fulfilled—in which case, one as eidem shall nevertheless will (hence intend and in this manner want) that one’s momentarily held pullward intent as eidem (here, namely, the eidem’s pullward intent that its total self’s non-autological will is to not be fulfilled) shall result in a syntelostasis; or else c) it could equate to the eidem’s total self intending (and in this manner wanting) that the eidem’s own pullward will (hence pullward intentioning and, in this manner, the eidem’s own pullward want(s)) not be fulfilled.

Whereas scenario (a) is inadmissible due to being a logical, and hence likewise ontological, impossibility, both scenarios (b) and (c) will be in full conformity to the prototelos, i.e. to the Will to a lack of incurred dystelostases—wherein the agency addressed shall necessarily hold as a background telos that that context-specific telos it telosates will end up in a syntelostasis, and this for as long as the context-specific telos is actively held.

13.2. Volitional Valence

The term valence shall here be addressed in its psychological sense—wherein valence is equivalent to the notion of hedonic tone such that positive valance is understood as pleasurable or else as attractiveness, negative valence is understood as displeasurable or else as aversiveness, and neutral valance is understood as neither pleasurable nor displeasurable or else as neither attractiveness nor aversiveness.

Volitional valance shall hence strictly apply to the hedonic tone of specific volitions; more precisely, to the hedonic tone applicable to volitions that end in syntelostases and to those that end in dystelostases. To address volitional valance with greater clarity, the following two terms will be made use of:

Suffering: In keeping with possible interpretations of the term’s etymology, let suffering in its generalized sense be herein understood as “the process or state of supporting or else bearing an unwanted burden” or, more simply, “a bearing of the unwanted”. Because all those here concerned will be averse to that which we deem unwanted, suffering will thereby always be to some degree a state of aversiveness and, hence, of negative valance.
Happiness: In keeping with possible interpretations of the term’s etymology, let happiness in its generalized sense be herein understood as “the process or state of being lucky and, hence, fortunate”. Because all those here concerned will either be attracted to or else be neutral toward being fortunate in our endeavors, happiness will thereby always either be of a positive valence of some degree or of a neutral valance.

Thus understood, all individual intentions from which a volition is comprised which terminate in dystelostases will then be understood to culminate in volitional suffering, which will strictly be of a negative valence. Conversely, all individual intentions from which a volition is comprised which terminate in syntelostases will then by entailment be understood to culminate in volitional happiness, which can either be of a positive valence or of a neutral valance.

13.2.1. Examples of Volitional Suffering

Were one to pullwardly intend and thereby pullwardly want to raise one’s arm but were to find oneself unable to so realize, one’s intent (that of raising one’s arm) will have here resulted in a dystelostasis. At the very juncture of this result, one will bear this unwanted dystelostasis and will thereby momentarily experience volitional suffering to some degree and in some form—which will always be of negative valence.

Were one to have for a significant time pullwardly intended some outcome X occurring during some time frame F and were outcome X to end up not being actualized during F, this very intent will have here resulted in a dystelostasis. One will hence experience some type and degree of volitional suffering upon incurring this dystelostasis in relation to one’s actively held intent.

Lastly here exemplified, were one to have for a significant time pullwardly intended some outcome X occurring during some time frame F and were one to then come to the psychological certainty that this intent cannot be fulfilled—either ever or else during F—one will then come to the psychological certainty that one’s heretofore held pullward intent can only result in a dystelostasis. At the time this realization is held, one will then bear the unwanted; namely, that all of one’s efforts to date will not allow for one’s intent’s syntelostasis. At the time of this realization, then, one will experience some type and degree of volitional suffering due to bearing this dystelostasis.

In summation, all of one’s pullward intentions that are either witnessed to terminate in a dystelostasis by oneself or else foreseen to terminate in a dystelostasis by oneself will entail the occurrence of volitional suffering—minimally occurring at the moment one’s actively held telos is understood to not result in a syntelostasis.

13.2.2. Examples of Neutral and Positive Volitional Happiness

In most, if not all, cases, the syntelostases of those intentions we actively engage in (or else once engaged in) whose eventual syntelostases are taken for granted by us shall result in volitional happiness with a relatively neutral valence. For example, were I to be psychologically certain—this in both unconscious and conscious manners—that I could raise my arm were I to so intend, and were I to then intend to raise my arm with this resulting in a syntelostasis, I would then be experiencing volitional happiness whose valence would be neutral to me. Let all such cases of volitional happiness be further specified as neutral volitional happiness.

In most, if not all, cases, the syntelostases of whatever intentions we actively engage in (or else once engaged in) whose eventual syntelostases are taken by us to be less than psychologically certain shall result in volitional happiness with a typically positive valence. For example, a person who has had a brain aneurysm which previously prevented the person moving their arm upon so intending will then be to some degree psychologically uncertain that now intending to raise their arm will result in their so raising their arm; supposing the person now so intends and that this intention now results in a syntelostasis, the person will then here experience volitional happiness whose valance will be to some measure positive. Let all such cases of volitional happiness be further specified as positive volitional happiness.

In summation, the more uncertain we are of realizing syntelostases via our pullward intentions, the more the obtainment of syntelostases will result in a positive volitional happiness. Conversely, the more certain we are (unconsciously, consciously, or both) that our intentions will result in syntelostases, the more the obtainment of syntelostases will result in a neutral volitional happiness.

13.2.3. Regarding Suffering and Happiness in General

In general, suffering can be equated to a deep-seated dissatisfaction and happiness to a deep-seated satisfaction—both of which will pertain to the totality of a total self or, else, to that part of a total self which is accordant to the eidem’s volition. As a relatively easy to address example of the latter, the masochist can experience happiness as eidem (and, hence, a deep-seated satisfaction) upon inflicting physical pain upon their own total self (wherein it can be here safely enough appraised that those aspects of their own total self which experience this physical pain shall then suffer, i.e. bear the unwanted).

Appraising the suffering and happiness of a total self—as well as the complexities that can ensue—will be greatly benefited by first investigating the nature of a total mind, which this treatise shall provide in Part 5.

Notwithstanding, it shall be upheld that all cases of an eidem’s generalized suffering and happiness will at all times be themselves constituted from individual installations of volitional suffering and volitional happiness, respectively.

13.3. Redefining the Prototelos via Volitional Valence

Most of our volitional happiness we take for granted as a matter of course and will thereby be of neutral valance. Moreover, because the degree of positive volitional happiness in telos X’s syntelostasis will often be directly proportional to the degree of psychological uncertainty that one’s telosating telos X will result in telos X’s syntelostasis, and because many of us will find experiencing a large degree of such psychological uncertainty uncomfortable irrespective of its results, it cannot be easily established that all those here concerned will then seek maximized degrees of positive volitional happiness.

In part due to the two complications just expressed, no attempt will be here made to redefine the prototelos via volitional happiness. Instead, for optimal stringency, the prototelos will be redefined in terms of volitional valence via use of volitional suffering, this as follows:

The prototelos—i.e., the unfalsifiedly certain Will to a lack of incurred dystelostases—can be further specified via volitional valence to be that generalized background intent ubiquitous to all volition in which the agency concerned seeks to optimally minimize all its volitional suffering such that, where it to be at all possible, no volitional suffering whatsoever would ever be incurred by it.

Rephrasing the just stated in more succinct manners, the prototelos can then be redefined via volitional valence in the following manner: the Will to not volitionally suffer.

13.3.1. Regarding the Intent to Suffer

It is not impossible for an eidem to hold the intent that it suffers at a future time. To avoid equivocation and the erroneous conclusions this would bring about, it will in such cases be important to adequately differentiate the possible volitional suffering of the given intention from the generalized suffering which the intention intends.

As a more concrete example of the aforementioned, suppose a person has done a misdeed, feels guilty about it, and thereby pullwardly wants to suffer for it so as to feel that compensation for the misdeed has been made. Here, were the person to not end up suffering despite their intent to so suffer, then and only then will the person experience volitional suffering at the dystelostasis of their intent. Conversely, were the person to end up suffering just as they had intended, they would then experience volitional happiness at the syntelostasis of their intent—be this volitional happiness either fully neutral or else in any way positive.

In this means, an intent or else want to suffer is not be confused with an intending (and in this sense wanting) that one’s very own actively held intention (and in this sense want) shall not be fulfilled (or else gratified)—as per the arguments of §3.1 (more specifically, the argument of §3.1.3), the latter can only be a logical contradiction, whereas the former is in no way logically contradictory.

13.4. Concluding Remarks

All aspects of our intentioning and hence of our volition in general will then always hold the unfalsifiedly certain prototelos as their most predominant pullward drive; the prototelos being a generalized telosial determinant that is inalterable, including by our free will capacities; that grounds all other intentions which one can engage in both in practice and in principle; and that is thereby a metaphysically fixed, foundational aspect of all conceivable volitions. All this entails that the unfalsifiedly certain prototelos is an ontically invariable, and hence ontically fixed, aspect of all volition.

Further enquiry into how the prototelos in part telosially determines (hence, telosially limits or sets boundaries to) all choices which can be made will be postponed till Chapter 15.

To better address this issue, next will first be addressed five conceivable scenarios regarding the prototelos’s very own ultimate telostasis—with these five, mutually exclusive, and collectively exhaustive possibilities being termed teleions. Four of these five teleions will concern the prototelos’s ultimate syntelostasis, which shall by entailment be the complete obtainment of a perfect cessation to all incurred dystelostases and, therefore, to all volitional suffering—with each of these four conceivable scenarios thereby fulfilling the prototelos. And one of these five teleions will be the prototelos’s invariably fixed ultimate dystelostasis—in which it is ontically impossible for the prototelos itself to ever become fulfilled.

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