To allow for Part 5’s enquiries into the agential workings of our minds with minimal emotive concerns for how some might interpret these enquiries to possibly lead into a position of metaphysical solipsism, it has been deemed beneficial to first address why metaphysical solipsism is an impossibility. So doing, however, will require the preliminary use of certain conclusions which are to be formally derived in Part 5. It will then be the case that, if the formally provided conclusions of Part 5 which are to be preliminarily addressed in Part 4 will be found unfalsifiedly certain in Part 5 of this work, then so too will be found unfalsifiedly certain Part 4’s culminating conclusion of metaphysical solipsism’s impossibility. Again, though so structuring the treatise will be logically cumbersome, it has nevertheless been deemed of significant emotive benefit for the interests of many a potential reader.

To commence Part 4’s formal falsification of metaphysical solipsism—i.e., of the possibility of there being only one self in all of reality—first will be addressed a generalized outline of what a total first-person selfhood can consist of.

Volumes could be written about what constitutes a self. This chapter, however, will generally address only those basic aspects of selfhood most pertinent to the issue of solipsism.

15.1. Preliminary Concepts and their Terminology

Although these concepts will be formally specified in Part 5 of this treatise, their preliminary presentation and use in Part 4 of this work will be required:

Enherent: in conformity to the etymology of the English term “inherent”—which as term today means “inborn; innate; inbuilt; to be a fixed or else permanently incorporated aspect of”—let “enherent” signify the state of sticking into or else of sticking within such that that which enheres into X shall form an at least momentary unity within that X enhered into, a unity so composed which however need not be (this unalike what the term “inherent” specifies) inborn or else permanent.
Animid: any prototelos-endowed agency of an eidem’s own mind other than the eidem itself which, as such, can be further inferred to hold its own allocepts to which it as agency acts or reacts and, therefore, its own means of apprehending allocepts—i.e., its own mesocepts—together with its own very apprehension of these allocepts via its mesocepts, such that it holds its own protoceptual being (however unlike our own protoceptual being as eidems such might be). Furthermore, let it be at least entertained that there is no currently discernible reason for why animids cannot themselves be poietic causes to the effects of made choices between alternatives and, hence, be endowed with some measure of free will (this as free will has been addressed in Chapter 11). Possible examples of animids will include one’s conscience when present within one’s paraconscious mind as well as all alloceptual (rather than autoceptual) emotions when also so present within one’s paraconsciousness—both of which shall then be aware of at least some of the same allocepts one as eidem is oneself aware of and, furthermore, will thereby agentially attempt to influence one as eidem as to one’s own future actions as eidem (such as that of choice making).
Uranimid: the most rudimentary form of animids possible, which, as such, can in at least humans be postulated to immediately result via constitutional (rather than genesial) determinacy from the firring of specific neural webs within one’s physiological central nervous system—such that multiple distinct uranimids constitutionally determined by distinct portions of one’s brain’s operations then (in part via their interaction) constitutionally determine animids with yet greater capacities of awareness and agency, this in a hierarchy of levels that culminate with some such animids mutually enhering so as to produce the reality of oneself as an eidem (again, as a fully unified, nonmanifold, first-person protoceptual awareness and agency that, as protocept, is endowed with its own mesocepts via which it apprehends allocepts).
Anim: a blanket term for any mesocept-endowed and prototelos-driven protocept which thereby apprehends allocepts, i.e. for any type of awareness endowed with the same three tiers of awareness specified in Chapter 6—this irrespective of how qualitatively different these three tiers of awareness might be from our own as eidems—that is also endowed with a prototelos. Anims will thereby include all possible types of eidems as well as their respective animids, and thereby their respective uranimids, whenever the latter two might occur.
Animana: the totality of all anims which occur with a given total mind, to thereby include oneself as eidem to which the given mind pertains, all one’s paraconsciously occurring animids whenever such are present, and all one’s unconsciously occurring animids, to include uranimids. As §15.2.2.2.1.1 will further address, one’s animana can then be generally classified into at least the following two categories: one’s animus and one’s anima.

15.2. Basic Aspects of a Total First-Person Self, aka of a Uniant

Let a total first-person self be understood to strictly consist of all experiences (be these autological or allological) of personal selfhood which eidemic protocepts—at minimum, all those here concerned—can in any way hold.

In part to further the terminology that is to be here used from strict connotations of personhood (which is commonly taken to not apply to nonhuman life), in part so as to emphasize the strictly first-person nature of what will be addressed, and in part for the sake of optimizing the brevity of expressions, let “a total first-person self” be in this work alternatively specified as a uniant. The term “uniant” (a combination of the English prefix “uni-” and the English suffix “-ant”) in part seeks to denote the unified or else unitary nature of what an eidemic protocept appraises to be its own total self—this irrespective of whether the just addressed unity is nonmanifold or else in any way manifold and thereby constituted of different, cooccurring parts or aspects.

Wherever linguistically needed, the condition or state of being a uniant can then in this work be more technically specified as unianthood.

As one example of this terminology’s use, were an insect to be endowed with all minimal requirements for holding its own total first-person selfhood—however foreign to our own sense of total first-person selfhood the insect’s sense of total first-person selfhood might be—the subjective first-person appraisal (implicit or explicit) of the insect’s eidemic protocept regarding its own total self can then be validly specified as being the insect’s unianthood, this without in any way insinuating that the insect is thereby endowed with personhood (i.e., that the insect is thereby a person). Less controversially, the same can then be likewise stated of, for example, the eidemic protocept of a great ape being aware of its own total first-person selfhood and thereby being endowed with (non-human) unianthood.

As will be shortly addressed in greater detail, a uniant will of itself consist of distinct aspects. For optimal ease of expression, most such distinct aspects of unianthood—which as a distinct aspect shall thereby not of itself be the totality of the first-person selfhood in question—will in this chapter persist in being individually termed a self or else a selfhood. As one example of this, a uniant can then consist of an allologically uniantive self or selfhood, this in addition to an autologically uniantive self or selfhood (see below).

Unianthood will then necessarily be subjective (i.e., consisting of the cognita and constraints to which an eidemic protocept is in any way subjected) rather than objective (i.e., that which the protocepts of all coexisting anims in the cosmos (be these anims eidems or else their animids) are equally subjected to in principle if not also in practice, and, hence, that whose occurrence is thereby completely or else perfectly impartial to any individual anim or any individual grouping of such). A uniant will thereby be in this manner distinct from any notion of an objective selfhood—with the latter being for example evoked when addressing the selfhood of an animal (humans here included) which is in a state of coma: wherein the first-person awareness, and hence the eidemic protocept, vanishes (this, therefore, together with all its unianthood) while the objectively appraised living and hence yet animated body as a self or selfhood persists.

To better emphasize the strictly first-person nature of a uniant via one further possible example: In all cases where a functional living brain is deemed to give rise to a respective eidemic protocept (with this being minimally upholdable, though by different means of inference, in the worldviews of both apeirosonism and materialistic nihilonism): the biological abnormality of a two headed animal, despite being objectively appraisable as one physiological entity (and, hence, as one objective self), will nevertheless be deemed endowed with two distinct unianthoods: each unianthood inferred to pertain to its distinct eidemic protocept which is constitutionally determined (either in part or in whole) by each individual brain found in each individual head of the same given animal. Hence, in this one extreme example, there will occur one animal and two simultaneously occurring uniants: with each of the two distinct yet cooccurring brain-specific eidemic protocepts being aware of and therefore being endowed with its own unique unianthood.

This one section, then, will only address a layered taxonomy of what a corporeal uniant (such as all humans are) can consist of. It will hence neither address the issue of objective selfhood nor that of possible to conceive of incorporeal unianthoods (e.g., ghosts, angels, deities, etc.).

While this chapter does not intend a comprehensive taxonomy of all possible aspects of all possible corporeal unianthoods imaginable (hence, for example, all altered states of consciousness which might occur due to psychedelic drug use that might then result in unianthoods distinct from that applicable to the unaltered state of consciousness), it will nevertheless intend to outline the basic constituency of what any corporeal uniant—regardless of type or state of mind—can possibly consist of.

Discussion of what §5.2 will uphold as unfalsified certainties regarding unianthood will be postponed till §15.2.3—this after a general outline is presented regarding any corporeal uniant’s possible makeup.

15.2.1. The Autologically Uniantive Self

Let the strictly autological aspects of the uniant be understood as that portion of the uniant which is strictly constituted or the eidemic protocept’s autocepts, be these autocepts strictly protological or also mesological.

Let that aspect of unianthood strictly constituted of the autological aspects of a uniant then be more technically specified as the autologically uniantive self, or for greater brevity, as either the autouniantive self or, else, the autouniant. The autouniantive self shall then, again, be strictly autological in full.

The autouniantive self can then be itself further classifiable into two conceptually distinct categories: namely, the protocepts specific to eidems alone, which are to be demarcated as protocores, and, in contrast, eidemic selves in whole. Because of the great importance this first category will hold to metaphysical understandings of unianthood at large in this treatise, heightened attention in respect to this first category will be first given.

15.2.1.1. The Protocore

To more succinctly differentiate eidemic protocepts from the protocepts of animids (such as one’s conscience), let the eidemic protocept per se be first more formally addressed as a uniant’s protological core or, for greater brevity, as any possible uniant’s protocore.

Because the protocore will strictly pertain to eidems (i.e., to the first-person points of view which all those here concerned minimally are), it will hence never specify the protocepts of our animids (this wherever animids, including uranimids, are hypothesized or else concluded to occur). Wherever needed, then, the latter will instead be specified as animidive protocepts, or, as pertains to uranimids in particular, uranimidive protocepts—with the protocepts of anims in general being then specified as animive protocepts. Then—whereas a unianthood will always pivot upon the protocore, i.e. upon the eidemic protocept—no unianthood will ever pivot upon any animidive protocept of which the unianthood’s protocore might be in any way aware or else might infer to occur. Unianthood, again, being delimited to that first-person total selfhood of which a protocore, i.e. the eidemic protocept, is aware of.

In general review, the protocore will protoceive its own states of protological being: such as those of being certain/uncertain, curious/bored, pleased/displeased, hyperalert/unfocused, etc. These protoceptions wherein there will be no duality whatsoever between the subject of awareness (the given protocept) and its object(s) of awareness (its own protological state(s) of being—which specify what the protocore momentary is (e.g., “I am curious”)) will all thereby be autological—but will be a special subcategory of autoception in so far as these protoceptions will not be directly dependent on the specific mesocepts of which the given protocept might also be autoaware of (again, with mesocepts being themselves autoceived and, hence, autological cognita). As one example of this, we as eidemic protocepts, i.e. as protocores, can be either pleased or displeased with ourselves (and hence be autologically aware of so being) at certain junctures irrespective of whether we are endowed with the mesocept of first-person physiological sight. And, in addition to the protocore’s protoception of its own being, the protocore will furthermore always apprehend allocepts via its mesocepts, this for as long as oneself as eidem (i.e., as mesocept-endowed protocore) occurs.

With that brief reviewed, the protocore—in strictly being the eidemic protocept—will be a nonmanifold unity (one devoid of parts or aspects), this as was established for all those here concerned in Chapter 6. This attribute of the protocore being a nonmanifold unity will thereby stringently remain even when the protocore is hypothesized or else concluded to be (this for at least all humans) a unity resulting from a plurality of certain animidive protocepts which mutually enhere (all such animids being in turn hypothesized to be constitutionally determined by certain uranimids, with the occurrence of the latter being in turn in part constitutionally determined by the functioning of certain portions of a living brain).

15.2.1.1.1. A Preliminary Overview of the Corporeal Uniant’s Protocore Within All Systems of Apeirosonism

In general review of what was addressed in Chapter 14, within all three possible interpretations of apeirosonism, the protocepture—consisting of all cooccurring animive protocepts in the cosmos—will, again, be the uncreatable and undestroyable nonillusory essence that, via any number of means, brings about the ultimately illusory essence of poieture, with the latter being both possible to create and—as is necessitated by the apeiroson’s actualization—possible to obliterate. Again, all this as will be logically entailed by the apeiroson in fact being the euteleion (were it to in fact so be). The objective physical world, then, will be one aspect of the poieture at large—namely, the equireal poieture—itself brought about by the fragmented nature of the protocepture.

In turn, then, the occurrence of an individual corporeal uniant (such as any human being is) will be subject to the constraints—be these causal or otherwise—of the poietural, objective physicality upon which the corporeality of the given uniant is dependent (an objective physicality of poieture that is, again, brought about by the fractiprotocepture at large). Due to this, the given corporeal uniant’s protocore will be correspondingly affected by changes in its individuated substrata of physicality—such that, for one example, damage to a corporeal uniant’s brain shall most always result in corresponding damage to the respective protocore’s functioning, if not its very occurrence within the physical world. Hence, in the most extreme case, this damage to a corporeal uniant’s body will result in the given protocore’s corporeal death to this world.

All this mentioned to specify that, in all possible interpretations of apeirosonism—this, again, being that worldview wherein the apeiroson is deemed to in fact be the euteleion—the occurrence of any corporeal uniant’s protocore will be in large part deemed constitutionally determined via any number of means from the respective corporeal body. Notwithstanding, within apeirosonism, this constitutional determinacy of the protocore from its objectively physical body can only metaphysically be in some ways partial—rather than (as any system of materialism or of physicalism maintains) complete. In one sense, then, within apeirosonism, the protocore of a corporeal being will perpetually be in-formed, in part, by its respective corporeal body’s physiology—but will as essence remain upon the apeiroson’s actualization in perfectly form-devoid manners.

While formal logical derivations of this generalized apeirosonic worldview shall be postponed till Volume II of this work—wherein physical objectivity will be derived—for now let the following suffice: Within apeirosonism—be it positive or negative—while the protocore of corporeal beings will be as mortal to this world as will be its physiological body, the same protocore shall nevertheless be apeirosonically immortal as an aspect of the protocepture per se. Which, within apeirosonism, shall again be that uncreatable and undestroyable nonillusory essence of which the actualized apeiroson shall strictly consist of—all this, again, as will be rationally entailed by, and hence derivable from, the apeiroson in fact being the euteleion.

15.2.1.1.2. Within Positive Apeirosonism

With the aforementioned generality being then understood to pertain to any apeirosonic worldview, next will be addressed possible interpretations of the protocore’s nature—and, by extension, the possible nature of the protocepture in whole—when strictly interpreted via systems of positive apeirosonism.

Positive apeirosonism, again, will consist of all possible worldviews wherein the apeiroson is interpreted as being either the static apeiroson or else the dynamic apeiroson—both being interpretations of the apeiroson as euteleion predicting that upon the apeiroson’s actualization the protocepture persists in protoceiving its own being in a protoceptual state of currently unimaginable bliss and, thereby, persists in its being.

Then, when strictly entertaining positive apeirosonism, two very distinct ontological interpretations of the protocore’s (and, by extension, the protocepture’s) nature can be validly derived logically, this when the protocore is considered devoid of all mesocepts and allocepts: one in which the protocore’s metaphysical nature is its being our genuine self (a genuine self that in its pure nature is an integral aspect of the protocepture at large) which of itself is imperishable and, in stark enough contrast, one in which the protocore is a fragment of an underlying and imperishable selfhood-devoid essence which persists its protoception upon the apeiroson’s actualization that, as a fragment of such essence, is the very selfhood-devoid core upon which all allological and hence poietural (and, thereby, ultimately illusory) aspects of unianthood attach and pivot.

15.2.1.1.2.1. As the Protoself (cf., the Atman)

In this positive-apeiroson-derived ontological interpretation of the protocore, one as protocore will be a purely nonpoietural aspect of an otherwise poieture-comprised unianthood which, as an integral aspect of the protocepture, will continue to occur in completely unchanged manners upon the apeiroson’s actualization as one’s strictly nonillusory self.

In this interpretation of the protocore, it is to be for example observed that the protocore will always be that aspect of a uniant to which all other aspects of unianthood belong. From “my (protologic) consciousness” (resulting from the certainty that “I am (protologically) conscious and am autologically aware of this,” thereby being a state of protological being which in this manner alone belongs to me as protocore), to “my mesocepts” (these being autological aspects other than me as protocore which belonging to me as protocore), to “my mind and body” (these being kentrons I as protocore am alloceptually aware of into which I as protocore most always effortlessly enhere), to “my clothes” (which are alloceptual kentrons fully separate to myself as uniant which, nevertheless, can partly define my unianthood—as can be echoed in the dictum “the clothes make the man”)—and everything else imaginable which can be addressed by the determiner “my”—what the term “my” will always ultimately reference will be a belonging to me as protocore. In so being, the protocore will then be that central, core aspect of self around which all other conceivable aspects of a total first-person selfhood pivot. And, in so being, the protocore can then rather naturally be inferred to be one’s nonpoietural, genuine, core self—hence, as being that nonillusory core aspect of one’s own otherwise poietural unianthood which, as core aspect, shall in some way necessarily remain upon the apeiroson’s actualization—this when all poieture (and, hence, all metaphysically appraised illusion which we experience as allocepts via our mesocepts) becomes obliterated.

In like enough manner, it will be observed that it is always the protocore per se (rather than the protocore’s mesocepts or allocepts) which is the prototelos-endowed, first-person agency or else agent that genesially determines the effects of made choices, this when one is engaged in freely willed choice making (this as has been established in Chapter 11). The protocore can then be here likewise easily inferred to be one’s genuine, nonillusory, core self—for it is the protocore to which responsibility (or lack of such) for consequences pertains; to which praise or blame for what an agent intends and actualizes can be offered, to which the burden of past wrongs or else the esteem of past right deeds relates, and so forth.

Were the apeiroson’s actualization to be that of the dynamic apeiroson, then this very agency will in some way persist in the absence of all poieture and, hence, in the absence of all mesocepts and allocepts (which are requisite for alloalternatives to be experienced within poietural realms) upon the apeiroson’s actualization. If, however, the apeiroson’s actualization will instead be that of the static apeiroson, then and only then will all agency vanish upon the apeiroson’s actualization—this while the protocepture persists in protoceiving its own being.

Hence, because the protocore will be both the pivotal or else central awareness to which all cognita that it experiences belong and, furthermore, the pivotal or else central agency of deeds pertaining to a unianthood, and because—contingent on positive apeirosonism being accurate—the protocore shall persist protoceiving itself upon the apeiroson’s actualization in the absence of all mesocepts, in this one interpretation, the protocore, again, then becomes inferred to be one’s nonillusory (hence, nonpoietural) and thereby genuine self.

Let this first mentioned, briefly outlined, possible metaphysical interpretation of the protocore be more technically specified in this work as that interpretation wherein any uniant’s protocore equates to the uniant’s protoceptual self or, else termed for greater brevity, to the uniant’s protoself.

As one possible embellishment of this interpretation, because the apeiroson’s actualization in part entails absolute absence of any culpability or blame for any allocept-contingent deed or action—such that no transgression, regardless of how miniscule or trite, will then remain or else will remain unrepented for—when the protocore’s genuine nature is deemed to be that of the genuine self (i.e., to be the protoself) one can then validly conclude that a return in one’s choices and doings as protoself toward the apeiroson’s actualization can fully equate to one’s return as protoself to a state of pure, perfect, and complete innocence in relation to one’s genuine self. Hence, the actualized apeiroson will in this interpretation then in part equate to the actualization of one’s absolutely innocent genuine self—a yet to be obtained future state of perfected being pertaining to one’s nonillusory self toward which one as protoself either evolves or else devolves from.

This just provided general interpretation of the protocore wherein it is deemed to be the protoself can then in some ways be found to parallel at least some Hindu conceptualizations of atman—in this treatise, such that the protocepture per se can be construed equivalent to the nonillusory essence of pure and genuine selfhood (which can at least in some interpretations be, as essence, equated to the Hindu notion of Brahman) which is capable of protoception in the absence of all poieture, and which, as such, is embedded in the ultimately illusory essence of poieture which is experienced as both mesocepts and allocepts (with this essence of poieture being in certain interpretations deemed equivalent to the notion of Maya which is found in Indian philosophies). All this such that the apeiroson’s actualization can at least parallel certain Hindu interpretations of moksha in its soteriological sense.

Due to this, in this possible interpretation of positive apeirosonism, the protocepture can in this work then be further specified wherever needed as the protoselfture.

15.2.1.1.2.2. As the Protonoself (cf., the Anatman)

In this alternative positive-apeiroson-derived ontological interpretation of the protocore—while the protocepture per se will remain unchanging as nonillusory essence that is to be the only given which remains upon the apeiroson’s actualization such that it continues protoceiving its own being—it will however be observed that no protocept pertaining to any anim (be the anim an eidem or an animid) can be found perfectly and completely permanent in any protoception(s) it currently experiences. In this second interpretation, then, there is inferred to be no perfectly and completely permanent genuine self—be it found in the protocepture or any fragmented aspect of it, protocores very much included.

For emphasis, it is here observed that prior to the apeiroson’s actualization, the protocore—this again being the eidemic protocept—will perpetually undergo changes such that it never obtains a completely permanent protoceptual state of being. These changes will minimally occur due to the following: they will in part occur due to the everchanging allocepts the protocore is aware of via its mesocepts perpetually affecting the protocore’s protoceptions; in part due to the consequences to the choices the protocore genesially determines producing changes in the protocore’s future being and, hence, in the protocore’s protoceptions; and—here granting that the protocore is a nonmanifold unification of animidive protocepts—in part as determined by the protocore’s perpetually changing constitutional makeup.

In this second interpretation, then, the actualization of the apeiroson will then likewise be the obliteration of all senses of selfhood imaginable—this as will be necessitated by the vanishing of all poieture in the cosmos—fully including the here illusory notions of a protoself.

Let this second mentioned, possible metaphysical interpretation of the protocore be in this work more technically specified as that interpretation wherein any uniant’s protocore equates to the uniant’s protoceptual no-self or, else termed for greater brevity, the protonoself.

Whereas when interpreting the protocore to be the protoself one will be inferring that the completely nondualistic genuine self (this being the protoself) that is imbedded within one’s own otherwise dualistic being of awareness will remain upon the apeiroson’s actualization, in this latter interpretation nothing pertaining to oneself can possibly remain: the actualized apeiroson shall necessarily be a literally selfless, yet protoceiving, protological being—such that, again, it here makes no sense to specify that any such thing as a genuine self shall remain and, by extension, that such a thing as a genuine (and hence nonillusory) self can ever occur prior to the apeiroson’s actualization. Yet, in likewise stark contrast to the notion of the protocore being the protonihilum (see below), the protonoself upon the apeiroson’s actualization shall nevertheless persist in experiencing protoception and, thereby, shall persist in being (rather than equating to absolute nonbeing)—this, again, as will be entailed by positive apeirosonism wherein one of the two positive apeiroson scenarios is deemed to in fact be the euteleion.

With all the aforementioned observed, because it is the protocept that chooses (rather than its mesocepts or allocepts) between alternatives, in this second given interpretation of the protocore as protonoself, it will nevertheless yet necessarily be the protonoself per se which will hold individual responsibility for the choices it makes on behalf of its total unianthood—such that the protonoself (despite not validly being any type of self in any ultimate sense) yet validly remains a first-person agent which is embedded within mesocepts and allocepts for as long as poieture occurs and, hence, for as long as the apeiroson is not yet actualized. (This understanding then further grants the possibility of the protonoself’s reincarnations as an agent within poietural realms—be these poietural realms corporeal or not—and hence, possibly, of its karma being carried over from one lifetime to another.)

The just provided second general interpretation of the protocore wherein it is deemed to be the protonoself can then in some ways be found to parallel at least some Buddhist conceptualizations of anatman—in this treatise, such that the protocepture can be construed equivalent to a selfhood-devoid nonillusory essence capable of protoception in the absence of all poieture which, as such, is embedded in the ultimately illusory essence of poieture (which, again, is possible to equate to Maya); an illusory essence of poieture which is experienced as both mesocepts and allocepts; an illusory essence of poieture which furthermore brings about the (metaphysically appraised) illusion of first-person selfhood. All this such that the apeiroson’s actualization can at least in part parallel certain Buddhist interpretations of nirvana without remainder.

Due to this, in this interpretation of positive apeirosonism, the protocepture can then in this work be further specified wherever needed as the protonoselfture.

15.2.1.1.3. Within Negative Apeirosonism

Just as with the two positive forms of apeirosonism, negative apeirosonism will uphold the apeiroson to in fact be the euteleion but—unlike the two conceivable forms of positive apeirosonism—will uphold the apeiroson’s actualization to be an absolute cessation of all possible types of awareness, much including all possible types of protoception. (To emphasize, this as will be contrasted to positive apeirosonism, wherein it can become validly inferred from the presumed nature of the euteleion that—irrespective of whether the protocore is the protoself or the protonoself—the apeiroson’s actualization will entail an unimaginably perfected and complete protoception of bliss which, as such, shall occur beyond all conceivable types of poietural time and space, such that no thingness shall take place.)

It can be observed that, in most respects, negative apeirosonism can upon enquiry be found virtually indistinguishable from positive forms of apeirosonism in most ways. For instance, here too there will necessarily be derived the nonillusory essence of protocepture as discerned from the ultimately illusory essence of poieture—this as is entailed by the actualization of the apeiroson—such that the fractiprotocepture can be deemed to hold the same general requirements for actualizing the apeiroson as euteleion. That stated, the main critical difference between positive and negative apeirosonism will be in how the two interpret the protocepture’s ontic nature: whereas positive apeirosonism deems the protocepture to be protologically aware of its own being in everlasting manners and thereby to always equate to nonillusory being (this irrespective of whether protocores are deemed protoselves or protonoselves), negative apeirosonism will instead deem the protocepture when fully devoid of all poieture (and, hence, when fully devoid of all mesocepts and allocepts) to literally equate to indefinite nonbeing, i.e. indefinite nothingness (maybe importantly, this such that the typical English understanding of “nothingness” is not to in any way be confused with the understanding of “no thingness”—with the latter being else addressable as the complete absence of any state or condition of being a kentron: In affirming a literally limitless pure protoceptual being upon the apeiroson’s actualization, positive apeirosonism will by entailment require that upon the apeiroson’s actualization no thingness (i.e., no state or condition of being a kentron) can possibly remain while, also by entailment, requiring that this very same state of absolute and divinely-simple being is the very contrary of nothingness or, else termed, of nonbeing).

The perspective of negative apeirosonism will then deem all animive protocepts (be they eidemic or else animidive) to be fragments of indefinite nonbeing as nonillusory essence which, as such, will however persist to hold protoceptual being—wherein protoceptions persist—only within poieture due to the very poieture which they are informed by as protocepts, this via their respective mesocepts and the allocepts thereby apprehended.

To more easily specify this also conceivable interpretation of the protocore obtainable from negative apeirosonism, the Latin term nihilum (meaning “nothing” or “nothingness” here in the strict sense of “nonbeing”) will be used: in negative apeirosonism, then, the protocore when conceptualized devoid of all mesocepts and allocepts will be more technically specified as the protological nihilum (to be a fragment of the nonbeing which pure protocepture equates to when devoid of all mesocepts and allocepts) or, for greater brevity of expression, as the protonihilum.

And in keeping with this, wherever needing to be so specified, the protocepture within systems of negative apeirosonism can in this work then be addressed as the protonihilumiture.

In parallel to the protoself and the protonoself, in this conceivable interpretation it will then be the protonihilum which will hold agentive responsibility for the choices it makes whenever presented with alternatives—and which, till the time of the apeiroson’s actualization, can then be deemed to remain apeirosonically immortal as a poieture-embedded protonihilum (for example, such as via reincarnations into poietural realms). Nevertheless, within this possible to conceive of worldview of negative apeirosonism, the protocepture per se will be construed equivalent to a selfhood-devoid nonillusory essence that—utterly unlike what is specified for both the protoself and the protonoself—is here deemed incapable of any protoception in the absence of all poieture.

As such, while the worldview of negative apeirosonism will entail that the materialistic nihilon is necessarily a pseudoteleion, in nevertheless upholding the nihilonic apeiroson as being the euteleion, negative apeirosonism shall, again, be one form of nihilonism—namely, that which has been specified as nonmaterialistic nihilonism.

In terse conclusion of what has just been addressed, whereas positive apeirosonism can be interpreted to intend the ultimate creation of an everlasting protoceptual bliss—this as either pertaining to a globally unified, nonmanifold, poieture-devoid and hence non-eidemic protoself or, else, protonoself—negative apeirosonism can be instead interpreted to intend the ultimate destruction of everything that occurs and thereby is, fully including the obliteration of all protological awareness. And, again, fear that the apeiroson’s actualization might in fact equate to the nonmaterialistic nihilon—this as is upheld in the worldview of negative apeirosonism—can serve as one sufficient reason to shun any intent which might significantly increase one’s proximity to the apeiroson.

15.2.1.1.4. Within All Other Teleion Scenarios

As was established in Chapter 14, it is unfalsifiedly certain that one of the teleions which we can conceive of will in fact be our euteleion. Other than the three apeiroson scenarios previously addressed, only four other teleion scenarios are possible to conceive of: the materialistic nihilon, the permanon, the turannon, and the dysteleion.

Unlike as can be directly derived from the general worldview of apeirosonism, none of these other teleion scenarios entail the occurrence of protocepture as distinct from poieture. In turn, none of these other teleion scenarios offer a relatively clear means of appraising possibilities regarding what the nonillusory ontic nature of the protocore might in fact be. This despite the protocore’s (i.e., the eidemic protocept’s) ontic occurrence being unfalsifiedly certain and, hence, of epistemic certainty for all those here concerned—this, again, as has been previously established in Chapter 6.

Notwithstanding, the following can be further inferred:

Firstly, as a generality applicable to all these alternative teleions: When any such non-apeirosonic teleion is upheld to be one’s euteleion, this will entail a worldview wherein the apeiroson is then deemed to necessarily be a pseudoteleion (i.e., a false teleion whose actualization is thereby metaphysically impossible). Were the apeiroson to in fact be a pseudoteleion, then the protocore could neither be the protoself, nor the protonoself, nor the protonihilum—this on account of apeirosonism being falsity, irrespective of whether it is positively or negatively interpreted—such that no apeirosonic immortality of the protocore will be possible in any of these alternative worldviews save for, possibly, that of dysteleionism (see below).

More individually addressed:

Materialistic nihilonism will presume that the only ontically actual, nonillusory essence will be that which is specified by, or else implicitly understood in, systems of materialism or else of physicalism. As such, the unfalsifiedly certain protocore will within this worldview be deemed to either be itself illusory—which leads to a logical contradiction between a) the protocore’s ontic actuality being of unfalsified certainty to all those here concerned and b) non-epistemically certain presuppositions upholding the protocore to in fact not be ontically actual—or, else, while not being deemed illusory, yet being deemed completely contingent on the material or else physical substrata from which it is inferred ultimately constituted in full (this, again, rather than only being partially contingent on such physical substrata—as is the case in apeirosonism). The protocore being illusory in its nature cannot be rationally upheld due to the logical contradiction between an epistemic certainty and non-epistemic certainties—with the epistemic certainty taking precedence at the expense of concluding the non-epistemic certainties false. What viably remains rationally appraisable as possibility is that the unfalsifiedly certain protocore—in being completely dependent on its material or else physical substrata—will permanently perish upon the obliteration of its respective material or else physical substrata, or else the obliteration of the functional operations of these. This, again, results in the notion that upon one’s corporeal death so too will one as protocore permanently perish—thereby resulting in the euteleion of the materialistic nihilon (which, again, thereby perfectly and completely fulfils one’s prototelos). In this worldview of the materialistic nihilon, then, it becomes metaphysically impossible that the protocore can persist to occur in the complete absence of a material or else physical substrata specific to itself—this such that, for example, all conceivable types of afterlives pertaining to the protocore become absurdity.

Both permanonism and turannonism, on the other hand, will uphold one’s euteleion to minimally necessitate the occurrence of oneself as eidemic being—i.e., as a mesocept-endowed protocore which thereby necessarily is aware of allocepts—thereby making the occurrence of the pure protocore a metaphysical impossibility: in permanonism this eidemic being’s cherished aspects of allological unianthood (see below) will remain perfectly and completely permanent for all time whereas in turannonism there will be an eidemic being free to change as it pleases which for all time obtains absolute control over everything other (including, were it to so will being endowed with, its own corporeal or otherwise allological unianthood). It, again, is to then be inferred that in both these teleion-relative worldviews the notion that a protocore can persist occurring in the absence of an eidemic selfhood can only be false by entailment. Hence, while neither of these two worldviews preclude the metaphysical possibility of what is commonly termed “life after death,” both will necessitate life after death to minimally consist in the continuation of one’s eidemic selfhood (see below) and, hence, in the eternal continuation of one’s duality-bound ego—in contrast to the unending continuation of the protocore per se. Hence, wherever it is presumed in either of these two worldviews that the death of one’s allological unianthood results in the permanent death of the uniant’s eidemic self, so too will it be presumed in these two worldviews that the respective protocore can then permanently perish.

Lastly, there is the possible to conceive of dysteleion. Dysteleionism will, again, affirm the metaphysical impossibility of any synteleion being the euteleion—hence specifying all conceivable synteleions to be pseudoteleions and thereby false, much including that of nihilonism. Because dysteleionism then likewise deems the apeiroson to be a pseudoteleion, it shall likewise preclude the metaphysical possibility of the protocore persisting to occur the absence of alloceptions. In this same worldview, however—because both the materialistic nihilon and the nonmaterialistic nihilon will be here deemed pseudoteleions—there will then be entailed some form of immortality of awareness wherein continuation of the eidemic self, and hence of the duality-bound ego, is necessitated. These aspects of the dysteleion when further enquired into can, in turn, then further lead into a worldview that for all practical purposes parallels that of apeirosonism save for the possibility of the apeiroson ever being actualized (with further enquires as to how this perspective can come about being deferred to Volume II of this work).

Irrespective of these alternative perspectives to that of the apeiroson as euteleion, it will nevertheless yet remain unfalsifiedly certain that it is the protocore which apprehends all its allocepts via its mesocepts and which, by virtue of being that which chooses in times of free will, shall likewise of itself be the pivotal or else central agency of a unianthood.

15.2.1.1.5. Agency Revisited

In every teleion-derived worldview which we can conceive of, it will always be the respective protocore which will be the agent which holds free will capacity—this rather than the eidem per se. As was evidenced in Chapter 11, it will not be one’s mesocepts (nor, for that matter, the allocepts thereby apprehended) which will genesially determine the effect of a made choice; instead, it will be one as protocore (as eidemic protocept) which so genesially determines.

This, in turn, entails that a protocore shall not only be that which is aware of all cognita—be this cognita strictly protological, more broadly autological so that it incorporates one’s mesocepts as protocore, or else allological—but will in addition simultaneously be a free-will-capacity endowed agency and, hence, agent.

Due to this, the protocore is at all times to then be understood as agency, or else agent—this in addition to being understood as that which experiences.

Via extrapolation, one might then also infer that the protocepts to be found intrinsic to all animids—be these one’s own animids or else those of other eidems—will likewise each be as an animid endowed with its own degree of agency to genesially determine effects and, thereby, will each be a prototelos-endowed agency or, else termed, agent.

15.2.1.1.6. A General Review

The very attributes of one as protocore—this being the core identity of one’s own unianthood (that identity upon which all other aspects of unianthood pivot)—can then be inferred by deriving the ontic nature of the unfalsifiedly certain protocore from that one teleion one presumes to be the ontically certain euteleion.

If one presumes the apeiroson to be the euteleion, then the protocore will necessarily be a fragment of the protocepture which, as such a fragment, might further either be the protoself, the protonoself, or else the protonihilum—such that a perfect, nonmanifold unity of all cooccurring protocepts, i.e. of all fragments of the protocepture, in the cosmos in the absence of all poieture is required for the euteleion to be actualized.

If one presumes the materialistic nihilon to be the euteleion, then one will uphold the protocore’s occurrence to necessarily be entirely (rather than partially) due to its immediate substrata of materiality or else physicality—such that upon the eradication of the latter (or else the eradication of the latter’s functional organizations) one as protocept instantly obtains the actualization of the nihilon as euteleion.

If one presumes either the permanon or the turannon to be the euteleion, then the protocore will necessarily not in any way be occurrent in the absence of an eidemic self—such that the only means of completely fulfilling one’s prototelos as protocore will be by safeguarding one’s eidemic self (i.e., one’s minimal form of duality-bound ego) against all volitional suffering either by actualizing the permanon or, else, by actualizing the turannon (contingent on which of the two one deems to be one’s euteleion).

If, however, one presumes the dysteleion, then—contingent on further interpretations of a reality wherein no synteleion is possible to actualize that nevertheless yet in part consists of an apeiroson-resultant equireal poietural world (such that the apeiroson is here nevertheless deemed a pseudoteleion)—one might come to appraise reality as consisting of a Sisyphean form of apeirosonism wherein the apeiroson’s very actualization is metaphysically impossible.

Irrespective of teleion-derived worldview via which the protocore can be interpreted, the protocore will remain an agency for at least as long as it apprehends allocepts via its mesocepts (with the dynamic apeiroson being a possible exception to this). And, again, although which teleion scenario will in fact be one’s euteleion remains less than epistemically certain, that one such teleion will in fact be one’s euteleion shall nevertheless persist in being epistemically certain.

15.2.1.2. The Eidemic Self

Let the eidemic aspect of a uniant—aka, the eidemic self or, more simply, the eidem—be fully equivalent to one’s own self as an eidem (i.e., as the mesocept-endowed protocore which thereby necessarily apprehends allocepts, this in addition to autoceiving both its own protocepts and mesocepts, which all those here concerned are).

In review, the eidemic self will strictly be the sum of a) the protocore and b) the mesocepts which the protocore autoceives itself being endowed with (via which allocepts are necessarily apprehended)—but will exclude all allocepts of which the eidem is in any way aware. In so being, because the eidemic self can only occur given a duality between autocepts (the protocore and its mesocepts) and all allocepts thereby apprehended, the eidemic self shall then stand in contrast to the completely nondualistic nature of the protocore within apeirosonic worldviews.

The eidemic self shall thereby be the minimal form of one’s duality-bound ego.

Furthermore, because the eidemic self will be a unified conflux of the protocore and its mesocepts, the eidemic self shall at all times be an autologically manifold unity—hence an autoceived unity consisting of diverse kinds of autological cognita—this in contrast to the protocore per se, which will instead always strictly be an autologically nonmanifold unity: consisting in only the protocept concerned.

As a maybe important note, the demarcation of the eidemic self is not to be confused with the demarcation of what has been previously addressed as eidemic consciousness: Whereas eidemic selfhood will exclude all allocepts of which the eidem might be aware, eidemic consciousness—i.e., eidemic awareness—will by its very nature include the allocepts of which the eidem is aware. (And, in review, in contrast to eidemic consciousness will be the viable notion of protologic consciousness: Whereas allocepts will be intrinsic to eidemic consciousness, protologic consciousness will strictly consist of protoception per se and, hence, will strictly consist of the protological cognitum which of itself holds awareness of a) its own being as protocept, b) its autological mesocepts, and c) the allocepts it apprehends via its mesocepts: this such that both mesocepts and allocepts are here deemed other in respect to the protologic consciousness itself. For any given uniant, then, protologic consciousness will be equivalent to the protocore’s—rather than the respective eidem’s—awareness.)

Of further note, within any system of apeirosonism, the eidemic self will necessarily always be in part poietural in its nature—for its mesocepts cannot be aspects of the (pure) protocepture that is inferred to remain upon the apeiroson’s actualization and must therefore be inferred to be aspects of the poieture. This understanding of the eidemic self will, again, stand in direct contrast to apeirosonism-derived understandings regarding the nature of the protocore—be it the protoself, the protonoself, or the protonihilum—wherein the protocore of itself can only be nonpoietural in full and, hence, wherein the protocore can only be devoid of any type of duality.

Just as no eidemic self can occur in the absence of a protocore—this irrespective of worldview—so too can no aspect of an allological unianthood (see below) occur in the absence of the eidemic self which, thereby, alloceives the allological aspects of its own unianthood via its mesocepts.

Lastly here succinctly specified, just as the protocore will literally be imperceivable (e.g., one does not see one’s own being as protocore when looking into a mirror, with everything there seen being alloceptual—this just as much as when looking at any other protocore-endowed being (be they human or else non-human life-forms), so too will the eidem per se be imperceivable: One cannot, for example, perceive one’s own mesocepts as allocepts, for mesocepts are the very means via which allocepts are apprehended—this just as one cannot alloceive the mesocepts of other mesocept-endowed protocepts (but can only best conceptually infer their mesocepts from the respective physiology and behaviors of the respective other).

15.2.1.2.1. Further Differentiating the Protocore from the Eidem Via Remembrance

As can sometimes occur during dreams of sleep and, to typically far lesser extents, during daydreams, the eidemic self can change by means of changes in the mesocepts which the respective protocore is autologically endowed with. In contrast, the protocore will throughout any such change remain unchanged in so far as being that which not only experiences its allocepts via its mesocepts but also as that which can remember previous protoceptual states of being wherein allocepts were apprehended via the mesocepts then held—including when these mesocepts were different from the mesocepts currently held by the protocore which is remembering its prior states of being, this as protocore.

As one easy to express possible example which concerns waking states of being, a protocore which was once endowed with the mesocept of physiological sight but which is, for whatever reason, currently blind can be capable of remembering its protoceptual states of being held back when it was able to physiologically see. This despite the makeup of the current eidem being distinctly different by comparison to its previous form.

Hence—in theory, if not also in practice—were a protocore to have during dreams of sleep experienced allocepts via mesocepts that are lacking during the protocore’s waking states of being, and were the protocore to remember these same states of personal being that occurred during dreams of sleep upon awakening, then here again the respective protocore will remember states of holding a different eidemic makeup than the eidemic makeup currently held.

Furthering the example previously made, suppose that a person who has become blind after once being able to physiologically see during waking states comes to experience themselves during a dream of sleep able to physiologically see quite vividly the appearance of a house. The protocore of this same blind person then remembers the perceptual appearance of this house upon awakening. Here, then, the now awakened protocore will remember its eidemic state of being and that which was thereby experienced in the given dream despite currently being an eidemic self devoid of the mesocept which makes all such visual experiences possible.

Cases such as those just mentioned illustrate that it will be the protocore which remembers its past states of protoceptual being—to include the allocepts apprehended via the mesocepts then held by the protocore but which the current protocore might be devoid of. It is to then be concluded that such remembrances are thereby not contingent upon the eidemic self’s makeup—but, again, strictly contingent on the nature of the protocore in question.

In terse overview, it is then the protocore—and not the eidem—which is aware of all its cognita, which holds the agency of free will and is thereby an agent, and which remembers prior states of personal being. This will remain so irrespective of which teleion one assumes to in fact be the euteleion.

15.2.2. The Allologically Uniantive Self

In contrast to the autouniant, let that aspect of unianthood constituted of allocepts apprehended by the autouniant (be the allocepts physiological, phainological, or else strictly ennoological) be more technically specified as the allologically uniantive self, or for greater brevity, as either the allouniantive self or, else, the allouniant.

The allouniantive self shall thereby be constituted of allocepts which the autouniant either implicitly or explicitly understands itself to be unified with in manifold manners—such that a) no allouniantive self can occur in the absence of an occurring autouniant to which the former pertains and b) the allouniantive self shall be a multifaceted aspect of unianthood which is affixed (however transiently or permanently in part or in whole) to the autouniant.

The allouniantive self can then be further classified into two broad and conceptually distinct categories: The physiological allouniant, which will be strictly demarcated by the autouniant’s physioceptions, and, in contrast, the psychological allouniant, which can be composed of phainocepts, ennoocepts, as well as physiocepts.

15.2.2.1. The Physiological Allouniant

For any conceivable corporeal uniant—such as all human beings are—its (minimally, waking state) unianthood will in part consist of what the given protocore understands to be its own physiological body, which the protocore minimally apprehends via its mesocept-resulting physiopercepts—this together with the sencepts the protocore holds regarding its own corporeal unianthood (all this, for one example, can be contrasted with the possibility of a protocore being aware (falsely or otherwise) of being endowed with what is sometimes termed a subtle body—with chakras being possible attributes of such—which will not be physiological but phainological in its perceptual nature were it, or any of its aspects, to be directly perceived—and which will otherwise solely consist of senceptual understandings regarding one’s own makeup as uniant).

A more in-depth enquiry into how an eidem holds physioawareness of its own physiological body will be presented in Chapter 16. Here, only a terse overview will be outlined. To commence, exological physioception—what in current English lexicon is termed exteroception—will be first addressed:

Our visual physioceptions of our own physiological body or any portion thereof will always consist of exological alloceptions apprehended via our mesocept of physio-sight by us as protocores—whereby our own visually physioceived body shall perceptually be in principle no different than any other physiological kentron which we might visually physioceive as exological allocept, a mug onto which we might be holding for example, a rock in the distance as another.

Likewise shall always be the case for all our physioceptions regarding our own physiological body’s physio-smells, physio-sounds, and physio-tastes: via any of these respective mesocepts, we as protocores will only experience our own physiological body as exological allocepts and, thereby, as that which is other than us as the protocore which so experiences.

Drastically different to these four types of exological physioception will be the exological physioception of touch.

The only time when we can physioceive our own physiological body—hence our own being as a physiological allouniant—via physio-touch as an exological allocept will be when one portion of our physiological body touches another portion of our physiological body. For one example, when our left and right hand touch each other or, as another example, such as when we pay attention to our tongue’s positioning within our mouth. Our body’s touching of itself then being a commonplace occurrence.

In all other instances, however, our exo-physioception of touch will be such that we as protocores experience via the mesocept of physio-touch some exological allocept which is senceived as other relative to us as physiological allouniants:

For example, in sitting on a chair at a table with feet planted on the ground, one as protocore might tactilely experience one’s buttocks touching the chair through one’s pants, one’s arms touching the table through one’s sleeves, and one’s feet touching the ground underneath through one’s shoes—with the chair, the table, and the ground being other relative to our own selves as uniants. As this example can illustrate, the mesocept of physio-touch will be experienced by us as protocores throughout the physiological skin of our whole physiological body which we can physio-see (as well as potentially physiologically smell, taste, and hear) alloceptually. In turn—whereas we tend to infer or else senceive ourselves as mesocept-endowed protocores to be centralized within our own physiological heads via the four other physioception-types which we as humans typically hold—when it comes to physio-touch, we as protocores will be present wherever the mesocept of physio-touch apprehends tactile physio-allocepts: Hence, we as protocores will be present throughout our otherwise physio-perceived bodies at all places where we as mesocept-endowed protocores physio-touch any allocept whatsoever.

This is to say that the one mesocept of physio-touch fully unifies us as protocores with the outermost aspect of our otherwise alloceptually experienced bodies—such that we as nonmanifold protocores are spatially present from the scalp of our heads to the tips of our toes.

Via the mesocept of physio-touch, we as protocores thereby autoceptually inhabit the totality of our bodies outermost layers—outermost layers which we simultaneously otherwise apprehend as strict allocepts via our other four exological mesocepts (those of physio-sight, physio-smell, physio-sound, and physio-taste) as well as when parts of our own body touches other parts or our own body.

Hence, out of the five exological mesocepts which the typical human commonly holds, it will primarily—if not solely—be that of physiological touch which unifies us as protocores with the totality of our otherwise exo-physiologically perceived body in unfalsifiedly certain manners.

In review, save for when one part of our body touches another (which tends to be a common occurrence), we do not physiologically perceive our own bodies strictly via our mesocept of physiological touch as alloceptual kentron. Instead, via the mesocept of physio-touch we as protocores can only perceive that which is other relative to the physio-touch-endowed protocore which thereby apprehends tactile allocepts—with us as nonmanifold protocores extending throughout the outermost layers of our otherwise alloceptually experienced bodies—this, again, not as an alloceived given but as the very protocore which apprehends allocepts.

To this tersely mentioned observation can then be added our endological physioception—what in current English lexicon is termed interoception.

This very broad category can include the endo-physiological cognita of experienced hunger, suffocation, fulness of bladder, the expansion of lungs, stomach aches, sense of balance, the awareness of our body parts’ muscles’ doings and positioning, physiological nervousness or anxiety (such as can be caused by heightened degrees of adrenaline), and the like. Here, the differentiation between autological cognita and allological cognita will be far more complex by comparison to exteroception (i.e., to exological physioception). As one example of this complexity, were we to feel pangs of hunger whose urges we reject as protocores, then the physiological hunger we’d here experience will most likely be experienced by us protocores to be an allocept. However, were we to as protocores to actively be hungry—such that we as protocores actively yearn to in some way satisfy this impetus—then the physiological hunger we’d here experience will most likely be autological in its nature, being, in effect, that which we as protocores actively are for the time so being (rather than that which we as protocores apprehend). With this difference between allological and autological hunger being, again, linguistically expressed as the difference between “I feel hungry” and “I am hungry”, respectively.

For a corporal being—such as all humans are—it will be furthermore observed that all endological physioceptions, i.e. all interoception, will be sharply bound by the limits of the exological physioception of tactile touch.

This is to say that all physioceptions which occur within the spatial boundary of what we as protocores autologically experience to be our mesocept of physiological touch will then be (either implicitly or explicitly) deemed by us to be endological—i.e., within the boundaries of our total physiological unianthood. In contrast, all physioceptions which occur outside this spatial boundary of physiological touch will conversely be deemed by us to be exological—i.e., to occur outside of, else beyond, our total physiological unianthood.

We furthermore experience our exteroception to be intertwined with our interoception. For example, a strong enough physiological discomfort or pain in our bodily organs (which we as protocores either allologically or autologically experience) can affect our exological physioceptions—such that, for example, our visual physioception might become diminished or altered due to the endological pain addressed.

Conjoined with this wide array of physiological perceptions will be our (senceptual) sense of agency as protocores. The hands that I simultaneously a) see typing at a keyboard, b) tactilely feel touching the individual keys of the keyboard, and c) perceive via proprioception to so type will, in almost all cases, be experienced by me as protocore to be fully unified with my volition as protocore—such that, for example, when I as protocore wish to type I experience (visually, tactilely, and proprioceptively—among other possible means) my hands doing as I desire in order to produce the typing I intend (and when I wish to cease typing and thereby intend I then likewise experience my hands ceasing to type).

In all this there is then a mixture of a) physiological cognita—both exological and endological, with the latter being either allological or autological—which, as cognita, we as protocores experience in entwined manners regarding our own physiological bodies as spatially demarcated by our mesocept of physio-touch and of b) the agency which we as protocores ordinarily experience as extending throughout our physioceived bodies such that it is in keeping with our own autological volition as protocores.

Via this mixture of (a) and (b) we as protocores then come to senceive or otherwise infer that our own physioceived bodies with which we as protocores are generally unified in volition is then an integral part of our total first-person selfhood, i.e. of our unianthood—thereby constituting us as physiological allouniants.

15.2.2.2. The Psychological Allouniant

This same sharp distinction between the endological and the exological which is to be found in one’s physiological allounianthood primarily via the one mesocept of physio-touch will be found lacking in regard to our own total minds—this due to ambiguities regarding what one’s total mind consists of.

Whereas what we as protocores experience as autocepts, ennoocepts, and phainocepts will be readily deemed psychological—and, hence, mental or psychical—in their nature, there will be found a great deal of contingent ambiguity in regard to what we as protocores physioceive as physiological kentrons.

The principal issue here will be whether the physiological kentrons we physioceive and are thereby aware of will themselves be intrinsic aspects of our own total minds.

For one example, whereas the ennooceptual kentron of “a chair” as concept which one as protocore is aware of will be readily deemed by all those here concerned to be psychical in its nature, the physioceptual kentron referenced by “that particular chair I see over there in the physical world” could, given certain considerations, be tentatively deemed either to be external to one’s total mind and hence external to one’s unianthood or, else, internal to one’s total mind and hence internal to one’s unianthood. And it will be in large part due to this ambiguity regarding whether our physioceptions are aspects of our own minds that the possibilities of solipsism emerge.

While the details of why there occurs an external world to us as uniants will be incrementally worked out as this treatise progresses—notably within Volume II of this work—for the general purposes of this work’s Part 4, the following observations will be deemed to here suffice:

15.2.2.2.1. What this Work Understands as Mind

Firstly, a mind will in part consist of apprehended allocepts—such as, for example, the thoughts and ideas one as a protocore is aware of senceptually if not also phainoceptually. Due to this, a mind cannot thereby be validly equated to one’s own strict being as a protocore—nor, for that matter, to one’s strict being as an eidem.

Furthermore, as will be elaborated upon in Part 5 of this work, a total mind cannot strictly consist of the protocore’s agency. For one example, whenever a slip of the tongue unfolds, the protocore’s intention will be undermined by agencies within the protocore’s mind which are at odds with the protocore’s own intentions and, therefore, with the protocore itself. In certain cases, we as protocores can ennooceive some such other agencies—as is for example the case with one’s conscience informing one as protocore to act differently than one as protocore intends. Extrapolated from cases such as that of one’s conscience, at least some such other agencies of one’s own mind will be aware of at least some allocepts of which one as protocore is aware of. In so being aware of allocepts, these other agencies of one’s own mind will then be inferred to themselves be mesocept-endowed protocepts which so apprehend ever-changing allocepts. Likewise inferable is that, as agencies of one’s own mind, these shall themselves intend to actualize certain outcomes and, in so being endowed, shall themselves be endowed with their own unique prototelos.

Then, and in review, let any mesocept-endowed protocept as prototelos-driven agency be termed an anim—irrespective of whether the anim is an eidem or not. And let all mesocept-endowed and prototelos-driven protocepts of an eidem’s own mind other than the eidem itself be termed animids—the most rudimentary of which will be termed uranimids.

A human’s total mind will then be here understood to in part consist of a plurality of anims—each being an allocept-apprehending, mesocept-endowed, and prototelos driven protocept—thereby resulting in the understanding of a total mind as eidem-inclusive commonwealth; else expressed, the understanding of an eidem-inclusive bundle-theory or mind. Oneself as eidem will be the core, or else pivotal, anim of one’s own mind, with all other anims of one’s total mind being either one's paraconsciously experienced animids or, else, inferred to be unconsciously occurring animids—with the most rudimentary form of the latter, again, being one’s uranimids.

This totality of anims pertaining to one’s own mind will, for ease of expression, be more technically addressed as an animana—such that an animana (this being the agential aspect of one’s own mind) will be understood to pertain to the protocore in question, this just as one’s own total mind so pertains.

The animana will then, again, be the agential portion of one’s own total mind.

All mesoceptual and alloceptual cognita which the anims of one’s own animana—here including oneself as eidem—experience will then be the non-agential portion of one’s total mind.

These two portions—the agential portion and the non-agential portion—of one’s total mind will then constitute one’s total mind in general.

And, again, one’s own total mind will be understood as pertaining, or else belonging, to oneself as a protocore.

15.2.2.2.1.1. The Animus and the Anima

With one’s own animana so construed, there can then be made a relatively clear distinction between that portion of the animana whose activities the protocore is in some way consciously aware of as occurring within its paraconsciousness—with this portion of the animana to be here understood as the animus—and that portion of the animana with which the eidem is most always fully unified with as agency—with the latter portion to be here understood as the anima. (Maybe importantly, this such that the two concepts of animus and anima as they will be herein employed shall not overlap with Carl Jung’s concepts of animus and anima in any significant way.)

The receiving of inspirations and intuitions, any background noise that some people report experiencing; the intruding thoughts that some are at times bothered by; any reply (be it for example phaino-auditory or phaino-visual) we as protocores receive to any question we as protocores ask ourselves as uniants and of whose answer we as protocores are momentarily ignorant of (e.g., where did I last place my keys); any alloceived emotion we as protocores veto and thereby desire to not be influenced by; among other possible examples; can all then be construed as instances of agencies occurring within our own total mind, agencies which are nevertheless not our own agency as protocores, of which we as protocores will nevertheless be in some way aware of. These interactions between the eidem, i.e. the mesocept-endowed protocore, and those agencies of its own total mind that in any way affect one as protocore in manners one as protocore is conscious of will then transpire as relations between the respective mesocept-endowed protocore—hence, the respective eidem—and various anims of its paraconscious mind.

To embellish upon one example, in asking, “Where did I last place my keys,” I as eidem will be ignorant of where I last placed my keys; any phaino-auditory, phaino-visual, or else ennooceptual information I then receive (which might or might not be correct) regarding where I last placed my keys will likely not be my own agency as eidem but due to some other agency of my total mind; this noneidemic agency of my total mind will nevertheless be aware of my question (if not also my intent) and of the very same allocepts regarding the concrete world I myself alloceive immediately inhabiting; in so being, then, this noneidemic agency of my own total mind can be inferred to be endowed with its own apprehension of what is relative to it allocepts—this as a mesocept-endowed animidive protocept. I as eidem will then receive information to answer my given question from at least one animid of my own total mind.

This cognitive space wherein the eidem interacts with animidive agencies of its own total mind in manners of which the eidem is aware of will, again, be within this work delineated as one’s animus.

The animus will thereby consist of oneself as eidem, of all the animids of ones paraconsciousness, and of all allocepts produced by or otherwise available to this set of anims. The animus will thereby encapsulate both the eidem and its paraconscious mind (and hence is not equivalent to the paraconscious mind alone).

In so being, the animus can hence sometimes—but by no means always—consist of discord if not strife between the animids of the eidem’s paraconsciousness and, furthermore, between such animids and the eidem itself; thereby paralleling what the term “animus” can at times signify in colloquial English use (this being the notion of animosity). For instance, although all conscious thought will occur within one’s animus, most all conscious thought—despite often requiring the rejection of some thoughts in favor of others—will not be of such nature as to be properly termed strife-endowed.

In contrast, that inferred portion of the animana which supports the eidem itself will within this work be delineated as being one’s anima—such that the anima is the inferred portion of the animana from which the eidem per se is constitutionally determined; such that this same portion of the animana, the anima, is generally unified with the eidem’s own will; such that the anima wakes the eidem up from sleep whenever it is deemed either required or beneficial; and such that the anima endows the physiological body of the corporeal eidem with metabolic processes of respiration (with breath).

Unlike the animus, the anima will always be conjoined with the eidem—such that the eidem can be deemed the anima’s zenith or else pinnacle being whenever the eidem occurs (in contrast to, for example, periods of dreamless sleep—wherein the anima yet functions in the absence of the eidem’s occurrence). It, for example, will be the anima which is inferred to endow the protocore with its mesocepts—rather than the animus with which the mesocept-endowed protocore interacts and is an integral aspect of.

Additionally, unlike the animids of the animus, the eidem will not be consciously aware of the animids of its anima—thereby entailing that the animids of one’s anima will fully be unconscious aspects of one’s animana and, by extension, of one’s mind.

These two generalized categories of the animana, what this work understands by the terms animus and anima, will be further addressed in Part 5 of this work. Although this generalized dichotomy can be derived from the enquiries to be there made, it is noteworthy to mention that the animus and anima do not together necessarily constitute all aspects of one’s animana (as one example of this, those unconscious aspects of one’s own mind from which the animids of one’s paraconsciousness emerge will neither of themselves be one’s animus nor one’s anima).

15.2.2.2.2. Regarding What Is and Is Not an Aspect of One’s Own Mind

The very notion that individual minds are utterly separate in all conceivable ways, i.e. that minds are completely autonomous—a perspective that can well emanate from the metaphysical position of materialism or of physicalism wherein an individual mind is construed completely determined by its individual physiological makeup—will be at odds with, for one here notable example, the worldview of apeirosonism. In the latter worldview, given what has so far been established, it is currently possible to hypothesize that there might indeed occur something akin to what Carl Jung has termed a collective unconscious—one to which all individual minds (and, hence, all individual animanas) are in one way or another ultimately connected.

It can be further appraised that this same here hypothesized notion of a collective unconscious will in some ways parallel—if not being directly implied by—the notion of an anima mundi. This such that a plurality of animuses—each specific to its own unianthood-endowed protocore—can all in some sense be deemed ultimately emergent form the same anima mundi. In parallel, this as could likewise be deemed the personal animas of individual uniants.

As this here vaguely expressed example can illustrate, the precise demarcation of where one’s mind begins and ends might be an error in framing the issue, i.e. a category error. By comparison, this just as much as the belief that one could catch up to the horizon if only one would move fast enough toward it would itself be a category error. For this very question presupposes that a mind is completely severed from all other minds in all conceivable ways—and, indeed, from what can be implicitly taken to be reality itself—this as materialism and physicalism can be deemed to infer. In contrast, one could for example construe there being a global animana embodied by the physical world at large—hence, a universally global mind (be it endowed with its own global protocore or not)—from which the personal animanas of unique beings emerge, individualized animanas which are themselves embodied in their own individualized aspects of the physical world at large.

However, notwithstanding the myriad issues which could here be embarked upon and questioned, in strict relation to Part 4 of this work will be the principal issue of whether or not there occurs only one mind in all of existence such that this same one mind is strictly one’s own as protocore—thereby resulting in there being only one uniant in all of reality, namely oneself. Were this to be the case, then the anima mundi—if at all entertained—would by entailment need to be deemed equivalent to one’s own personal anima as protocore and, furthermore, there would by entailment only occur one animus: only that one animus which one as protocore partakes of. So, for example, where there to minimally occur so much as two distinct animuses at the same time, each pivoted around its own unique protocore, reality could then not be logically deemed solipsistic—for, because each individual animus will then pivot upon its own distinct mesocept-endowed protocore, and because each such protocore shall be itself endowed with its own unique unianthood, there will thereby be necessitated the simultaneous cooccurrence of two or more total first-person selfhoods.

The just specified train or reasoning will be furthered in Chapter 17—this, again, with the intent of demonstrating the metaphysical impossibility of solipsism.

15.2.3. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

The unfalsifiedly certain reality of ourselves being eidems was evidenced in Chapter 4. The unfalsifiedly certain reality that our being as eidems in turn holds three tiers of awareness (alloceptual, mesoceptual, and protoceptual) was evidenced in Chapter 6—which, in turn, entails our experiencing various allocepts, various mesocepts, and ourselves as a nonmanifold singular protocept. Because a protocore is that protocept specific to an eidem, the reality that we are at pith protocores is thereby entailed with unfalsified certainty.

For all those here concerned, it is then unfalsifiedly certain that we cannot be an eidem in the absence of being a protocore.

Likewise, for all those here concerned, it is furthermore unfalsifiedly certain that we cannot be aware of any alloceptual aspect of our own total first-person selfhood in the absence of our being mesocept-endowed protocores and, hence, in the absence of our being eidems—with these aspects to include any aspect of our own bodies as well as any aspect of our own minds which, as such an aspect, is an object of our awareness as eidems that is other than us as eidemic subjects of awareness (e.g., our own physiological appearance, on the one hand, and our own thoughts, ideas, and memories, on the other).

Because all those here concerned will be alloaware of certain aspects of our own total first-person selves, it is then unfalsifiedly certain that all those here concerned will in turn not only be eidem-embedded protocores—and, hence, autouniantive selves—but also autouniantive selves embedded in alloceptual kentrons which we, tacitly or otherwise, appraise to be our own allouniantive selves.

Because the totality of our autouniantive self in conjunction with our allouniantive self will by definition constitute our unianthood proper, it is then unfalsifiedly certain that all those here concerned will be uniants—this whenever we as mesocept-endowed and thereby allocept-apprehending protocores occur.

Lastly here specified, due to the aforementioned, it will be unfalsified certain that the occurrence of a protocore will be necessary to any possible form or else possible conceptualization of a uniant. Without the protocore’s occurrence, no eidem (i.e., mesocept-endowed first-person protocept) can occur—and, by extension, neither could there then occur any mesocept or allocept from which a given uniant might be construed.

As one consequence of this, no artificial intelligence, regardless of how sophisticated, can be properly deemed a uniant were such AI to be fully devoid of at minimum one protocore’s occurrence. In contrast, if a prokaryote or even a gamete were to be in any way aware of allocepts—e.g., a bacterium’s awareness of other bacteria which are either beneficial or detrimental to its own existence or, otherwise, a sperm’s awareness of directionality in relation to the egg toward which it moves—this would then entail its being able to apprehend allocepts via some set of mesocepts particular to itself and, furthermore, that it as that which apprehends allocepts via its mesocepts will in turn be a protocore which, as such, can distinguish its own unianthood from other (obviously, all this despite the unicellular organism or gamete not being endowed with a central nervous system).

15.3. Of Protological Understanding as Tacit Knowledge

Chapter 5 has explicitly addressed the attribute of understating only in terms of ennooception—wherein an understood object of awareness is other than the subject of awareness which so understands—thereby limiting itself to the apprehension of allological objects of awareness which are strictly senceptual in their nature. For example, in apprehending the meaning of the term “world” one here ennooceives a senceptual allocept.

For any such conceptual understanding to however be in any way grasped by the respective mesocept-endowed protocore, the protocore in question will itself need to be endowed with a capacity for, or else a faculty of, purely autological—and more precisely, protological—understanding. This such that it will only be via the quality and the (nonquantitative) magnitude of the protocore’s protological understanding that concepts—which, again, are of themselves senceptual allocepts—can in any way be ennooceived.

To better engage in discussions of this, the notion of a protocept’s purely protological understanding will, whenever greater brevity of expression is desired, be termed its protounderstanding. Protounderstanding shall then be contrasted to a protocept’s allological understanding—or, else expressed for greater brevity, its allounderstanding—wherein a protocept will, via its ready occurrent protounderstanding, hold or else gain understanding of givens other than itself as mesocept-endowed protocept (and, in this one manner, ennooceive allocepts). Just as with allounderstanding, protounderstanding can then signify both a specific faculty as well as the content(s) of that faculty. So, if one specifies a protocept’s protounderstanding of X, one will then specify that which the given protocept protologically understands via its faculty of protological understanding—this such that there is no duality between the protocept as subject of awareness and its protological understanding as the object of awareness. Following is one example of such protological understandings:

It should first be observed that no protologically understanding can so strictly remain once the given protological understanding becomes contemplated as a concept—this either via pure ennooceptual cognita or else via some type of perceptual cognita, be these either phainological or physiological (with the latter often enough taking the form of words). For, in so doing, the very understanding shall in part become allological—wherein a duality occurs between the subject of awareness and its objects of awareness—rather than remain purely protological and hence nondualistic. Notwithstanding, as one example of a purely protological understanding, most if not all of us will during most if not all times hold a protological and hence tacitly nondualistic understanding that we are human Earthlings—this rather than Martians or some other form of extraterrestrial. At most times during our lives this understanding is not alloceptual and hence explicit to us as eidems, for it goes without saying that we are indeed Earthlings—but we hold this very protological understanding of who or, maybe better stated, what we are nevertheless, as will be evidenced whenever the issue of whether or not we are inhabitants of planet Earth becomes brought to our alloawareness (such as is being currently done).

While other examples of protounderstandings could be numerous, many of these will be far more particular to individuals and individual cohorts. These can include one’s protounderstanding of being a male, a female, or else something in-between, one’s protounderstanding of being of this or that nationality and ethnicity, one’s protounderstanding of one’s own social standing, and so forth. Hence, when one for example is playing a sports game, reading a novel, or watching a movie one will actively hold onto one’s protounderstandings without any thought regarding them—with conceptual thought again being alloceptual rather than protoceptual.

A protocore’s capacity of allounderstanding shall then be dependent upon the same protocore’s quality and magnitude of protounderstanding as faculty innate to the protocore—such that in the absence of a protocore’s sufficient quality and magnitude of protounderstanding the protocore will be unable to ennooceive certain conceptual kentrons.

For example, the protocore of a human infant will not be capable of ennooceiving many a concept which the protocore of an adult human will be capable of allologically understanding. For instance, a human infant’s protocore, irrespective of how much experience it might be exposed to as an infant, shall not be capable of comprehending highly abstract concepts such as those required to differentiate between causation and mere correlation, or else those required for algebraic calculations, such as the concept of mathematical variables. Whereas the typical human adult will be capable of so ennooceiving given sufficient experience. As a more extreme example, an adult dog’s protocore will be unable to ennooceive many if not most concepts which an adult human protocore is capable of ennooceiving—and this, again, irrespective of how much experience the adult dog might become exposed to.

In these examples, then, a newly birthed being’s capacity of protounderstanding shall be deemed lesser than an adult’s capacity of protounderstanding—and endowed with far less content. Furthermore, an adult dog’s capacity of protounderstanding, for example, will be deemed lesser than that of an adult human’s—and will likewise be deemed endowed with far less content.

Moreover, an adult human protocore’ quality and magnitude of protounderstanding can vary over time. For one example, when a human protocore is hyperalert and focused its protounderstanding will likely be more acute and of greater magnitude than when the same human protocore is exhausted and unfocused.

A protocore’s protounderstanding can then be further equated to the protocore’s tacit knowledge—a tacit knowledge that not only takes the form of “know-how” but also “know-that”.

To readdress a previously given example, our protounderstanding that we are human Earthlings will typically be so deeply engraved into our being as protocores that we as protocores can well deem it proper to express “I know that I am an Earthling” whenever so asked if one is—despite this held onto knowledge being otherwise unthought of prior to the given questioning; and despite some of us not being able to immediately justify this protounderstanding—in this case, this tacit “know-that”—upon questioning by some extreme skeptic. As a more extreme case, we likewise hold a protounderstanding that we are not brains in a vat and, so, tacitly know that we are not, this despite this tacit knowledge which we hold onto as protocores not being typically thought of prior to questionings regarding it—and despite most if not all of us being unable to immediately justify this otherwise held tacit knowledge in the face of extreme skeptics. And, as a more mundane example, the very same shall hold for tacitly knowing that—and, hence, for our protounderstanding that—we are capable of moving our arms at will: barring certain forms of paralysis, all those here concerned will at all times be endowed with protounderstanding of being endowed with this capacity to voluntarily move our arms (this in addition to a protounderstanding of how one goes about so moving)—despite typically not thinking about this otherwise tacitly held knowledge and despite not easily justifying the continued presence of this capacity.

To be clear, firstly, it is to be understood that no knowledge, tacit or otherwise, can be held in the complete absence of any type of understanding. And, secondly, it is to be further understood that all tacit knowledge will pertain to some agent and, hence, to some protocept—rather than to mesocepts or else allocepts—or, otherwise, to some cohort of protocepts: such that the cohort’s tacit knowledge will itself be an aggregate sum constituted from the tacit knowledge held by each protocept within the cohort. This cohort could then be a cohort of uniants just as much as it could be a cohort of those anims from which one’s own personal animana is constituted.

Then, when strictly addressing our own tacit knowledge as protocores, this tacit knowledge shall then be one and the same as our protounderstanding as protocores. And, when addressing our tacit knowledge as individual uniants, this tacit knowledge shall then be that aggregation of tacit knowledge held by all anims within our own personal animana (with the respective eidem here included).

Further enquiry into this issue of protological understanding as tacit knowledge shall in large part be deferred to this work’s Volume III, wherein the issue of epistemology shall be enquired into.

15.3.1. The Protological Intellect vs. the Uniantive Intellect

In current English use, the term intellect has come to typically mean either “the faulty of conceptual understanding, abstract reasoning, judging, and thought” or else “the capacity of this faculty”—with this faculty so understood always consisting of ennooceptions and, hence, of allological understandings. Yet, in keeping with the term’s Latin etymology, the intellect can more generally be understood as the very faculty of understanding or of comprehension via which meaning in any way holds for the respective awareness addressed—and, hence, as what in our modern lexicon has come to be termed tacit knowledge—such that it thereby allows for “the faculty of conceptual understanding, abstract reasoning, judging, and thought” to take place and, furthermore, such that its quality and magnitude determines the capacity of this just quoted faculty.

Then, in keeping with the latter presented understanding of the intellect, let a protocept’s faculty of protounderstanding be further equated to the same protocept’s faculty of strictly protological intellect.

So construed, the protological intellect can then be contrasted to the uniantive intellect (or, otherwise expressed for greater precision, the animanative intellect, i.e. the sum intellect of a total animana). Whereas the protological intellect will strictly pertain to the given protocept in question, the uniantive intellect will be the aggregate sum intellect resulting from the protological intellect of all interacting anims pertaining to a protocore’s personal animana. Whereas the protological intellect of the protocore will specify the protocore’s a) sum contents of protounderstanding (and, hence, of tacit knowledge) and b) its capacity to via (a) ennooceptually grasp and thereby manipulate concepts (which are other than itself), the uniantive intellect of the protocore will, for example, specify the quality and depth of intuitions which the protocore’s animana makes available to the protocore in question. Then, in this one example of intuition, in an Eureka moment the respective protocore’s protological intellect will gain greater protological understanding via information that emanates from the protocore’s animana rather than from the protocore itself.

In theory, if not also at least at times in practice, one’s uniantive intellect might then at certain junctures significantly exceed one’s protological intellect as protocore—for example resulting in one as protocore engaging in activities for reasons which one as protocore is relatively ignorant of but which have nevertheless been intelligently devised by one’s animana, this such that, as such junctures, one’s uniantive intellect shall again exceed one’s own protological intellect as protocore in quality and magnitude.

15.3.2. As Concerns the Euteleion Within Systems of Positive Apeirosonism

In short, within any system of positive apeirosonism, the apeiroson’s actualization as euteleion shall result in a singular, divinely simple, hence nonmanifold, and pure protological intellect which shall thereby be perfectly nondualistic—one devoid of any and all poieture and, hence, one completely freed from all alloceptual and mesoceptual constraints (be these physioceptual, phainoceptual, or otherwise purely ennooceptual)—that, as a purely protological intellect, will at that juncture obtain a literally boundless, limitless, and hence infinite protounderstanding (and, hence, a literally infinite tacit knowledge), this, minimally, regarding the reality of its own being as protocepture. And this will be entailed by positive apeirosonism irrespective of whether it is foreseen to be at the juncture of the apeiroson’s actualization a poieture-devoid, fully unified, and hence singular protoself or else protonoself.

In no other teleion-derived worldview will there be the possibility of obtaining an absolute understanding of what is non-illusorily real.

15.3.3. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

Following is a list of this section’s currently upheld unfalsified certainties:

All those here concerned can as protocores ennooceive fully senceptual allocepts—such as at least some of the concepts this work addresses—and will thereby hold the faculty of allological understanding.

No one here concerned could for example grasp (allologically understand) the relative value of any allological sencept (such as a concept is) were we as protocores to be completely devoid of some preexisting body of autological sencepts which is held by us as protocores in fully tacit and nondualistic manners—such that the latter is equivalent to our (nondualistic) protological understanding or, else termed, our (nondualistic) protological intellect as protocores.

All those here concerned will thereby assimilate allological sencepts (such as concepts) into our preestablished body of protological understandings—with this being required to make any sense of allological sencepts.

All those here concerned will furthermore tacitly know that which we protologically understand. For example, all those here concerned that protologically understand ourselves to be Earthlings will hold tacit knowledge of so being—this even when we hold no thoughts regarding the matter (this when thoughts are understood to always require kentrons—often including those of concepts or ideas—which, as kentrons, can only be in some manner alloceived).

These unfalsified certainties will then entail that all those here concerned will as protocores be endowed with some quality and magnitude of protological understanding—which will consist of tacit knowns and which will be equivalent to our protological intellect as protocores when “the protological intellect” is interpreted as it was in §15.3.1—that, as our protological understanding, then facilitates our very ability and its varying capacities to allologically understand anything whatsoever.

15.4. The Ego (I-ness)

There can be found considerable ambiguity in what the term “ego” references: When strictly interpreted as that referenced by “I-ness” the ego could potentially be characterized into a) the nondualistic ego of the (pure) protocore, b) the dualistic ego of the (pure) eidem, and c) the dualistic ego of the allouniant. However—as for example can be found in the common connotations of terms such as “egoist” and “egoistic”—the term “ego” might also be implicitly, if not also explicitly, be understood to strictly reference dualistic I-ness—this such that the previously mentioned category of (a) (be it conceived of as the protoself, the protonoself, or the protonihilum) cannot be that which the term “ego” can in any way here reference, this due to being entirely nondualistic in its pure nature.

Whereas the second interpretation of “ego” seems to be preferred in Eastern philosophies—one can, for example, contrast the difference in Hindu philosophy between Atman (nonegoic witness consciousness) and Ahamkara (mortal ego, non-spiritual psychological I-ness)—there is nevertheless a tradition in Western philosophy of addressing the ego in terms of that which can in any way be referenced by “I-ness”. Most pertinent to this chapter will be parallels with the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Willian James, and Edmund Husserl: despite differences between these three philosophers, all have addressed a dichotomy between a) the transcendental or else pure ego which apprehends and b) the empirical ego which is apprehended by (a).

Entering into discussion of how this treatise’s understanding of I-ness compares with and contrasts to that upheld by the three Western philosophers just mentioned will be beyond the scope of this work. Instead, this work shall provide an outline of I-ness as directly derived from the unfalsified certainties so far obtained—an outline which will be found in general keeping with the dichotomy of ego as that which apprehends and of ego as that which is apprehended.

15.4.1. Two General Ego Types

Following §15.2, two general ego types will be entailed for any corporeal uniant: The autouniantive ego and the allouniantive ego.

The autouniantive ego, aka the I-ness of one as autouniant, shall minimally be that I-ness which is protoaware of its own being, autoaware of its own mesocepts, and furthermore apprehends all types of allological cognita via its mesocepts; that I-ness which is endowed with protounderstanding via which it can allounderstand; that I-ness which is the first-person agency endowed with the prototelos-driven capacity for free will; and that I-ness which remembers. This type of I-ness will include that “I” which can be referenced by statements such as, “I am content” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that if a protocore is protoaware of being content as protocept then it will be the given protocore which is content), “I am endowed with physiological sight” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that it is the protocore—the protocept which one is—that is endowed with mesocepts), “I am looking at a house” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that it will be the protocore which will be looking at a house via its mesocepts, hence, as an eidem), “I understand” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that it is the protocore which will understand alloceptual givens via its preestablished body of tacitly known protounderstandings), “I choose X” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that it is the protocore which chooses rather than its mesocepts or allocepts—this despite all choices requiring awareness of alternatives and thereby entailing the presence of oneself as eidem which is so aware of allocepts), and “I remember X” (for it is unfalsifiedly certain that the protocore’s conscious awareness of a no longer occurring X is required for remembrance to occur).

In all such cases wherein the autouniantive ego is addressed, all allocepts will by necessity be extrinsic to the ego in question. Hence, as one example, in cases such as those of “I am looking at a house” and “I am remembering a house”, the house in question shall be fully extrinsic to the referenced ego and its activities.

It then bares note that, within systems of apeirosonism, the autouniantive ego can be further dichotomized into the protocorial ego (i.e., the I-ness of one as protocore) and the eidemic ego (i.e., the I-ness of one as eidem).

Contingent on what the euteleion of the actualized apeiroson is envisioned to be, the protocorial ego can the be deemed equivalent to a pure protoself, a pure protonoself, or a pure protonihilum—one that of itself would dwell beyond both poietural time and poietural space were it not for the occurrence of poieture, the same poieture which endows all protocores (all protocepts in general, for that matter) with allocept-apprehending mesocepts, thereby requiring the protocore to be an eidem (else, more generally addressed, an anim) embedded within poietural space and time for as long as the apeiroson remains unactualized.

Whereas the eidemic ego necessitates duality between cooccurring autoawareness and alloawareness, the pure protocorial ego, in all systems of apeirosonism, will necessarily be of itself nondualistic in full—this as is entailed by the apeiroson’s actualization and the metaphysical requirements for such, irrespective of whether it be the dynamic apeiroson, the static apeiroson, or else the nihilonic apeiroson.

With the autouniantive ego having been addressed, the second general type of I-ness for all corporeal uniants will be that of the allouniantive ego, within which the autouniantive ego will be embedded.

The allouniantive ego, aka the I-ness of one as allouniant, shall be that I-ness which the (autological) eidem is in any way alloaware of. Examples of this type of I-ness will include that “I” which is referenced by statements such as, “I am tall/short/of average height,” “I am rich/poor/of average capital wealth,” “I am of this or that ethnicity,” “I am of this or that profession”, and so forth. In these and like examples of I-ness, the ego one references shall necessarily be contingent on allocepts from which it is deemed construed and, therefore, shall be allouniantive—such that the allocepts concerned shall be intrinsic to the very ego affirmed (this, again, in contrast to one’s autouniantive ego, for which all allocepts concerned shall be extrinsic to the ego affirmed).

15.4.1.1. The “I” and the “Me”

In keeping with common practice, the term “I” will be here understood to be oneself as the subject of awareness and the term “me” will be understood to be oneself as the object of awareness.

Because in autoawareness there is no duality between the subject of awareness and the object of awareness, it then becomes rationally feasible to address the autouniantive ego not only as “I” but also as “me”, depending on context. As an extreme example of this, one could address oneself as protocore by stating, “me as protocore” rather than “I as protocore”—such as in the following example, “my protologic consciousness, with all its protounderstandings included, belongs to me as protocore”.

15.4.2. Regarding the Possibility of Ego Death

The notion of ego death has been used in wide array of thought. Pertinent to this chapter’s discussion of selfhood will be what metaphysically can and cannot be validly construed by ego death.

Firstly mentioned, within systems of apeirosonism, all dualistic forms of ego—regardless of whether they consist of an allouniantive ego or, more simply, an eidemic ego—will necessarily perish in permanent manners upon the apeiroson’s actualization. Unlike in systems of negative apeirosonism (wherein so too will perish all protoception and, hence, all protounderstandings), in system of positive apeirosonism, despite (or maybe better stated, because of) the permanent disappearance of all forms of dualistic ego, there will be produced a singular, purely nondualistic protocorial ego—one devoid of any form of otherness—and this in an infinite (and non-quantitative) magnitude of protounderstanding-endowed being (irrespective of whether it be the apeiroson-actualized protoself or else the apeiroson-actualized protonoself). Hence, within the worldview of positive apeirosonism, the death of the protocorial ego (else termed, the protocorial “I”) is metaphysical impossibility—yet it must be understood to be an I-ness that is beyond any sense of duality and, hence, any sense of otherness (an I-ness that could be further described as perfectly complete and, thereby, absolute—a perfectly whole protoceptural being which is simultaneously perfectly wholesome).

Positive apeirosonism will then hold the euteleion of the apeiroson to constitute the literally global dualistic-ego-death of all sentient beings, wherein all beings, in the then obtained absence of all poieture, mutually enhere into one limitless being unadulterated by anything which is other—thereby obtaining absolute liberation or else freedom from all poieture-resultant volitional suffering.

Other than that which can be deemed to occur upon the apeiroson’s actualization, the possibility of ego death (be it due to consumption of hallucinogens or else due to purely psychological or spiritual reasons) can only viably consist of the loss of one’s allouniantive ego, but not of one’s autouniantive ego—this if ego death is to in any way be experienced by a protocore (or else remembered by a protocore subsequent to the experience).

Were the autouniantive ego to cease occurring in full, there would then be no awareness—be it purely autological or in any way allological (such as would pertain to a newly found conceptual understanding of reality)—regarding anything whatsoever.

In summation, ego death—when not equated to the nihilon—can then take on only two possible forms:

One such form will be the death, else termed loss, of one’s heretofore held onto allouniantive ego while one as eidem yet remains: Even if one as eidem will at such juncture only hold those mesocepts via which senceptual allocepts can be apprehended—be these allological sencepts conceptual understandings, apprehension of metaphysical or else existential truths, or any some such—this such that no physiological or else phainological perception occurs during the experience, the protocore in question will nevertheless remain endowed with mesocepts via which some form of allological cognita is apprehended via its protounderstanding, and will thereby remain an eidemic self, aka an eidemic ego.

The other possible form will be the death, else termed loss, of oneself as eidem while one as strict protocore remains. This form of ego death being precisely that which is required for the obtainment of the apeiroson as actualized euteleion—and can be further addressed as a state of being which can be transiently approached to different degrees via various forms of, for example, meditation (wherein one will nevertheless technically yet remain an eidem at all times—this till the apeiroson is actualized).

15.4.3. Regarding the Ego’s Self-Knowledge

The following, here briefly addressed, three general forms of self-knowledge (or else self-awareness) can then be inferred:

The allouniantive ego’s self-knowledge (else, allouniantive self-awareness) will consist of the autouniantive ego’s awareness and understanding of its own being as allouniant—and, therefore, of that which is other than itself as allouniant. This form of self-awareness can then be appraised by means such as that of the mirror self-recognition test—at least in animals that prioritize the visual aspects of their own being as allouniants.

The other two forms of self-knowledge will both be autouniantive self-knowledge, and will be found distinct in systems of apeirosonism:

The eidemic ego’s self-knowledge (else, eidemic self-awareness) will consist of autological understandings and thereby tacit knowledge regarding what one is as an eidem—and, therefore, autological understandings of what is thereby other than oneself as eidem—tacit knowledge of one’s own being as eidem (constituting one’s protounderstanding which one as mesocept-endowed protocore holds) which could, in principle if not also in practice, at least in part become explicitly contemplated and analyzed via use of allocepts such as concepts and words, this by sentient beings so capable of doing. (Of potential note, were some simple lifeform, such as that of bacterium or gamete, to in fact be eidem-endowed, it too would then necessarily hold some quality and magnitude of eidemic self-knowledge—irrespective of how minimal its protounderstanding would be as an eidem—via which it would tacitly discern what is and is not other relative to itself.)

Lastly here specified will be the protocorial ego’s self-knowledge (else, protocorial self-awareness). This self-awareness shall solely consist of nondualistic protounderstanding in strict relation to one’s own being as protocore—and can only viably obtain a level of certain knowledge upon the apeiroson’s actualization, contingent on it not being the nihilonic apeiroson.

The aphorism of “know thyself” could then in principle apply to any of the three types of self-knowledge just addressed.

15.4.4. This Section’s Unfalsified Certainties

That which we addressed by the term “I” can either exclude all allocepts which we experience, in which case it will be termed the autouniantive ego, or else can include certain allocepts which we deem constitute our allounianthood, in which case it will be termed the allouniantive ego.

For all those here concerned, it will be unfalsifiedly certain that when we are seeing a house it will be us as protocores—rather than our mesocepts or allocepts—which will be apprehending the occurrence of a house via our mesocepts. Hence, it is unfalsifiedly certain that the “I” in the statement “I am seeing a house” will reference us as protocore in exclusion of the allocept(s) we experience whenever we so express, “I am seeing a house”—thereby having the term “I” reference our being as an autouniantive ego.

For all those here concerned, it will be unfalsifiedly certain that when we appraise ourselves to be tall relative to, for example, ants (but not relative to, for example, adult giraffes) we will necessarily address ourselves as in part constituted of certain allocepts we apprehend in relation to our own allounianthood. Hence, it is unfalsifiedly certain that the “I” in the statement, “I am tall relative to X” will reference our own being as an allouniant and, thereby, us as an ego which is in part constituted of certain allocepts whenever we so express, “I am tall relative to X”—thereby having the term “I” reference our being as an allouniantive ego.

It is thereby unfalsifiedly certain for all those here concerned that I-ness can either reference our own being as autouniants or as allouniants, thereby entailing our being as either autouniantive egos or as allouniantive egos.

(Furthermore, while no teleion can be deemed the euteleion with unfalsified certainty, were the apeiroson to in fact be the euteleion—which, again, cannot be established with epistemic certainty—I-ness could then further reference either the eidemic or else the strictly protocorial aspect of ourselves as autouniants: thereby either referencing an eidemic ego or a protocorial ego.)

15.5. Concluding Remarks

To recap, this chapter has addressed only the most basic aspects of a total first-person self. Far more could in principle be enquired into as regards selfhood—with some such enquiries being revisited in Part 5 of this work.

The unfalsified certainties presented in this chapter shall however provide a sufficient appraisal of what a total first-person self, i.e. a uniant, will consist of: in short, of a necessary autouniantive self or ego which, as minimally applies to at least all corporeal uniants, is embedded within an allouniantive self or ego.

It is furthermore readily feasible to presume that all those here concerned are corporeal uniants, hence uniants which are in some way physioceiving their own physiological bodies as they are reading this text. In so being, all those here concerned will be endowed with a physiological allounianthood in addition to a psychological allounianthood.

The next chapter will engage in a more detailed analysis of our own physiological allounianthood. Subsequent to this analysis, the possibility of metaphysical solipsism—that of our own unianthood being the sole self in all of reality—will be appraised via such means as enquiry into the hypothesis that all which we experience is a dream produced by our very own mind. Again, this with the intent of providing an unfalsifiedly certain account of why it is impossible for our own unianthood to be the sole unianthood in existence.

• Navigation

Main Page || Chapter 16: An Eidem’s Discernment of its Body