Being by far more descriptive than analytical, this chapter will serve as a general introduction to many future aspects of this work regarding issues of reality, truth, perception, and knowledge—with an additional introductory account of awareness regarding teleions.

Given the philosophical contents and related terminology so far expressed in this work, this chapter’s diverse topics now become feasible to express with relative cogency. Furthermore, the summative overviews to be here presented will give a clearer comprehension of this philosophy’s outlooks in general. Moreover, the topics to be herein presented—while most will not be logically necessitated at this point of the treatise—will nevertheless better ground the reader’s understating throughout the upcoming arguments of Part 4, which intend to culminate in an unfalsifiedly certain proof of solipsism’s impossibility and which, by the author’s own reckoning, can at times become relatively extreme in flights of the imagination.

It is to be emphasized that this chapter, by and large, will merely present a descriptive prelude to the more analytical and in-depth contents which are to be presented in this work’s forthcoming two volumes. Analytical evidence and relavent references for the perspectives which are to be herein offered will therefore be almost entirely deferred to topic-specific chapters within this work’s subsequent volumes.

In so then presenting, this chapter will preliminarily assume the culminating conclusion of Part 4: the commonsense notion that solipsism is an absurdity.

16.1. The Four Subcategories of Reality and Truth

This section’s exposition of reality and truth will only briefly introduce topics to be enquired into in far greater detail within Volume II.

16.1.1. What Reality Will Signify in This Treatise

Reality will be understood as the noun form of the adjective real, which in turn will be deemed synonymous with the adjective actual.

In so upholding, reality will then be understood as either a set of actualities—to include the possibility of that one set comprised of all actualities occurrent within the cosmos—or else as pertains to any element within such a set (e.g., the reality of that rock over there).

16.1.1.1. The Four General Subcategories of Reality

Readdressing what has been tersely addressed in Chapter 14, this philosophy will maintain the following four general subcategories of reality:

Intrarealities, aka intrasubjectivities [multiple; poietural]: any actuality or set of such to be strictly found within an agent—be the agent an individual anim (e.g., the intrareality of one’s own protounderstanding as protocore) or else an individual uniant (e.g., the intrareality of one’s recalled ennooceptions that occurred during a dream of sleep for which one as awakened eidem can find no proper means to express to any other).

Interrealities, aka intersubjectivities [multiple; poietural]: any actuality or set of such to be strictly but commonly shared within a particular grouping of agents that, as grouping, is a subset of all contemporaneous anims in the cosmos. Examples of interrealities can include the species-specific reality of shared cognitive attributes (such as the species-specific qualities of physio-sight), realties commonly shared by a grouping to be found within a given species of life (such as cultures, ethnicities, languages, and religions), and realities commonly shared by as few as two uniants (such as that of a private conversation between two people).

Equireality, aka equiobjectivity [singular; poietural]: that one actuality or that one set of actualities which is equally applicable to literally all contemporaneous agents in the cosmos (and thereby all contemporaneous anims in the cosmos). Due to its equal poietural applicability to literally all anims in the cosmos, equireality—i.e., the equiobjective, and hence physical, world—can only be singular.

Ultrareality, aka ultraobjectivity [singular; strictly protoceptual]: that one actuality consisting of protocepts and their ontically certain prototelos-driven euteleion, i.e. consisting of the real teleion which—if a synteleion and not the dysteleion—in fact fully satisfies the prototelos of protocepts by maximally, and hence perfectly, obliterating all personal volitional suffering when actualized. Since there can only be one ontically certain euteleion (with all other four teleions being false), irrespective of the euteleion being either one of the four synteleions or else the dysteleion, ultrareality can only be singular: it will in all cases minimally consist of the one ontically certain euteleion which serves as one’s own future state of being wherein one fully satisfies one’s personal prototelos. Presuming different teleions to be the one ultrareal euteleion will then result in significantly disparate metaphysical worldviews. Also worthy of note, all teloi (including all pseudoteleions) will be poietural save for the euteleion—whichever teleion it might in fact be—which, as the determinate (i.e., the metaphysically fixed) ultraobjective reality, can only in and of itself be nonpoietural (this irrespective of the poieture which might be employed in conceptually addressing the euteleion—or, as pertains to both the turannon and the permanon, in the actualized teleion’s then perpetual manifestations).

As will be further addressed in Volume II, these four distinct types of reality can only cooccur in entwined manners for as long as a multiplicity of protocepts inhabit poieture, i.e. for as long as the cosmos remains cosynteleionic.

Wherever needed, to more technically specify the total collection of all subcategories of reality—i.e., of all occurring intrarealities, intrarealities, the one equireality, and the one ultrareality—the term omnireality shall be employed. That mentioned, the concept of omnireality will have relatively limited use in this philosophy—which will instead mostly reference the four reality types just expressed.

16.1.2. What Truth Will Signify in This Treatise

Truth will be understood as the noun form of the adjective true, which in turn will be deemed synonymous with the adjective conformal or else conformant.

In so upholding, truth will then be understood as the state of being conformal to an actuality and, hence, reality—be it an intrareality, an interreality, equireality, or else ultrareality (or some mixture of these).

In so upholding, truth will then minimally encompass a) an agent being true to a reality by conforming thoughts, communications, and actions to that given reality, a.i) an agent being true to some other agent (for example, by conforming one’s thoughts, communications, and actions to the other’s communicated intentions), a.ii) an agent being true to the commonly-shared interreality of an either implicit or explicit commonly-endorsed promise (as will typically occur in cases of mutual loyalty or faithfulness), a.iii) an agent being true to the ultrareality of their own protoceptual nature in perfected form (for example, within apeirosonism, by the agent remaining true, and thereby conformant, to the apeiroson’s future actualization as best as one can; when more colloquially expressed, this then being understood as the state of remaining true to oneself), b) an object being true to the either intra- or interreality of the given object’s intended course or destination, this by conforming its motions to the given intended course or destination (as can apply to an arrow’s aim being true), c) an agent or object being true to some prescribed specification(s) by conforming to the given specifications (e.g., the person was true to their specific culture’s morality; e.g., this bicycle wheel is true (rather than warped) due to the truth of its build)

In addition to such various applications of the terms truth and true—because conformity in its full, or completed, nature will make identical that which otherwise conforms to that which it otherwise conforms to—the adjective true can then also encompass that which is genuine, legitimate, and in this sense valid. Examples of such total conformity are numerous and can include “that is a true Rembrandt painting”, “a spider is not a true bug by scientific standards”, and “she wrote a true work of literature”.

16.1.2.1. The Four General Subcategories of Agential Truth

An agent’s conformity to that which is real can then take any of the following four forms, or else any mixture of these:

Intratruths: conformities as agent to one or more actualities from which one’s own intrareality is composed. (E.g. #1: that was an (intra)true dream of sleep I had—rather than it being a false memory, a willfully given lie, or some such falsity regarding the specific intrareality addressed. E.g. #2: it is an (intra)truth that I see that plant in front of me to have green leaves.)

Intertruths: conformities as agent(s) to the one or more actualities from which interrealities are composed. (E.g. #1: I promised him that I wouldn’t and I was (inter)true to my promise. E.g. #2: It is an (inter)truth that all non-color-blind members of my species will see that plant in front of me to have green leaves in the same manner I do were other members of my own species to take a look. E.g. #3: It is an (inter)truth that in certain cultures past and present female circumcision is—relative to the given cultures addressed—moral and thereby good.)

Equitruths: conformities as anim(s) to the singular equireality or any aspect thereof. (E.g. #1: I’ve for the most part remained (equi)true to what I know to be equireal in both the present and the past—this rather than lying to others or to myself about what I know to be equireal in the present and in the past. E.g. #2: It is an (equi)truth that planet Earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa—and this despite the (intra)truth that we each immediately perceive the sun to revolve around the Earth or any (inter)truth maintained by any culture or subculture (past or present) which interprets equireality to be such that the sun revolves around the Earth. E.g. #3: It is an (equi)truth that—despite certain culture-specific, moral intertruths specifying otherwise—female circumcision can only be detrimental to the both physical and mental well-being of females such that, at least within systems of apeirosonism, female circumcision can only be an unethical practice (and, thereby, an equireal bad—and this, again, despite the same practice being deemed morally good within certain cultures, i.e. within certain interrealities.))

Ultratruths: conformity as agent(s) to the singular ultrareality or any aspect thereof. (E.g. #1: Here granting the (ultra)truth that the apeiroson is the ontically certain euteleion, I’ve for the most part remained (ultra)true to my (true) self (this, in this interpretation, roughly being one’s maximal conformity to the future perfected form of one’s current self as protocore wherein one as protocore no longer volitionally suffers due to at last becoming the actualized apeiroson)—and have thereby for the most part remained authentic (i.e., in a state of authenticity rather than willfully deceiving myself or others via fakeness). E.g. #2: Here also granting the (ultra)truth that the apeiroson is the euteleion, it is (ultra)true that one can only find peace of mind by best pursuing virtues such as those of honesty, compassion, maximal impartiality, and a lack of fear regarding what might occur subsequent to one’s own current mortal life granting that one has lived a more virtuous life than not.)

Importantly, as with the four types of reality, these four types of truth are not, and cannot be, metaphysically separated from each other for as long as poietural existence occurs. They, rather, will at all junctures of poietural existence be intertwined.

Notwithstanding their entwinement, they each shall nevertheless hold their own unique perspectives as regards conformity to reality:

Here starting from the arguably most extra-ordinary perspective, that of ultrareality, granting that the apeiroson is the euteleion, in one’s being ultratrue to the euteleion one can easily enough express the following: In parallel to the teaching of the Buddhist Heart Sutra, all poieture—be it intrareal, interreal, or equireal; to then include all physiological or phainological percepts (which can only be poietural); all (poietural) feelings; all occurring poietural teloi and, hence, all volitions within the cosmos; all that therefore in any way appears as forms; and all other poietural aspects of mind—will in ultrarealistic terms be illusory. Because all these manners of poieture are ultraobjectively illusory, all which stands out to us (and thereby exists) as some type of form can then be understood to in ultrareal fact be emptiness. Furthermore, all which in ultrareal fact is ultrarealistically occurrent will be the protocepture itself which, when devoid of all poieture, can only be perfectly formless and therefore, in at least one manner of speaking, an unbounded emptiness. So generally construed, this can thereby easily enough lend itself to the stance of śūnyatā. Likewise can one affirm that any reality regarding there being individual selves—due to such reality being contingent on the occurrence of poieture, which, again, is ultrarealistically illusory—will be fictions, will be ultrarealistically unreal. Thus, from this ultraobjective perspective, the very affirmation of “I am” (when this I-ness is in any manner interpreted as holding any kind of duality to anything other) shall then be inferred to be a falsehood—one kept alive, so to speak, by the very ultrareal illusion of poieture which we nevertheless intra- and interrealistically experience to exist and which partitions the protocepture into individual and otherwise disparate protocepts, i.e. into the fractiprotocepture. And, with this same frame of mind maintained, one can further express that we (all contemporaneous anims of the cosmos) are all in ultrareal fact one (here implicitly understanding that this protoceptual singularity of oneness addressed, i.e., the apeiroson, is boundless, therefore devoid of quantity, and, therefore, in ultrareal fact nonquantifiable—this rather than being a quantifiable unit of being (wherein, for example, one plus one would equal two)). All these perspectives (though themselves poietural in their nature and thereby imperfect) will then be, each in their own way, ultratrue—i.e., conformant to the apeiroson as euteleion—again, this contingent on the apeiroson in fact so being the euteleion (rather than a pseudoteleion).

It however will by no means be unfounded to best maintain this set of ultraobjective perspectives while at the same time, but in different respects, likewise maintaining the intratruth that one occurs as an eidem—and, indeed, as a uniant—which nevertheless does in fact physioceive a solid world external to oneself, that within this external world at least appear to be other fragments of the same, as of yet unrealized, apeiroson, each fragment being its own anim that in one way or another inhabits its own unianthood, with each such unianthood being other than one’s own self as uniant. And that, here, the affirmation that “I am” (whose I-ness is implicitly understood to be in some manner dualistic and thereby other relative to that which it is not) shall steadfastly remain one’s conformity as agent to, at minimum, one’s own experienced intrareality.

Granting the impossibility of solipsism, both the occurrence of multiple interrealities and of the singular equireality will also by entailment then become necessary aspects of the poietural existence one experiences (this as will be tersely expressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter).

One, thereby, can generally maintain the aforementioned ultratruths regarding ultrareality while simultaneously, though in different respects, likewise maintain the various equitruths one is aware of relative to equireality’s being, the various intertruths one is aware of relative to any number of interrealities, and the various intraturths one is aware of relative to one’s own intrareality.

(Maybe tangentially, the Buddhist two truths doctrine—which differentiates between conventional or provisional truth(s) and absolute or ultimate truth(s)—can here rather easily be understood as follows: Ultratruths shall all be aspects of absolute or ultimate reality (i.e., of ultrareality) whereas equitruths, intertruths, and intratruths shall all be aspects of conventional or provisional reality.)

16.1.2.2. A Theory of Truth named Conformitism

For the sake of greater specificity, the theory of truth which this philosophy shall espouse will be herein coined conformitism—such that an adherent of this theory can be termed a conformitist (which is to be in no way confused as term with that of the ready-existent term conformist).

Conformitism, then, shall consist of the conformity theory of truth (regarding both agential and non-agential truths) just outlined in §16.1.2.

A preliminary discussion of how conformitism relates to three of the more prevalent current theories of truth shall be offered in §16.3—this subsequent to the brief expositions regarding equireality’s nature.

16.2. A Synopsis of Equireality’s Derivation and Nature

As previously mentioned, equireality (aka, equiobjectivity, i.e. the objectively physical world) shall be that one actuality—or else that one set of actualities—which in either practice or principle is equally applicable to all contemporaneously occurring anims in the cosmos.

To present a synopsis of equireality’s derivation, the following, extremely minimalist hypothetical will be first considered: Given the already established unfalsified certainty that one as eidem occurs and, additionally, given the unfalsified certainty that solipsism is false—which is to be presented as the culminating end of this work’s Part 4—it then becomes entailed as unfalsified certainty that, at the absolute minimum, at least two eidems cooccur in the cosmos. The philosophically hypothesized world wherein only two eidems cooccur in the cosmos, for brevity of expression, shall then be herein termed duoipsism.

If so much as two selves, i.e. uniants, cooccur (be these selves corporeal or not), there will then be certain poietural aspects of each self’s intrareality which shall remain solely applicable to the respective self in question—these then yet being fully intrareal realities—and there will simultaneously then be certain poietural aspects of each self’s otherwise intrareality which shall be commonly shared, and thereby commonly experienced, by all. The later shared poietural actualities shall then constitute, in the extreme hypothetical case of duoipsism, an interreality that is equally applicable to all (both) agents. Because in the extreme hypothetical of duoipsism the two selves are the total sum of all selves in the cosmos, this interreality equally applicable to all shall then simultaneously here be the equireality commonly pertaining to all selves in the cosmos.

Where just one more self to be included in the totality of all selves in the cosmos, then it becomes possible that, in addition to each self’s intrareality and their ubiquitously shared equireality, two of these three selves might share an interreality not shared by the third. And, at this juncture, there will then occur at least one non-equireal interreality in addition to the individual intrarealities of each and their yet ubiquitously shared equireality.

The equireality thereby established will then, in one sense, equally belong to all selves in the cosmos in identical manners and, in yet another sense, will belong to no single self in the cosmos. In the latter sense, equireality shall then occur independently of individual selves.

The more selves cooccur in the cosmos, the more stable equireality becomes as an occurrence independent of individual selves’ occurrence, of their individual, consciously intended aims, and so forth.

When considering all currently occurring individual lifeforms to be endowed with their own eidemic being and, hence, unianthood, i.e. self, the following metaphor might become of relative service: Consider an oceanic body of water to represent equireality at large. Next, consider the individual drops of water from which the given ocean is composed to represent the individual eidems (i.e., individual prototelos-endowed protocores that each hold a three-tiered awareness consisting of alloception, mesoception, and protoception) from whose protoceptual being the fractiprotocepture is composed. Devoid of the individual drops of water, no body of water, oceanic or otherwise, would occur. The individual drops of water, when taken together, then constitutionally determine the ocean and its properties. Yet, relative to any one drop of water or any one grouping of drops of water, the ocean addressed will hold what, for all practical purposes, will be an utterly independent existence: Take one drop of water away from the ocean and the ocean shall remain, for all practical purposes, utterly unchanged. Neither does the ocean in any significant way change via the addition of any one drop of water. The same yet holds were one to take away a bucket of water or add a bucket of water to it.

As an alternative metaphor, because geometric points are defined as being volumeless, were there to occur just a singular geometric point in all of being, no spatial dimensions would manifest—for no distances would occur. However, were so much as only two geometric points to cooccur, then spatial dimensions would simultaneously cooccur—for, here, distances relative to the two geometric points would become constitutionally determined. The greater the quantity of geometric points that cooccur, the better the spatial dimensions which they inhabit become defined. Yet, given a sufficient quantity of cooccurring geometric points, the spatial dimensions thereby defined would remain unchanged were any one geometric point to be removed or added.

The latter metaphor better parallels the physical space of equireality: wherein two or more cooccurring eidems shall constitutionally determine the then simultaneously cooccurring, equireal, spatial dimensions that they each inhabit.

In manners more difficult to concisely present, the same constitutional determinacy of equireal time shall manifest via the cooccurrence of, at absolute minimum, two individual, free-will-endowed eidems.

Then, given a sufficiently large enough quantity of simultaneously occurring individual protocores, equireality shall in effect be synonymous with physicality: to thereby include all physical objects, all aspects of physical space, and all aspects of physical time.

Reexpressing this in somewhat greater detail as a slight tangential: The greater the quantity of individual anims in the cosmos—i.e. the greater the quantity of the protocepture’s fragments—the more equireality will occur (for all practical purposes) in manners fully independent of individual anims and of their doings. Here, individual eidems will hold virtually no say as to what equireality in fact happens to be in concrete form. Conversely, however, the fewer the quantity of anims in the cosmos—here presuming these relatively few anims to be very proximate to the apeiroson, again with duoipsism as an absolute minimum—the more power each individual anim will hold over the characteristics of equireality in total. And, here, individual eidems will theoretically hold a relatively significant say in what equireality is and what it ought to be.

That mentioned, the two metaphors just offered, as with most others, will however be an incomplete representation: They, for just one example, overlook the stratified hierarchy of degrees of sentience to be found among lifeforms and, hence, among eidems (to be addressed in §16.9.1). All the same, it is hoped that the presentations just provided shall better guide the reader’s understanding of what equireality in part entails.

Next addressed, especially when re-invoking duoipsism, it then becomes derivable that whatever is or else becomes equireal shall be equally harmonious to—this implicitly if not also explicitly—the individual volition of all anims in existence. The poietural equireality which obtains will thereby be conformant to the volitional happiness of all anims in occurrence when considering duoipsism and, when considering an innumerable quantity of cooccurring selves, to the volitional happiness of at least the vast majority of selves in the cosmos.

Here yet again entertaining duoipsism, the more conflict which takes place between the disparate intrarealities of the two selves that occur, the more their commonly shared equireality becomes less than stable, the more their individual volitions become obstructed by the volitions of the other, and therefore the more both (all) selves in the cosmos volitionally suffer—this being contrary to their prototelos, with the prototelos of each mandating that their volitional suffering be optimally minimized.

Conversely, the more harmony, else stated (either implicit or explicit) accord, which is to be found between the two selves that cooccur within a system of duoipsism, the more stable their equireality becomes, the more their individual volitions are not obstructed by the volitions of the other, and thereby the more both (all) selves in the cosmos experience volitional happiness—be it of either a neutral or positive form—this, then, being conformant with their respective prototelos mandating that their volitional suffering be optimally minimized.

The first stated scenario, wherein the volitional suffering of all selves in the cosmos becomes intensified, shall constitute a relative furtherance from the apeiroson; this while the second stated scenario, wherein the volitional happiness (be it either positive or neutral) of all selves in the cosmos becomes intensified in relatively stable manners, shall constitute a relative approach to the apeiroson:

In one possible manner of addressing this issue, tentatively consider all poieture (be it equireal, interreal, or intrareal) to in one manner or another be the representations of the fractiprotocepture (within duoipsism, with the fractiprotocepture being fully composed of only two selves). So construed, equireality then becomes in essence a commonly accordant unity of being on the part of all anims in existence—one obtained via ubiquitous volitional accord on optimal representations of the very volitions of all anims in the cosmos—an optimal cosmic understanding, in one manner of speaking, on the part of all anims in the cosmos which thereby maximally suits all participants involved.

As just expressed, equireality shall then be an indirect unity of protoceptual being, one obtained via commonly accepted poieture, rather than a direct unity of protoceptual being (with the topic of a direct unity of protoceptual being to be discussed at significant length within Part 5 of this work, the main focus therein being on that unity of protoceptual being applicable to any individual human uniant, i.e. to all those here concerned).

Then, the closer to the apeiroson the totality of the cosmos becomes, the less volitional suffering shall occur on the part of all anims—or at least the vast majority of all anims—in the cosmos and the greater the unity of protoceptual being—both in indirect and in direct manners—that becomes obtained, this relative to all cooccurring anims in the cosmos. Thereby, in being a closer proximity to a literally complete and perfect unity of being, equating to a closer proximity to the actualized apeiroson.

All this shall become elaborated upon at length within Volume II of this work. Yet, having addressed this terse preview of equireality’s general derivation, it remains the case that this overall process of minimizing the volitional suffering of one and all via closer cosmic proximity to a complete unity of protoceptual being, i.e. to the apeiroson—a process which has been termed apeirosonesis in §14.2—shall, as process, perpetually occur for as long as the eusynteleion, whichever synteleion it might be, is not actualized. Or else it shall occur in unconditionally perpetual manners in case the euteleion happens to be the dysteleion.

For emphasis, regardless of which teleion in fact is the euteleion, apeirosonesis will inevitably persist to occur in some manner or other for as long as the cosmos remains cosynteleionic—and, this, so as to optimally minimize the volitional suffering of one and all (this as the prototelos of each mandates).

16.2.1. Within the Worldview of Apeirosonism

This treatise shall heavily lean toward ultrareality in fact consisting of the apeiroson as the eusynteleion.

Within the worldview of apeirosonism, then, the cosmos will be interpreted as being contingently eternal: it will be of endless duration, but this only until the apeiroson becomes actualized, at which point all poieture—and, hence, all poietural time, all poietural space, and all poietural objects—will cease to occur. The actualization of the apeiroson, however, shall forever remain fully contingent: this on the individual, freely willed intentions of all anims in the cosmos—for all anims in the cosmos minimally need to freely will of their own accord the actualization of the apeiroson for the apeiroson to stand any chance of becoming actualized.

The more or less perpetual cosmic process of apeirosonesis shall, then, forever seek closer approach to the actualization of the apeiroson—thereby optimally minimizing the volitional suffering of one and all—till the time the apeiroson becomes actualized.

All this shall occur despite the possibility of a cosmic Big Breakup occurring in the cosmos’s apeirosonesis toward the apeiroson—which, if a cosmic Big Breakup were to occur, would result in the fractiprotocepture further fragmenting to unknowable extents, with considerable consequent loss of equireal poieture currently had, only so as to once again restart the process of a global approach toward an actualized apeiroson.

Here further expressed in relatively brief manners, despite apeirosonesis, which can only perpetual occur to some extent or another—and this due to all protocepts seeking to optimally satisfy their own prototelos by minimizing personal volitional suffering—individual anims will always yet have free will capacity to choose as they see fit, including in their choice between (always synteleion-aligned) alternative teloi, some of which might be apeirosonic and some of which might be anti-apeirosonic. In at least the worldview of apeirosonism, then, it can only be due to the free will choice of anims between synteleion-relative teloi, with anims then choosing teloi that are anti-apeirosonic, that equireality can ever undergo a cosmic Big Breakup (with the probability of such a Big Breakup occurring increasing in due measure to the cosmos’s proximity to the actualized apeiroson).

In further theory, the closer to the apeiroson the cosmos becomes, were a Big Breakup to at any future point ensue, the greater and thus more catastrophic the fragmentation of the already fragmented protocepture and, simultaneously, the greater the loss of ready-existent equireal poieture. Were such a Brig Breakup to unfold in relatively close proximity to the apeiroson’s actualization, it would result in a relatively new poietural cosmos that, in due measure to the degree of protoceptual fragmentation, would be inhabited by protocepts which lose all possibility of recalling the now vanished poietural cosmos that previously broke apart (this while here entertaining the possibility that the newly fragmented protocepts would yet be endowed with a capacity to remember—rather than, for one example, being so fragmented so as to constitute a life-devoid panpsychistic cosmos strictly constituted of the most basic possible constructs, such as the individual subatomic quarks which are stipulated to have occurred during the very initial phases of the Big Bang).

Furthering this one topic: Such a catastrophic Big Breakup of the cosmos could theoretically occur upon the cosmos’s proximity to the apeiroson, in part, because the closer to the actualized apeiroson the cosmos becomes, the more interrealities and intrarealities become equitrue, thereby a) further solidifying equireality for one and all while b) obliterating all subjective realties (both inter- and intrareal) which are not true to equireality (and, ultimately, that are not true to the apeiroson, via which equireality obtains). This, of itself, will greatly reduce the quantity of poieture in the total apeiroson-proximate cosmos. And there are yet other considerations for why and how poieture would be further reduced—all of which might be best understood via a metaphysics of idealism—which, in terse summation, could in part be expressed as follows: The fractiprotocepture’s steady forgiveness of itself (of each uniant finding adequate reason and justification to forgive the wrongs performed both in their own previous doings and in the doings of yet other uniants) then followed by the fractiprotocepture’s literal forgetting of its past wrongs which, in literal terms, then further obliterates the cosmic poieture of the past in incremental manners—poieture which, again, otherwise partitions individual anims from each other.

With all this tentatively considered, upon such a fragmentation of the protocepture, the newly fragmented protocepts will no longer hold the same unity of being via the equireality once commonly shared, will then engage in far greater degrees of conflict in how to best satisfy each fragment’s prototelos, will thereby experience far more volitional suffering relative to each fragment of the protocepture, and, lastly here addressed—as will be further discussed in the latter portions of Volume III—granting the panpsychism of the cosmos, such a catastrophic state of affairs following a Big Breakup would then rationally result in an exceedingly rapid restructuring of a basic equireal order to the cosmos: here paralleling the exceedingly rapid relative ordering from out of states of relative chaos which our current day physics expresses to have occurred during the cosmos’s Big Bang.

(As a parallel and far more sentimental account of the same issue: As can at least be metaphorically expressed of any union of interpersonal love, be it romantic, fraternal, or otherwise: The greater and more intense the union of being becomes, both the more pleasant, potent, and bliss-like reality becomes for all agents involved and the more detrimental the possible risks of any participant betraying this trusted-in union of being. In so appraising, then—contradictory to the presumptions of some—consensually sponsored increased global harmony, though far more pleasant for all, never becomes easier to maintain, with risks of personal volitional suffering due to inappropriate choices by oneself or others only worsening, such that—because of these reasons and the like—a relatively apeiroson-proximate cosmic state of being then never becomes tainted by boredom (itself a form of volitional suffering). And all this is mentioned while overlooking the potentially far more intense pleasures that a more global harmony can theoretically facilitate: from those of interpersonal love that does not end in tragedy, to those of greater liberty to freely pursue the creation and appreciation of aesthetic manifestations, to those of greater volitional power to manifest that desired (ultimately, this being one’s total eradication of person volitional suffering), to—as just one more mention—those of greater protounderstandings regarding existence at large and the new, previously unavailable, discoveries which such increased protounderstanding affords.)

More can, and will, be expressed in the subsequent two volumes of this work regarding equireality’s derivation and aspects of its entailed nature. For now, let it be observed that such general understanding of equireality can well serve as a cogent enough means of analytically specifying what physicality is (to include physical objects, physical space, and physical time) within a metaphysical system of what could be termed a variant of objective idealism—an understanding of physicality which (though differing in various ways from modern-day materialist, or else physicalist, metaphysical accounts of the physical world and their respective theories) will in no way be contradictory to any known data obtained by any one of the various empirical sciences. (For one example—though nonmathematical in its composition, and although not accommodating the metaphysical notions of block-time—this philosophy’s derivation of physical (i.e., equireal) time shall in many ways at the very least parallel the modern understandings of physical time resultant from the empirically verified Theory of Relativity.)

Such an understanding of equireality will then also allow for an analytical understanding of what shall be in Volume II coined progressive uniformitarianism: that state of affairs wherein uniformitarianism obtains at every present moment yet nevertheless progressively changes in gradual manners as the cosmos itself gradually evolves toward the apeiroson. This very same frame of mind will then readily accommodate what the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce theorized in terms of natural laws: namely, that natural laws are themselves the habits of the cosmos.

Furthermore, this overall philosophy—due to its just expressed metaphysical stances regarding equireality—shall make the following, empirically accessible prediction: despite all indications evidencing that that cosmos is currently expanding, the cosmos is, and can only be, cyclical, but this in a contingent manner: As per traditional cyclic models of the universe, the cosmos will be predicted to oscillate between periods of expansion (in which we are currently living) and periods of contraction, the latter always resulting in a Big Bounce—this whenever a Big Breakup occurs that, thereby, commences an new Big Bang—till, at some unknown future juncture, the cosmos’s contraction results in a Big Crunch, into a sole gravitational singularity, which, in essence, will equate to the apeiroson having been at last actualized.

Maybe needless to add, despite the many other related subjects that await to be addressed in respect to this philosophy’s understanding of data obtained from modern physics—and unlike the typical materialist, or else physicalist, accounts of the universe’s nature—this philosophy’s account of cosmology has the unique virtue of explaining the physical world in manners that, with generally equal validity, likewise provide an analytical account of the cosmos’s metaethics, this together will many another aspect of value theory in general (and this while simultaneously explaining the how and why to physical objectivity per se).

Let this concise and very incomplete exposition of equireality’s derivation and nature serve as a type of preface for what will be further investigated in the subsequent two volumes of this work.

16.8. How the Conformity Theory of Truth Relates to Others

This section will only present a terse summary of what shall be further addressed within Volume II in far greater detail.

Whereas the correspondence theory of truth can be understood to stipulate that truths are all an agential correspondence to equireal facts, conformitism will stipulate that agential truths need not be strictly related to equireality—but can, in addition, be related to various intrarealities, various interrealities, and to the singular ultrareality. This, for one example, then facilitates a conformitist understanding of agential truths which take the form of faithfulness—such that one’s faithfulness (e.g., one’s being true to another) will in effect be one’s conformity to some interreal, either implicitly maintained or explicitly made, promise—this, then, being an example of truth which the correspondence theory of truth does not accommodate. Furthermore, while the correspondence theory of truth cannot address many a non-agential truth—such as that of an arrow’s trajectory being true or else the truth of a bicycle wheel—conformitism very much can.

The various complexities of the coherency theory of truth shall commonly affirm that agential truths, in order to so be, will cohere into all other agential truths in logically consistent manners. Making short a very complex topic, as can be inferred from equireality’s derived nature, equireality at large cannot ever consist of logically contradictory elements—and this will remain so even where equireality facilitates tychistic outcomes. Hence, whatever equireality happens to be in concrete form, its numerous aspects shall at all times remain logically consistent. Due to their logical consistency, they then will all cohere into each other—for emphasis, this in logically consistent manners. So tersely understood, because all equitruths shall conform to equireality—whose elements are all noncontradictory—all equitruths shall then hold the capacity to cohere into each other in logically consistent manners. This state of affairs thereby accounting for at least most properties commonly ascribed to the coherency theory of truth.

Lastly here addressing the constructivist theory of truth, and for now here strictly focusing on intertruths: All interrealities (e.g., languages, their words, and these words’ meanings; cultures and subcultures; ethnicities; nationalities; moneys; etc.) shall be constructed in one manner or another by their individual agential constituents. The then resulting intertruth that a piece of paper termed a one-dollar bill shall hold a value lesser than that of a one-hundred-dollar bill shall then be fully constructivist in its nature—and can then be readily altered were either all or a majority of this interreality’s agential constituents to commonly agree upon, for example, the one-hundred-dollar bill being of lesser value than that of the one-dollar bill.

16.4. Of Physioceptions and Equireality

The following subsections will address some of the many relations between equireality and physioception.

16.4.1. Perceptual Senceptions and Perceptual Appearances

It will be maintained that, at the very least for all those here concerned, no percept can be or else become an apprehended cognitum in the absence of one or more sencepts which give some type of understanding to that which is perceived—thereby making some type of sense of, i.e. giving some type of meaning to, that which is perceived.

To best evidence this, first the following unfalsified certainty will be presented and subsequently maintained:

No one here concerned can as eidem (rather than as a uniant’s total animana) understand any given X—this irrespective of whether X is a process, an entity, both, or neither—while at the same time and in the same respect being utterly devoid of any type of understanding regarding what X might possibly be. More curtly expressing the same, no one here concerned can hold any understanding of X while at the same time and in the same respect holding no understanding of X whatsoever. Not only is this contradictory to the experiences of all those here concerned but it will also, of itself, be a logical contradiction and thereby unacceptable as possibility of what can be ontic.

Tangentially, this expressed unfalsified certainty is not given to then imply that new understandings cannot be gained through new experiences via any number of means—the general topic of understandings being further investigated in Volume III of this work.

The following unfalsified certainty will be next presented and subsequently maintained:

For all those here concerned, any perception—be the perception physiological or phainological—of any given X which is in any way understood, this however transiently, will necessitate some type of understanding (be the understanding inborn or learned, be it implicit or explicit, be it allological in the form of ennooceptions or else autological in the form of protounderstandings) regarding that X addressed. Stated otherwise, for all those here concerned, there can be no perception of any given X wherein X is in any way understood—and, thereby, endowed with any meaning whatsoever—in the complete absence of all possible understandings regarding what X is or else might be.

Here too, to affirm otherwise will be to affirm a logical contradiction wherein X is at the same time and in the same respect both a) understood in some way and b) not understood in any way. This then being unacceptable as possibility of what can be ontic.

For example, if a young enough child perceives a reddish-yellow flame in motion holding a particular spatial placement, the child will then hold an understanding of there occurring a reddish-yellow flame in motion at the specified location rather than at some other location—this even if the child as of yet holds no understanding of it being fire and of the fire burning flesh when flesh comes into contact with it. More extremely, a newly born human infant holds the innate (hence unlearned) instinct specified as “breast crawl”—wherein, when placed upon the mother’s abdomen, the newborn crawls to the breast toward the nipple. This behavior would not be possible in the complete absence of perceptions: primarily of skin-to-skin contact, of smell, and of warmth. The newborn—though not yet endowed with any explicit understandings which it could articulate—will nevertheless implicitly understand that being placed on a women’s abdomen is other than being placed on an inanimate surface, such that the infant will instinctively engage in the breast crawl when it perceives itself resting on a woman’s abdomen but not when placed, for example, in a crib. Here too, then, there will be some measure of understanding in respect to that perceived—some measure of meaning apprehension—this even if the understanding here specified happens to be both fully implicit (rather than in any way explicit) and fully innate (rather than in any way learned).

In short, to perceive X is to in part understand that which one perceives to be X—this via any number of possible types of understanding—and, therefore, for that perceived to hold some type and degree of meaning.

Understandings, irrespective of type, shall all be senceptual.

Then, this very senceptual aspect of all which we might perceive—either physiologically or phainologically—will be here generally termed perceptual senception. More succinctly and specifically, as either physio-senception in the case of senceptions applicable to physioceptions or else phaino-senception in the case of senceptions applicable to phainoceptions.

All those here concerned, of course, experience more than pure senceptions (which, of themselves, are non-perceptual) when perceiving anything whatsoever. In any instance of perception, in addition to our perceptual senceptions, we will also be aware of the appearances to that which we perceive (be these appearances, for example, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, or gustatory (to not here embark on our many endo-physioceptions)). And this too shall be of unfalsified certainty to all those here concerned.

Let the appearances—be they physiological or phainological—to that which we perceive then be generally termed aspects of perceptual appearance. More succinctly and specifically, as either physio-appearance in the case of appearances applicable to physioceptions or else phaino-appearance in the case of appearances applicable to phainoceptions.

Then, given all which has just been addressed, it is to be understood that perception—be it either physiological or phainological—will be a convergence of perceptual senceptions and of perceptual appearances: a convergence into what to us shall most typically be undifferentiable cognita of perception.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the convergence just specified, because no comprehension of perceptual appearance will be possible in the complete absence of all perceptual senceptions regarding that perceived, it is to be then further concluded that the apprehension of perceptual appearances shall be—either partially or fully—contingent upon the occurrence of some one or more forms of perceptual senception (irrespective of whether the latter are innate or learned, implicit or explicit, and so forth).

16.4.2. Physioceptions of Equireality

For this general exposition, first, let it be entertained that each lifeform on planet Earth shall be endowed with its own eidemic being and, therefore, with its own unique unianthood—this from the very simplistic unianthoods of prokaryotic organisms such as archaebacteria to the extremely more complex unianthoods of human beings. Secondly, let it be entertained that individual kinds, or types, of lifeform occur on planet Earth such that lifeforms can be classified into individual species of life.

So maintained, and as is commonly established by the empirical sciences, each individual species of life shall have its own unique, species-specific set of perceptual abilities, with the unique set of perceptual abilities applicable to each species of life to some extent overlapping those applicable to other species of life. (Examples of disparate species-specific physioceptions can include a bat’s sonar, a viper’s infrared sight, and a typical human’s sight of what we term the visible electromagnetic spectrum.)

For example, a fly, a lizard, and a cat might each be endowed with its own unique form of physiology-resultant visual physioception while, nevertheless, certain aspects of visual physioception abilities applicable to each type of lifeform will overlap.

Next, entertain the scenario wherein a fly, a lizard, and a cat are all interacting in the following, generalized manner: the fly is seeking food from some item on top of a boulder, the lizard is seeking food by pursuing the fly on the boulder so as to eat the fly, and the cat is seeking food by stalking the lizard on the boulder so as to capture and eat the lizard. The fly, the lizard, and the cat each have their own unique set of exo-physioceptions; yet all three will behave in relation to their exo-physioceptions in manners completely conformant to all three being endowed with an equally shared—i.e., identical—awareness of the given boulder’s placement, dimensions, motions or lack thereof, impenetrability, etc.

The question can then be placed: what is the boulder’s equireal (or, else expressed, equiobjective) perceptual reality?

To this question can now be articulated the following answer:

The boulder of which the fly, the lizard, and the cat are equally aware (as can likewise be affirmed of everything from the bacteria on the boulder to any other individual lifeform that in any way interacts with the boulder: say, a human who is watching this interaction between the fly, the lizard, and the cat from a distance) does not have an equiobjective perceptual appearance. What perceptually appears to the fly’s exo-physioceptions shall in this context be fully intrareal to the fly (or else interreal to the fly’s species of life) and will not be identically shared with the lizard or with the cat; the same applies to the lizard’s intrareality of the boulder’s appearance as well as to the cat’s. No one lifeform here holds an equiobjective set of cognita regarding the boulder’s perceptual appearance—for each will hold its own unique cognita of perceptual appearance which will not be identically shared by the others.

Notwithstanding this lack of equiobjective perceptual appearance, all three lifeforms involved which are simultaneously aware of the same boulder and its steadfast, myriad, physical properties will all equally hold the very same perceptual senceptions of a) the spatial compositions of the boulder around which they interact and, thereby, of the boulder’s spatial properties as well as of b) the temporal befores and afters which transpire in their interactions around the given boulder.

Here is not intended an in-depth enquiry into the matter of awareness of spacetime—such enquiries, again, being reserved for Volume II of this work—but, again, merely a preliminary introduction to the nature of physioception which this treatise shall espouse.

In short, then, this philosophy will endorse the view that no uniant is ever endowed with an awareness of equiobjective physio-appearances regarding the equireal (i.e., the objectively physical) world. However, in every veridical physioceptual experience of the equireal world which a uniant has, the given uniant shall at all times experience physio-senceptions of what is equireal which, as physio-senceptions, are equally experienceable in identical manners by all anims in the cosmos—this in principle if not also in practice (with these anims, again, ranging from the simplistic eidems of prokaryotes to the extremely more complex eidems of human beings—a cosmic set of eidems to which can then also be added, were any such to in fact exist, the eidems of otherworldly aliens and the like).

Again, to all contemporaneous eidems in the cosmos, as well as to all their unianthood-specific animids (where applicable), a physioceived physical object shall always hold the exact same physio-senceptual attributes to one and all. The physical object—to includes its physical properties of space and time—will, in effect, be equally senceived in identical manners by all corporeal anims—this wherever corporeal anims are in any way interacting with the physical object (including via such means as looking at it).

16.4.3. Comparison to Kantian “Things in Themselves”

Kantian philosophy, in short, maintains that space and time are not aspects of the objective world but are instead sensible intuitions we individually hold via which we collectively structure the objective world ^[1]. In keeping with this, Kantian philosophy can easily be interpreted to maintain that the objective world of itself—being composed of “things in themselves”, or else of “noumena”—is unknowable to us ^[2].

In contrast, the overall body of this current work shall maintain the following perspective:

While it is upheld that the fractiprotocepture is the prime constituency from which equireal poieture is constitutionally determined, with physical objects, physical space, and physical time all being equipoietural in their nature, this philosophy yet endorses the view that physical objects and the space and time via which they are bound are all equi-senceptual (while yet devoid of any equireal perceptual appearance).

In so being equi-senceptual, then, all physical objects, to include both their spatial and temporal properties, equally affect all contemporaneous anims (with this entailing that they don’t then belong to any one anim or cohort of these) and, therefore, will be physio-senceived in identical manners by all anims in the cosmos which in any manner interact with these physical objects.

Because understanding is senceptual—either allologically or autologically so—the equi-senceptuality of physical objects then implies that the spatiotemporal aspects of physical objects will be (in one manner of another (be it innately, implicitly, or otherwise)) understood by all corporeal anims in the cosmos (from bacteria to humans, etc.) in identical manners.

Because the spatiotemporal aspects of physical objects will be understood by all corporeal anims in the cosmos in identical manners, and because these senceptual aspects of physical objects will be equireal, they then will by entailment hold an existence independent of any one anim and of any one cohort of anims—this while their equi-senceptual existence will nevertheless be contingent on the occurrence of all anims in the cosmos (again, this due to the equireal poieture being constitutionally determined by the fractiprotocepture at large).

While this subject of equireality will, again, be explored in in-depth analytical manners within Volume II (and while the epistemological issues of knowledge and understanding will be explored in in-depth analytical manners within Volume III), it will yet remain the case that equireal objects a) shall hold an equi-senceptual existence independent of us as individual uniants and b) that we as individual uniants shall necessarily at minimum hold an implicit understanding of the equi-senceptual spatiotemporal qualities of the physical objects we interact with.

Otherwise expressed, what we as individual uniants (veridically) senceive to be physical objects and to thereby be equi-senceptual will, indeed, be equireal sencepts—aka, equisencepts—relative to one and all other corporeal uniants: will then in at least this sense be knowable aspects of what our objectively physical world is constituted of.

16.4.4. On the Primary and Secondary Qualities of that Physioceived

As to the complex and often debated issues regarding direct versus indirect realism:

In summative overview, this treatise shall uphold a ubiquitous direct realism amongst all cooccurring corporeal anims (e.g., from the eidems of prokaryotes to those of humans) as regards our individual physio-senceptions of the equireal world—the equireal world, again, being of itself solely equi-senceptual in its nature. Due to the very same reasoning, this treatise will then at the same time uphold various forms of indirect realism when addressing issues of physio-appearances.

This thereby results in a primary-secondary quality distinction of the following nature:

All veridical physio-senceptions of the equireal world shall pertain to the primary qualities of our commonly shared, equireal, objectively physical, senceptual world (will thereby be qualities of the physical objects themselves); this while the veridical physio-appearances of the same objectively physical world shall all be classified as pertaining to the secondary qualities of our commonly shared objective world (i.e., qualities that are not of the objects themselves but, instead, are products of the given unianthood—or else set of uniants—in question).

For one example of the latter, the typical human being shall be endowed with a visual physioception common to the majority of all other members of the same species of life, i.e. to most of humanity at large—with various forms of color blindness among humans as a significant exception to this otherwise present ubiquity. Hence, for the majority of human beings, the visual physio-appearances of physical objects will be commonly shared with most other uniants of our own species of life. This will then thereby specify a Homo-sapiens-relative interreality of physio-appearances.

Somewhat more concretely expressed, when one human interacts with another—barring the unlikely possibility of any having some form of color blindness, etc.—all humans shall commonly see the same colors in that which is focused on, shall commonly experience the same qualitative aspects of sounds, shall commonly smell the same smells, and so forth. This physiology-resultant commonality of physio-appearances in that perceived by most all human beings shall, firstly, of itself be an integral aspect of the objectively physical world of which a human’s physical body is constituted—for emphasis, such that objective physicality is again fully devoid of physio-appearances while being equi-senceptual when equiobjectively addressed. And, secondly, this physiology-resultant commonality of physio-appearances amongst humans shall then be a species-specific and species-relative interreality—i.e., an actuality that is commonly shared by a plurality of agents (thereby not being an intrareality) but not commonly applicable to all contemporaneous agents in the cosmos (thereby neither being an equireal attribute).

Our human-specific interreality of physio-appearances will, then, most overlap those species-specific interrealities of physio-appearance applicable to our closest evolutionary relatives: namely, those species-specific interrealities of physio-appearance with which great apes are endowed. With our own species-specific interrealities of physio-appearance next best overlapping the species-specific interrealities of physio-appearance applicable to monkeys. And so forth. Hence, when considering the vast diversity of lifeforms to be found in the evolutionary tree of life, each species’ specific interreality of physio-appearance shall overlap, first and foremost, with that of those species to which it is most closely related evolutionarily. And yet, again, all species of life, from the simplest to the most complex, will commonly physio-senceive in their sometimes disparate physioceptions the exact same underlying, equiobjective, purely equi-senceptual, physical world (to include its spatiotemporally bound physical objects).

16.5. Reappraising Physioceptual and Interreal Truths

For simplicity of expression, here only veridical visual physioceptions will be addressed:

Irrespective of whether one happens to be colorblind or not, it will then be intratrue that one will visually physioceive one’s own equireal body just as one does—this together with visually physioceiving all other equireal entities in existence just as one does.

Here granting one’s absence of colorblindness, it will then be intertrue that one will visually physioceive one’s own body in the same manners that most all other members of one’s own species of life will visually physioceive one’s own body—this together with most all other members of one’s own species of life visually physioceiving all other equireal entities in existence just as one oneself does.

It will then be equitrue that, firstly, all aspects of equireality, to include one’s own body, shall be equally physio-visually senceived (this in principle if not also in practice) by all contemporaneously occurring anims in the cosmos while holding no equireal visual appearance whatsoever; and, secondly, that different species of life will visually physioceive equireal entities to hold different visual appearances (with these differences between species of life sometimes being minor and sometime major) while all species of life will simultaneously apprehend the exact same visual senceptions in respect to that visually physioceived.

Lastly here addressed, here granting that the apeiroson is in fact the euteleion and thereby comprises ultrareality (this rather than some other teleion in fact being the euteleion and thereby comprising ultrareality), it will then be ultratrue that all physioceptions—irrespective of how veridical they might be in respect to equireality, the interrealities we might be members of, and our own individual intrareality—are, in final analysis, without exception poietural and, hence, ultrareal illusion (which is to not be confused with equireal illusions, the latter consisting of mirages, hallucinations, and the like). As with the ultrarealistically illusory nature of all other poieture which is thereby in no way ultratrue, all equirealistically veridical physioceptions will then likewise be in no way ultratrue.

That stated, if one’s physioceptual intratruths are conformant to equireality, they then will be equitrue and thereby veridical.

If one’s physioceptual intratruths are not conformant to equireality, they then will not be equitrue and thereby veridical—being instead some variant of equireal illusion, mirage, hallucination, or the like.

Likewise, then, with intratruths: If an intertruth is not conformant with equireality, it can only be an equireal falsehood—i.e., an equi-falsehood. To better illustrate this, the discrepancy between the logically contradictory interrealities of Young Earth Creationsim and Evolutionism will next be used as example:

Young Earth creationsim (YEC) maintains that the cosmos has been in existence for less than some 10,000 years. Evolutionism, on the other hand, accepts the validity of the modern evolutionary synthesis between Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and Gregor Mendel's theory of genetics—thereby upholding that life has existed on Earth for at least some 3.8 billion years. Both YEC and Evolutionism are cultural actualities commonly applicable to a multitude of individual humans—and are thereby each its own interreality.

Because YEC and Evolutionism are logically contradictory, at minimum in terms of the age of the cosmos, either one or else both of these interrealities can only be false (a subject of logic to be further explored within Volume III). Therefore, it is not logically possible that both interrealities equally conform to our commonly shared equireality.

Then, that one of the two just mentioned interrealities which in fact conforms to the equireal nature of our commonly shared world (here assuming that one of the two interrealities shall in fact so conform) will likewise then also be that one of the two interrealities which is veridical (i.e., equitrue).

Because, via its ensuing metaphysics and epistemology, this philosophy will uphold and endorse all known data collected by the empirical sciences, this philosophy will then uphold that Evolutionism is equitrue (and thereby veridical) and that YEC is equifalse (and thereby invalid).

That said, it is yet to be upheld that any individual Young Earth creationist will be intertrue to YEC for as long as they maintain those stipulations which YEC espouses—here most prominently, that the cosmos is no older than some 10,000 years.

16.6. Ontic Truth vs. Pragmatic Truth

While a very complex epistemological topic—which shall have its proper investigation within subsequent volumes of this work—the distinction between ontic truth and pragmatic truth which is to be there made has been deemed of significant enough importance to warrant a brief current mention.

Let it first be at least tentatively understood that ontic truths shall be ontically certain conformities by one or more agents to that which is actual and, therefore, real—be the reality concerned intrareal, interreal, equireal, or ultrareal. An ontic truth shall then be an agential conformity to that reality in question which, as conformity, in fact ontically occurs.

Let it next be at least tentatively understood that, epistemologically, all those here concerned can only hold beliefs regarding what is ontically true. These beliefs regarding that which is ontically true shall be general meta-beliefs specifying that the particular, or else concrete, beliefs in question are in fact conformant to that which is real.

These general meta-beliefs regarding what is ontically true can, in turn, at least in theory then either be infallibly certain or else fallibly certain.

As subsequent volumes will strive to evidence with unfalsified certainty, no infallible certainty can be established by anyone here concerned—this either in practice or in principle. This lack of obtainable infallible certainty will extend into all matters, including that of basic mathematics, to include such steadfast truths as, for one example, that of 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. Consider, for instance, the alternative mathematics wherein the notion of 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 is deemed valid—the latter being a mathematics that, for one example, can be readily found in many a Christian notion of the Trinity, wherein three distinct persons are deemed to in fact be one (or, as yet another example, consider the commonly enough found dictum that “we (a multiplicity of distinct beings) are in fact all one (all one being)”—such that a possibly innumerable quantity of individual ones all sum up to one). Because the mathematics of the Trinity (and other similar stipulations regarding beings) can be readily cogent and thereby justifiable, this at least to the satisfaction of many, the mathematics of 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 can then in principle serve as a justifiable alternative to the mathematics of 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. Due to this, the truth of the abstraction that 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 cannot, on its own, then even be considered an unfalsified certainty, much less an infallible certainty. (Volume III will however strive to evidence how each of these two mathematical systems will be unfalsifiedly certain within its own context of essence: that of 1 + 1 +1 = 3 as pertains to poieture and that of 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 as pertains to protocepture.)

Since it will in subsequent volumes be deemed with unfalsified certainty that all we can epistemologically have in practice will be fallible certainties, all our general meta-beliefs regarding what is ontically true can then of themselves only be fallibly certain: for example (here using concepts addressed in Chapter 1), ranging from intuitively-certain meta-beliefs regarding what is ontically true (these consisting of the likely most unsupported form of psychological certainty, that of intuitive certainty, which shall be fallible in its nature) to unfalsifiedly-certain meta-beliefs regarding what is ontically true (these consisting of the strongest fallible certainty type possible, being in part due to this classified in this treatise as one of the two possible types of epistemic certainty), with many a possible degree of fallible certainty in-between.

Such fallibly certain meta-beliefs regarding that which is ontically true shall, in turn, be then generally coined pragmatic truths. This, in part, because pragmatic truths shall be the only type of truth that can be had in practice by anyone here concerned.

Pragmatic truths, in turn, can then be more precisely specified by the type of fallible certainty they consist of. Hence, for one example of this, the strongest possible instantiation of pragmatic truth shall be that of unfalsifiedly-certain pragmatic-truth, aka that of unfalsified truth. It then bares note that the unfalsified certainties so far obtained in this work—commencing with that of “I as an eidem am whenever I am aware of anything” specified in Chapter 4—all serve as examples of such unfalsified truths: of such maximally strong but nevertheless yet fallible certainties regarding what is ontically true.

As with the impossibility discussed in Chapter 1 of there occurring epistemic certainties in the complete absence of ontic certainties, pragmatic truths could not be maintained in the absence of ontic truths—the latter, in effect, always serving as referents to what all pragmatic truths seek to ideally consist of: It, for example, will only be due to our intent upon ontic truths that we seek to properly justify our particular, or else concrete, beliefs. The justifications we provide for our particular, or else concrete, beliefs—which, as justifications, strive to evidence that these beliefs are in fact conformant to ontically certain actualities—when successful, will then validate that these very same beliefs are not in fact false, therefore that these beliefs likely in fact are ontically true. The greater the quantity of successful justifications we can provide for any particular belief we might entertain, the more validation occurs that the given particular belief is in fact not false, is in fact likely to be ontically true.

16.7. Knowledge as Justified and True Belief

As a quick preview of how this treatise will then address the epistemological issue of knowledge as justified, true belief:

In generalized overview, all knowledge as justified, true belief will consist of beliefs that can in theory be endlessly justified to in fact not be ontically untrue—thereby in some manner and degree validating the ontic truth of the given belief. They all will thereby consist of beliefs which are in some way justified to be ontically true.

In greater detail, and in parallel to the three epistemological truth types this section has specified—those of ontic truth, infallible (epistemic) truth, and fallible (epistemic) truth—one can next obtain three theoretical classifications for knowledge as justified, true, belief:

Ontic knowledge (i.e., the state of ontically knowing) will consist of beliefs in any way justified that in fact are ontically true—beliefs which, furthermore, because they in fact are ontically true, one can in principle justify endlessly without any possibility whatsoever of ever finding the belief false. Ontic knowledge will thereby be synonymous to ontically certain knowledge—i.e., with knowledge that in fact ontically occurs. That stated, whether or not ontic knowledge is in fact had will however be an epistemological matter. And, epistemologically, only the following two general categories of knowledge present themselves:

Infallible knowledge (i.e., the state of infallibly knowing) will consist of beliefs whose justifications perfectly demonstrate the given belief to be ontically true with infallible certainty. Yet, due to this treatise’s maintaining with unfalsified certainty that infallible certainties are impossible to obtain by anyone here concerned, infallible knowledge shall then be of itself deemed impossible to obtain. Which then only leaves the following general possibility as viable:

Pragmatic (aka, fallible) knowledge (i.e., the state of pragmatically (or else fallibly) knowing) will consist of beliefs whose justifications (which in practice can never be unending) do not result in an evidencing that the beliefs in question are false. Pragmatic knowledge shall then consist of beliefs that via the justifications afforded to them are found to be pragmatically true. In so being found via the justifications afforded to them to be pragmatically true, these same beliefs can then very likely be ontically true—such that the epistemologically fallible knowledge concerned might very well in fact be ontic knowledge—yet, due to the lack of infallible certainty in the matter, this state of in fact being ontic knowledge cannot ever be established with infallible certainty.

Pragmatic knowledge, then, will hold variable strengths that parallel the degree of strength to be found in the fallible certainties from which it is comprised: On one end of the spectrum, a belief whose justifications are strictly comprised of intuitive certainties shall be pragmatically true till the time this belief’s presumed ontic truth is found to be false, if such a time every occurs—and, with justifications strictly comprised of intuitive certainty, such intuitive knowledge (i.e., the state of intuitively knowing) shall be among the weakest forms of consciously maintained knowledge possible. On the other extreme end of the spectrum, a belief whose justifications are comprised of unfalsified certainties shall likewise be pragmatically true till the time this belief’s presumed ontic truth is found to be false, if such a time every occurs—yet, because this belief’s justifications are comprised of unfalsified certainties, such unfalsified knowledge (i.e., the state of unfalsifiedly knowing) shall be the strongest form of pragmatic knowledge possible.

With this very quick glance given toward some of the epistemological topics of Volume III in regard to knowledge as justified, true belief, one can, for one example, then rather easily and cogently understand the following affirmation in completely consistent manners: “I unfalsifiedly know (i.e., I hold a belief in that which is real which, as belief, is justified to be unfalsifiedly certain) that I do not infallibly know anything whatsoever (i.e., that I do not hold a belief in that which is real which, as belief, is justified to be infallibly certain, and this in respect to anything whatsoever).” The just expressed affirmation, then, being one possible, fully consistent interpretation of the following, often addressed, seemingly contradictory expression, “I know that I know nothing”.

The unfalsifiedly certain conclusion that no infallible certainty can be established in either practice or principle will, then, result in an epistemological system of ubiquitous fallibilism. One wherein all consciously entertained truths (from the intrareal to the ultrareal) will therefore be fallible without exception—being pragmatic truths rather than ever being infallible truths. This, in turn, will then entail that all instances of knowledge as justified, true belief will likewise be fallible—with no infallible knowledge in the form of justified, true belief ever being obtainable by anyone here concerned. (Tangentially, with the only possibility of holding infallible knowledge—this when knowledge is addressed in the sense of protounderstanding, rather than in the sense of justified, true belief—being obtainable upon the apeiroson’s actualization.)

16.8. On Ultrareality’s Importance

Within apeirosonism—a worldview which this treatise will for the most part endorse—ultrareality will specify that all which is in any way poietural shall be ultrarealistically illusory: to include the occurrence of intrarealities, interrealities, the our commonly shared equireality, all physioceptions (more specifically, all mesocepts and their entailed allocepts—be these physioceptual or otherwise), and the like.

Given this perspective wherein all poietural givens are deemed to be ultrarealistically untrue, the following question might then surface: Why might considerations of apeirosonic ultrareality be in any way important to the living of daily life?

To better address this question, there will first need to be made distinctions between what each of the five possible to conceive of teleions entail as regards truths (including those addressing what is good rather than bad, what is correct rather than incorrect, and what is real rather than unreal).

The materialistic nihilon will entail that all activities of life, to include the upholding and pursuit of various truths, shall be utterly irrational save for the following: within any system of materialistic nihilonism, actualizing the materialistic nihilon (and this in as short a time span as possible) shall be the only rational means of satisfying one’s unfalsifiedly certain prototelos which, as prototelos, drives one toward minimizing all of one’s own volitional suffering. The materialistic nihilon thereby has nothing of significance to offer in respect to explanations regarding truths and their ontology.

The permanon will likewise have nothing of significance to offer in respect to explaining truths and their ontology—for the permanonist simply strives to remain as imperturbably unchanging as possible in respect to their own dualistic ego and, by extension, their own unianthood. And, in this, there can be no entailed explanation of why truths occur.

The dysteleion, too, will not be of any help in the issue of explaining the ontology of truths—other than to affirm that all truths are fabrications, save for that of the dysteleion being the euteleion. For, as can only be derived from dysteleionism, all four synteleions will be false and, therefore, equally participatory as falsehoods in our then fully fabricated constructs regarding what the ontology of truths might consist of. Indeed, when adopting the worldview of dysteleionism, it then becomes somewhat (though not entirely) feasible to claim that there in fact are no truths whatsoever, but only constructed fabrications which, as Nietzsche once affirmed, we’ve with time forgotten are in fact nothing but constructed fabrications ^[3]. This, however, will not be entirely feasible for reasons such as the following: the worldview of dysteleionism is yet contingent on the ultratruth of the dysteleion in fact being the euteleion and, with equal import, the ultratruth of the dysteleion being the real teleion (itself yet a pragmatic truth that—as with any other stipulated teleion—cannot be established to be unfalsifiedly certain on grounds of its justified alternatives: the four other possible to conceive teleions) will yet be of itself contingent on the occurrence of all unfalsified truths (i.e., on the occurrence of all unfalsified certainties) derived in this work required to establish its possibility.

Placing the issue of the dysteleion aside for now, what then viably remains are the two universal synteleions of the turannon and of the apeiroson.

Despite its myriad rational inconsistencies (which can make this scenario false with unfalsified certainty), it remains the case that one cannot prove turannonism false with infallible certainty. Turannonism, then—this when conceived of as having already been actualized by some eidem (and, this, possibly for all of eternity)—will basically stipulate that all truths are the creations of a singular, omni-creator deity: a deity who thereby perpetually dwells in a state of having fully actualized the turannon: a deity which is then the absolute, and absolutely authoritarian, author of all that exists. This will then entail that all truths we might entertain or otherwise live by—again, including all truths regarding what is good and what is bad, what is correct and what is incorrect, what is real and what is unreal, etc.—are, in ultimate analysis, sheer fabrications: namely, the fabrications of the singular omni-creator deity, who creates all that occurs save for its own (typically understood as metaphysically separate) being. It is however noted that the explanation of “the omni-creator deity willed it and thereby did it” does not provide what, for many if not most, would be a satisfactory account of truths and their ontology. For one reason, this explanation amounts to no more than a metaphysics wherein all things occur simply for the reason that some eidem so says they can—and to claim that, “such and such is so merely because I/you/they so say it is,” this for all things in occurrence, will be a highly unpalatable explanation for why things so happen to be. For yet another reason, just as the here supposed omni-creator deity has so far willed truths of all kinds to be of nature X, so too could the supposed omni-creator deity will that all truths shall be of nature Y in the upcoming five minutes, thereby completely altering the very nature of the cosmos—and, this, for no discernable reason other than due to a personal whim on the part of this omni-creator deity.

Apeirosonism, on the other hand, can provide far more comprehensive explanatory accounts of truths and of their ontology—and this such that these apeiroson-derived accounts remain permanent for all time yet to come. Following are a few, here tersely expressed, examples of such explanations:

Firstly, equireal truths shall all be contingent on the occurrence of protocepts dwelling within equireality. Equireality, in turn, as summarized in §6.2, shall in effect be an indirectly obtained cosmic unity of being which consists of that poieture that all protocepts in the cosmos are both equally bound to and equally dependent on. All manifestations of unity of being, equireality very much included, will, in turn, be solely governed by the apeiroson (this rather than by the nihilon, the permanon, the turannon, or else the dysteleion)—and this irrespective of whether the apeiroson is in fact the euteleion or else just one more pseudoteleion. Laconically reexpressed, devoid of the apeiroson—be it the euteleion or else a pseudoteleion—no unity of being would in any manner obtain in the cosmos and, thereby, no equireality could unfold.

So tersely understood, all equireal truths shall then be contingent on the occurrence of the apeiroson—again, be the apeiroson the one real teleion or else a false teleion, no unity of being of any type could obtain in its ontic absence.

Because all interreal truths shall be contingent upon the occurrence of individual uniants from which the given interrealities are constituted, and because the occurrence of individual uniants shall via one manner or another be dependent on the occurrence of equireality, all interreal truths shall then likewise be in one manner or another dependent on the apeiroson. This will remain the case even when interreal truths happen to significantly deviate from equireal truths.

And, as with interreal truths, so too can be affirmed with equal validity of all intrareal truths: these too shall be significantly dependent on equireality, even when they happen to significantly deviate from equitruths.

Secondly, the very state or process of conformity to that which is real, i.e. of truth per se, shall of itself be an attribute of unity of being. This, at least, in so far as agential conformity will be the act of unifying one’s protoceptual being to that concerned: to conform to X to any given extent is to become one with X to the same given extent—this such that one’s own being and that of X becomes to some degree unified. And, in so being an installation of unity of being, truths too shall within apeirosonism then of themselves be apeirosonical in their ontological nature.

Willfully given deceptions such as lies, on the other hand, shall then always make use of turannonical means, and this irrespective a) of the teleionic intent with which the deception was given (one might, for example, lie to another for greater long-term apeirosonic benefit) and b) of whether or not the turannon is in fact the euteleion or else one of the four pseudoteleions. While more in-depth investigations of willfully given deceptions will be provided in Volume II, for now, let it here be tersely understood that deceptions shall always further fragment omnireality in some means or another. For one example of this, when one knows that what one truthfully perceives is a vase and convincingly states to some other that the object seen is in fact a rope or else that one does not see any item whatsoever, the otherwise unified understandings of reality between oneself and the other shall at this juncture no longer so be unified: one oneself will understand reality to be X while, due the fabricated (and, hence, fictitious) truths one successfully conveys to the other, the other will then understand the same reality to be Y—and this such that there is now a logical contradiction between one’s own understanding of reality and that of the other.

Within at least apeirosonism, truths shall on the other hand always be devoid of logical contradictions—this in respect to the realties they specify—and will, thereby, hold the potential to cohere with one another in logically consistent manners, thereby finding a unity of being relative to each other. The intratruth pertaining to an intrareality that is itself true to one or more interrealities that are all themselves true to equireality which, in turn, is always of itself true to the apeiroson as ultrareality will, as the specified intratruth, then not contradict the interrealities it might be embedded in, nor will it then contradict equireality, nor the ultrareality by which equitability is governed. This is such that the given intratruth will then hold the capacity to cohere in logically consistent manners with all intertruths, equitruths, and ultratruths it is either directly or indirectly conformant to—as well as with all other truths that are similarly conformant to, ultimately, the apeiroson.

This exceedingly complex topic too shall be further enquired into within Volume II. For now, however, the following two results of this outlook can be tersely expressed to then obtain:

One thereby cannot help but live within truth: within a state of conformity to that which is real. No matter the quantity of lies one might express, one will at all times lie relative to the conformity to that which is real which one at the very least intrarealistically experiences.

Also, because logical contradictions shall always result in a disunity of being in respect to the (always pragmatic) truths offered—such that at least one of the offered contradictory pragmatic truths will then mandatorily be false—while successful lies shall always fragment and thereby divide omnireality and its various truths in some way, truth(s) shall always in turn hold the capacity to burst bubbles of deception, so to speak—hence, will always hold the capacity to destroy lies and other deceptions.

Thirdly, within apeirosonism, the apeiroson as euteleion—entailing the future perfected state of the fractiprotocepture wherein the protocepture is in longer in any way fragmented but instead becomes perfectly unified into a literally limitless being, thereby entailing the protocepture per se—shall be the only given that of itself is neither creatable nor destroyable, that is in no way determined by something other (and that is thereby in no way caused), that is perfectly independent of anything other. In a colloquial manner of speaking, the apeiroson as euteleion will then be the only occurrence that “just is”—i.e., that lacks any reason for being. And, in so being, the apeiroson as euteleion shall then be the only aseitous occurrence that can possibly be: of itself then being the ground of all that exists.

So construed, because within apeirosonism the apeiroson will be the only correct teleion—with this correctitude being the most pivotal correctitude possible—the following can then become further derivable:

Ontic truth (i.e., ontic agential conformity to that which is actual) is of itself as generality neither metaphysically creatable nor destroyable but, instead—as an integral aspect of the aseitous apeiroson—shall be, in at least one manner of speaking, of itself aseitous. As to the many details regarding specific pragmatic truths relative to specific poietural realities, their analysis will be deferred to Volume II.

Additionally, all justifications (e.g., justifications that beliefs are in fact ontically true) will, in essence, be an optimal means of evidencing the alignment of that being justified with, ultimately, the apeiroson itself. Due to the complexities involved—including the needed, preliminary analysis of laws of thought—the actual derivation of this conclusion shall be deferred to Volume III. Yet, the culminating conclusion of these derivations shall nevertheless remain as following: to justify X is to evidence how X is in fact consistent with the ultratruth of the apeiroson—this being the correct teleion—and, thereby, is to evidence how X is in fact of itself correct (or, at the very least, how X can in fact be of itself correct).

In similar enough manners, when maintaining a worldview of apeirosonism rather than that of turannonism, other features of sentient being at large—such as those of fairness (which itself bifurcates into the attributes of justice and of aesthetics), of psychological objectivity, and of love—can likewise be derived, ultimately, from the apeiroson’s occurrence as euteleion. (With these awaiting to be properly addressed in subsequent volumes.)

In quick review, each conceivable teleion will logically hold its own various capacities (and, sometimes, the lack of such) to address the ontology of truths—and, this, along with the ontology of justification, justice, aesthetics, objectivity of mind and perspectives, and the like. Of the unfalsifiedly certain five conceivable teleions, only the cosmically applicable synteleions of the turannon and the apeiroson hold any significant capacity to address the ontology of these: with turannonism basically always affirming the same simple to convey reason for these givens, that of “the turannon-actualized deity willed an thereby did it”, and with apeirosonism (which, again, could be construed in very spiritual manners just as well as it could be construed in purely logical and naturalistic manners—irrespective of manner, with the apeiroson never being an eidem and, thereby, a deity) holding by far more complex, yet also far more comprehensive, descriptive accounts of these same givens.

16.9. Awareness of Teleions and Related Issues

In general relation to the many issues regarding ultratruth shall be the issue of a being’s conscious awareness, or lack thereof, regarding the unfalsifiedly certain five conceivable teleions.

To better address this, first a general presentation will be given in relation to agential telosations at large (in review, with all possible intentions being forms of telosation).

Agential telosations can either occur tacitly or lucidly:

Being tacitly telosational will entail pursuing actively held pullward drives—i.e., actively held teloi which one thereby strives to result in syntelostases—in manners of which one is not consciously aware. As just one example of this, an insect will engage in sexual activities while being tacitly telosational about the primary telos for such activities being that of maximizing its biological fitness (here, at least, granting that so maximizing biological fitness is the principal telos of an insect’s pullward drives when it engages in sexual activities—something that quire arguably need not be the leading telos in human sexual activities, which, unlike any insect, as human is endowed with superlative capacities for wisdom among known corporeal lifeforms and other like abstraction-contingent attributes: arguably, that of highly abstract sensual likes and dislikes included).

Being lucidly telosational, on the other hand, will entail pursuing actively held pullward drives in manners of which one is consciously aware. When one knows that one is driving a car with the aim of arriving at, for example, a bookstore, one will therefore be lucitelosational in so driving the car.

To more succinctly address tacit telosations and lucid telosations, the prefixes taci- and luci- will be here coined. Hence, an eidem can either be tacitelosational or lucitelosational in the telosial determinacies it actively partakes of.

Of current main interest, however, will be an eidem’s telosations toward any one teleion at any given juncture: A given eidem can then either be taciteleionic or luciteleionic in the choices upon alternative teloi which it makes.

If at any given juncture an eidem will be taciteleionic, at this juncture the eidem will pursue one of the four synteleions via the choices it either currently makes or previously made while, nevertheless, holding no conscious awareness of the unfalsifiedly certain five teleions—and, therefore, in how the choices it makes or else previously made relate to the four synteleions.

Conversely, if at a certain juncture an eidem will be luciteleionic, the eidem will pursue a specific teleion via the choices it either currently makes or previously made while holding conscious awareness of the unfalsifiedly certain five televisions—and will, therefore, hold a conscious awareness in how the choices it makes or else previously made relate to the four synteleions.

It can then be safely assumed that, in today’s world, only humans will have the ability of being or else becoming luciteleionic. All other lifeforms on Earth—which could for this reason alone be considered lesser lifeforms—will hold far lesser capacities of protounderstanding, such that no member of a lesser species of life will, in today’s world, hold any possibility of becoming luciteleionic. Were otherworldly aliens of equal or greater sapience relative to humans to also inhabit the cosmos, then such aliens too would either already be or else hold the potential to become luciteleionic. Likewise could be affirmed, were any such to in fact occur, of incorporeal beings of equal or greater sapience relative to humans (e.g., the spirits of deceased loved ones, archangels, deities, forest and house fairies, etc.).

Then, at the very least, all those here concerned who have read the ready presented aspects of this treatise will then either be or hold the capacity to become luciteleionic. It could furthermore be projected that many a human in humanity’s history has been luciteleionic—this in some manner or another (hence, for the most part, via making use of different interreal poieture—e.g., via utilization of different words if not languages in whole, different connotative notions, and the like—than those so far proposed within this treatise).

Of such potentially luciteleionic humans in humanity’s history, Jeusus Christ and the Buddha might stand out as pinnacle possible examples—given all existent indications, with both, each in their own ways, most likely having been a luciapeirosonist. Though it’s near to impossible to discern these matters with any form of stringent (yet always fallible) certainty, other possible such luciapeirosonists could include present and former philosophers, scientists, artists, and various religious figures world over, among others.

In contrast to luciteleionicity, most if not all children world over shall be taciteleionic in their endeavors. As one such example, when a child shares a toy, book, or some such with another due to the intrinsic value it intuitively recognizes in so sharing and respective pressures, the child will at such juncture be taciapeirosonic in its actions, words, thoughts, and choices.

So generally differentiating taciteleionicity from luciteleionicity will, then, greatly help in subsequent portions of this work—to include in at least some of Part 4’s subsequent chapters.

16.9.1. Omiants and the Pyramid of Sentience

The following terse presentation will overlook the possibility of panpsychism and will strictly focus on lifeforms.

To further assist in future analyses, then, let any uniant in the cosmos which either is or else has the capacity to become luciteleionic be then specified as an omiant.

For reference, the term omiant has been coined as a contraction of “om”—which, in at least Hinduism, can for example as term or sound be defined as representing the essence of the supreme Absolute—and “uniant”, this as unianthood has been addressed in Chapter 15.

So characterized, the human species of Homo Sapiens (which literally translates to “wise (or wisdom-endowed) human”) will then consist of omiants in full—will consist of the only omiants currently known to occur in the cosmos. From this vantage, all other known to occur lifeforms in the presently occurring cosmos will be non-omiants—and, in respect to their non-omianthood, can, again, then be validly termed lesser lifeforms (more explicitly, this in respect to omiants).

So generally construed, one can then conjoin the issue of omianthood with that of equireality’s nature as addressed in §16.2 in the following, tersely expressed, hierarchical manner:

Here will be made unbashful reference to the visual symbolism portrayed in the truncated pyramid topped by the Eye of Providence that can be found on the reverse side of the Great Seal of the United States (as well as on the backside of the United States one-dollar bill). This reference shall be in part made due to the ready-existent representation of the Great Seal being readily-enough known to most humans worldwide. Interpretations of the cosmically occurring hierarchy to sentience could then be cogently obtained as follows:

In general conformity with the relatively well-established ecological pyramid utilized in the biological sciences, sentience per se can well be hierarchically visualized to form what shall be here termed the pyramid of sentience—whose visual representation, again, can at least in certain interpretations well enough resemble the previously addressed Great Seal.

Most of this pyramid of sentience shall in the current world consist of non-omiants. The lowest layer of this pyramid of sentience will consist of the most numerous quantities of individual, non-omiant lifeforms—and, hence, of individual, non-omiant, protocept-endowed eidems—which shall likewise be endowed with the smallest degrees of free will capacity imaginable among lifeforms. Due to their exceedingly limited degrees of free will capacity, these individual lifeforms—with prokaryotic organisms as possible examples of such (here, again, overlooking the possibility of panpsychism)—shall then not hold much if any capacity to tacitelosationally choose teloi relative to the four synteleions and, thereby, will not hold much if any capacity to, for example, intentionally deceive (either themselves or others). As one makes one’s way up the pyramid of sentience’s layers, the quantity of individual lifeforms on each layer will become relatively reduced while the free will capacity of individuals in the given layer will be increased. In today’s world, great apes, toothed whales, elephants, and other highly intelligent lesser animals could be deemed to constitute the highest layer of the non-omiant portion of the pyramid of sentience.

In what could be a relatively non-spiritual interpretation, above the non-omiant portion of the pyramid of sentience will be found all omiants—hence, a conflux of all corporeal omiants of the cosmos (and only were such to occur, this together with of all incorporeal omiants of the cosmos (e.g., deities, angels, fairies, etc.))

In one possible more spiritual interpretation, among others—one which thereby endorses the spiritual reality of incorporeal beings and, hence, of incorporeal eidems—this same omiant portion of the pyramid of sentience can be deemed to be ultimately governed by a plurality of fully incorporeal beings that are unified in their common cause of best preserving or else guarding the sanctity of, and of best approaching the cosmos toward, the euteleion—here presumed to be the apeiroson—such that these fully incorporeal eidems are themselves the most apeiroson-proximate beings in the cosmos. Such a latter interpretation, then, can easily enough lend itself to the further interpretation of the pinnacle of the pyramid of sentience being that of Elohim—such that, for example, the Eye of Providence equates to the eye of Elohim.

That mentioned, it is however noted that the pyramid of sentience thus generally understood does not necessitate the reality of any incorporeal, spiritual being in fact occurring; given the current form of the cosmos, it will only necessitate the reality of corporeal omiants, in this one sense of protounderstanding alone, being sharply distinct from all non-omiants.

Hence, whereas human beings shall all be lifeforms within the biological kingdom of Animalia—and shall therefore all be biological animals in terms of both body and mind—in so being omiants, humans shall nevertheless in our capacities of protounderstanding be sharply distinct from all lesser lifeforms, including all lesser animals: for, again—to the best of our knowledge—only humans are endowed with a sufficient protounderstanding to facilitate understanding of the five possible teleions. Humans can thereby be further specified as omiant animals—this, again, in contrast to non-omiant animals and other lifeforms.

As pertains to the visual representation of the cosmos’ hierarchy of sentience as interpreted via the Great Seal’s symbolism, the multi-layered non-omiant portion of the pyramid of sentience will be here visually depicted as being masoned with bricks—with each brick potentially representing an individual lifeform or, else, an individual species of lifeform—such that, as one possible interpretation among others, non-omiant lifeforms will be bound to the poietural world in manners relatively devoid of free will capacity, this at least by relative comparison to omiants.

Omiants, on the other hand, for lack of better concise visual representation, will be represented by a single eye—with the eye indicating the faculty of sight and with the faculty of sight well holding the capacity to represent the attribute of (proto)understanding, this at the very least in the English language (e.g., when one replies “I see” to a statement, one typically intends to express that one understands, rather than that one either visually physioceives or phainoceives).

Furthermore, this visually depicted single eye will often be represented as enveloped in light—a light which might be best interpreted as not being poietural in its nature but, instead, as being protoceptual: with such symbolism in at least many a western culture symbolizing wisdom (this rather than the physical photons of electromagnetic waves or some such physical, and hence poietural, attribute)).

Other, subtly yet significantly different, interpretations of the same symbolism can obtain. Regardless of any such differences, in such general, roundabout manners, equireality (as addressed in §16.2) will then be anchored, or else steadfastly maintained, by the occurrence of, minimally, the vast majority of coexistent lifeforms in the cosmos (and, thus, by the vast majority of cooccurring, corporeal protocepts of the cosmos), most of which shall be non-omiants. With known-to-occur corporeal non-omiants outnumbering known-to-occur corporeal omiants in so vast a quantity as to be nearly unfathomable, this will then allow for a majority of known-to-occur corporeal omiants to possibly, for one example, be or else become viciously turannonic in their proclivities (and thereby engage in extreme conflicts) without in any way damaging equireality at large—i.e., without resulting in a Big Breakup of the equipoieture—and this despite the loss of ecological habitats and associated life which such shortsighted proclivities might possibly result in.

Here has only been presented a vastly simplified account of a topic which deserves far more in-depth attention. This topic of sentience’s hierarchies within the context of equireality’s makeup shall then be revisited in more analytical manners within portions of Volume II.

16.10. Concluding Remarks

Though relatively numerous, the topics which have been herein curtly presented shall, again, better assist the reader in apprehending the general understanding of reality which the overall contents of this philosophy shall espouse.

So understanding will in turn grant the reader a better footing throughout the labyrinth of possible to conceive of realities as regards dream states—this being a subject which further aspects of Part 4 will make mention of in attempts to optimally safeguard the unfalsified certainty of solipsism’s impossibility.

• References

↑ Stang, Nicholas F., "Kant’s Transcendental Idealism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/>.
↑ Wikipedia contributors. (2025, June 3). Noumenon. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 21:10, July 5, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Noumenon&oldid=1293722863
↑ Wikipedia contributors. (2025, January 27). On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 21:23, July 5, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=On_Truth_and_Lies_in_a_Nonmoral_Sense&oldid=1272085872

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[1] Stang, Nicholas F., "Kant’s Transcendental Idealism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/>.

[2] Wikipedia contributors. (2025, June 3). Noumenon. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 21:10, July 5, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Noumenon&oldid=1293722863

[3] Wikipedia contributors. (2025, January 27). On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 21:23, July 5, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=On_Truth_and_Lies_in_a_Nonmoral_Sense&oldid=1272085872

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