This chapter investigates conceivable ultimate telostases to the prototelos, which are to be termed teleions. It will be upheld as unfalsifiedly certain that only the five teleions to be here specified can be validly conceptualized by anyone here concerned—thereby making these five teleions collectively exhaustive. Four of these will address the ultimate syntelostasis of the prototelos, which by entailment will be an eventual outcome in which absolutely no dystelostasis—and, hence, no volitional suffering—on the part of oneself as eidem can thereafter occur. Because it can be conceived of, a fifth teleion will be the impossibility of the prototelos holding an ultimate syntelostasis.

Because of the logical contradiction this would entail, it will be further upheld as unfalsified certainty that one cannot at the same time and in the same respect actualize any two or more of the five teleions—such that only one of the five teleions can in principle be actualized by any one of those here concerned. The five teleions will then be mutually exclusive in terms of their obtainment by any on eidem.

It will be furthermore upheld as unfalsified certainty that—although one’s eventual obtainment of one of these five, collectively exhaustive teleions will be necessary and, thereby, ontically certain—no one here concerned can evidence with epistemic certainty which of these five conceivable teleions are in fact ontically certain telostases of the prototelos and which are unactualizable.

The five teleions which are to be addressed will then play a pivotal role in this treatise’s analysis of both value theory and ontology—such that they will form the metaphorical backbone of the philosophy which this treatise seeks to espouse.

14.1. Demarcating Teleions

The term teleion is a contraction of the rare English adjective “teleiotic” and the suffix “-on”. The adjective teleiotic (itself etymologically stemming from Ancient Greek) signifies “complete, perfect” whereas the suffix -on has been borrowed, however imperfectly, from the Ancient Greek “-ον” so as to construct a noun.

As the term is to be understood within this work, a teleion is then a conceivable ultimate telostasis of the prototelos—importantly, this given all unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work, commencing with the reality of the eidem, progressing through the eidem’s three-tiers of awareness, and so far concluding with the prototelos—such that this ultimate telostasis addresses the prototelos’s complete and perfect fulfillment, this in respect to the prototelos’s perpetual strivings to minimize the incurring of dystelostases and, hence, of volitional suffering.

14.1.1. Differentiating Synteleions from the Dysteleion

Teleions will be classified via a dichotomy between a) those teleions which present the prototelos’s complete and perfect syntelostasis and b) that one teleion which presents the absolute absence of (a).

Teleions pertaining to category (a) will be specified as synteleions—this being a contraction of “syntelostasis” and “teleion”. The one teleion of category (b) will be specified as the dysteleion—this being a contraction of “dystelostasis” and “teleion”.

Informally specified, any conceivable synteleion will be a conceivable end-all and be-all to the protocept’s prototelos—else expressed, a conceivable end of all ends regarding one’s own volitional suffering as eidem—upon whose conceivable actualization all of one’s dystelostases and, hence, all of one’s volitional suffering as an eidem will cease to occur.

Alternatively expressed, any valid, conceivable synteleion will be a conceivable form of one’s complete and hence perfect liberation form all eidemic volitional suffering. This thereby makes all valid synteleions soteriological—such that all synteleions address one’s own personal salvation from eidemic suffering.

Also informally specified, conversely, the dysteleion will be the only conceivable end-all and be-all to the protocept’s prototelos wherein, irrespective of the synteleion one might at any juncture aspire toward, one’s aspirations to fully satisfy one’s prototelos will forever be completely Sisyphean—hence, incessantly reoccurring while nevertheless being completely and perfectly futile. This thereby makes the dysteleion the only non-soteriological teleion which we can conceive of.

14.1.2. Differentiating Euteleions from Pseudoteleions

When affixed to either the term teleion or synteleion, the English prefix “eu-” shall in this work signify genuine; hence not counterfeit, not fabricated, and not fake; hence correct or accurate; and therefore good—thereby specifying that one (or more) teleion whose potential obtainment oneself as eidem is ontically certain given the adequate volitional effort to actualize it (this yet maintaining that an eidem can obtain only one of the five conceivable teleions).

Conversely, the English prefix “pseudo-” when affixed to either the term teleion or synteleion shall in this work signify not genuine; hence counterfeit, fabricated, and fake; hence incorrect or wrong; hence false and therefore bad—thereby specifying a teleion whose obtainment is metaphysically impossible irrespective of the volitional effort expended to actualize it.

14.1.3. Concerning Inconceivable Teleion(s)

As was mentioned in §11.5, to prevent dead-ends of enquiry—and, thereby, the termination of all this treatise’s further enquiries into optimal subjective certainties regarding that which is ontically certain—the category of inconceivable possibilities can only be excluded from collectively exhaustive lists. This will then fully include the category of “inconceivable teleion(s)” in the collectively exhaustive list of all conceivable teleions.

Therefore, while we can conceive of the possibility that there might be one or more teleions which no one here concerned can currently fathom in practice, the possibility that one such currently inconceivable teleion is in fact the only euteleion (such that all teleions in any way conceivable by any of us shall then necessarily be pseudoteleions) cannot be entertained without likewise terminating the investigation of this treatise.

Because of this, the category of “inconceivable teleion(s)” will, again, be excluded from the following collectively exhaustive list of teleions.

14.2. The Five Collectively Exhaustive Teleions

Teleions will, again, be subclassified into four collectively exhaustive synteleions and the dysteleion. Together, these five scenarios will be upheld with unfalsified certainty to constitute the five collectively exhaustive teleions which anyone here concerned can conceive of. This unfalsified certainty can be at any time falsified via the provision of an additional, validly appraised teleion.

14.2.1. The Four Collectively Exhaustive Synteleions

A synteleion will, again, be a possible to conceive of teleion which is an ultimate syntelostasis of the prototelos. This will entail that any conceivable synteleion will necessarily consist of the absolute cessation of all of one’s both actual and possible dystelostases and, thereby, the absolute cessation of all of one’s volitional suffering as eidem—thereby completely fulfilling one’s prototelos in complete and perfect manners. Otherwise addressed, a valid synteleion will necessarily present one’s complete liberation from all volitional suffering as an eidem without exception. In this sense, then, all synteleions will present a conceivable perfect and complete salvation from all volitional suffering that one as eidem might incur.

It will be upheld as unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned can only conceive of the following, here briefly introduced, four possible synteleions—with the collective exhaustiveness of these four synteleions being falsifiable via the provision of any alternative valid synteleion:

14.2.1.1. The Nihilon

Let the nihilon—a term constructed from the Latin nihil (indefinite nothing) + -on (a noun-forming suffix borrowed from the Ancient Greek “ον”)—be here understood as a possible to conceive of synteleion which specifies the absolute nonbeing of oneself as that which is in any way aware.

The nihilon’s hypothetical actualization will then entail the absolute (i.e., perfect or else complete) cessation of—and hence liberation from—all dystelostases and, hence, all volitional suffering as an eidem.

The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the nihilon’s actualization can be alternatively specified as “the Will to absolute nonbeing”.

14.2.1.1.1. As Possible Euteleion

Let all those ontologies wherein the nihilon is considered the euteleion be termed forms of nihilonism, i.e. that worldview in which the nihilon is actualizable.

The nihilon can at present be coherently upheld via the following two, collectively exhaustive, metaphysical positions:

14.2.1.1.1.1. The Materialistic Nihilon

Given the unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work, it remains possible that some variant of physicalism or else of materialism accurately depicts that which is ontically certain, such that the unfalsifiedly certain occurrence of the eidemic protocept previously addressed in this work is fully contingent on, and fully emergent from, specific organizations of specific physical or else material structures—without which the protocept ceases to be in full and for all time. This will then in turn require that the nihilon is necessarily actualized, and thereby obtained, upon one’s corporeal death within the world (wherein the specific organizations of the specific physical or else material structures which facilitate the occurrence of the eidemic protocept cease to occur).

Let this scenario be further specified as the materialistic nihilon.

Hence, if such physicalism or materialism in fact happens to be ontically certain, then so too will be the materialistic nihilon. This scenario of materialistic nihilonism cannot currently be evidenced incorrect with epistemic certainty.

14.2.1.1.1.2. The Nonmaterialistic Nihilon

Given the unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work, it remains possible that some variant of a non-physicalist or else non-materialist ontology accurately depicts that which is ontically certain. In considering the many variants of such non-physicalist else non-materialist ontological possibility, it is then conceivable that in some such variants the eidemic protocept can be interpreted to of itself be pure nothingness, i.e. pure nonbeing, which only gains being due to the very allocepts it apprehends as eidem. In such latter conceptualizations, with the complete cessation of all allocepts (both exological and endological) the protocept will itself completely cease to in any way be—instead reverting to a state of indefinite nothingness. And, upon such cessation of being, the protocept will then necessarily obtain the nihilon—i.e., a complete and perfect cessation of any and all dystelostases which results from the complete and perfect cessation of personal being.

Let this scenario be further specified as the nonmaterialistic nihilon.

Hence, a) if neither physicalism nor materialism depicts that which in fact is ontically certain and b) it is nevertheless ontically certain that the protocept sans allocepts cannot in any way occur, hence be, then the nonmaterialistic nihilon will by entailment be ontically certain were all allocepts to cease occurring. This scenario of nonmaterialistic nihilonism too cannot currently be evidenced incorrect with epistemic certainty.

The possibility of the nonmaterialistic nihilon will be further addressed in §14.2.1.4.1.1.

14.2.1.1.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion

Firstly, because no ontology can at present be established with epistemic certainty, no ontology wherein the nihilon will be the euteleion can at present be established with epistemic certainty. Hence, the nihilon being obtainable in principle can be—not only affectively doubted, but also—inferentially doubted on these grounds alone.

Secondly, and maybe most potently, were the nihilon to in fact be obtainable in principle, this would then logically imply that the nihilon’s actualization would be the only valid means of completely satisfying the prototelos—i.e., of optimally minimizing all incurred dystelostases and, hence, of optimally minimizing all incurred volitional suffering on the part of oneself as eidem, this via their complete eradication. More specifically:

Were our corporeal death in this world to equate to the obtainment of either the materialistic nihilon or the nonmaterialistic nihilon, then this would in turn logically entail that all prototelos-endowed beings will obtain a liberation from volitional suffering, and thereby obtain their prototelos’s full syntelostasis, upon their own corporeal death. Given that the prototelos is of epistemic certainty (this as was addressed in Chapter 13) and due to the prototelos’s invariable imposition that we optimally minimize our volitional suffering as eidems via the choices we make, the nihilon’s hypothetical reality will moreover logically entail that, when rationally appraised in unbiased manners, all those here concerned should choose paths that produce our own corporeal death in as soon a time as possible—this so as to fully actualize our prototelos’s syntelostasis in the form of the nihilon. And, in so doing, our own volitional happiness (be it of positive or neutral valence) will then be maximally actualized via our strivings to corporeally die and thereby obtain the nihilon.

Barring those who entertain suicidal thoughts, this logically entailed intentioning to obtain the nihilon via corporeal death will however be directly contradictory to the intentioning which we all engage in and live by. This direct contradiction between a) what would be our beneficial (prototelos-impelled) intentioning were the nihilon to in fact be the euteleion and b) what we all in practice deem to be our (prototelos-impelled) beneficial intentioning will then of itself entail the following impossibility: were the nihilon to in fact be the sole euteleion to be had, it would then be a logical impossibility that we are in any way correct in what we deem to be our (prototelos-impelled) best intentioning when this intentioning in any way avoids the nihilon’s actualization via our corporeal death in as short a time as possible—for, again, in being the euteleion, the nihilon’s obtainment will then be the sole possible means of satisfying the prototelos, with all contrary intentions (regardless of how much volitional happiness they might transiently produce) being telosially driven by one or more pseudoteleions, thereby resulting in varying degrees of continued volitional suffering (this contrary to the prototelos’s want that no volitional suffering be incurred).

Readdressed, firstly, we hold sound reasons to inferentially (and not merely affectively) doubt that the conceivable nihilon is in fact the euteleion of our volition. And, secondly, because the nihilon’s hypothetical ontic certainty upon corporeal death would directly contradict all of our life-affirming intentioning, we then hold sound reason to conclude either that a) all our life-affirming intentions are self-sabotaging and thereby fully irrational (this given the unfalsified certainty of the prototelos) in not seeking the eusynteleion here assumed to be the nihilon via our own immediate corporeal death or, else, that b) our corporeal death to this world will not result in the obtainment of the nihilon—thereby making our corporeal-death-avoiding, life-affirming intentions rational in principle if not also in practice.

Were the just stipulated scenario (a) to be accurate in depicting that which is ontically certain, then all our life-affirming intentions will be utterly irrational without exception when unbiasedly addressed; and, because this treatise will greatly, if not fully, concern conclusions established via life-affirming intentions, this will then further logically entail that the remaining portions of this treatise will of themselves exemplify fully irrational intentioning and the fully irrational worldview(s) that can thereby result.

However, were the just stipulated scenario (b) to be accurate in depicting that which is ontically certain, then, firstly, the materialistic nihilon will by entailment necessarily be a pseudoteleion: one which could be pursued in principle but which is nevertheless false and hence ontically unobtainable—thereby necessarily resulting in incurred dystelostases upon one’s willful pursuit and actualization of one’s own corporeal death in hopes of actualizing the nihilon. Secondly, while this will of itself not conclusively establish that the nonmaterialistic nihilon is also a pseudoteleion, it will nevertheless entail that the nonmaterialistic nihilon—were it to in fact be the euteleion—also cannot be obtained via one’s corporeal death to this world, thereby again resulting in incurred dystelostases upon one’s pursuit and actualization of one’s own corporeal death in hopes of actualizing the nihilon.

Hence, were scenario (a) to be inaccurate and scenario (b) accurate, then the following would also apply: Firstly, i) the remaining portions of this treatise, in willfully upholding the optimal preservation of life, will not by entailment be necessarily irrational—for the nihilon will be a pseudoteleion—and, secondly, ii) because our corporeal death will then necessarily not result in our obtainment of the nihilon, our corporeal death will then necessarily not be an absolute cessation of our being as eidemic protocepts.

The entailment addressed in (ii) will, in turn, then make it viable to obtain other possible to conceive of synteleions, if not within one’s own current lifetime then at some point thereafter.

14.2.1.1.3. Culminating Remarks

Due to the aforementioned, whether the nihilon is the euteleion or else a pseudoteleion currently remains less than unfalsifiedly certain and, hence, cannot be demonstrated with infallible certainty.

It is to be noted that the materialistic nihilon, were it to be the euteleion, would necessarily be personal—rather than necessarily being globally applicable by entailment. However, the nonmaterialistic nihilon, as it will be addressed in §14.2.1.4.1.1 and were it to be the euteleion, will in contrast necessarily be globally applicable by entailment.

Furthermore, were the materialistic nihilon to be the valid euteleion, then all other conceivable teleions yet to be specified would then by entailment be necessary pseudoteleions. Why these same pseudoteleions should then at all occur—or, for that matter, why anyone should then hold any trepidation regarding the actualized nihilon—will, within any system of materialistic nihilonism, remain unexplainable in full given the strict set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this treatise.

[As a personal sidenote, I, the author of this work, almost feel apologetic for addressing the scenario of the materialistic nihilon. The very subject is doubtlessly close to being taboo due to its immediate pertinence to our living of life—especially for many of those who deem the living of life less than pleasant. Notwithstanding, the possibility of the materialistic nihilon—along with what I currently find to be obvious arguments against its reality—is one requisite aspect of the subject matter at hand, and so is in need of being addressed. More so, this chapter’s list of possible to conceive of teleions best commences with that teleion here specified as the nihilon, this because only were the materialistic nihilon to be a pseudoteleion would all other teleions then become appraisable as logically possible euteleions. In the due course of this treatise, arguments will culminate to the effect of further evidencing the nihilon to be a pseudoteleion—instead strengthening the likelihood of that teleion to be termed the apeiroson being the real euteleion. For now, however, the basic dichotomy between either all life-affirming intentions being rudimentally irrational or else the materialistic nihilon not being real and thereby not obtainable is deemed to suffice.]

14.2.1.2. The Permanon

Firstly, commencing with this subsection—and in keeping with William James’ analysis of the self^[1]—let the following general dichotomy be understood:

the empirical self: as defined by the APA Dictionary of Psychology, the self that is known by the self, rather than the self as knower—with the former including what William James further specified as the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self^[2]; rephrased using this treatise’s terminology, let the empirical self be understood to be one’s total self (hence, both exological—e.g., one’s seeing of one’s own corporeal body—and endological—e.g., one’s conceptual understanding of the concepts one holds in mind) as it is discerned by the eidemic protocept via its mesocepts. The empirical self can hence be deemed equivalent to the Kantian notion of the empirical ego.
the protoceptual self; aka, the nominative self (what William James himself termed “the pure ego”): as the nominative self (aka, the protoceptual self) is defined by APA Dictionary of Psychology, the self as knower of the self, rather than the self so known^[3]; rephrased using this treatise’s terminology, let the protoceptual self be understood to be the eidemic protocept per se—which can only be an I-ness relative to all other for as long as it apprehends other via its mesocepts as an eidem. The protoceptual self can hence be deemed equivalent to the Kantian notion of the transcendental ego.

When generally applied, the term a self will then be here understood to consist of both the protoceptual self in question and its empirical self.

Secondly, and in conformity with its common usage, let the term self-preservation be here understood as the process via which a given being attempts to optimally avert all forms of personal harm from befalling its own self.

Thirdly, let it be understood that, because incurred psychological suffering will be a form of personal harm, and because volitional suffering (i.e., the incurring of dystelostases) will be a form of psychological suffering, the incurring of volitional suffering will of itself be a form of personal harm—one which the process of self-preservation as just defined thereby attempts to optimally avoid.

And fourthly, let the following be understood: There will be a difference between engaging in, and hence actualizing, a relative self-preservation and the obtaining of an absolute self-preservation. Whereas in relative self-preservation the self in question strives to optimally avert all forms of personal harm from being incurred (and may further embrace changes in one's self as well as expect an eventual cessation of one’s empirical self), in an absolute—hence complete and perfect—self-preservation all forms of personal harm (including all volitional suffering) will be permanently averted for all time yet to come.

Given the aforementioned, an obtained absolute self-preservation—wherein all forms of personal harm are thereby averted in complete or else perfect manners for all eternity by a given self—will then qualify as a possible to conceive of full syntelostasis of the prototelos, such that no volitional suffering on the part of oneself as eidem can possibly occur once this state of being is obtained. More succinctly stated, an obtained absolute self-preservation will then qualify as a possible to conceive of, valid synteleion.

For emphasis, this specified synteleion will require that one as a protoceptual self shall not incur any volitional suffering whatsoever precisely due to all the cherished aspects of one’s own empirical self permanently remaining devoid of any harm whatsoever—this such that one’s empirical self will minimally include both all aspects from which one as a self is necessarily constituted and all aspects of one’s social networks via which one’s social roles are established and which thereby in part define what one is as a self.

Because this synteleion requires an unending permanence of being as just described, this particular synteleion has been thought best specified as the permanon: a term contracted from the Latin permaneō (to remain or endure through whatever happens) + -on (a noun-forming suffix stemming from the Ancient Greek “ον”).

Whether the permanon is conceived of as occurring within a person’s corporeal lifetime (e.g., such as via some transhumanist means) or at any point thereafter (e.g., such as via entrance into an incorporeal Heaven wherein its obtainment becomes actualized), it, importantly, will again need to be a state of being wherein all eidemic volitional suffering ceases to occur without exception, this in order to be a valid synteleion. Without this requirement, eidemic volitional suffering would yet persist, thereby not fully satisfying the prototelos—and, thereby, not presenting a valid synteleion.

In summation, the permanon as just described will be that possible to conceive of synteleion wherein an absolute (rather than relative) self-preservation—and, hence, an absolute (rather than relative) permanence of one’s own empirical self’s being—is obtained, this such that all personal harm becomes averted without exception upon this state’s actualization, thereby equating to a perpetual state of being wherein no eidemic volitional suffering ever occurs.

The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the permanon’s actualization can be furthermore specified as “the Will to absolute self-preservation” or, alternatively, as “the Will to absolute permanence of one’s own empirical self”.

14.2.1.2.1. As Possible Euteleion

If all life-affirming and sustaining intentions either directly or indirectly intend some form of self-preservation, and if the optimal aversion of all forms of personal harm (i.e., the optimal form of self-preservation) will be an obtained state of absolute self-preservation, then it can become cogently maintained that life’s faculties of self-preservation have as their ultimate aim the obtainment of the permanon.

Furthermore, aspirations to optimally approach if not also obtain the permanon can be found throughout history and in different cultures in different guises: Examples can range from the fabled fountain of youth, to the fabled elixir of life, to the interpretation of Heaven as a domain wherein no suffering (and, hence, no eidemic volitional suffering) occurs, to other forms of longing for happiness via the immortality of one’s empirical self (be this immortality either corporeal or incorporeal, with the latter further classifiable as either spiritually incorporeal or non-spiritually incorporeal (as one example of non-spiritually incorporeal immortality, the ideal of having human consciousness converge with advanced artificial intelligences such that we then shed our corporeal, biological bodies))—more specifically, an immortality which brings about happiness by obliterating all forms of personal harm (this, for example, in contrast to the unending occurrence and, hence, immortality of an eidem commonly conceived of as occurring within the domains of an incorporeal Hell).

Regardless of how strivings toward the permanon might manifest, they all nevertheless appear to hold in common the conviction that the permanon is the sole synteleion to be had in principle and that the closer to the permanon one approaches the less suffering is to be had.

Because at the present juncture there is no comprehensive ontology that is to be upheld with unfalsified certainty, there cannot at the present juncture be found a means of establishing the permanon to be a pseudoteleion with unfalsified certainty.

14.2.1.2.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion

For the permanon to obtain, it will seem that the cherished aspects of the self in question will need to become completely, and hence perfectly, permanent and, because of this, completely and perfectly changeless. For example, any changes which hinder or else obliterate those aspects of the cherished empirical self pertaining to the protoceptual self in question will result in the volitional suffering of the respective protoceptual self, for one intends to indefinitely preserve these very aspects in unharmed manners.

Firstly, this will seem to require that all aspects upon which one’s empirical self is dependent will themselves then need to become perfectly permanent and hence changeless so as to actualize the permanon for the addressed self.

Secondly, and maybe more importantly, were no changes whatsoever to occur to one’s cherished empirical self—all of which is known to the protoceptual self via allological cognita—then would seem to entail that no changes be possible in the allocepts which one as protocept experiences. If so, then it would further seem that no changes would occur in oneself as the protoceptual self to which the given empirical self pertains.

Hence, if this is so, then the obtainment of the permanon—where it to be in any way possible to obtain—would fully equate to the absolute fixedness of one’s own being as an allocept-apprehending protocept, i.e. as an eidem.

In short, one as eidem would here seem to become as frozen as a statue, albeit in everlasting manners. Whereas one as eidemic protocept would yet occur with the obtainment of the permanon thus inferred and, by comparison, would in no way occur given the actualization of the nihilon, both these synteleions (were either to be an eusynteleion, rather than both being pseudosynteleions) would seem to equate to an absence of oneself as an aware being, this given that the awareness which all those here concerned are autoaware of requires changes in the cognita one as protocept is alloaware of. And it is questionable whether anyone here concerned seeks such perfect fixedness of psychological being when in any way longing for or aspiring toward closer proximity to the permanon (this aspiration being applicable only to those who so yearn for the permanon’s actualization).

Conversely argued, where this absolute fixedness of psychological being just specified to not obtain—such as via one’s continued interactions with other eidems—then changes in allological cognita would yet manifest and, with their manifestation, there would then yet be intentions engaged in which will not be guaranteed to always result in syntelostases for all time yet to come. This then entailed possibility of dystelostases, though, would by its very nature preclude this state of being from being a valid synteleion—for potential volitional suffering can here yet occur due to the very possibility of dystelostases—and would because of this thereby not be the valid synteleion here termed the permanon.

14.2.1.2.3. Culminating Remarks

Due to the aforementioned reasons, whether the permanon is a (or "the") euteleion or else is a pseudoteleion currently remains less than unfalsifiedly certain and, hence, cannot be demonstrated with infallible certainty.

Of note, the permanon, were it to be a euteleion, would be strictly personal—rather than necessarily being globally applicable by entailment.

The permanon’s so being a eusynteleion will also allow—if not altogether require—for the turannon being a cooccurring eusynteleion (be below).

14.2.1.3. The Turannon

The turannon—a term constructed from the Ancient Greek τῠ́ρᾰννος ("túrannos", absolute ruler) + -on (a noun-forming suffix borrowed from Ancient Greek “ον”)—will be here understood as that possible to conceive of synteleion wherein one obtains a state of absolute rulership (hence, wherein one regulates absolutely and, hence, holds absolute control) over everything other relative to oneself, this without exception. Thus understood, the turannon once actualized—if it is at all possible to actualize—would grant one as eidem the ability to create, eradicate, or else modify anything whatsoever that one deems other relative to one’s protoceptual self as an eidem in full conformity to one’s own will—including the very nature of space, time, matter, and the volition of other selves, hence including all aspects of Nature writ large.

Because the turannon-actualized eidem will then hold the ability to do anything it wants in manners fully devoid of any opposition from anything other, this eternally, it becomes readily conceivable that a turannon-actualized eidem will for all eternity never experience any dystelostases and, hence, would for all eternity never experience any volitional suffering. Due to this, the turannon then becomes a conceivable valid synteleion.

Unlike with the materialistic nihilon (or any system of nihilonism wherein the nihilon is immediately obtained upon one’s corporeal death) and the permanon, the turannon can only be a globally manifesting synteleion: In order to be actualized by any one eidem, everything other relative to the eidem will need to conform to the given eidem’s will in absolute manners—hence entailing that the cosmos in full together with all aspects of it regardless of how miniscule be fully conformant to that which the turannon-actualized eidem desires them to be. This, in turn, necessitates that the turannon, where it to be a valid euteleion, can only be globally manifesting. For one example, were there to hypothetically only be two equally turannon-proximate eidems that in any way interact, neither eidem would obtain a synteleion wherein all of its dystelostases completely cease; then, for the turannon as eusynteleion to be obtained, one of the two given eidems would need to conquer the other in manner that allow it to actualize the turannon at the expense of all the other’s proximity to the turannon.

Also—in stark contrast to the apeiroson, which, as another globally applicable synteleion, can only take a singular global form (see §14.2.1.4 for more information regarding this)—the turannon’s actualization can take an indefinite number of forms, each of these being fully contingent on the character traits and respective whims of the specific eidem which would actualize the turannon as synteleion. Otherwise expressed, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, benevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively benevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. On the other hand, were the eidem which actualizes the turannon to be, for example, malevolent, what would then conceivably result is a relatively malevolent cosmos as outcome of this turannon-actualized eidem’s will. Because of this, each hypothesized turannonist’s ultimate ideal of an actualized turannon will entail a resulting cosmos as unique as is the individual eidem which so intends—thereby further entailing one of an indefinite number of different possible cosmoses upon the turannon’s actualization and, thereby, an indefinite quantity of forms that the actualized turannon could itself take.

The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the turannon’s actualization can be furthermore specified as “the Will to absolute control over other”.

14.2.1.3.1. As Possible Euteleion

As possible euteleion, the turannon can take one of two broad forms: as being already actualized by some eidem who singularly brings about all there is or, otherwise, as not being yet actualized by any eidem.

As to the first scenario, in stark contrast to possible apeirosonic interpretations of Divinity (see §14.2.1.4.1 for some examples of these), any notion of the total cosmos being the fully creation of a singular incorporeal and supernal eidem which holds absolute control over all that was, is, and will be shall, then, be a turannonist explanation for all that is—which will itself be founded in the supposition of a preexisting turannon-actualized eidem. Within such system of turannonism (this being that worldview wherein the turannon is upheld as eusynteleion), to every conceivable question can be given the here primordially valid answer that the turannon-actualized eidem so did it. This singular creator eidem of all that is will, within turannonism, by entailment then necessarily be the creator of not only all realities (to fully include all aspects of the physical cosmos) but also of all truths—be the latter either personal or impersonal, this where truth is tentatively understood to be “conformity to that which is real”—as well as the creator of justice and of goodness itself. This singular absolute-creator eidem shall then necessarily dwell as eidem beyond truths, beyond justice, and beyond goodness—instead being their creator in full, rather than being in any way subject to any semblance of truth, or justice, or goodness to which it is in any manner constrained. All this while, again, necessarily remaining an eidem and, hence, a mesocept-endowed protocept which can thereby apprehend allocepts.

In considering the possibility of such a ready-established (if not eternally-established) turannon-actualized eidem, as humans we can then possibility seek to be in this turannon-actualized eidem’s best regards so as to either a) possibly further approach the turannon’s actualization ourselves and either i) attempt to overtake the current turannon-actualized eidem’s position so that we can ourselves become the singular turannon-actualized eidem or, else, ii) somehow fully unify with the already turannon-actualized eidem so as to completely and perfectly become one with the turannon-actualized eidem or, otherwise, so as to b) eventually find ourselves in a reality ready-established by the turannon-actualized eidem wherein we might obtain the permanon’s actualization for ourselves (with scenario (b) entailing that oneself as eidem never actualizes the eusynteleion of the turannon but, instead, holds the possibility of actualizing the eusynteleion of the permanon via the turannon-actualized eidem’s will).

In any system of turannonism different from that aforementioned, the turannon—while yet remaining a eusynteleion—shall not as of yet be actualized by any eidem. Whereas the previously given description illustrates what might be termed a macrocosmic scenario wherein the turannon is already actualized by some eidem, the following can then be termed to be microcosmic scenarios wherein the turannon yet awaits to be actualized by the eidem addressed:

Just as the macrocosmic scenario presents a case where cosmic order is singularly brought about by the turannon-actualized eidem, in microcosmic scenarios maximal order will be brought about by the most turannon-proximate eidem in a cohort—this as can be typically exemplified by the position of emperor or king. As with the macrocosmic scenario, subjects of the most turannon-proximate eidem might then seek the cohort’s most turannon-proximate eidem’s best regards either a) so as to optimally approach this turannon-proximate position themselves or b) so as to optimally obtain a permanon-proximate state of being for themselves. In at least this microcosmic scenario, where the cohort’s most turannon-proximate eidem to no longer so be, disorder (if not chaos) would potentially result for the cohort; due to this possibility, the subjects of the cohort’s most turannon-proximate eidem will then likely defend the position and wellbeing of this order-bringing, turannon-proximate eidem.

This briefly described microcosmic system of societal order would not be possible in manners devoid of the turannon as synteleion and, therefore, the occurrence of such systems of societal order makes it conceivable that the turannon might in fact be a eusynteleion.

Many other accounts of turannon-driven systems can be presented. Nevertheless, for the time being the general outlook so far presented is deemed sufficient illustration of what the turannon as euteleion would entail—as well as sufficient illustration for the turannon potentially being an ontically certain synteleion.

14.2.1.3.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion

The following is a partial list of arguments for the turannon being a pseudoteleion:

Per the turannon’s requirement, obtaining all that one wants all the time without any strife or challenges—and, hence, without any risk of dystelostases whatsoever being ever incurred—this for all eternity, can easily be conceived to itself result in a boredom so strenuous and unbearable that it would result in unending volitional suffering—thereby directly contradicting the possibility of the turannon in fact being a eusynteleion.

Were the turannon to in fact be the euteleion, then, upon its actualization, there would conceivably be nothing left to want, hence nothing left to intend, hence a cessation of all volition. This, however, directly contradicts that which is conceivable as the turannon as eusynteleion.

An eidem’s actualization of the turannon necessitates the eidem’s absolute control over everything in order to be the valid euteleion—this, thereby, entails either a) the complete and perfect negation of free will on the part of any other being in the cosmos upon the turannon’s actualization by an eidem or, else, b) the complete and perfect obedience of all otherwise free-will endowed other beings in the cosmos to the turannon-actualized eidem’s will, this such that no conflict ever then occurs between the turannon-actualized eidem and all other eidems. It, however, is unfalsifiedly certain that all those here concerned are endowed with free will as eidems, and that at least some of us via our free will rebel against turannonic beings and powers. This then strongly implies that no ready-existent turannon-actualized being occurs.

As the last, and maybe most important, argument to be here addressed: One’s actualizing the turannon as eidem will entail that one becomes an omnipotent poietic cause and—although not an infallible certainty and thereby fallible—as was addressed in Chapter 11, it currently is an unfalsified certainty that an omnipotent poietic cause is logical impossibility due to the logical contradiction it entails. This previously evidenced unfalsified certainty then directly presents the unfalsified certainty that the turannon’s actualization is impossibility.

Other arguments for the turannon being a pseudoteleion are possible—and will be further addressed in Volume II subsequent to enquiry into the nature of physical objectivity.

14.2.1.3.3. Culminating Remarks

As has been illustrated, in the case of the turannon, that it cannot be a eusynteleion can be evidenced with unfalsified certainty; notwithstanding, because all unfalsified certainties that the turannon is in fact a pseudoteleion cannot be themselves evidenced with infallible certainty, they thereby remain technically fallible. Due to this reason alone, the possibility that the turannon is in fact an eusynteleion will remain entertained within this work.

Notwithstanding—whether or not the turannon is actualizable—the closer to the turannon one approaches the more control over other one obtains. Hence, all selves—to the extent that all selves hold some degree of control over that which is other relative to themselves, irrespective of how miniscule—shall then be to different extents turannonical in at the very least some of their behavioral heuristics. Yet, as will be further discussed in later portions of this chapter, this will so be regardless of whether one’s overall intentions as an eidem are permanonical, turannonical, or apeirosonical and, indeed, regardless of whether an eidem might in fact be a permanonist (which hence upholds the permanon as their yet to be obtained eusynteleion), a turannonist (which hence upholds the turannon as their yet to be obtained eusynteleion), or else an apeirosonist (which hence upholds the apeiroson as their yet to be obtained eusynteleion). At core issue here will not be the type of means (i.e., heuristics) used but, rather, the very end(s) pursued for which these means are in the necessary service of obtaining; rephrased, in this philosophy the ultimate ends (hence, the synteleions) shall always justify the means. As will be further addressed at later junctures, this synteleion-based consequentialism will however not be deemed mutually exclusive to deontology within any system of apeirosonism.

That sated, of important enough further note: Dictatorships and their respective dictators, authoritarian regimes and their respective authoritarian figures, all systems of supremacism, and so forth—as well the pleasures (momentary or otherwise) of those who willfully engage in the raping of others, the murdering of others, the dehumanizing of others, and so forth, with these pleasures hence obtained in the process of so doing—will all then in their own ways be ultimately telosially driven by the turannon in either conscious or unconscious manners, this either via very turannon-proximate eidems or, else, via eidems seeking closer proximity to the turannon.

Lastly here addressed, were the turannon to in fact be a eusynteleion, the nihilon, the apeiroson, and the dysteleion would then necessarily be pseudoteleions—but the permanon might yet be a concurrent eusynteleion for all those who do not themselves actualize the turannon but, instead, properly obey the turannon-actualized eidem’s will. In any turannonism wherein the turannon is already actualized by some eidem, the reason for the occurrence of the other three teleions as pseudoteleions will, again, be that the turannon-actualized eidem so wills their occurrence. In any system of turannonism wherein the turannon is not yet actualized by any eidem, why pseudoteleions occur—for that matter, this alongside the occurrence of a physical reality—shall by in large remain unexplainable when more deeply enquired into in this philosophy.

14.2.1.4. The Apeiroson

The apeiroson is a term constructed from the English prefix apeiro- (infinite, here strictly meaning completely and perfectly devoid of any conceivable finitudes), the Doric Ancient Greek ὠσία (“osia”; essence or being), and -on (a noun-forming suffix borrowed from the Ancient Greek “ον”)—and can hence translate into “being which is fully devoid of any conceivable boundaries or limits and is hence fully devoid of all finitudes—thereby being infinite in this complete and perfect sense—which is thereby free of all conceivable constraints and, because all duality poses a limit or boundary between, which is therefore completely or perfectly nondual”. With this understood:

Were one as a protoceptual self to persist occurring in manners fully devoid of all allocepts and, hence, of all mesocepts such that the only cognita remaining will be purely senceptual and autological, one would then obtain a literally nondual state of being devoid of all otherness. For emphasis, one here would not occur as an eidem—i.e., as an ego in the sense of an I-ness—for an eidem necessitates there being allocepts apprehended via mesocepts and, hence, the occurrence of a duality between some form of self and its respective otherness. Because in this literally nondual state of being there will no longer be anything which could facilitate distances (between givens) or durations (between givens), this state of being can furthermore then only be both distanceless (hence, spaceless) and durationless (hence, timeless). Moreover, in this nondual state of being, because there will occur nothing else but the literally egoless, or I-less, protoceptual self, there will be nothing else remaining which can in any way limit or else constrain the given protoceptual self—thereby entailing that in this state the protoceptual self will be completely and perfectly limitless—potentially entailing that selfhood fully dissolves such that the notion of selfhood (here strictly understood as that which interacts with, but is not, other) loses both all meaning and occurrence: such that this state of being could then be described as completely and perfectly selfless being. In short, the protoceptual self will here be completely and perfectly devoid of any finitudes and will thereby be an absolutely infinite mesocept-devoid autoawareness. Lastly here addressed, because in this scenario there will not remain anything which can in any way obstruct one’s own will as a protocept on account of there being no otherness whatsoever, there will then no longer occur any prospect of dystelostases and, therefore, of volitional suffering—such that the current volitional suffering which one as eidem experiences and holds the potential to experience fully vanishes upon the obtainment of this literally nondual state of infinite being.

This just specified literally nondual state of infintie and egolless being will then be here addressed as the apeiroson. Although the apeiroson is far harder to imagine than any of the three previously mentioned synteleions, it nevertheless is a conceivable synteleion given this treatise’s so far accumulated unfalsified certainties—i.e., the apeiroson is then a conceivable ultimate syntelostasis of the eidemic protocept’s prototelos. In so being, the apeiroson is then a valid teleion wherein the prototelos becomes fully satisfied, making it the last of the four conceivable synteleions this chapter specifies and briefly describes.

Doubtlessly, the apeiroson will be the most difficult teleion to properly explain and argue the possibility of. In this philosophy, it will also be the most pivotal teleion to, among other things, the occurrence of a physical reality. To more adequately and succinctly explain this teleion, first a brief outline of the general ontology minimally necessitated by the apeiroson, this were it to be the euteleion, will be presented.

For further ease of expression, let the term apeirosonism be understood to specify that ontology wherein the apeiroson is the only teleion possible to actualize, i.e. wherein the apeiroson is the euteleion.

Then, here tentatively assuming the reality of apeirosonism, the ontology of the cosmos will necessarily be categorized in the following generalized, here tersely outlined, manner:

Prior to the apeiroson’s actualization, there will necessarily occur an ontic duality between two types of fundamental essences that intimately—maybe even in nearly (if not fully) indiscernible manners—cooccur for as long as the apeiroson remains unactualized: one fundamental essence will strictly consist of protoceptual being and will be the sole remaining essence, or being, once the apeiroson is actualized; whereas the other will be non-protoceptual and will be via any number of means perpetually brought about, i.e. made or created, by the former essence till the time of the apeiroson’s actualization, whereupon it becomes fully dissolved. This latter fundamental essence will furthermore be illusory from the vantage of the apeiroson as ultimate reality—and, again, for emphasis, must fully dissolve in order for the apeiroson to be actualized:

The protocepture: The first of these two fundamental essences will be termed the protocepture—this being a contraction of “protoceptual” and “nature”, hence signifying “that aspect of nature consisting of protoceptual being at large”. Hence, the protocepture will be understood to strictly equate to protoceptual being as category, and will therefore consist of both one’s own protoceptual self as an eidemic protocept as well as all other protocepts which populate the cosmos—this granting the impossibility of solipsism, which is to be so evidenced as impossible in Part 4 of this work—such that the protocepture will be equivalent to the sum total of all coexisting protocepts in the cosmos. Granting the logical impossibility of solipsism, because prior to the apeiroson’s actualization the protocepture can then only be fractioned—else expressed, fragmented—into a plurality of individual protocepts (be these eidemic or not—a topic to be further addressed in Part 5 of this work), the protocepture as it occurs prior to the apeiroson’s actualization can then be furthermore termed the fractiprotocepture (a contraction of “fractioned” and “protocepture”) so as to emphasize its fragmented state of being prior to the apeiroson’s actualization—a fragmented state of protoceptual being which, for emphasis, will again indefinitely persist to different extents (hence, in different quantities of fragmented parts) prior to the apeiroson’s actualization. Upon the apeiroson’s actualization, the former fractiprotocepture fully unifies into a completely partless whole due to becoming perfectly devoid of the second fundamental essence of poieture (see below). Individual eidemic protocepts—which are necessarily partly poietural in nature minimally due to always at minimum being allocept-apprehending—can be birthed into and pass away from the physical (and, hence, poietural) cosmos as it is known yet, given apeirosonism, the protocepture per se can nevertheless only be both uncreated and undestroyable as a fundamental essence (despite the precise nature of this fundamental essence termed the protocepture being unknowable till the time the apeiroson becomes actualized).
The poieture: The second of these two fundamental essences will be here termed the poieture. The term poieture will here specify “that aspect of nature consisting of all that is in any way created, made, or produced—and which is thereby non-protoceptural”. The term is coined by contracting the English term “poietic” (meaning “formative” or “creative”)—this such that the adjective “poietic” is here strictly interpreted to intend that which has been, is being, or will be in any manner formed or created—and the term “nature”. The poieture thus understood will then consist of all alloceptual actualities—be these perceptual, phainoceptual, or senceptual—all alloceptual-reality contingent mesocepts, and all autoceptual cognita whose occurrence is dependent upon any alloceptual actuality (the autoception of physiological hunger and of being in physiological pain as two examples of the latter). Within apeirosonism, then, the poieture will necessarily be brought about, hence formed or created, by the fractiprotocepture in one manner or another—be this collectively by the cosmos’s fractiprotocepture in total or via any of its individual parts, these including individual cohorts of eidemic protocepts or else individual eidemic protocepts (as one example of the latter, the effects which individual eidemic protocepts genesially determine, and thereby bring about, via our free will as poietic causes will in and of themselves be aspects of the poieture at large). The poieture will thereby be brought about via, minimally, the four determinacy categories addressed in Chapter 8, with these determinacy categories occurring either individually or collectively. The poieture will, again, include all that is in any way—perceptually, phainoceptually, or else senceptually—allological relative to the protocepts of the cosmos and, hence, relative to the protocepture at large. One’s empirical self—fully including one own corporeal body and one’s endoalloceived mind—will thereby itself be one aspect of the cosmos’s poieture in total—whereas one’s protoceptual self (despite its being formed via poietural constraints into an eidem) will be an aspect of the cosmos’s protocepture.

The ontic duality between the protocepture and the poieture will hence be in no way Cartesian. One reason for this is that all which is alloceptual—both psychically and physically (be such alloceptual givens either endo-alloceptual or exo-alloceptual)—will, again, be aspects of the same fundamental essence of poieture at large. For emphasis, while the poieture can well be concluded to hold a property dualism between the mental and the material, both the mental and the material will nevertheless be aspects of the same fundamental essence—informally expressed, of the same stuff—which is the poieture. This then mandates that there is no ontic duality between mind and body as Cartesianism is typically understood to uphold.

The second reason for this duality of fundamental essences being non-Cartesian is that, within apeirosonism, only the protocepture will be real in an ultimate sense; the poieture, in contrast, in an ultimate sense of reality can here only be illusory in full. This, again, as is entailed for the apeiroson to be in fact actualizable and for it to thereby be the euteleion.

Moreover—because the ontic duality between the protocepture and the poieture will hold all poieture (both mental and physical) to be illusory from the vantage of the (yet to be) actualized apeiroson as ultimate reality, and because from this same vantage of the actualized apeiroson there will then only occur one ontically real essence, that of the protocepture—this state of affairs can then be further interpreted as a form of non-dualistic monism wherein all duality between self and other—and hence all instantiations of ego or, else expressed, of I-ness—will itself ultimately be illusory.

The just expressed ontology applicable to apeirosonism can then be furthermore labeled either a form of idealism wherein all existents will be ultimately psychical (given the implications which follow in this philosophy, more specifically, an objective idealism in general conformity to that proposed by the philosopher Charles Sandars Peirce wherein the physical cosmos could be interpreted as an ever evolving effete mind, one which here ever-evolves toward the apeiroson), or, otherwise, a form of neutral monism (wherein both mind and matter are two aspects of the same substance here termed poieture which, as poieture, is itself dependent on the utterly different fundamental essence of protocepture).

Also of further interest to this chapter, at the very least apeirosonism—if not all other teleionic worldviews—will further necessitate the following four general types of reality (with these four categories of reality being formally derived and explained in considerably more detail within Volume II of this work]. For these four categories, let “subjectivity” be tentatively understood as the state of being subjected to allocepts and to constraints and let “objectivity” be tentatively understood as the state of being wholly impartial and thereby not contingent on subjective perspectives and appraisals, where the latter can only be partial to the subject(s) concerned.

Intrareality; aka, intrasubjectivity; aka intra-agential reality: when relative to us as eidems, this being the sum of all poietural actualities experienced by the eidemic protocept which remain strictly known to the eidemic protocept in question. As an example of this, the senceptual quality to a phainoceived aspect of an REM dream which one as eidemic protocept upon awakening does not share with any other eidemic protocept will, then, be strictly intrareal. In a strictly intrasubjective sense, then, we each as eidems perpetually inhabit, and are at the center of, our own unique intrareal world, hence intrareality—which can hold the same properties as what has been traditionally termed an umwelt.
Interreality; aka, intersubjectivity; aka, inter-agential reality: poietural actualities which can only occur when commonly shared between two or more intrasubjectivities. Examples of this can include languages and cultures, as well as more mundane actualities such as that of a (commonly shared) conversation or else the reality of a relationship between two people.
Equireality; aka, equiobjectivity; aka, equi-agential reality: that poietural actuality which is commonly shared by all coexistent protocepts in the cosmos, which is thereby wholly impartial to any protocept or cohort of these, and which can thereby only be singular in its nature; physicality or, else expressed, the physical world or cosmos; i.e., the universe; in C. S. Peirce’s objective idealism terms, the effete mind.
Ultrareality; aka, ultraobjectivity; aka, ultra-agential reality: the reality of the euteleion(s) which, irrespective of which of the five teleions it might in fact happen to be, perpetually remains real in manners wholly impartial to any mesocept-endowed protocept or cohort of these—this in conjunction with the likewise impartial reality of the prototelos. Within apeirosonism, however, because the apeiroson will be here deemed the euteleion and thereby ultrareal, and because the apeiroson necessitates the generalities of ontology previously addressed in order to be actualized, apeirosonic ultrareality will by entailment be further comprised of—not only the yet to be actualized apeiroson as euteleion, which once actualized can only be a wholly unified protocepture devoid of all poieture, but also—the very (prototelos-endowed) fractiprotocepture as fundamental essence within the cosmos (such that the cosmos is understood to contain and be comprised of both the ultrareal fractiprotocepture as well as all aspects that are in any way poietural: intrarealities, interrealities, and the equireality). As such, oneself as protocept—when conceptualized in manners fully independent of poieture and thus fully devoid of one’s own empirical self, all other allocepts, and hence all of one’s mesocepts—will within apeirosonism strictly be ultrareal: hence being neither intrasubjective, nor intersubjective, nor equiobjective. Likewise, all poieture—hence, all intrarealities, all interrealities, and the equireality itself in total—shall then be ultrarealistically illusory (hence, addressable as different types of māyā, this via Hindu terminology)—this despite yet being intrarealistically real (else, actual) relative to respective individual, mesocept-endowed protoceptual selves; interrealistically real (else, actual) relative to respective cohorts of mesocept-endowed protoceptual selves, or else equirealistically real (else, actual) relative to all coexisting mesocept-endowed protoceptual selves in the cosmos. Hence, within apeirosonism, while oneself as pure protocept will be ultrareal, oneself as eidem will minimally be intrareal, for one’s eidemic being can only occur given the occurrence of poieture one as protocept is aware of.

[Of note—due to the many enquiries yet needed to satisfactorily address how, within apeirosonism, the apeiroson as yet to be actualized euteleion serves to form and stabilize a compatibilistic equireality (hence the singular equireality we all share that facilitates both our free will and an overwhelmingly stable causal (semi)determinism within the cosmos—the issue of how equireality is necessarily dependent on the apeiroson (this granting that the turannon is not yet actualized, if at all possible to actualize) will be deferred to Volume II of this work.]

With all of the aforementioned stated, were solipsism to be valid in any system of apeirosonism, then one would be the only protoceptual self in the cosmos which thus must somehow actualize the apeiroson on one’s own. In this hypothetical, there would occur no fractiprotocepture but only oneself as poieture-constrained protoceptual being. One, for example, might in this scenario want to endlessly meditate till the time one thereby somehow actualizes the apeiroson.

However, if solipsism is false—this as this treatise shall sternly uphold—then one as empirical-self-endowed protoceptual self shall be one aspect of the fractiprotocepture at large. As such, one will inhabit a cosmos together with other protoceptual selves, each endowed with its own prototelos, its own empirical selfhood, its own unique poietural contexts and environments, and its own freely chosen teloi to pursue. Hence, via their own free will capacities, which will be necessarily conjoined to their own empirical self of poieture, these other protoceptual selves will, just as yourself, gravitate toward any one of the four synteleions mentioned in this chapter in what they choose—thus gravitating either with conscious awareness of the alternative synteleions or else via unconscious predilections regarding any one of the same four synteleions. Where conflict results from two or more protoceptual selves intending different synteleions—again, either consciously or unconsciously (such as strictly emotively without any conscious apprehension of why)—not only will volitional suffering be likely to result on the part of at least one, if not all, parties involved but this will prevent, when abstractly appraised, the fractiprotocepture’s closer proximity to the apeiroson, of which one as protocept is a part. Though the complexities which could potentially be further addressed here are many, within a non-solipsistic apeirosonism, for the apeiroson to be at last actualized all coexistent protocepts in the cosmos will, firstly, then need to intend the apeiroson’s actualization and, secondly, thereby in some manner together actualize the apeiroson—and in the process do away will all poieture (with all forms of what in ultimate terms is here protocept-dividing illusion: including all intrareal ultimate illusions, all interreal ultimate illusions, and all equireal ultimate illusions) which, as poieture, again perpetually partitions individual protoceptual selves from each other. Here, then, while one cannot logically actualize the apeiroson via meditation on one’s own, it is at least conceivable that one can both obtain awareness of the apeiroson via meditation and closer proximity, however transient this proximity might be, to the apeiroson via meditation.

While the details of how the apeiroson’s actualization might be accomplished in a non-solipsistic world shall be further enquired into in Volume II of this work, for now let it suffice to say that, were the apeiroson to in fact be the euteleion, then the apeiroson will—much the same as the turannon—necessarily be a global euteleion. In the case of apeirosonism, the apeiroson is a globally applicable euteleion that can only be actualized upon the absolute union of all globally coexistent, individual protoceptual selves into an infinite protoceptual being perfectly devoid of any and all poieture. Unlike the case for the turannon—wherein what the actualized turannon consist of will be fully contingent upon the specific character and will of the given turannon-actualized eidem, aka ego—in the case of the actualized apeiroson, despite its particular nature being fathomable in distinctly different manners (see §14.2.1.4.1.1 for more information on this), the actualized apeiroson can nevertheless only take one singular identity, or, when thus interpreted, one singular form: that of a poietureless infinity of protoceptual essence wherein all egos cease to occur.

The remaining portions of this chapter will strictly address the apeiroson as euteleion (or else as pseudoteleion) within a non-solipsistic cosmos.

The either conscious or unconscious intentioning upon the apeiroson’s actualization can be alternatively specified as “the Will to absolute unity of protoceptual being”.

14.2.1.4.1. As Possible Euteleion

Rather than here engaging in rational argumentations for it—to which Volume II will in large part be dedicated—a currently best means of evidencing the possibility of the apeiroson in fact being the euteleion will be to compare apeirosonism to ready-established doctrines, both religious and strictly philosophical.

It is to be understood that no claim is being here made that any of these to be briefly addressed doctrines necessarily demonstrate the reality of apeirosonism. Here is only claimed that these many, sometimes quite disperse, doctrines can give the appearance of referencing what in this treatise has been termed the apeiroson and the entailed requirement of the fractiprotocepture prior to its actualization.

Also of note, when considering diverse cultures and histories, there is a very large quantity of doctrines which could in principle be compared with, and associated to, apeirosonism; because this chapter only seeks to relatively briefly present both the pros and cons of each of the five conceivable teleions, the doctrines which are to be here specified—though relatively many in number—will be limited to those doctrines deemed by the author to generally hold most cultural import to the current readership. The addressed religious and philosophical doctrines will, thereby, need to be understood as having been selected by the author via the author’s unavoidable subjective partiality and, furthermore, to be described via the author’s limitations of (else expressed, imperfect) understanding.

With these important caveats stated, first will be addressed the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, omnibenevolence, divine simplicity, and of being beyond both space and time commonly ascribed to the Abrahamic notion of God, else of Alah, else of G-d:

If the apeiroson is the euteleion and thereby (ultra-)real, then there will necessarily likewise occur the ultrareality of the fractiprotocepture prior to the apeiroson’s actualization—which shall essentially be the apeiroson fragmented into individual protocepts such that each protocept is embedded within poieture. From the vantage of the fractiprotocepture, because all poieture is via any number of different means determined by the fractiprotocepture (this, ultimately, out of nothing), the fractiprotocepture per se shall then necessarily be omnipotent: the fractiprotocepture creates all that was, is, or can be poietural without exception and, where it to so will as fractiprotocepture, holds the ability to (for lack of better terms) create the actualization of the apeiroson. The fractiprotocepture shall furthermore necessarily be omniscient: the fractiprotocepture necessarily is aware of all that was, is, or will be poietural, and is furthermore aware of all that is ultrareal, to include the (prototelosial) desires and fears we individually experience autologically as protocepts. Likewise shall the fractiprotocepture necessarily be omnipresent: the fractiprotocepture is everywhere protoceptual beings occur and hence present to all poieture of which protocepts are in any way aware. When the apeiroson is contemplated as the euteleion, hence as a yet to be actualized full unification of the fractiprotocepture whose reality as euteleion is existentially fixed for all time, the apeiroson is then necessarily omnibenevolent: it allows for anyone to reapproach its future realization (including the possibility of entering supernal, and hence incorporeal, realms of supernal beings that are in far closer proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization) irrespective of the anti-apeirosonic deeds they might have formerly engaged in, this granting that by honestly aligning to the apeiroson the individual does what is required to amend the wrongs previously committed; this general outlook will be necessarily so due to the requirement that the fractiprotocepture fully unifies into one infinite protoceptual being comprised of all former protoceptual selves irrespective of their former intentions and deeds. And, when the protocepture is addressed from the perspective of an actualized apeiroson, wherein the former fractiprotocepture completely and perfectly unifies into an infinite protoceptual being, the protocepture shall necessarily be divinely simple: completely and perfectly devoid of any parts, which is a requirement of it being completely and perfectly limitless and boundless, hence devoid of all finitudes, hence infinite. Furthermore, because, as previously addressed, no space or time can remain upon the apeiroson’s actualization, the protocepture as fundamental essence can only be beyond both space and time in pure form (with a conceivable understanding of the fractiprotocepture thereby itself being beyond both space and time if not for the poieture which it creates, is surrounded with, and is constrained by)—thereby further mandating that the apeiroson’s actualization will literally be the end of time.

The likewise Abrahamic notion of Elohim, given apeirosonism, can then easily enough conform to a plurality of protoceptual selves unified in their great proximity to and in their commonly shared stringent intent upon the apeiroson’s actualization—a plurality of mesocept-endowed protoceptual beings that are thereby unified in that which is intended and brough about.

More specifically in relation to most forms of Christianity, the doctrine of the Trinity can then cohere to a strictly protoceptual unity between a) the apeiroson-telosating and proximate Elohim, b) the apeiroson-telosating and proximate Jesus Christ, and c) the globally occurring drive, or heuristical process, of approaching, or gravitating toward, the apeiroson (with this global heuristical process to be termed apeirosonesis, as will be further addressed in later portions of this work) which could itself cohere to the concept of the Holy Spirit.

Despite its various interpretations, the Hebrew notion of God as the Ein Sof—which can be translated into “the Endless One” or infinity—can likewise conform to the nature of the protocepture, including to its form as the actualized apeiroson.

The properties of the actualized apeiroson can further conform to the Neoplatonic notion of “the One”, otherwise specified as the “the Good”—this such that one of the One’s properties of being beyond all categories of being and non-being can, in short, be here understood as follows: the One is beyond all categories of poietural occurrence and of nothingness.

In Gnosticism, the supreme, hidden God can be deemed to be the apeiroson, whereas the lesser divinity responsible for the flawed material world can be equated to that aspect of the fractiprotocepture imagined to be responsible for the creation of the flawed equiobjective world—which, technically, prohibits the fractiprotocepture from becoming the actualized apeiroson.

The principal themes of Zoroastrianism can also be expressed in apeirosonistic terms: Here, Ahura Mazda seems to generally share the properties of the apeiroson; whereas Angra Mainyu, the evil spirit with which Ahura Mazda is in conflict and which seeks to drive humans away from Ahura Mazda, seems to generally cohere to the representation of a superlative, turannon intentioning eidem. The Zoroastrian core maxim of “good thoughts, goods words, and good deeds” can in this interpretation be translated into “apeiroson-striving, else apeirosonical, thoughts; apeirosonical words, and apeirosonical deeds”.

Likewise does the Ancient Egyptian religion of Atenism seem to relatively easily coalesce with a simplified apeirosonism. Here, for one example, Aten (which was initially associated to “Amun (also sometimes termed Amen) – Ra”) can be likened to the apeiroson which, in Atenism, seems to be interpreted as the undivided source of divine light of which all humans, in not all lifeforms, are individualized points, or emanations, of—the later conceptualization generally conforming to what has in this work been termed the fractiprotocepture.

Although for the most part requiring considerably more explanation to present—such as, for example, would be the case with Sufism—many other non-Eastern systems of belief and reoccurring themes can likewise be compared with and potentially deemed to cohere to apeirosonism. With this example being easier to express, such as is the case with the recurrent theme of a virgin mother, or womb, hence in this sense matrix (this being potentially conformant, for example, to an ever existent equipoieture—be it endowed with its own eidemic being or not—which sustains all life and which is not impregnated by any other so as bring about the individual lifeforms that it does create and sustain) and her divine son (who can be deemed conformant, for example, to an idealization of that divine protoceptual self which brings all life and existence into closer proximity to the apeiroson—if not to the actualized apeiroson itself); else, and her two competing sons, one brother being turannonic and the other brother being apeirosonic.

In a similarly terse and limited appraisal of Eastern beliefs, the apeiroson in both actualized form and as the fractiprotocepture can be found to conform to the Hindu notions of Brahman. The Atman, the true self, is here the protoceptual self which is itself an aspect of the protocepture at large, i.e. of Brahman—the protoceptual self being what is sometimes termed “witness consciousness”—whereas the poieture can, again, be equated to what in Vedic texts is expressed as māyā (illusion).

When interpreted in conjunction with Buddhist tenets, the actualized apeiroson can be equated to the actualization of “Nirvana without remainder”. When viewed from a Buddhist perspective, when being is contemplated from the stance of ultrareality there in fact is no-self, this being the doctrine of Anatta, for all I-ness only occurs due to the poieture, which is again deemed illusory in an ultimate sense, and which can itself be here further conformant to what is termed saṃsāra.

In Chinese philosophy, there occurs the concept of wuji, which originally referenced infinity. This term first appeared in the Tao Te Ching in the context of returning to one’s true nature^[4]:

“Know whiteness, Maintain blackness, and be a model for all under heaven. By being a model for all under heaven, Eternal integrity will not err. If eternal integrity does not err, You will return to infinity [aka, wuji].”^[5]

In so being addressed, the wuji as contextualized by the just mentioned Taoist quote conforms to the apeiroson being the euteleion.

The Tao Te Ching furthermore states that “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.” This can well make sense were the term Tao as here addressed to refer to the pure protocepture—be it either as an actualized apeiroson or in fragmented form—for the pure protocepture of itself can only be nonpoietural in full, whereas all that can be said can only be poietural in nature. (Given apeirosonism, the same reasoning can also viably apply to the proposed ineffability of “G-d”.)

The halo within both Western and Eastern artwork can within apeirosonism be relatively easily interpreted as a visual depiction of the eidem in question being relatively proximate to and guided by the apeiroson. When visualized as a disk of light it might here want to represent the apeiroson via the depiction of a perfect circle of divine, rather than equipoietural, light—with such divine light often associated with gnosis—with a perfect circle being often enough itself used to represent a perfect wholeness and, hence, wholesomeness of being which, in literal and absolute form, will within apeirosonism be fully equivalent to the apeiroson itself. When this same disk, or circle, of light is presented with equidistant projections of any type, the halo so depicted might want to represent a unified plurality of sections of the fractiprotocepture which are, as a unified plurality, themselves apeiroson-proximate and guided; within Abrahamic interrealities, here potentially wanting to represent Elohim as previously outlined in this section; furthermore being potentially appraisable as what a king’s and queen’s crowns seek to represent. When, in typically Eastern artwork, the halo is represented as an emanating fire, here again—given the hypothetical reality of apeirosonism—it might want to represent divine, rather than equireal, transformations (else, fluxes) of being toward the apeiroson’s actualization.

Addressing theological possibilities with broader stokes—contingent on intrasubjective or intersubjective appraisals and affinities—apeirosonism can then be interpreted via, minimally, any of the following with similar plausibility within this philosophy: Apeirosonism could be interpreted as a monotheism—for the apeiroson can be itself inferred to be the only true God with all other supernal divinity being subject to it; this although the apeiroson can in no way be a (necessarily eidem-endowed) deity as, for example, the apeiroson-aligned Elohim (when apeirosonically understood as previously interpreted in this section) can be deemed to be. Apeirosonism could be interpreted as a panentheism—for the protocepture as God or as Divinity will intersect all aspects of the cosmos as well as being beyond space and time. Apeirosonism could be interpreted as an apeiroson-endowed polytheism, potentially one wherein many supernal heavens (else expressed, multiple supernal and hence incorporeal realms of being) cooccur—for, if there were to be supernal aspects of the fractiprotocepture (to include respective supernal, and hence incorporeal, realms of poieture), and in taking into account all of the current religions of the world, it might be possible that each religious interreality will manifest its own, sometimes disperse, supernal realms. Apeirosonism could be interpreted as a pantheism—for, in this interpretation, because all poieture (including the equipoieture itself, all the equipoieture-contingent intrapoietures, and all the interpoietures that result from the former) will be the creation of the fractiprotocepture, all poietures shall then themselves be aspects of Divinity, thereby making everything which occurs (both worldly and supernal) aspects of the same Divine cosmos. And, were there to in fact be no supernal realities whatsoever between equireality and the ultrareality of the apeiroson, then one could validly uphold apeirosonism via the strict stance of a naturalistic pantheism—for, here, there would be no spiritual realms whatsoever (no supernal beings, no afterlives to speak of other than that of mundane reincarnations of eidemic being, etc.) but, given apeirosonism, the fractiprotocepture, its poieture, and the apeiroson would nevertheless yet all be upheld as aspects of, for lack of better words, an atheistic (else, a supernal-deity-devoid) divinity which is fully equivalent to nature at large, with nature itself necessarily consisting of both protocepture and poieture till the time the apeiroson is actualized.

It can be emphasized that apeirosonism (despite upholding the ontic certainty of the apeiroson, which, of itself, does not need to be interpreted religiously) does not in any way necessitate the occurrence of the supernal (and potentially infernal) realms and beings which most, if not all, religions in their own interreal systems of belief make mention of. That having been emphasized, neither does apeirosonism logically contradict the possible reality of such supernal (else possibly infernal) realms and beings, which can for example include demons, angels, and archangels within monotheistic systems or—from the vantage of non-monotheistic religions—deities of different magnitudes and roles which interact with plausibly different teleions telosated, this among the other possibilities which various religions might address.

That having been stated, in considering the possibility of the apeiroson being the euteleion and thereby real (which, to emphasize, this philosophy cannot evidence with unfalsified certainty, much less with infallible certainty), were apeirosonism to in fact be ontically certain, the apeiroson could then present the pivotal element to the perennial philosophy—such that, granting the many different ways in which this, here, sole ontically certain teleion and its entailed reality can be interpreted, different cultures and religions can be deemed to hold different interpoietural scaffoldings of conceptualization toward a) a realized awareness of the apeiroson’s reality and b) a progression toward closer proximities to its actualization as euteleion. Here, a metaphor might be of service: were the equireal poieture (aka, the equipoieture) to be likened to a mountain whose very zenith is the actualization of the apeiroson, then each religion constructed with the apeiroson in mind can be likened to an individual interreal path on the very same mountain of equireality which, as path, aims toward the very same climax.

With the aforementioned incomplete set of religious doctrines and perspectives having been expressed, the remaining portions of this philosophy will not focus on the specifics of individual religious doctrines but on the rational implications of the apeiroson as a possible euteleion (this in as impartial a manner as the author is currently able of)—which, due to the materialistic nihilon here being found an impossibility, will at certain junctures include best appraisals of possible to conceive, apeiroson-dependent afterlives.

To now address philosophical topics which can be deemed to speak in favor of the apeiroson’s reality as euteleion, the first such topic to be here briefly touched upon will be that of objectivity.

Due to the ambiguity of the term, objectivity can be defined in many diverse ways. While a more in-depth appraisal of objectivity shall be provided in Volume II, for the purposes of this chapter, let the sense of the term objectivity which is to be here implemented be understood as the property of being fully devoid of the partiality requisite to subjectivity—be the latter one or more intrasubjectivities or intersubjectivities—where subjectivity is, again, to be itself understood as the property of being subjected to other or to otherness. As will be more formally addressed in Volume II, at the very least apeirosonism shall then require two distinct types of ontically certain objectivity:

Firstly, the reality of that poieture whose occurrence is, either directly or indirectly, necessarily equally applicable to all coexistent mesocept-endowed protocepts (this such as eidems are)—by entailment, this in manners perfectly indifferent to the subjective appraisals or desires of individual subjects of cohorts of these—shall be understood to be the objective world, aka equiobjectivity, aka equireality, aka physicality or, else expressed, the material world or cosmos. Differently expressed, the objective, physical world will here consist of that poieture which is necessarily equireal, aka of equipoieture. All corporeal lifeforms will then be birthed into the equipoieture and eventually perish to the equipoieture, but the equipoieture, though always incrementally evolving toward the apeiroson, shall at all times remain the equireal objective world which we know as physicality. Were some form of panpsychism to be ontically certain—this such that the fractiprotocepture can be validly stated to have occurred before the emergence of life in the universe—then the equipoieture will have occurred long before life ever evolved into being in the cosmos as it is known. Here, then, any equipoietural entity can validly be termed an object—aka, an equiobject—here, in the sense of being that which is an aspect of equiobjectivity and which thereby stands, or has the potential to stand, in the way of all coexistent protoceptual selves in equal manners.

The second form of objectivity necessarily occurrent within apeirosonism will strictly consist of and pertain to the protocepture. First and foremost, the actualized apeiroson can then be the only possible instantiation of a complete and perfect psychological (here in the sense of “pertaining to the psyche”) objectivity of awareness. Given apeirosonism, once the apeiroson is actualized there will remain an infinite, purely senceptual and mesocept-devoid, autoawareness which is hence completely and perfectly devoid of the partiality requisite to subjectivity and thereby literally nondualistic—for no subjectivity whatsoever will here remain. This state of being could, for example, be expressed as the juncture wherein one as a protoceptual being at last gains full, perfect, and hence completely unbiased awareness, or knowledge, of what one as protocepture is—this when one as protocept becomes literally infinite by means of perfectly unifying into a singular identity with all other protoceptual beings—with this state of affairs in at least some ways being further interpretable as harkening back to the dictum of “know thyself”.

Because this same state of an actualized apeiroson will entail an obtained absolute equality of protoceptural being, one wherein the fractiprotocepture then completely unifies into a singular and absolute identity of being, the attribute of being in closer proximity to the apeiroson will likewise entail a more equitable perspective (else, set of perspectives) regarding what is. Here, the psychological objectivity of eidems can only be at all times imperfect, differing only in magnitudes between the two extremes of a strictly solipsistic, fully egotistic, intrasubjectivity wherein one’s own subjective perspective is the only reality to be hand and hence is literally the only thing that matters in all of existence (here, grounding all that is real upon oneself as ego such that, again, a reality of absolute egotism is obtained wherein ones’ otherwise biases become concrete facts) and, as the other extreme, of an actualized apeiroson wherein one gains a literally egoless, complete, and infinite awareness of all that is ultimately real, i.e. of ultrareality. Hence, the psychological objectivity of subjects, i.e. of eidems, can only be measured via a) the two extremes just specified and, more broadly, b) relative to that occurring among other eidems in a given cohort.

That stated, within apeirosonism, though it can never be perfect among humans (or any other conceivable eidem for that matter—be such either corporeal or incorporeal), optimal psychological objectivity is to be nevertheless desired in judgments regarding what in fact is, especially in cases such as those of the empirical sciences (which do their best to accurately understand our commonly shared equireality), in journalism, and in judicial systems.

In review, within apeirosonism, a complete and perfect psychological objectivity can only be ultrareal, hence being termed ultraobjectivity to distinguish it from the equiobjectivity which was previously addressed.

As will be evidenced and expressed in far greater depth within Volume II, within at least apeirosonism, equiobjectivity will then be pivotally contingent on the relative proximity of the fractiprotocepture to ultraobjectivity and, hence, to the apeiroson’s actualization. In so being, and here laconically expressed, the globally applicable equiobjective world will then be the fractiprotocepture’s closest proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization—which thereby constrains via limits and boundaries all (free-will-emergent) non-apeirosonic intents via what could be termed the current best of all possible worlds. In so being, apeiroson-aligned interests will do their best to conserve the currently established equireality which all corporeal beings inhabit—fully including its equireal systems of causation—this rather than attempting via one’s volition to deviate from the equireal limitations and boundaries of the current equireality as is; for example, such as would be the case with the intent to overcome the globally applicable processes of gravity by means of levitation, or of flight via ones will (as one can for example find oneself flying within REM dreams or as the cartoon character of superman is depicted to fly), or of walking upon the surface of a body of water given the equireality we currently inhabit, and so forth. By being antagonistic to the apeiroson-driven equireality we currently hold, all such endeavors then being, in one way or another, misaligned to the apeiroson and thereby anti-apeirosonic. In short, within apeirosonism, all apeiroson-telosating people will value, cherish, and defend equiobjectivity rather than seeking to in any way subjugate it to their own ego’s non-apeirosonically inclined will (with the later instead generally being turannon-driven interests). And this defense of equiobjectivity will generally occur via optimal psychological objectivity regarding that which is equireal—which, as optimal psychological objectivity, will again be telosially driven by the apeiroson, i.e. by the telosial drive to further approximate the ultraobjectivity of an actualized apeiroson till it is obtained in full.

As a related, here very briefly touched upon, topic, within apeirosonism, all change by and in individual selves (these again including both the protoceptual self and its empirical, hence poietural, self) will need to sufficiently conform to the ultraobjectivity-driven equiobjective world in order for these same selves to persist in the equiobjective world. Although here for the most part only metaphorically addressed, all biological evolution—which will eventually be evidenced metaphysically necessary within apeirosonism—will, because of the just stated, then be equivalent to an optimal conformity to ultraobjectivity via conformity to equireality by both intrarealities and interrealities. Partly exemplifying this in rather blatant and simple manners, were a human to try to fly strictly via use of their will by jumping off of a tall building or cliff, equireality will have it that the same human will perish to equireality—for, in terse appraisals, the stated human would have here sufficiently deviated from, rather than sufficiently conformed to, the equally applicable (equi-)reality which we all share as individual eidems.

Next will be briefly touched upon the philosophical notions of absolute order of being and of absolute chaos of being as interpretable via apeirosonism:

Within apeirosonism, the actualized apeiroson will then be the sole absolute order of being to be had. Conversely, absolute chaos, where such to in any way be metaphysically obtainable, then necessarily equating to an absolute fragmentation of the protocepture in which no conceivable semblance of either protocepts or of any equireality remains. However, given apeirosonism, although ever closer proximity to absolute chaos could be in principle obtained, absolute chaos can itself never be actualized. The greater one’s proximity to absolute order, the greater the unity of being obtained—and, hence, the greater the health obtained in the sense of being more whole or more wholesome as well as lesser the conflicts which occur and, hence, the greater the volitional happiness of all—and the closer the proximity to the apeiroson. Again, the actualization of the apeiroson entails the absolute absence of volitional suffering on the part of any protoceptual self—which, here, shall become perfectly unified. On the other hand, the closer to absolute chaos obtained the less whole or wholesome the protocepture (or respective portion of it) becomes, hence the greater the lack of unity of being, hence the greater and more frequent the conflicts of volition, and hence the greater the magnitudes of volitional suffering. Also of note, by entailment to the just expressed, although the closer the proximity to the apeiroson the greater the order of being which becomes manifest, till the time the apeiroson is actualized some measure of both conflict and chaos in the cosmos will yet persist.

When thus conceptualized, an absolute harmony of being can only occur upon the apeiroson’s actualization wherein all factions literally disappear in full—directly implying that increased harmony between factions, this as can for example be expressed by the yin-yang, leads to an increased proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization. This maintenance of optimal balance, or harmony, between opposing factions of being is within apeirosonism however directly contrary to any notion of balance between good and bad/evil somehow being itself a good to be pursued—this as might be upheld within any system of permanonism which, thereby, seeks eternal permanence of protocepture-endowed poietural being in as is form—for, if for no other reason, such later conceptualization of balance can only serve to forever prevent the apeiroson’s actualization (thereby, within apeirosonism, being itself a bad to be avoided).

Likewise to be better addressed and investigated within Volume II, where all conceivable forms of bona fide love (to include agape, eros, filial, and the like) to in one way or another essentially consist of a telosation toward unification of the protoceptual beings involved (such that this “unification of protoceptual beings” in part includes new, commonly shared understandings regarding previously disparate and ununderstood perspectives held by different eidems, as well as empathy and compassion for other eidems given their own unique contexts of poieture, etc.), the actualization of the apeiroson shall then quite validly equate to the obtainment of an absolute, hence complete and perfect, love.

With that mentioned, and as here only briefly touched upon, the cosmos's process of evolving toward the apeiroson’s actualization shall in this work be coined apeirosonesis. Within at least apeirosonism, irrespective of the scenario, in part because the apeiroson will perpetually remain an ontically fixed aspect of reality in total, so too will apeirosonesis perpetually occur (as will be later addressed, this even were the fractiprotocepture to cause its equireality to move away from the apeiroson to such drastic extent that it, potentially, brings about an newly reformed cosmos that is far more distant relative the apeiroson’s actualization than the former now destroyed cosmos). This very process of what will here be termed apeirosonesis shall, then, give indications of being generally equivalent to C. S. Peirce’s concept of agapism as applied to his philosophy of objective idealism: within apeirosonism, all life when addressed as a whole together with the effete mind (i.e., physicality) perpetually evolves via a process of universal agape (i.e., via apeirosonesis) toward the absolute, hence complete and perfect, love to be found in the apeiroson’s actualization (with the anti-apeirosonic intentions of individual eidems hampering this process of general apeirosonesis).

Because the apeiroson’s actualization can only be the obtainment of an absolute equality of protoceptual being—which prior to the apeiroson’s actualization can only remain less than absolutely equal as fractiprotocepture due to the poieture which then necessarily occurs and the differences of poietural selves that dwell as individual (mesocept-endowed) protocepts within different poietural contexts (this irrespective of whether the poietural selves and contexts can only be corporeal or, otherwise, can also be incorporeal and thereby supernal)—and because apeirosonic intentions will all be (telosially) driven by an either unconscious or conscious desire, else want, to further approach the apeiroson’s actualization of absolute equality of protoceptual being, all desires for a functional equalitarianism—including desires for an equitable, hence fair, justice for all and desires for an honestly democratic system of governance (including in its hierarchical form of a republic)—can only be ultimately driven by the apeiroson as teleion (to emphasize, this rather than being telosially driven by the nihilon, the permanon, or the turannon).

On a more ontologically technical level of contemplation, within at least apeirosonism, the prime constituency of all poieture—this being here equivalent to what Aristotle termed prime matter—can only be the fractiprotocepture in total as fundamental essence. This topic too will be addressed in far greater depth within Volume II. However, as a synopsis, while the equipoieture will be constitutionally determined by the fractiprotocepture, individual eidems—hence, individual poieture-embodied protoceptual selves—will themselves be limited and bounded, hence constrained, by the very equipoieture which the fractiprotocepture together constitutionally determines (in review, with constitutional determinacy of itself strictly being a change-independent determinacy type). Skipping over many an important detail, in overview, this then facilitates an equireality wherein the corporeal bodies of humans with which eidems are almost indiscernibly entwined (with each such body being itself constrained by its equireal environments)—via the rules and laws of the constitutionally determined equipoieture, to include those of equireal causation and natural laws—will themselves as individual bodies of equipoieture constitutionally determine our psychological natures as human eidems. In at least humans, more specifically, this via the physical operations of our central nervous systems. The state of affairs just specified—where the nature of an individual intrareal mind, to include its respective eidem, will be constitutionally determined by the respective equireal, hence physical, body, this such that individual minds will be dependent on their bodies’ functioning—however, will within apeirosonism necessarily not be equivalent to epiphenomenalism: for the individual eidem, via its unfalsifiedly certain free will capacity, shall likewise be able to formationally determine the workings of its respective corporeal central nervous system and, hence, physical body (this in addition to the individual eidemic protocept being a staple, although miniscule, aspect of the fractiprotocepture at large as the prime constituency of equireality). The complex system of constraints just outlined, again, then resulting in the current best of all possible worlds which the fractiprotocepture (as a whole) can bring about given a) different eidems’ different (either conscious or unconscious) intensions that are ultimately telosially driven by the prototelos's gravitation toward any one of different synteleions and b) the ontically fixed ontological constraint of the apeiroson itself as eusynteleion (with the apeiroson then here being conformant to the Aristotelian notion of the unmoved mover of all that is). Despite the importance of this just addressed topic in respect to corporeal life—this among other fields of interest—because this chapter strictly intends to present relatively succinct arguments for and against each of the five conceivable teleions, the details of how these constraints can be deemed to generally operate shall, again, be deferred to Volume II of this work.

Lastly addressed in this section, the question could be asked, “why are we as fragments of the protocepture here in the poietural cosmos we inhabit as eidems”. This philosophical question, within the bounds of this philosophy, can only be honestly answered as follows: While it can be affirmed that no eidem—corporeal or otherwise possibly incorporeal—can honestly know the answer to this question while in any way an ego, it can also be affirmed that the only scenario in which an answer to this question holds the possibility of being obtained will be that of the apeiroson’s actualization. Neither the nihilon, nor the permanon, nor the turannon, nor the (soon to be addressed) dysteleion holds any possibility of answering this question. However, upon the apeiroson’s actualization—this were the apeiroson to in fact be the eusynteleion—this question could be feasibly answered via the infinite autoawareness that would then be obtained which, in turn, facilitated the possibility of an infinite autoceptual (rather than conceptual) understanding.

14.2.1.4.1.1. As Intention-Devoid (aka, Static), as Non-Spatiotemporally Intentioning (aka, Dynamic), or as Absolute Nonbeing (aka, Nihilonic)

Given apeirosonism, three disparate possibilities regarding the apeiroson’s actualization—which in all cases remains that of infinite egoless being—are currently fathomable:

One of these three possibilities will be that upon the actualization of the apeiroson all coexistent poieture-endowed protoceptual beings will transmute via absolute unity of the protocepture into an infinite protoceptual being that is not in want of absolutely anything whatsoever and, thereby, permanently obtains an as of yet inconceivable peace of limitless bliss. In this scenario, because there remains nothing to want, there then remains nothing to strive for and, hence, there then remains no intentioning (aka, will or volition). This one conceivable possibility regarding the apeiroson’s actualization can be tentatively specified as the intention-devoid apeiroson or, alternatively, as the static apeiroson.

Another conceivable possibility is that the infinite protoceptual being which obtains upon the apeiroson’s actualization shall, for lack of better phrasing, awaken to a fully poietureless world wherein an as of yet unfathomable form of timeless and, hence, durationless intentioning will occur—this, also in an as of yet unfathomable manner, potentially as one poietureless being among other poietureless beings such that no space and, hence, no distance (as we can in any way fathom it) occurs. The very (semi-)conceivability of such a poietureless world into which the actualized apeiroson would be (when metaphorically addressed) birthed (this from out of the womb, or mother, or matrix of poieture—which, where it to have its own eidem, would then necessarily be an aspect of the fully unified protocepture we would become) will, however, require one to uphold the possibility of relations—if they may be called such—which are unfathomable to any poieture-bound eidem, this on account of all such relations being fully devoid of both durations and distances. Nevertheless—despite some as of yet inconceivable form of intentioning (hence, of will or volition) yet occurring within this semi-conceivable scenario—here too the actualization of the apeiroson would equally entail the absolute end of all our volitional suffering as eidems. This scenario—which can metaphorically be poetically likened to, for example, a prehistoric frog’s contemplation regarding the human lifeform into which it will eventually evolve (of which the frog’s limitations of cognition grant no means of appraising)—can be tentatively specified as the non-spatiotemporally intentioning apeiroson or, alternatively, as the dynamic apeiroson.

In review, in both just specified scenarios, given apeirosonism, there would be entailed unimaginable bliss upon the apeiroson’s actualization—an auto-senceptual bliss that would be literally infinite in magnitude. If the actualized apeiroson were to be static, then this infinite bliss would be everlasting and one of absolute peace, absolute love, absolute understanding, and absolute equality of being taking the form of a singular identity, all of which would be perfectly egoless in literal manners. However, were the actualized apeiroson to be dynamic, then—though this same obtained state of egoless, unimaginable bliss would yet be—in manners technically unimaginable by any poieture endowed protoceptual self (be such corporeal or even hypothesized as incorporeal, such as incorporeal angles of deities), we as a then perfectly unified protocepture would yet somehow progress toward new realities.

The last, and likely most unpleasant, of the three here fathomable scenarios regarding the apeiroson’s actualization will be as follows:

In review, the apeiroson’s actualization—wherein a fully unified protocepture obtains and all poieture disappears such that what remains is literally of zero volume and infinite protoceptual energy—can only be a complete annihilation of all cosmically coexistent egos (I-nesses), this irrespective of whether the I-nesses are corporeal or incorporeal. Given this entailed aspect of the apeiroson’s actualization, it then becomes possible to conceive that the actualized apeiroson fully equates to the actualization of the nonmaterialistic nihilon (as described in §14.2.1.1.1.2). For this to be the ontically certain state of the actualized apeiroson, however, it then becomes necessary that oneself as pure autoceiving protocept which is an aspect of the protocepture at large is, in fact, quite literally a fragment of an indefinite nothingness in full—such that one’s being as a protocept-endowed eidem is fully contingent on the poieture which the fractiprotocepture (here, as the literal fragments of indefinite nothingness when addressed in their totality) brings about, this, ultimately, from indefinite nothingness. As a reminder, however, the eidemic protocept is that aspect of the eidem which auto-senceptually apprehends, and thereby comprehends, all allocepts obtained via its mesocepts. That that which apprehends is in ontic fact pure ontic nothingness then at least seems very implausible. Notwithstanding this observation, there currently is no epistemic certainty (be it either unfalsified or infallible) to the effect that the protocepture is in fact not pure ontological nothingness—thereby currently mandating the feasability of the possibility that the actualized apeiroson (rather than being unimaginably infinite autoceptual bliss) in fact fully equates to the actualization of a complete and perfect nothingness, i.e. to a complete and perfect absence of being. This very possibility—which again is currently not possible to evidence wrong with any epistemic certainty—can of itself be deemed by many aspects of the fractiprotocepture unpleasant enough to warrant an opposition to the apeiroson’s actualization despite it being deemed the euteleion. Let this last of the three fathomable possibilities regarding what in fact shall occur upon the apeiroson’s actualization—here assuming any system of apeirosonism—be then termed the absolute nonbeing apeiroson or, maybe more properly, the nihilonic apeiroson.

While none of the five teleions can in this philosophy be demonstrated either false or valid with infallible certainty, via analysis—such as that regarding each teleion’s explanatory powers relative to all others—one can establish justifications for upholding one teleion as being the euteleion and the others then being pseudoteleions. This, then, minimally results in the possibility of holding justified belief as to which of the five teleions is the real euteleion.

With that observed, in contrast, within any system of apeirosonism, which of the three fathomable scenarios regarding the apeiroson's actualization will be ontically certain can only remain an issue of faith, i.e. (as “faith” is being here utilized) of belief that is not possible to adequately justify.

14.2.1.4.2. As Possible Pseudoteleion

The following partial list of conceivable possibilities can neither be evidenced nor disproven with unfalsified certainty:

It might be literally impossible to actualize the apeiroson due to all the turannonic intentions and yearning that occur among eidems in the world, in which case the apeiroson would be a pseudoteleion. Here, yearnings for greater peace, love, understanding, equitable justice, honesty, fair democracies, and the like (both local and global)—all of which bring one into closer proximity to the apeiroson—will necessarily always ultimately result in dystelostases, hence volitional suffering, hence psychological pain (which then serves to strengthen, else further empowers, turannonic interests). This perspective can conform to the often enough quoted dictum that love always leads to pain.

It is likewise conceivable that the apeiroson’s actualization shall result in a rebeginning of the same spatiotemporal cosmos anew—such as a via a newly brought about Big Bang produced by the actualization of the apeiroson wherein essence of zero volume and infinite energy obtains. Were this to be the case, the apeiroson would then again not be a euteleion, for eidemic volitional suffering would yet again eventually occur subsequent to the apeiroson’s actualization. This possibility too will then mandate that the apeiroson is a pseudoteleion.

In close enough relation to the aforementioned, it will also be conceivable that the apeiroson cannot ever be actualized regardless of efforts but can only be ever-approached, this till the time the cosmos undergoes a cataclysmic fragmentation of the protocepture which produces—in due measure to the poieture dissolved via approach to the apeiroson—a newly formed poietural cosmos wherein newly fragmented eidemic protocepts are of exceedingly far lesser magnitudes of awareness. For the purposes of easier expression, let such cataclysmic re-fragmentation of the fractiprotocepture wherein a new poietural cosmos is subsequently brought about be termed a Big Breakup.

14.2.1.4.3. The Possibility of Being the Euteleion Which Is to Be Nevertheless Avoided

It is further conceivable that while the apeiroson is the euteleion, existence has experienced numerous Big Breakups in which new cosmoses were brought abought prior to the manifestation of the stable cosmos we currently find ourselves as eidems to be inhabiting—this replete with all its presently known or else inferred histories. This scenario can generally cohere to that of a Big Bounce universe—one of many conceivable cosmological models regarding the universe as it is known within modern physics—wherein the cosmos, or universe, progressively evolves toward a state of zero volume and infinite energy (this, within apeirosonism, interpreted as being either the actualized apeiroson or, else, an equireal representation of it) but has so far undergone what has here been coined Big Breakups. In this outlook, then, is found an eternal return toward the apeiroson via apeirosonesis that, as euteleion, can only be actualized in the complete absence of any Big Breakup. A more in-depth discussion of this conceivable ontological model shall be addressed in Volume III. Yet for the time being, considering that this cosmological interpretation makes the very actualization of the apeiroson exceedingly daunting if not highly improbable (though not yet technically impossible), it then gives good reason for any individual eidem to shun the apeiroson as euteleion to be pursued. For emphasis, the just expressed is a cosmological scenario of apeirosonism, one wherein the apeiroson is deemed to be the ontically certain euteleion, and, thereby, wherein the apeiroson is acknowledged to not be a pseudoteleion. Informally addressed, here the prevailing theme might be that one must “try and try again till one gets it perfect”—and the very challenge to so doing and possibly once again failing might well be sufficient reason for many to not partake in so attempting.

Secondly, an eidem’s dislike of any fathomable alternative outlined in §14.2.1.4.1.1—such as an eidem’s disliking the notion of becoming ever more egoless till the time all ego vanishes and, maybe most especially, it’s disliking that possibility specified as the nihilonic apeiroson—will then of itself be likely sufficient reason for the given eidem to not partake in attempting to further approach the apeiroson despite the apeiroson being yet assumed to be the euteleion.

14.2.1.4.4. Culminating Remarks

Again, whether or not the apeiroson in fact is the eusynteleion cannot be in this work demonstrated with unfalsified certainty, much less infallible certainty.

Nevertheless, although paths toward the apeiroson are many (if not literally innumerable), all such paths will in one sense be identical in that they all—either via conscious or via unconscious desires—intend closer proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization. Among other facets, these apeiroson-aiming paths can include a closer proximity to an absolute objectivity of being, to absolute fairness of judgment, to an absolute equity of being, to an absolute compassion, to an obtaining of that which is the ultimate aesthetic, to an absolute understanding (else, knowledge) of that which is real, and so forth.

The apeiroson, again, will necessarily be a global euteleion: its actualization will necessitate global participation by, and will affect all globally cooccurring, protoceptual selves.

Lastly here addressed, were the apeiroson to be the euteleion, then this would of itself logically necessitate that all four other teleions—namely, the nihilon, the permanon, the turannon, and the dysteleion (see §14.2.2)—can only be pseudoteleions. Within apeirosonism, the reason for the cooccurring four pseudoteleions—together with all potential or actual trepidations as concerns apeirosonic heuristics which would bring one into closer proximity to the apeiroson—will all result from a) eidems’ dislike of what the actualized apeiroson entails (namely, a complete disappearance of all ego), b) from fear of the apeiroson being in any way false and, hence, a pseudoteleion (thereby that furthered proximity to it will necessarily result in dystelostases and, hence, volitional suffering), or else, as previously discussed, c) these aversions would instead result from eidems’ dislike of the effort involved when considering factors such as the possibility—but not inevitability—of what could potentially be yet another Big Breakup from apeirosonic proximity (to not here specify the many various examples of microcosmic occurrences wherein apeirosonic proximity within or among individual eidems ends up being followed by any manner of incurred volitional suffering due to opposition from non-apeiroson-driven interests). More succinctly expressed, within any system of apeirosonism, all pseudoteleions will via one means or another result from eidem’s fear of the apeiroson. (Given that the actualized apeiroson will be the obtainment of absolute love when “love” is broadly understood to always consist of a unity of protoceptual being, this then in some ways generally conforms to views both ancient and more recent which simplify ethics into consisting of either love or a fear of love.)

14.2.2. The Dysteleion

Dysteleionism equates to a Sisyphean reality that is utterly devoid of any synteleion, much including that of the nihilon. Within this possible to conceive worldview, one can then fluctuate in one’s approach toward any of the four synteleions but, despite one’s potential ability to maximally approach any one synteleion upon one’s efforts, one here can never actualize any synteleion whatsoever—for, again, all conceivable synteleions shall be pseudoteleions in the case that the dysteleion in fact is the euteleion.

The dysteleion can currently be neither evidenced a euteleion nor a pseudoteleion with unfalsified certainty, much less with infallible certainty.

Were the euteleion to be that of the dysteleion, then all other teleions—these by entailment being synteleions—will, again, necessarily be pseudoteleions.

With that stated, apeirosonesis and nearly all that it in one way or another entails could be concluded to occur within dysteleionism in manners indistinguishable for its occurrence within apeirosonism—save for what would here be the fact of the apeiroson nevertheless remains literally impossible to actualize.

14.3. Further Implications

This section will address overviews of additional implications respective to each teleion. These will be enquired into in far greater depth within Volume II, wherein the heuristics associated with each teleion will be more thoroughly focused on.

14.3.1. Of Nihilonism

In terms of value, and in considering the nature of the prototelos, materialistic nihilonism would inevitably result in the philosophical position of nihilism when rationally appraised:

Here, all life-affirming or else life-benefiting meaning, knowledge, value, ethics or morality, intentioning, and the like, will be not only transient in full but also fully pointless: In this worldview, not only will all these inevitably end in an absolute nonbeing upon corporeal death but all these will likewise be counterproductive to that which we all innately strive for: the optimal fulfillment of our prototelos which, in the supposition that the materialistic nihilon is in fact the euteleion, can only occur via our actualizing the materialistic nihilon and, thereby, our own absolute nonbeing via our own corporeal death. Materialistic nihilonism thereby makes all life-affirming or else life-benefiting givens technically irrational—thereby again resulting in a nihilist worldview.

In contrast, nonmaterialistic nihilonism will inevitably equate to an apeirosonism—fully including the position of apeirosonic immortality (see §4.3.4.1)—which however happens to hold faith in the nihilonic apeiroson and, thereby, maintains the faith-based conviction that upon the apeiroson’s actualization the nonmaterialistic nihilon would be obtained as euteleion. Yet, maybe importantly, given the vast quantity of eidems that would be in opposition to this outcome as held by any nonmaterialistic nihilonist, it seems reasonable to conclude that this very faith-based conviction in the nihilonic apeiroson would need to itself fully dissolve for the apeiroson to stand any chance of being actualized—paradoxically, this irrespective of whether it might in fact be the nonmaterialistic nihilon.

In terms of ontology, it is currently unimaginable to the author how any version of nihilonism wherein we instantly obtain the nihilon upon our corporeal death to this world can be in any way used to meaningfully derive anything regarding ontology, fully including the occurrence of a physical world—this especially given the limited set of unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work.

Lastly specified, when the nihilon is assumed to be the euteleion—irrespective of scenario—one here can only equate one’s essential personal identity as a protoceptual being to indefinite nothingness or, else expressed, to absolute nonbeing.

14.3.2. Of Permanonism

As pertains to value, the absolute—hence complete or else perfect—permanence resulting from an absolute self-preservation of the empirical, hence poietural, self as it’s known by the protoceptual self will here be deemed of quintessential value. Here, the stability of personal being shall not be deemed a means toward an end but, instead, shall be deemed the very absolute end toward which various means can and should be applied.

In permanonism, then, an absolute immortality of one’s empirical self shall be the only rational intentioning to be had. This then implies that many, if not all, actions associated with altruism wherein one risks one’s own empirical self’s wellbeing for the wellbeing of some other self can well be deemed irrational—for so doing will in most, if not all, cases be contrary to one’s optimal proximity to the permanon.

In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one will then value the permanonic preservation of all upon which one’s self is dependent on—for its permanonic stability will then facilitate one’s own optimal permanonic stability as an eidem. From this permanonist vantage, most, if not all, doctrines which uphold a complete changelessness in that upon which one’s own self is dependent will be favored and thereby be likely upheld. These doctrines, then, can include those maintaining an absolute permanency of natural laws to, for example, the doctrine of eternalism (sometimes referred to as the “block universe” model of spacetime wherein spacetime is interpreted as an unchanging four-dimensional “block”).

In so valuing the permanon as the euteleion, one can furthermore project upon other aspects of the cosmos exhibiting optimal proximity to the permanon either a superlative value of being or as close to such as can be obtained. This, for example, can be found exhibited in Richard Dawkin’s book The Selfish Gene—wherein genes are assumed to be nearly, if not fully, permanonically immortal (see §14.3.2.1 for further description of permanonic immortality) and are thereby granted superlative importance to life; such that, for one example, the purpose of a lifeform is therein assumed to be its ability to propagate the very same selfish and immortal genes by which it is as lifeform is manipulated into propagating.

Also here tersely appraised, permanonism, when applied to the structure of society in general, can be deemed to value the unending permanency of any societal status quo irrespective of the quality of the status quo being maintained.

As pertains to ontology—given all the unfalsified certainties which have so far been established in this work—it is currently unimaginable to the author how the permanon of itself can be in any way used to meaningfully derive anything regarding ontology, fully including the unfalsifiedly certain occurrence of a causally semideterminate world which is thereby itself change-endowed.

And, in terms of identity, a permanonist shall equate their own essential personal identity to those aspects of their empirical self which they cherish and which they desire to remain never-ending in unaltered manners.

14.3.2.1. Permanonic Immortality

In short, permanonism entails permanonic immortality as its euteleion—this as distinct from either turannonic immortality or apeirosonic immortality—such that permanonic immortality shall consist of an unchaining self (comprised of both the protoceptual self and the empirical self) within a cosmos that can otherwise be everchanging.

14.3.3. Of Turannonism

When laconically expressed in very informal manners, turannonism will equate to a dog-eat-dog world wherein one’s only salvation from the volitional suffering this brings about will be to either be or else someday become the top dog in charge of all then subservient others—which, as such, can then grant permanonic proximity, if not actualization, to some others.

Here, all apeiroson-driven intentions—including intentions toward greater peace, love, harmony, understanding, equitable justice, liberty, etc., for all—are necessarily weaknesses of character and of thought; weaknesses which are within turannonism deemed to sooner or later necessarily always lead to dystelostases, hence to volitional suffering, and hence to psychological (if not also physical) pain; these same so deemed weaknesses being the very means via which such-weakness-devoid turannonists can then manipulate and control the weak into obedience of the turannonist(s) in charge. Hence, the optimally proximate turannonist might best so manipulate (what is here deemed to be) weakness-endowed others by means of deceptively assuming personally held credos which echo the very apeiroson-aligned desires of the masses—while nevertheless not honestly believing in these very same principles and values which they purport to uphold.

Here—when rationally appraised from within a turannonical worldview—peace within any cohort can only be stably obtained via means of there being a turannon-proximate, if not actualized, eidem (or else oligarchical set of eidems) which via its ability to control all other alleviates the otherwise inevitable and unending dog-eat-dog conflicts that produce volitional suffering in all. From the turannonist vantage, then, while minor apeirosonic intents and accomplishments can be accommodated for within turannonism, those apeirosonic intents and accomplishments that hold significant advancements toward the apeiroson can inevitably only be detrimental to the stability of society, bringing about a chaos of conflicts that (within turannonism) can only be resolved by some eidem or set of eidems once again gaining a turannon-maximal position in the cohort which, then, eliminates the conflicts, hence once again bringing about a relatively stable peace to society.

As previously expressed, the nature of this obtained turannon-driven order within a given cohort will be fully dependent on the character of the turannon-proximate, or actualized, eidem. Nevertheless, optimal turannon-driven societal order will often take the form of stringent fascism or will else make use of and implement fascistic ideals.

The rights of individual subjects will here tend to be provided by the turannon-proximate or actualized eidem: this such that subjects (again here entailing protoceptual selves subjected to otherness and to constraints) will here be deemed the subjects of the turannon-proximate or actualized eidem—this in contrast to possible apeirosonic appraisals wherein all protological selves subjected to otherness are understood as inevitable subjects of objective reality (both equireal and ultrareal) and hence of that which is contingent upon objective reality. Such turannonist understanding of subjects can often enough be found occurring within feudal systems among others.

In terms of value, the obtaining of optimal control over other will here be deemed of utmost value—be this other purely poietural or else also protoceptual. In derivative means, here, maximal ownership of other such that one can do with it as one pleases—this irrespective of what one wills to do—shall be a staple aspect of increased turannonic proximity. This, along with multiple other turannon-driven interests, all again being directly derived from the idealization of the turannon as euteleion—upon whose actualization, again, all volitional suffering is envisioned to cease and, hence, upon whose proximity all volitional suffering is envisioned to diminish.

In terms of ontology, as previously expressed, either there occurs a preexisting turannon-actualized eidem, in which case all that otherwise is will without exceptions be in full conformity to the preexisting turannon-actualized eidem’s will, or, otherwise, there is no turannon-actualized eidem, in which case it is currently unimaginable to the author how the turannon as an as of yet unactualized euteleion can be used to explain anything pertaining to the relatively stable physical reality we all experience and commonly share.

In terms of personal identity, here—via one valid perspective of interpretations—one’s personal identity shall pivot on the quantity of possessions which one owns and holds a relatively total control over. These can then include one’s possession as eidem of one’s own mind, of one’s own body, of one’s own private physical territories, and so forth. Hence, as for example pertains to the dictator of a country or nation, the turannonist’s identity as a self will then include the dictator’s possession of that country or nation which they hold ownership of, much including the inhabitants of the country or nation as subjects owned or possessed (subjects which then serve to benefit the dictator’s will). Hence, for further example, were any external influence to guide the inhabitants of that dictatorial country or nation into rebelling against the dictator’s authority, the dictator as turannonist would psychologically find this an affront to his own personal self’s integrity of being—for the fewer subjects the dictator own’s the lesser the dictator’s turannonical power and, hence, the greater the furtherance of the dictator from the turannon—and the dictator could then retaliate against both these external influences and the no longer obliging individuals in what the dictator would then perceive to be a strict act of self-defense. Again, with selfhood being here essentialy defined in terms of that owned or possessed by the protoceptual self.

14.3.3.1. Turannonic Immortality

Turannonism shall entail turannonic immortality as an aspect of the actualized turannon, wherein one’s self (comprised of both the protoceptual self and the empirical self) perpetually changes within an otherness that is completely and perfectly determined in full by the turannon-actualized self in question—and, because of this, that holds no changes which are in any way independent of the turannon-actualized eidem’s manifested will. The turannonic immortality of an eidem shall in this manner then stand as the diametrical opposite of permanonic immortality (wherein, again, the self is of itself absolutely unchanging, rather than everchanging—this within an environment whose reality is not contingent on, and hence is independent of, the permanon-actualized changeless eidem).

14.3.4. Of Apeirosonism

In review, the actualized apeiroson, as well as the till then occurrent fractiprotocepture, can only be senceptual in nature. In short, this can be derived from the necessity that the actualized apeiroson—and, hence, the protocepture in absolutely pure form—must necessarily be devoid of both all allocepts and all the mesocepts via which any type of allocept might be apprehended.

From this vantage, within any system of apeirosonism, sometimes drastically different attitudes can be held toward the poieture at large. Poieture at large can for example be seen as dissatisfactory (with this attitude being conformant to that generally held by Buddhist doctrines) or else disliked in whole (with the latter attitude being reminiscent of views that might portray (poietural) nature as bad of evil—an attitude which when taken to what might be termed an unbalanced extreme has at times resulted in attempts at mortification of the flesh via practices such as self-flagellation), for, within any system of apeirosonism, it is to be acknowledged that a) the poieture is forever in flux, hence everchanging, making nothing of poieture (including any selfhood) absolutely permanent and b) were it not for the (acknowledgedly, fractiprotocepture-created) poieture, we as individual protoceptual selves would have already obtained the infinite bliss of the pure protocepture to be found in the actualized apeiroson. With this attitude can be associated practices such as that of asceticism (wherein one renounces as many worldly pleasures as possible), vows of silence (for every word spoken can only be poietural in nature, thereby prolonging, if not also adding to, the poieture that already is), and the like. Yet, on the opposite extreme, certain aspects of the poieture—namely that of equipoieture and all intra- and interrealities which are conformant to it—might be viewed with adoration and reverence, if not sacredness—for, here, it is acknowledged that it is this very equireality which the fractiprotocepture brings about which binds, or else tethers, all individual creatures to that which is equally actual for all otherwise disparate selves, thereby binding all selves large and small to an optimal proximity to the apeiroson, wherein an absolute equality of ultrareal being is to be obtained. To more poetically express this by paraphrasing a partial lyric (this from the song "Baba Hooker" by Zap Mama^[6]), in any such latter addressed perspective it can be validly upheld that, “[equireal] nature fights with the [non-apeirosonic] beast that's within us”.

This very nature of equipoieture is what the empirical sciences via an as objective a manner as possible—this being found in the various applications of the scientific method—then collectively seek to better comprehend (this topic is to be further derived and enquired into in Volume III of this work). This search of greater understanding regarding that which currently is shall in itself be in large part driven, either consciously or not, by apeirosonic interests—here with a focus on that interest of discovering (else stated, uncovering) reality as best we can, and this simply for the sake of greater understanding which is deemed of intrinsic value. Whereas, in contrast, the technologies that develop from such further scientific understanding of our global, equireal, poietural nature will to large extents be influenced by individual humans’ various teleionic interests—such that the not all technologies created by humans align to apeirosonical affinities (although the ethics to these are not black and white, with weapons of mass destruction and our ability to clone humans serving as two possible examples of human produced technologies whose application could well serve non-apeirosonical ends).

As pertains to optimal social structures, the motto of E Pluribus Unum (Latin for, “out of many, one”)—however unintentionally—can directly speak to the apeirosonic worldview, this notably when applied to democratic systems of governance. For further example, this just as much as will a governance deemed to be performed by all the people, to be for all the people, and to be of all the people. Yet for such governance to be stably preserved, it is to be acknowledged that all selves without exception shall be in part constituted of some turannonical interests and affinities—this despite the turannon being a pseudoteleion within apeirosonism. With this turannonical proclivity—which occurs in some more than in others—being acknowledged as fact within a system of apeirosonism, the issue will then be that of how to best prevent the pure-democracy-intending governance from being overtaken by turannonic interests, and thereby becoming turannonical. To this effect, as a general rule of thumb, one prescribable means will be to preserve optimal checks and balances of turannonic powers within the society in general—and especially those with powers of governance—as one aspect of this, to necessitate uniformly agreed to limited terms of power, else of rulership, within the pure-democracy-intending republic.

Such an apeirosonic system of governance will then more or less consist of a majority of individuals that intend ever-closer proximities to such apeiroson-dependent states of being as that of an equitable justice for all (irrespective of the individuals' powers or lack thereof), equalitarianism as regards the personal worth of all individuals in respect to the apeiroson, the fully liberty to pursue any kind of apeiroson-aiming happiness individuals see fit, and so forth. Whereas this same apeirosonic system of governance—in order to preserve its ever-closer proximity to the apeiroson (however incremental such progression might be, with the occasional, relatively minor backsteps here taken into account)—will, via the same equitable justice previously specified, need to in one way or another reprimand or else optimally constrain all those who via their non-apeirosonic interests would destabilize this very binding of the society toward the apeiroson. This, idealy, via systems which reform individuals toward regraining apeirosonic interests.

To this effect, within any apeirosonic system, corruption shall in all instances in essence be a breaking apart of apeirosonic binds (otherwise expressed, a “together-rupturing (breaking into pieces) of apeirosonic proximity”)—be these binds toward optimal apeiroson proximity to be strictly found within individuals or, else, as they can be found in-between individuals which are together governed by (again either conscious or unconscious) interests in closer apeirosonic proximity. Corruption as it is to be understood within apeirosonism shall, hence, necessarily occur for an ego’s or a set of egos' non-apeirosonic personal profiting (this, then, toward synteleions other than that of the apeiroson). Whereas from the vantage of turannonism, corruption can only ultimately reduce to betrayal of the given turannonist’s will—irrespective of what it might be.

Whereas the rights of individual subjects will within turannonism be provided by the turannon-proximate or else actualized eidem, within any system of apeirosonism the rights of individual subjects will always be ultimately provided by the requirements of actualizing the apeiroson and, hence, by the requirements of further approaching the apeiroson—in essence, by the apriroson itself.

As previously touched upon, although the telosial (aka teleological) system of ethics this philosophy will make use of (see §14.6 for a synopsis of this) will ultimately be one of consequentialism—such that the eusynteleion (whichever synteleion it might be) shall be the ultimate consequence for which right, or correct, or good means are to be employed—within any system of apeirosonism this very apeiroson-intending consequentialism can likewise take on the form of deontological ethics. In the latter interpretation, one can be affirmed to have a duty to always act in that manner one would want all other protoceptual selves to act were they to be embodied as a protoceptual self in the exact same poieture (to include one’s empirical self and its context(s) of otherness) one oneself is at the given juncture in which the respective act is to be taken. Yet, again, when upholding this very duty within any apeirosonist system, one will inevitably then make choices which shall bring both oneself and one’s environment into closer proximity to the apeiroson.

Likewise from an apeirosonist vantage, many, if not all, turannon-aspiring egos will either unconsciously or consciously hold a desire to obtain the very powers which the apeiroson itself can be abstractly stated to wield over all as the eusynteleion—but, in contrast to the apeiroson which is literally egoless, the turannonist will desire to hold these same powers over others as an occuring ego. As one here briefly mentioned example, a mass-murderer’s pleasure in committing murders (else, even an abused child’s pleasure in burning ants with a magnifying glass) can from within apeirosonism be deemed at least in part intimately entwined with a) the egos dislike and possible fear of mandatorily needing to eventually perish as ego to the world (as can be deemed established by the apeiroson, which, again, brings about the equireal world we share from the fractiprotocepture as foundational essence) and b) the ego’s strong desire to overcome (a) by itself holding the same unmitigated power of life and death over others—thereby, within apeirosonist perspectives, having this same ego approach the pseudoteleion of the turannon to the detriment of other aspects of the fractiprotocepture and, hence, to the detriment of apeirosonic proximity.

As to value, intents upon ever greater peace, love, understanding, compassion, empathy, equitable justice for all, and the like—because all of these are means toward further approaching the apeiroson’s actualization—will all be intrinsically valued (in contrast, these same intents and (imperfect) states of being shall only be instrumentally valued by turannonists as means of manipulating others for the benefit of the turannonist’s closer proximity to the turannon’s envisioned actualization). Of noteworthy mention, within apeirosonism there will occur the intrinsic valuing of altruism in oneself and in others which, when properly engaged in, shall be a rational means toward optimal apeiroson proximity.

In terms of ontology, as was previously touched upon, apeirosonism requires that the fractiprotocepture at large via any number of determinacy types brings about an optimal proximity (which endows the fractiprotocepture at large with minimal overall volitional suffering) to the apeiroson via a relatively stable—although ever evolving—equireality which, hence, is equally actual to all individuations of the fractiprotocepture.

As a brief introduction to apeirosonic personal identity, dependent on mindset held, an apeirosonist might not hold an enduring attachment to any poieture whatsoever—including any poieture whatsoever via which one’s very reality as an eidem, and hence ego, is established. Regardless of mindset, however, an apeirosonist will associate themselves as a protoceptual self with a yet unevolved, or else yet incomplete, aspect of the pure protocepture—which can only be actualized via the apeiroson’s actualization. In so associating oneself to, ultimately, pure protocepture, the apeirosonist then conceptually—if not also auto-senceptually—recognizes themselves as protoceptual being within other people world over, if not all other lifeforms, potentially prioritizing those other poieture-embodied instantiations of the protocepture which show themselves to likewise be apeiroson-yearning. Yet, in at least times devoid of immediate conflict, an apeirosonist might all the same not in any way hate those instantiations which, for their own personal reasons, are utterly non-apeirosonical in their behaviors and deeds—(again, when immediate conflicts are here overlooked) instead of wishing them ill, wanting for all these potential opponents to the apeiroson’s actualization to find themselves in the apeiroson’s graces (this either so as to become apeirosonic themselves or, otherwise, so as to not actively oppose apeirosonists’ ever-closer proximities to the apeiroson).

14.3.4.1. Apeirosonic Immortality

This topic too will be revisited with greater specificity within Volume II of this work. Here, only a generalized overview will be provided.

In a simplified analysis wherein no Big Breakup occurs, the closer the fractiprotocepture-resultant cosmos (or any aspect of it) approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the more all non-apeirosonic intentions will necessarily vanish from the fractiprotocepture of the cosmos (or from that apeiroson-proximate aspect of it). By entailment, then, the closer the cosmos approaches the apeiroson’s actualization, the greater the proportion of currently occurring turannonical intentions—be they in service of obtaining either the permanon or the turannon (see §14.4 for further discussion)—will progressively vanish from the cosmos’s fractiprotocepture. This such that only more apeirosonic selves shall then remain. Given that the apeiroson is the euteleion, this same increase of apeirosonic intentions and reduction of non-apeirosonic intentions shall progress until all apeiroson-proximate selves finally dissolve their remaining egos in the actualization of the apeiroson.

Till the apeiroson’s actualization, then, those apeirosonic aspects of current selves which are more apeirosonic than not (as a possible rule of thumb, being apeirosonic in their thoughts, words, and deeds 60% of the time and non-apeirosonic in such 40% of the time) will forever become more apeirosonic poieture-embodied egos, hence I-nesses—conceivably this via a) progressive evolutions of personal being within incorporeal-poieture-endowed supernal realms that are far more apeiroson-proximate by comparison to equireality as it is currently known, b) via perpetual reincarnations of protoceptual selves in what would then become a progressively more apeirosonic equireal world, or c) via some combination of the two—this granting their overall and persisting intent upon closer proximity to the apeiroson, if not also upon the apeiroson’s actualization in full. The progressive evolution of apeirosonical selves just specified will then again occur until the time the apeiroson is actualized, at which point all I-nesses in the cosmos vanish and our illusion-devoid and literally egoless, poietureless and genuine self (else expressed, genuine being) is actualized.

As one possible way to rephrase this simplified analysis of evolution toward the apeiroson’s actualization, as global apeirosonesis inevitably progresses progresses toward the apeiroson (despite occasional setbacks), turannonist egos shall progressively vanish from the world—this due to their egos being defined by turannon-driven intentions which can only progressively vanish upon closer proximity to the apeiroson (for emphasis, here the ego, i.e. the poieture-dependent I-ness, vanishes but not the protoceptual aspect of the fractiprotocepture from which the ego is construed)—whereas apeiroson-aligned egos shall maintain an ever evolving immortality of being in an ever-developing poietural embodiment (akin to what in some cultures is metaphorically associated to the sacredness of a snake being rebirthed into a more magnificent body subsequent to the shedding of its now old, dead skin—hence remaining the same but more evolved being—with this metaphor here representing rebirths of being and, thereby, immortality of life) until all apeiroson-aligned egos grow tired of this very poietural embodiment and converge as different aspects of the now far more apeiroson-evolved fractiprotocepture into a fully unified, infinite, nonpoietural, and singular protoceptual identity: this being the actualized apeiroson.

So understood, the actualized apeiroson can then be of itself equated to immortal nonpoietural life per se—which, in individual fragmented forms that constitute the fractiprotocepture, takes on imperfect poieture-endowed forms that nevertheless all share the basic property of life itself. (Of note, were panpsychism to be valid, this as this work shall more formally propose upon its completion, then the cosmos shall necessarily be in some way pan-animistic or, else expressed, pan-vitalistic such that what we conceptually tend to demarcate as a sharp divide between nonlife, aka inanimate matter, and life shall need to be reappraised as a gradual (or, else, graduated) cline in sections of the ever apeiroson-evolving fractiprotocepture.) The more apeiroson-proximate the evolution of lifeforms, the more these lifeforms then gain sapience regarding the totality of being, including of their poietural contexts at large. This, again, till the fractiprotocepture can be conceived to gain a complete and perfect autoawareness of what it ontically is as a formerly poieture (i.e., illusion) producing protocepture which, upon the apeiroson’s actualization, ceases its attachments to everything illusory.

Importantly, the immortality just expressed pertaining to apeiroson-aligned beings—or souls, aka animas (this in contrast to the conscious mind, i.e. the paraconsciousness of which an eidem is aware in conjunction with the eidem’s (anima-entwined) autoawareness, aka the animus) which as concepts are to be further enquired into in part 5 of this work—shall be neither that of permanonic immortality nor turannonic immortality, but shall instead be driven by recognizing in oneself as one’s pivotal identity as a being (not any particular poieture or particular relation to poieture, this as both permanonism and turannonism require, but) an as of yet unevolved, or else incomplete, aspect of the actualized apeiroson’s absolutely unified and infinite pure identity as protoceptual being—an identity that in completed form can only dwell in the future yet, in present form, is to be optimally found as much in oneself as in all other protoceptual selves which share this same either consciously appraised or else fully emotive drive upon apeirosonic-proximity.

Also of potential further note, were the progressive evolution toward the apeiroson to somehow strictly occur via worldly reincarnations of being (a subject whose specifics are also to be addressed in greater detail within Volume II)—this as might be upheld in an apeirosonism of strict naturalistic pantheism—then memories of previous lifetime(s) would not be necessary for this apeirosonic immortality of the soul to obtain via reincarnations of being: Here, a protocept, construable as an individual segment of the pure fractiprotocepture, could simply be rebirthed into a corporeal central nervous system whose biologically, else genetically, inherited cognitive traits are nearly identical to that of former lifetime(s), and whose formative years expose the child to the same general lessens of heuristics and heuristical advantages the being was privy to in former lifetime(s), thereby resulting in a new equipoieture-embodied eidem whose affinities and aversions, whose innate talents and intelligence type(s), whose curiosities and hence curiosity-driven body of knowledge and understandings, etc., and whose very volitional happinesses and sufferings in relation to the world they are surrounded by are virtually identical to that held in the former lifetime(s). Here would then reoccur the same protoceptual self that might nevertheless be embodied in a relatively different empirical self—such that it becomes valid to uphold that the person, or persona, is a reincarnation of former persons, or personas. How the person interacts with the world in their current lifetime then modifies both the interreal poietures and the equireal poieture they partake of so that they eventually will be rebirthed into a future poietural world they (together with all other coexisting selves) played a role in bringing about.

Lastly here specified, in brief, in considering a more complex apeirosonism wherein cosmically applicable Big Breakups have previously occurred, the very same progress of perpetual evolution applicable to (never absolutely permanent) selves, or souls, toward ever-closer proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization will yet occur—such that turannonic egos steadily vanish and apeirosonic egos steadily evolve into far more apeirosonical future selves. Only that in any such scenario, upon any such Big Breakup (which, again, might have formerly occurred and thereby resulted in the current cosmos as it is known), the quantity of psychological pain endured by the apeiroson-proximate and hence far more unified eidems’ re-fragmentation away form the apeiroson can conceivably be deemed to once again result in (this either initially or else at some point in the new cosmoses evolution) eidems which—here more poetically expressed—do all they can to avoid a re-approach toward the apeiroson so as to avoid any recollection of such former mistakes leading to the last Big Breakup and any possibility of such Big Breakup once again reoccurring.

In review, if apeirosonism is ontically certain, then so too is the falsity of, at minimum, the materialistic nihilon. We as protoceptual beings, then, cannot cease to be upon our corporeal death. What will exactly occur subsequent to our individual corporeal death can only remain a mystery (as, when cosmically addressed, can the actual reality of what occurs upon the apeiroson’s actualization only remain a mystery toward which one can assume some faith-based belief). Yet, until the time of the apeiroson’s actualization, by entailment, within apeirosonism all individual aspects of the fractiprotocepture shall nevertheless, subsequent to corporeal death, remain so as to reawaken embedded in poietural states of being and contexts (be these poietural states equireal or else in any way occuring above or beyond the realms of equipoieture and, in this sence, be supernatural realms of poietural bieng). Though we, again, cannot know the specifics of what will occur after our own corporeal death, within apeirosonism we can however know due to the rational entailment involved that the more apeirosonical our thoughts, words, and deeds are in this lifetime the closer we will reawaken (else, regain cognizance) to the apeiroson—thereby becoming more apeiroson-proximate—in poietural dwellings subsequent to our corporeal death to this world as protocept-endowed empirical selves. In rough parallel, while we cannot know what the actualized apeiroson will be like, we do know that in order to obtain it we will need to become perfectly understanding, perfectly loving, and perfectly benevolent in general, this amogh other attributes we typically consider to be good. So too, while we cannot know what specifics are to come after our corporeal death, within apeirosonism we can validly deduce that being optimally understanding, loving, and benevolent in general, among other attributes commonly considered good, can only further approach us into closer proximity to the apeiroson upon our corporeal death. This in contrasted to, for example, our persisting to be overwhelmingly non-apeirosonical in what we think, speak, and do in the lifetime we currently live—for in so being we can only rationally further from the apeiroson’s actualization the poietural environment we leave behind, thereby, when abstractly appraised strictly form the vantage of corporeal reincarnations, furthering from the apeiroson the poietural cosmos which we will reawaken to—such that there then is a good likelyhood that we end up reawakening as babies to what will for us be a more hellish world than the one we leave behind—this, hence, even were the apeiroson-endowed cosmos to be adequately defined by a strict naturalistic pantheism wherein no supernal (or else infernal) realms of incorporeal poieture occur.

14.3.5. Of Dysteleionism

In short, dysteleionism facilitates a radical subjectivism as pertains to what one ought to do so as to best satisfy one’s nevertheless unfalsifiedly certain prototelos.

Here the situation could be somewhat informally expressed as follows: Irrespective of which synteleion one chooses to further approach oneself to, one will inevitably experience eventual volitional suffering—as well as synteleion-specific transient happinesses. All that one can here do for all of eusynteleion-devoid eternity is choose which synteleion-dependent happiness one best likes to experience and, given that all such will inevitably be followed by psychological pains, pursue closer proximity to one’s chosen pseudosynteleion for as long as one pleases come what may—till the time one changes one’s mind as to which pseudoteleion to pursue, were this to ever occur (for one may viably maintain the same pseudosynteleion-driven telosation—such as that of further approaching the here unactualizable apeiroson—for all of unending eternity were one to so will)—here acknowledging that others of different pseudosynteleionic drives will always at some point oppose your own efforts which, thereby, shall again inevitably result in dystelostases. This, again, irrespective of which pseudosynteleion you might happen to pursue.

All the same, as previously mentioned, due to the nature of dysteleionism and the reality of each eidem’s prototelos, apeirosonesis will again in this philosophy be the sole discernable reason for the occurrence of a commonly shared, relatively stable, equireality—despite the apeiroson being nevertheless unactualizable in principle and thereby false. Details as to the how and why of this just stated aspect of dysteleionism will be addressed in Volume II of this work.

14.4. Cosynteleionism

Given the unfalsified certainty that we each hold free will capacity to choose as we please, we each then hold the free will capacity to choose as we please between synteleions. Furthermore, this very same free will capacity shall directly contradict there being a ready-established turannon-actualized being: Such an eidem would by entailment necessarily hold complete and perfect control over all that we (who are other in respect to this turannon-actualized eidem) in any way do and, were this to so be, it would then directly contradict our holding the free will capacity which Chapter 11 evidences to be unfalsifiedly certain. Consequently, it can be validly established as unfalsified certainty that there presently is no turannon-actualized eidem.

Then, irrespective of whether the cosmos is in fact eusynteleionic or else dysteleionic, the cosmos will at all junctures be cosynteleionic—i.e., will consist of, and hence will be commonly composed of, multiple synteleions—this till the time one will actualize any of the four synteleions, were dysteleionism to be false. This state of affairs shall then be coined that of cosynteleionism.

Within cosynteleionism, it will be a logical contradiction that one can at the same time and in the same respect telosate two (or more) of the four synteleions. For example, in considering the two global synteleions of the turannon and the apeiroson, one cannot telosate both at the same time and in the same respect.

As another important observation, permanonical behaviors which thereby aim at an optimal changelessness of personal being can only be characterized as utilizing both turannonical and apeirosonical heuristics for this very purpose. The same can also be affirmed of all conceivable nihilonist behaviors, which will typically make use of turannonical heuristics against, rather than in favor of, one’s very self.

14.4.1. Synteleionic Heuristics vs. the Ultratelos

One as eidem has no choice whatsoever in being propelled (or else here expressed, pushwardly driven in indiscernible manners) by the prototelos in optimally minimizing one’s sort- and long-term volitional suffering—but one will hold free will in choosing which of the four synteleions one is pullwardly driven toward at any given juncture wherein one makes a choice, irrespective of how miniscule.

Furthermore, the synteleion-driven choices one makes need not be in the ultimate service of that synteleion one ultimately aspires to actualize.

While the many details of this will be deferred to later portions of this work, for now, an important differentiation will be made between a) synteleion-driven heuristics and b) that synteleion one desires actualized.

Say that a staunch apeirosonist is walking down a dark alley and is there accosted by a stranger that charges toward the apeirosonist with a knife in hand. The apeirosonist by entailment wishes for optimal apeirosonic proximity (such as can be found in brotherly love). However, were the apeirosonist not to defend their personal poietural being against the assailant, the apeirosonist’s ability to further bring about an optima apeirosonic proximity (for oneself just as much as for others) will likely be strongly diminished—as would occur were the apeirosonist to corporeally die at the assailant’s hands. So dying at the assailant’s hands, with the assailant in all likelihood being turannon-driven, would only further empower turannonic interests at the loss of apeirosonic interests—hence being a loss in respect to maintaining optimal apeirosonic proximity. Were the apeirosonist to attempt to rationally discuss issues with the turannonist, the turannonist would proceed in their attack without pause. In this scenario, then, the apeirosonist—due to a lack of any better option available to choose from—choses to utilize turannon-driven heuristics in defending themselves against the turannonist. In this example, the apeirosonist then punches the turannonist in such manner as to safeguard their own self against harm—and, upon so doing, in this example the turannonist then runs away.

In so having done, the apeirosonist has not even momentarily become themselves a turannonist—but, again, has used turannon-governed heuristics in order to optimally maintain their own apeiroson-proximity.

Then, let it be understood that the apeirosonist held the apeiroson’s actualization as their ultimate telos throughout this interaction—with their here use of turannonic heuristics being an optimal path toward this ultimate telos given the choices that were available.

This ultimate telos of a chosen synteleion can then be in this work more succinctly specified as the ultratelos one holds.

In so terming, a staunch apeirosonist will then necessarily hold the apeiroson as their ultratelos at all times. And, in so doing, they might at times then be necessitated to use what would otherwise be blatantly non-apeirosonical heuristics in doing their best to stay optimally aligned to their ultratelos.

Likewise, for one further example, can a turannonist utilize apeirosonical heuristics in maintaining optimal alignment to their ultratelos of the turannon.

In short, one’s ontically fixed prototelos compels one to freely chose an ultratelos—which, again, can only take the form of a synteleion—such that one can furthermore change one’s mind about which ultratelos to pursue at any time. The given ultratelosial heuristics one then utilizes could be themselves governed by any synteleion whatsoever just as long as these heuristics serve to optimally approach one to one’s actively held ultratelos.

Here then, for further example, an apeirosonist can well choose to fight in self-defense but, win or lose, will likely gain no pleasure from the fight, acknowledging it to be a non-apeirosonical heuristic that was nevertheless needed for further apeirosonical approach. Else expressed, a step back which was nevertheless required to take two or more steps forward.

Further appraisals of optimal heuristics in approaching individual synteleions will be provided in Volume II.

14.5. Regarding Hume’s Guillotine

The understanding of synteleions satisfies the is-ought problem, otherwise known as Hume’s guillotine. In short, the is-ought problem explains that one cannot soundly derive what one ought and ought not do from awareness, knowledge, or propositions which strictly regard that which is.

In this treatise, however, what one ought to do is—first and foremost—always that which one is inescapably compelled to do by one’s prototelos: one ought to optimally minimize one’s both short- and long-term volitional suffering via the choices one makes.

The question of how one best accomplishes this will then be answered by that one synteleion which happens to be the euteleionic. In so being the genuine, correct and actual, and hence good (here, genuinely beneficial) synteleion, it will then be that synteleion which one can in fact eventually actualize as a protoceptual self. In so being, the eusynteleion will then be existentially fixed as actualizable reality for all time and, hence, will itself in this sense hold existentially fixed being. In other words, by inferring as best one can which synteleion is the eusynteleion, one then arrives at an “is” from which one can then determine what “oughts and ought nots” are to be engaged in so as to best realize this very “is”.

In the case of the dysteleion, although the is-ought problem will in one sense ultimately remain—for here all synteleions will be pseudosynteleions and thereby unactualizable in principle—in yet another sense that pseudosynteleion which one wants to be more proximate to will nevertheless determine what one ought to freely choose in one’s immediate surroundings so as to maximally satisfy one’s prototelos, this by optimal proximity to the given pseudosynteleion which, nevertheless, will yet here serve as one’s ultratelos.

Hence, for one example, here presuming the apeiroson to be the euteleion, all (context-relative) heuristics which further approach one to the apeiroson will then be that which one ought to do—this, again, so as to optimally minimize one’s both short- and long-term volitional suffering and, thereby, satisfy one’s prototelos.

14.6. Regarding Metaethics and the Problem of Evil

The following shall only present a brief synopsis of metaethics and the problem of evil.

For the purposes of this section, let "right" be understood as equivalent to “correct”. Furthermore, let "good" be understood as equivalent to “beneficial” or “favorable”. Conversely, let "wrong" be understood as equivalent to “incorrect” and let "bad" be understood as equivalent to “unbeneficial” or “unfavorable”.

The euteleion will thereby be the right teleion, for it will be the correct teleion—i.e., that one teleion which can be actualizable by oneself a eidemic protocept.

In the case of a eusynteleionic cosmos, then, the eusynteleion will then also be that which is beneficial or favorable to one’s fully satisfying one’s prototelos. Because upon the eusynteleion’s actualization one will completely and perfectly satisfy one’s prototelos—such that no volitional suffering is further incurred by oneself as eidem—the eusynteleion’s actualization shall then also be that which completely and perfectly beneficial and favorable, hence that which is absolutely good.

That stated, we hold free will as to which of the four synteleions we choose to believe is the eusynteleion.

When we as protoceptual selves thereby choose to approach pseudosynteleions (here indulging in pseudosynteleionic joys) rather than to approach the eusynteleion and, in the process intend, to harm others so that we as egos might be closer to our chosen pseudosynteleion, we as egos then engage in evils.

And, again, within apeirosonism—wherein the apeiroson is the absolute good—the reason for why pseudosynteleions occur reduces to fear of the apeiroson. Whereas in the worldviews of other synteleions, such reason is far harder, if at all possible, to come by.

The aforementioned, however, shall only apply to a eusynteleionic cosmos. Where the cosmos to be devoid of eusynteleions and thereby be dysteleionic, then there would occur no such thing as an absolute good nor would any synteleion be right.

14.7. Regarding the Purpose of Life

As interpreted via the stipulations of this chapter, the often enough mused about purpose of life will—from the vantage of this philosophy—quite literally be to fully satisfy one’s prototelos via the obtainment of the eusynteleion—this if the dysteleion is false—although which synteleion is the ontically certain teleion cannot be evidenced with epistemic certainty (but, again, can potentially be justified to be ontically certain via the respective synteleion's explanatory power in comparison to others). Otherwise, if the dysteleion happens to be ontically certain, the purpose of life would then be to forever be Sisyphean in intentionally approaching and then unintentionally furthering away from what would then be any one of the four pseudosynteleions.

Within apeirosonism, for example, the purpose of life will be to approach, and eventually actualize, the apeiroson.

14.8. Concluding Remarks

Despite this chapters lengthy (yet still superficial) presentations, the only unfalsified certainties which this chapter shall uphold will be as follows: a) the prototelos logically necessitates what has been termed teleions, b) no one here concerned can conceive of a synteleion (this being a conceivable teleion wherein the prototelos becomes fully satisfied) which i) has not been presented in this chapter but which ii) is fully accordant to all unfalsified certainties previously established in this work, c) we can also conceive of that possibility wherein no synteleion is possible to actualize, here termed the dysteleion and, d) out of the four conceivable synteleions and the dysteleion, at least one of these teleions will necessarily be an ontically certain euteleion for oneself as an eidemic protocept.

The four synteleions this chapter presents will then serve as the ultimate constrains to what we as eidems can become or else be—with a formalized ontology to be itself in large part derived in later portions of this work from these same four ultimate constrains to protoceptual being.

• References

↑ William James (1890) The Principles of Psychology. Chapter X. Classics in the History of Psychology, an interent resource developed by Christorpher D. Green, York University, Toronto, Ontario. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm
↑ APA Dictionary of Psychology. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://dictionary.apa.org/empirical-self
↑ APA Dictionary of Psychology. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://dictionary.apa.org/nominative-self
↑ Wikipedia contributors. (2024, April 1). Wuji (philosophy). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 04:28, April 21, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wuji_(philosophy)&oldid=1216747059
↑ Mair, Victor H., ed. (1990), Tao Te Ching: The Classic Book of Integrity and the Way, New York, NY: Bantam Books, ISBN 978-0-307-43463-0
↑ Zap Mama – Baba Hooker (Official Audio). Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19o6xtafuZA

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[1] William James (1890) The Principles of Psychology. Chapter X. Classics in the History of Psychology, an interent resource developed by Christorpher D. Green, York University, Toronto, Ontario. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm

[2] APA Dictionary of Psychology. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://dictionary.apa.org/empirical-self

[3] APA Dictionary of Psychology. Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://dictionary.apa.org/nominative-self

[4] Wikipedia contributors. (2024, April 1). Wuji (philosophy). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 04:28, April 21, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wuji_(philosophy)&oldid=1216747059

[5] Mair, Victor H., ed. (1990), Tao Te Ching: The Classic Book of Integrity and the Way, New York, NY: Bantam Books, ISBN 978-0-307-43463-0

[6] Zap Mama – Baba Hooker (Official Audio). Retrieved 4/20/2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19o6xtafuZA

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[5]

[6]