This chapter’s primary intent is to set the background of concepts and respective terminology which will be used in arguing for the metaphysical occurrence of free will (as free will shall be defined in §8.1.1).
A general note regarding this and subsequent chapters:
In part for the sake of readability, at this juncture in the work focus will be turned to providing the reader with a more generalized, or wholistic, account of relevant issues in as succinct a manner as is deemed feasible. To accommodate this, at least some unfalsified certainties will henceforth be affirmed without enquiry into why they so qualify. In so doing, three caveats apply:
Firstly, as was previously the case, potentially due to the inevitable limitations of the author’s intellect, the author cannot at present discern justifiable alternatives to the conclusions that are to be herein affirmed unfalsifiedly certain. In other words, at the time of this writing, the affirmed unfalsified certainties of Part 3 are in earnest deemed unfalsifiedly certain by the author.
Secondly, it is to be remembered that any conclusion affirmed to hold the status of unfalsified certainty can at any time become falsified in so being unfalsifiedly certain via anyone’s provision of alternatives to the given conclusion, this given that the alternatives are cogently justifiable (via experience, reasoning, or both). That observed, and in keeping with the demarcation of unfalsified certainties, it remains the case that lack of such discovered, justifiable alternatives shall serve to evidence the given conclusion being of unfalsified certainty, hence of a possible unassailable certainty, and hence of epistemic certainty—this relative to all those here concerned.
Thirdly, as an extension of the previous two caveats and in review of the intrinsic property applicable to all unfalsified certainties in general, it remains possible that the conclusions of Part 3 which are to date found devoid of justified alternatives (again, at the time of this writing, this when solely scrutinized by the author) shall at some future time be evidenced endowed with justifiable alternatives by readers. Were this to become the case, in the best of scenarios, subsequent revisions to the arguments to be herein presented might correct this deficit—thereby once again endowing the most important conclusions of Part 3 with the status of unfalsified certainty (the pinnacle conclusion of Part 3 being that of free will’s ontic—rather than illusory—occurrence). Alternatively, were free will’s ontic occurrence to at some future time be definitively found less than unfalsifiedly certain regardless of revisions to arguments, though the strength of this work will hereafter be reduced to consisting of only psychological certainties added onto previously evidenced unfalsified certainties, this treatise would yet potentially remain endowed with the virtue of heightened degrees of explanatory power in the topics to be addressed. Moreover, Part 3 of this work would nevertheless yet express the metaphysical limitations of what this treatise intends by free will, were it to be ontic—this alongside at least some of free will’s most important metaphysical implications.
With the aforementioned having been mentioned, Part 3 of this work will be one individual’s best current attempt to demonstrate the reality of free will.
8.1. Definitions and Concepts
For the purposes of addressing free will, at least some of the definitions for listed, ready-existent terms will be to some extent idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, it will strictly be these definitions which will be employed in this and the following chapters.
- free will: the ontic (rather than illusory) ability to have chosen otherwise than what one has previously chosen, to choose otherwise than what one is currently choosing, and to choose otherwise than what one will choose—this in any particular situation in which a decision is to be made. For simplicity of expression, this same understanding can alternatively be expressed in this work as, “the ability to choose otherwise in a selfsame situation.”
- to determine: To determine has the etymological Latin roots of de- and termināre (“to limit”). As such, and in keeping with at least some of the term’s modern usage (see for example the first sense of the English verb as listed on Wiktionary, The Free Dictionary, this as of November 3, 2022 ), in the context of this and subsequent chapters, let to determine be strictly understood as “to set the limits or boundaries of”.
- determinant: that which determines.
- determinate: an adjective that—as it will be henceforth employed—will strictly specify that addressed as being determined by one or more determinants [rather than, for example, as used in §1.2.1 to specify the attribute of being set, fixed, and unvarying].
- nondeterminate (aka indeterminate): an adjective that will strictly specify that addressed as not being determined by one or more determinants [rather than, for example, the attribute of being imprecise or vague].
- determinacy: the condition of being—at least in some respect—determinate.
- nondeterminacy (aka indeterminacy): the condition of being—at least in some respect—nondeterminate [as such, the term’s usage will remain in keeping with, for example, its usage in §1.3.1].
- determinism: a system wherein everything that happens is completely determined by one or more determinants such that no free will (as “free will” is defined in §8.1.1) can occur.
- indeterminism (aka nondeterminism): a system that holds properties in regard to determinacy other than those held by determinism. As such, indeterminism will allow for the possibility of free will without guaranteeing the occurrence of free will.
- kentron: The Ancient Greek etymology of κέντρον (kéntron) in part suggests “that which spurs or goads” as well as “the center of a circle” ; it is also the etymological root for the English noun center  and, by extension, the English adjective central.  The term kentron has been arbitrated by the author to be useful as a relatively connotation-neutral word for unambiguously expressing the herein intended meanings of the Ancient Greek term εἶδος (eîdos, “eidos”) as it was and is used philosophically, often translated in English as either idea or form—this while better distinguishing the intended concept a) from what we typically interpret by the term idea (a term which at the very least today tends to strictly denote items generated by individuals’ thinking), b) from what we often interpret by the term form (which at the very least today is often taken to address the shapes of things), and c) from Plato’s theory of Ideas, aka theory of Forms (which this treatise currently neither endorses nor rejects). Then, for the purposes of classifying determinacy types with optimal clarity, let a kentron be understood as the generic identity of anything that can be cognized and thereby identified (hence, of any cognita irrespective of type) which can thereby be said to spur, or goad, our awareness in general. Defined in greater detail, let a kentron be understood to be the conceptually central (else addressed, the conceptually essential or pivotal) aspect of anything that is in any manner cognized and is thereby differentiable from something other—this irrespective of whether that thus cognized is deemed to be a specific entity (e.g., a leg or legs), a specific process (e.g., bending or walking), or some other identifiable given (e.g. #1, an event, when such is deemed differentiable from entities and processes; e.g. #2, nothingness as the state of indefinite nonbeing, which is neither entity nor process); of whether it is deemed to be physical (e.g., a rock) or psychical (e.g., the perception of a rock); of whether it is deemed a concrete instantiation (e.g., a particular living animal) or a conceptualization abstracted from the former (e.g., the concept of animal); of whether it is deemed the grammatical subject (e.g., “a ball” in “a ball hit the window”) or the attributes—else expressed, the abstract qualities—of some grammatical subject (e.g., the notion of “redness” in “the ball which hit the window was red”); and so forth.
- formation: For the purposes of better classifying change-independent determinacy types (see §8.3.2 below), let a formation be herein understood to be a kentron that is itself made up of (hence composed of, and thus constituted of) one or more other kentrons. For clarity of communication, to better differentiate between a formation as a whole and a formation as a whole-part complex, the formation as a whole will be specified as a formational kentron. Formational kentrons will thereby be understood to be made up of constituent(s), and to be that by which a formation as a whole can be or else can become identified. Thus understood, a formational kentron will be deemed equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of a form (as, for example, used in the Aristotelian notion of formal cause) when such is deemed to be constituted of one or more kentrons (in Aristotelian terms, when forms are deemed to be made up of matter).
8.2. Three Mutually Exclusive and Collectively Exhaustive Possibilities Concerning Determinacy and Nondeterminacy
A strict dichotomy between a) determinacy as a feature of determinism and b) indeterminacy as a feature of indeterminism will at this point in the work be found lacking for the purposes of investigating the ontic possibilities of free will. This is so, primarily, for the following two reasons: Firstly, while determinism is relatively specific in what it addresses, indeterminism (as the negation of determinism) can be excessively ambiguous in what it specifies. Secondly, and in consequence of the former reason, indeterminism could easily connote a complete lack of determinacy in the givens it can be presumed to be a system to—this despite indeterminism technically allowing for a wide variety of determinacies, this so long as the determinacies do not culminate into the position of determinism outright.
To better clarify conceivable categories of metaphysical possibilities in relation to determinacy and nondeterminacy as these terms were defined in §8.1.6 and §8.1.7, a trichotomy will be instead proposed. This trichotomy will consist of what will be termed omnideterminacy, negadeterminacy, and semideterminacy.
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that no one here concerned can discern classifications comprised of determinacy and nondeterminacy, as these terms were defined in §8.1.6 and §8.1.7, that are not included in the trichotomy here presented.
Where “omni-” is understood to indicate “all”: Let omnideterminacy be understood as the ontic condition wherein that being implicitly addressed has all its possible limits or boundaries fully set by one or more determinants (irrespective of whether that which is determined can be deemed causa sui, i.e. self-caused).
An omnideterminate kentron will thereby be a kentron that ontically is completely determined by one or more determinants—such that all its possible limits and boundaries are fully set.
Possible candidates for omnideterminate kentrons include any physical entity in the universe.
A system fully comprised of omnideterminate kentrons shall be deemed equivalent with determinism—and, for increased clarity, will henceforth in this work be specified as omnideterminism.
Where “nega-” is understood to indicate “the polar opposite of”: Let negadeterminacy be understood as the ontic condition wherein that being implicitly addressed has no limits or boundaries—pertaining to duration, extent, or anything other—in any way set by any determinant (be this determinant something other or itself).
A negadeterminate kentron will thereby be a kentron that ontically is completely undetermined (by itself or anything other)—such that it is completely devoid of any possible limit or boundary.
Possible candidates for negadeterminate kentrons include a) the metaphysical notion of nothingness, this when understood as the state of indefinite nonbeing or, else expressed, as the state of indefinite nonoccurrence (especially when considered as something that—for lack of a better phrasing—might have been or occurred in the absence of all being or occurrences, as in the expression, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”)—and b) at least some metaphysical notions of God, wherein perfect being is often assumed to take place.
Negadeterminacy will then be one of two metaphysical possibilities within this trichotomy that can constitute indeterminism.
Where “semi-” is understood to indicate “to a partial extent or degree”: Let semideterminacy be understood as the ontic condition wherein that being implicitly addressed has only some of its possible limits or boundaries set by one or more determinants—this while other possible limits or boundaries remain unset.
A semideterminate kentron will thereby be a kentron that ontically is partially determined by one or more determinants and partially undetermined by any such, this at the same time but in different respects.
A semideterminate kentron can in principle be nearly omnideterminate (without being omnideterminate) or nearly negadeterminate (without being negadeterminate) and yet remain semideterminate so long as some of its limits or boundaries are determined by determinants while other possible limits or boundaries are not. Because these distinctions will not play a crucial role in this treatise, no new terminology will be herein provided for them. However, one might, if needed, for example distinguish a more determinate semideterminacy from a more nondeterminate semideterminacy by so expressing.
Possible candidates for semideterminate kentrons include some, if not all, physical entities within the universe. For example, any kentron which exhibits particle-wave duality could conceivably be semideterminate—as could in principle likewise be those kentrons which are composed of the former (with such latter kentrons conceivably approaching omnideterminacy while never obtaining it, this in general correlation with their complexity). Other possible candidates include the ontically occurring free will of all those here concerned (such that our free will is neither an illusion within a causal omnideterminism nor is it devoid of all limits and boundaries set by determinants and, thereby, a negadeterminate kentron).
Semideterminacy will then be the second of two metaphysical possibilities within this trichotomy that can constitute indeterminism.
8.3. Four Conceivable Determinacy Types as Defined by the Relations Between Determinants and That Determined
Greatly influenced by Aristotle’s four causes—which are in modernity often commonly understood of as four types of explanations, or four types of answer to “why” questions  (hence, one might then add, as four distinct types of reasons used to explain what is)—this section will endeavor to present a listing of conceivable ontological determinacy types classified via distinct types of relations between that which determines and that which is being determined. Although the listing herein proposed is not affirmed to be exhaustive, it will outline those ontological determinacy types that will be most pertinent to subsequent portions of this philosophy.
For what was deemed by the author to be greater specificity (as well as to broadly differentiate these ideas from those presented by Aristotle), the Aristotelian notions of efficient causes, final causes, and material causes will be renamed—and, especially in the case efficient causes, to some extent reconceptualized—as genesial determinants, telosial determinants, and constitutional determinants, respectively. The Aristotelian notion of formal causes will not be here directly addressed but, instead, will be indirectly specified via the concept of kentrons in general—such that the Aristotelian notion of form will be herein deemed equivalent to a kentron as defined in §8.1.11. That mentioned, this work will directly address the significantly different notion of formational determinants—which takes the Aristotelian notion of forms when such pertain to formations (which, as specified in §8.1.12, are herein identified as formational kentrons) and adds to these the attribute of downward determinacy upon their constituent(s).
In this work, genesial determinacy will be equated to causality. In overview, causality will be defined as the process in which kentrons (be they in principle entities, processes, or any other type of identifiable occurrence) themselves bring into being, and thereby generate, occurrences—such that the generating kentron will be deemed equivalent to a cause and the generated occurrence (itself a kentron) will be deemed equivalent to an effect, and such that the generating kentron thereby determines the generated occurrence in this specific manner. Irrespective of whether this conceivable form of determinacy is wholly illusory or else holds ontic presence in at least some capacity, and also irrespective of how we might formally conceptualize what causation entails (with regularity theories  and counterfactual theories  of causation serving as two possible examples of this, among others), the following unfalsified certainty will yet be affirmed: All those here concerned will inevitably address causal relations in daily life as those in which causes generate their effects—this where “to generate” is understood as “to bring into being”. Examples of this include one billiard ball’s movement generating, and hence causing or effecting, a second billiard ball’s movement upon impact between the two; wind generating, and hence causing or effecting, the movement of a tree’s leaves; and, maybe most pertinently to Part 3 of this work, a person’s capacity to generate, and hence to cause or to effect, a course of action for which the person is responsible.
That having been mentioned, the precise ontic nature of causality is still greatly disputed among philosophers . An in-depth investigation into the relations between this just mentioned understanding of causality and those traditionally and currently entertained by philosophers will be beyond the scope of this chapter. This work, again, will simply affirm the unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned will in our daily life address causation as a process in which causes generate effects.
Furthermore, it is emphasized that what follows are basic ontological descriptions of conceivable determinacy types classified by relations between the determinant and that determined. No investigation into the epistemological criteria for appraising what is and is not a specific determinacy type will be here made. For example, in addressing causation (aka, genesial determinacy) the specific relation between determinant and that determined in this type of determinacy will be outlined—but no enquiry into how, for example, one best epistemologically distinguishes between causations and correlations will be here made.
Of additional note, all the determinacy types to be listed could in principle occur within a global system of omnideterminacy just as readily as they could in principle occur within a global system of semideterminacy. However, because they are determinacy types, they could not occur within a global system of negadeterminacy, which specifies an utter lack of determinacy. Similarly, any instantiation of any of the four determinacy types to be here mentioned could be construed to either be omnideterminate or semideterminate—but not negadeterminate (for, in considering these terms as they’ve been herein defined, a “negadeterminate determinacy” would be a logical contradiction).
8.3.1. Conceivable Change-dependent Determinacies
Change-dependent determinacies shall be understood to consist of those conceivable determinacies which minimally necessitate the psychological evaluation of change taking place—if not also necessitating the ontic occurrence of change—in the act of determining. In contrast to change-independent determinacies (see §8.3.2 below), only change-dependent determinacies will be pivotal to the arguments of Part 3.
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that the two change-dependent determinacy categories that are to be here presented will either encapsulate or be equivalent to all categories of change-dependent determinacies which those here concerned can envision:
188.8.131.52. Genesial Determinacy (aka Causality)
Let genesial determinacy consist of kentrons that—in whole or in part—bring about, hence bring into being, hence generate, occurrences. These generating kentrons will thereby be the genesial determinants that determine those occurrences they generate. A genesial determinant can in principle take the form of any kentron—including an entity, a process, or any other identifiable given—and will herein be alternatively termed a cause. A generated occurrence can include a kentron’s inception, alteration, or cessation, and will herein be alternatively termed an effect. Genesial determinacy will herein be alternatively termed causality or causation. As such, to genesially determine will herein be alternatively termed to cause or to effect.
Here, to generate is to be strictly understood in its sense of “to bring into being”. It is emphasized that by referring to “generated occurrences” rather than to “generation” per se, a genesial determinant can thereby genesially determine some kentron’s degeneration (this being a type of alteration) or some kentron’s annihilation (this being a type of cessation)—this in so far as both the latter will be occurrences that are brought into being by the determinant(s). Else expressed, what is here specified is not that a degeneration or an annihilation can be generated, or “brought into being” (this being a semantically muddled expression, if not a contradiction in terms). Subtly but importantly, what is instead here specified is that the occurrence of a degeneration, just as with the occurrence of an annihilation, can be brought into being as occurrence and hence be an effect generated by one or more causes. A degermation or an annihilation will then be an occurrence which did not occur prior to its being so genesially determined. Hence, for one example: a mutated virus (here, serving as a genesial determinant; aka, a cause) can hypothetically first cause (i.e., generate the occurrence of) a species’ degeneration and then cause (again, generate the occurrence of) the same species’ annihilation.
For minimized ambiguity, within this work no other determinacy type specified shall be termed causality, no other type of determinant specified will be termed a cause, and no other type of determination specified will be termed an effect. This affirmed, it is nevertheless acknowledged that in colloquial and, at times, technical philosophical speech other determinacy types to be yet specified can be expressed in causal terms: For one example, a group’s commonly held intent or purpose—hence, the group’s commonly held telos (see §184.108.40.206 below)—can be expressed as the group’s common cause; this despite the commonly shared intent not of itself generating any occurrence. As a second example, in certain technical philosophical speech the term downward causation can be used to specify a conceivable determinacy type wherein the determinant—here being a formational kentron, or a whole made up of one or more constituents—does not generate that which it nevertheless determines, this being its own constituents  (see formational determinacy, §220.127.116.11, below for further information on this conceivable determinacy type).
Genesial determinacy will be the only conceivable determinacy type herein specified in which an asymmetrical sequential differentiation between the determinant and that which it determines takes place. Namely, because causes bring into being effects, the cause will always sequentially occur before its effect relative to the act of causation. Otherwise expressed in relation to the three other determinacy types yet to be addressed, only in genesial determinacy will the occurrence of the determinant not be strictly concurrent with the occurrence of that which it determines relative to the act of determination.
The concept of genesial determinacy will at the very least necessitate psychological evaluations of change; and, were it as concept to accurately represent an ontic aspect of the world, the ontic occurrence of genesial determinacy would likewise necessitate the occurrence of ontic change. Because in this conceivable determinacy type the determinant will be deemed to directly generate the occurrence of that thereby determined, there will then also be a psychological apprehension of a change from what was the case until the act of causation to what will be the case after the act of causation. This psychologically appraised change between what was prior to the act of causation and what will be after the same act would then accurately represent what ontically occurs were genesial determinacy to ontically occur.
Because the determinant is here deemed to have generated that which it determined, in genesial determinacy that determined will then be originated by its one or more determinants. Hence, in genesial determinacy, the cause will always in some way be the origin of its effects.
Aristotelian efficient causes were specified by Aristotle to be that which brings about—hence, as here interpreted, that which generates—change or else a state of rest (the latter being here interpreted as itself being a change from motion to non-motion) (cf., Aristotle’s Physics, Book 2 Part 3  and Metaphysics, Book 5 Part 2 ). Hence, were a) genesial determinacy as herein defined and b) the necessitated change previously specified as entailed to both be ontically occurring (rather than a subjective illusion), genesial determinacy would then share the same property with Aristotelian efficient causes in being the sole type of determinacy (in Aristotelian terms, the sole type of cause) one can envision that of itself brings about changes in the world (such that the ontic occurrence of genesial determinacy would then necessitate an ontically changing—rather than an ontically static—world).
In so being, genesial determinants will then be deemed to be a more generalized form of the Aristotelian notion of efficient causes, which thereby encapsulates the latter—such that it will account for all ontically occurring changes, were such to occur, as well as for all non-ontic but psychologically appraised changes: for one example, in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, the father can be deemed an efficient cause [here, a genesial determinant] of the child [here, a generated occurrence] (cf., Aristotle’s Physics, Book 2 Part 3  and Metaphysics, Book 5 Part 2 ).
Investigation regarding conceivable categories of genesial determinants—i.e., regarding conceivable categories of causes as herein defined—will be made in Chapter 9.
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned will inevitably make use of reasoning that concerns genesial determinacy, i.e. of reasoning that concerns causality, as herein defined—this irrespective of whether causality as herein defined is illusory or ontically occurring. For instance, irrespective of whether genesial determinacy ontically occurs or else is illusory, we all will appraise who was the cause of what and, in so doing, will maintain that a person who caused effect X was that which generated, hence who brought into being, who in this manner determined, and who hence originated, X—thereby allowing us to hold the given person responsible (e.g., via praise or blame) for X.
18.104.22.168. Telosial Determinacy
The adjectival term telosial has been coined as a compound of “telos (e.g., purpose, end pursued, aim, goal, or intent)” and the suffix “-ial (which forms adjectives from nouns)”, and is used to signify, “relating to teloi (the plural form of telos)”.
Let telosial determinacy consist of those kentrons that take the form of an unactualized succedent occurrence, else expressed an unactualized succedent outcome, for the sake of whose fulfilment genesial determinants generate occurrences—such that a specified telosial kentron set limits or boundaries on, and hence determines, which of multiple possible occurrences become generated by one or more genesial determinants (this just in case the genesial determinants happen to be telosially determined). Rearticulated, the telosially determining kentron, i.e. the telosial determinant, will be that for the sake of which occurrence(s) are generated by a genesial determinant which happens to itself be determined by said telosial determinant—and, as such, the telosial determinant will set limits or boundaries on the occurrences generated by the genesial determinant.
As an example, the intent held by a person to make a soothing song can be deemed the telosial determinant of the person’s generating occurrences that culminate in the outcome of a song which sooths rather than, for example, a painting that disquiets.
For emphasis, in contrast to genesial determinants, telosial determinants will not of themselves generate occurrences—but will instead strictly place limits or boundaries upon the possible occurrences which genesial determinants bring about. For example, a person’s intent to make a song will not be that which of itself brings into being the song—but will instead only set limits or boundaries on what occurrences the person generates in their endeavor to bring the song into being.
Because telosial determinants can only operate on genesial determinants determining occurrences, telosial determinacy in general will then likewise minimally necessitate the psychological evaluation of changes—if not also the ontic occurrence of changes—which are brought about by genesial determinants via their generation of occurrences.
This then signifies that telosial determinacy can only be a second-order change-dependent determinacy: Expressed in greater detail—despite the occurrence of telosial determinacy minimally necessitating the psychological apprehension of occurring changes, if not also the ontic occurrence of changes—were no genesial determinacy to ontically occur, neither then could telosial determinacy ontically occur, both then being illusory and resulting in the complete absence of ontically occurring change (again, thereby signifying all changes of which we are aware to be illusory).
Whereas genesial determinacy requires sequential differentiation between the determinant and that determined, in telosial determinacy the determinant will strictly occur concurrently to that which it determines for as long as the specific telosial determinacy occurs. For example, a person driven by and thereby determined by an intent X will be so driven in strict concurrency with the actively held intent X: no telosial determinacy performed by intent X will occur prior to intent X being actively held by the person nor after intent X was actively held by the person. Hence, the person as genesial determinant can only be telosially determined by intent X while the actively held intent X’s occurrence is concurrent with the given person—with no sequential differentiation taking place between the two during the telosial determinacy.
A telosial determinant will herein be fully synonymous with a telos (teloi in the plural)—with ends pursued, goals, aims, and intents (wherever differentiable, if at all differentiable) being examples of such. Though all conceivable ends pursued, goals, aims, and intents will necessarily be teloi, not all conceivable teloi will necessarily be ends pursued, goals, aims, or intents when the latter are interpreted as contingent upon the sentience of sentient beings. As one example of this, were biological evolution to be deemed functional in the sense of being telosially determined by one or more teloi—and, hence, to be purposeful—this would not entail that biological evolution is of itself a sentient being which holds a conscious, subconscious, or unconscious goal that it aims to actualize; this despite, in this hypothetical, biological evolution being deemed a process in which changes are generated for the sake of actualizing some as of yet unactualized succedent outcome(s).
Telosial determinacy will not be deemed equivalent to teleology in that the latter will be considered the study of teloi and, thereby, the study of telosial determinacy.
Telosial determinants will be deemed equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of final causes: for one example, in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, health can be deemed a final cause [a telosial determinant] of walking [this when walking is brought about, hence generated, for the sake of fulfilling a future state of (optimal) health—else a future state of sustained (optimal) health] (cf., Aristotle’s Physics, Book 2 Part 3  and Metaphysics, Book 5 Part 2 ).
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned will inevitably make psychological use of telosial determinacy in our activities (e.g., that we all hold awareness of being to some extent driven by—and hence determined by—intents, goals, or aims which we attempt to fulfill)—this irrespective of whether telosial determinacy ontically occurs or else is illusory.
Lastly here addressed, telosial determinacy will be deemed to minimally entail three interrelated yet distinct aspects: these being exemplified by a) one’s actively held intent or goal, b) the process of one’s intending to fulfill the actively held intent or goal, and c) an actualized outcome of one’s so intending. It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned can neither make sense of the ontic occurrence of (a) in the absence of (b) nor of the ontic occurrence of (b) in the absence of (c)—such that (a) conceptually necessitates both (b) and (c) were telosial determinacy to be ontically occurrent. For example, were a human to hypothetically actively hold the unreasonable goal of flying by flapping his arms at noontime, and were it to be noontime, this actively held goal would necessitate that the same person intends to fly at noontime by engaging in the activity of flapping his arms; furthermore, this intentional flapping of arms at noon so as to fulfill the intent of flying would itself necessitate that there would be an outcome to this intending: here, of main importance to this hypothetical, either the person succeeds in fulfilling his intent of flying at noon by the activity of flapping his arms or, else, he does not.
These three aspects will be made use of in subsequent chapters and will be addressed via the following terminology:
22.214.171.124.1. The Telos (Plural: Teloi)
In review, let a telos (in the plural, teloi) be synonymous to a telosial determinant and be understood as “an unactualized succedent occurrence for the sake of whose fulfillment occurrences are generated by those genesial determinants that are themselves telosially determined”.
One’s actively held intent will thereby be an example of possible teloi—this where the person specified is understood to be a genesial determinant (for example, to be the cause of the decisions made, hence generated, by the person).
There is a distinction to be made between actively held teloi and potential teloi, the latter being entertained without being actively held. This distinction can, for one example, be made in times when choices are presented to us as eidems. Often, if not always, the alternatives we choose among will be different, possible, though as of yet inactive, teloi—for example, in choosing between going out for the night or seeing a movie at home, one will choose between two different as of yet unactualized succedent occurrences (for the sake of whose fulfillment occurrences would then be generated by oneself). Once the decision is made, the one of the two or more potential teloi which was chosen will then transcend into that telos we actively hold and are telosially determined by. Again, prior to this made decision, the alternatives we are faced with will remain potential—rather than actively held—teloi.
As previously expressed, the specific determining telos will logically occur concurrently with the genesial determinant(s) it determines for as long as the respective telosial determinacy occurs.
126.96.36.199.2. The Telosation (Plural: Telosations)
Let a telosation (in the plural, telosations) be understood as “one or more genesial determinants’ progression—this via the genesial determinant(s) generating new occurrences—toward fulfilling the telos they are telosially determined by”. Expressed more concisely, let a telosation be “progression toward fulfilling a telos”.
One’s intentions when contrasted to the intent which one’s intentions aim at will thereby be an example of possible telosations. For instance, the statement of, “his intentions of becoming a doctor were fruitful,” can be more precisely specified as, “his intentions of fulfilling his goal to become a doctor were fruitful”—with the latter expression making clearer the difference between telosations (e.g., intentions) and their telos (i.e., their intent or goal).
Because the telosation will be the process, or activity, in which the genesial determinant progresses toward fulfilling the telos it is telosially determined by, the telosation will also logically occur concurrently with the actively held telos, as well as with that which the telos determines, for as long as the telos’ telosial determinacy occurs.
The following describes the adjectival and verbal forms of telosation:
Telosational: The adjectival form of telosation will be termed telosational (e.g., intentional). As an example, “the person knocked the cup over intentionally” can be more technically herein rephrased as “the person knocked the cup over telosationally”.
To Telosate: The act of engaging in telosations (e.g., the act of engaging in intentions) will be further termed to telosate (e.g., to intend) such that this verb can hold the following tenses: telosates (e.g., intends), telosating (e.g., intending), and telosated (e.g., intended).
188.8.131.52.3. The Telostasis (Plural: Telostases)
A compound of “telo-” and “stasis”, let a telostasis (in the plural, telostases) be understood as “the actualized end-state—else expressed, the actual result or outcome—of telosating to fulfill a telos”.
The actual outcome of one’s intending to fulfill an intent will thereby be an example of possible telostases.
Because the telostasis will be the result of a telosation, the telostasis will logically not be concurrent with the telosation but, instead, will occur only upon the end, else expressed the completion, of the telosation.
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that, for all those here concerned, telostases can logically only further take one of two conceivable, generalized forms in relation to the respective telos:
184.108.40.206.3.1. A Syntelostasis
Let a syntelostasis be understood as “a telostasis accordant with the telos that was telosated”.
Obtaining an outcome that corresponds with the goal that one intended to fulfill will be an example of syntelostases.
Any telos actively pursued by a sentience will be envisioned by the same sentience to hold the potential of becoming a syntelostases at the time the given telos is so pursued. Nevertheless, the same sentience will not be able to predict with epistemic certainty whether the actively pursued telos will in fact so become a syntelostasis. For example, suppose one’s immediate intent (one’s immediate telos) is to arrive on the other side of a fence by jumping over it so as to evade a dog (this being a more general telos); one then intends (telosates) to jump over the fence while envisioning that one will be able to successfully arrive at its other side (while envisioning that so telosating will result in a syntelostasis); nevertheless, whether one falls back down on the same side of the fence or successfully jumps the fence cannot be predicted with epistemic certainty.
Upon any syntelostasis’s actualization, the telos which led toward it will necessarily cease occurring together with its respective telosation—thereby ending, else expressed completing, the specific telosial determinacy which the given telos previously enacted. For example, upon successfully jumping over a fence to evade a dog, the intent to jump over the same fence to evade the same dog at the same period in one’s life will cease occurring.
220.127.116.11.3.2. A Dystelostasis
Let a dystelostasis be understood as “a telostasis discordant with the telos which was telosated”.
Obtaining an outcome that does not correspond with the goal that one intended to fulfill will be an example of dystelostases.
Unlike the obtaining of a syntelostasis, and relative to the window of time implicitly specified by the telos in which the telos is to be fulfilled, the obtaining of a dystelostasis will not necessarily result in the cessation of the respective telos—but can, for instance, result in repeated attempts to obtain the given telos’ syntelostasis—this despite the dystelostasis resulting in the completion of one specific telosation. For example, were one’s initial attempt to jump a fence to evade a dog to result in the dystelostasis of falling back down the same side of the fence, one can again attempt to jump the fence anew in hope of being successful the second time around. Notwithstanding, the first attempt will have resulted in a dystelostasis where the specific telos-driven telostasis came to an end, and, upon the second attempt, a new telosation driven by the same telos will unfold that will hold its own telostasis. If the second attempt results in a syntelostasis, then the telos will itself end; but, if resulting in another dystelostasis, then a third telosation driven by the same telos might commence.
That mentioned, it can also be the case that upon the obtaining of one or more dystelostases in respect to the same telos (which, again, implicitly holds some window of time to be fulfilled), the given telos can cease occurring. For example, upon one or more dystelostases of falling back on the same side of the fence when intending to jump the fence so as to evade a dog, one’s intent to jump the fence might cease to occur—although the occurrence of the more general intent to evade the dog would likely yet persist.
8.3.2. Conceivable Change-independent Determinacies
Change-independent determinacies shall consist of those conceivable determinacies which neither necessitate the psychological evaluation of change nor the ontic occurrence of change in the act of determining.
Nevertheless, it is to be understood that, wherever change-dependent determinacies are deemed ontically occurrent, most if not all change-independent determinacies can be deemed, at least to some degree, in states of change: this, namely, on account of genesial determinacy being enacted a) by the determinant(s) of change-independent determinacies, b) by that which is determined in change-independent determinacies, c) by both (a) and (b), or else d) by external factors which genesially determine some or all aspects of the change-independent determinacies.
In contrast to change-dependent determinacies, the specific types of change-independent determinacies to be here mentioned will not be pivotal to the arguments of Part 3—but will be nevertheless mentioned largely for the sake of presenting a complete overview of the determinacy types this treatise will in time make explicit use of.
18.104.22.168. Constitutional Determinacy
Let constitutional determinacy consist of a formational kentron’s makeup—thereby, a formation’s constituent kentron(s)—determining the given formational kentron (to include its properties) in strict concurrence to the given formational kentron’s occurrence; with these constituent kentron(s) thereby being the formational kentron’s constitutional determinant(s).
For emphasis, any kentron which is a constitutional determinant of some formational kentron X would not occur as a constitutional determinant of X in the absence of X’s occurrence. For example, a sand grain that in part constitutionally determines a brick cannot be the brick’s constitutional determinant if the given brick does not occur; the sand grain might yet in that case occur ontically as a freestanding kentron or else as the constitutional determinant of some other formational kentron(s) but, here, not as the constitutional determinant of the given brick. Again, for the sand grain as kentron to be defined as a constitutional determinant of a brick, the brick must be occurring in manners concurrent with the sand grain’s constitutional determinacy of the brick. Constitutional determinants hence cannot be the constitutional determinants of a formational kentron prior to the formational kentron’s commencement nor after the formational kentron’s cessation.
Importantly, however subtle the distinction, this thereby entails that constitutional determinants cannot in any way be the genesial determinant(s) of the formational kentron: it cannot be the case that those constitutional determinants so defined by their constituting formational kentron X themselves occur as defined before the occurrence of formational kentron X—this being a sequential differentiation between determinant and that determined that is necessary for genesial determinacy to occur but that, again, does not occur in constitutional determinacy.
In principle if not also in practice, no change needs to be psychologically appraised for nor ontically occur in relation to constitutional determinacy. For example, a geometric line as a formational kentron constitutionally determined by geometric points can be deemed constitutionally determined by the geometric points it is made up of without necessitating any type of genesial determinacy, and, hence, any type of change, in the formational kentron or in its constituents.
Any change in the formational kentron will, again, not be generated by its constitutional determinacy per se but, instead, might occur via any manner of genesial determinacy, which can include the following four possibilities occurring individually or collectively:
a) Genesial determinacy enacted by factors extraneous to the formational kentron can be deemed to directly affect the formational kentron itself, thereby resulting in changes to it. For example, the movements of a billiard ball struck by a cue will hold the cue as the cause of its movement—such that the billiard ball as formational kentron was affected as a whole by the cue.
b) Genesial determinacy enacted by factors extraneous to the formational kentron’s constituents can be deemed to directly affect one or some, but not all, of the formational kentron’s constituents and can, at least in certain situations, thereby simultaneously translate these changes in constituent kentron(s) into changes in the formational kentron via constitutional determinacy. For example, a house of cards as formational kentron falls apart and hence no longer occurs due to a person having significantly moved one the cards at its base—this rather than, for example, a strong gust of wind having brought down the house of cards as a whole all at once. In the case just specified, these extrinsic-factor-generated occurrences among some, but not all, of the formational kentron’s constituents will concurrently translate, via constitutional determinacy, into changes in the formational kentron. Nevertheless, it will not have been the formational kentron’s constitutional determinacy which of itself generated changes in the formational kentron. This can be in part illustrated by insignificant changes in constitutional determinants occurring without resulting in any discernible change, if any, within the formational kentron. More concretely, were a card at the base of the house of cards to have been moved by a person in so minimal a manner that neither does the house of cards topple nor does it assume any discernable changes as a whole, a change in the house of cards’ constitutional determinants would have occurred that arguably would nevertheless not translate into a change in the house of cards as formational kentron (such that it nevertheless remains the same house of cards despite this small change in one of its constituents).
c) Genesial determinacy wherein the formational kentron itself is deemed to be a genesial determinant of the changes which unfold in the formational kentron. For example, a person, as a formational kentron, who holds the telos of becoming muscular genesially determines occurrences which make the same person, i.e., the same formational kentron, muscular (this scenario can hold for as long as we deem ourselves to be the same person over time despite the changes in us which constantly unfold and, additionally, deem ourselves as persons to be the genesial determinants of the activities we intentionally engage in).
d) Genesial determinacy wherein one or more of the formational kentron’s constituents are deemed to be the genesial determinants of the changes which unfold among the formational kentron’s constituents which, via constitutional determinacy, will in certain situations concurrently translate into changes in the formational kentron. For example, a tadpole as formational kentron can be deemed to change into a frog as formational kentron due to the genesial determinacy of the animal’s individual constituent cells. Importantly, here, the change in the formational kentron will be due to the genesial determinacy of its constituent kentrons which, via constitutional determinacy, will concurrently translate into changes in the formational kentron—but not due to constitutional determinacy per se. As with scenario (b), in certain cases, changes in makeup brought about by the genesial determinacy of constituent kentrons can occur without resulting in changes in the formational kentron itself: For example, via chemical signals, a cell’s injury in a human’s body can be deemed to cause another cell in the same human body to engage in mitosis without this change in constitutional determinants being deemed to translate into any changes in the given human’s body as formational kentron via constitutional determinacy.
In review, wherever genesial determinacy in the form of (a), (b), (c), (d), or any combination of these occurs, the formational kentron itself can undergo changes. These changes in the formational kentron will, however, all be due to some form of genesial determinacy—and not due to constitutional determinacy in and of itself, which, in the absence of genesial determinacy, will occur independently of change.
Most all kentrons—with the cosmos as one conceivable exception among potential others—can be simultaneously deemed to both be the constitutional determinants of formational kentrons and to be formational kentrons in their own right that are thereby themselves constitutionally determined. For example, a sand particle as formational kentron will itself be constitutionally determined by molecules, each individual molecule as formational kentron being constitutionally determined by atoms, each individual atom as formational kentron being constitutionally determined by certain subatomic particles, and so forth—this just as validly as the same sand particle as formational kentron can itself be the constitutional determinant of a brick, with the brick as formational kentron itself being a constitutional determinant of a wall, with the wall as formational kentron itself being a constitutional determinant of a house, with the house as formational kentron itself being a constitutional determinant of a town, and so forth.
Constitutional determinants will be deemed equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of material causes: for example, in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, bronze can be deemed a material cause [a constitutional determinant] of a statue and its properties; likewise, letters can be deemed the material causes [the constitutional determinants] of syllables; lastly here exemplified, hypotheses (else, premises) can be deemed the material causes [the constitutional determinants] of a conclusion in the sense that the former make up the latter (cf., Aristotle’s Physics, Book 2 Part 3  and Metaphysics, Book 5 Part 2 ).
Following are further examples of salient kentrons that constitute formational kentrons wherein constitutional determinacy could be assumed on the part of the salient, constituent kentrons:
Individual organisms and the physical environment(s) with which they interact can be deemed the constitutional determinants of a particular ecosystem as formational kentron. Individual cells and their interrelations can be deemed the constitutional determinants of a particular tree as formational kentron. Individual ideas and their interrelations can be deemed the constitutional determinants of a particular paradigm as formational kentron. Individual word-meanings and their interrelations can be deemed the constitutional determinants of a particular sentence’s meaning as formational kentron. The individual beliefs, values, and behaviors (and their interrelations) of a peoples can be deemed the constitutional determinants of a particular culture as formational kentron.
It will be deemed an unfalsified certainty that all those here concerned will inevitably make use of constitutional determinacy in our appraisals of what is—such that, whenever we cognize any whole that we deem constituted from parts, we invariably assume, however tacitly, that at least some of the properties of the given whole, aka of the formational kentron, are at least in part determined by the formational kentron’s constitutional makeup. As a more concrete example of this, suppose two six-foot-tall statues standing in close proximity whose differences in shape are indiscernible to us, and which have been painted with a paint that endows both statues with no discernible difference in color or tactile feel; further suppose that we do not scrutinize the two statues so as to distinguish between the finer details of their formational kentrons (such as via the use of a magnifying glass) and that we moreover intend to move both statues one yard’s distance. Upon our attempt to so move these two statues we discover that the first statue weighs more than our own body weight and that it chimes when hit with our metal equipment but does not dent when so hit—whereas the second statue can be lifted very easily by us and, furthermore, easily dents when hit by our equipment without chiming. All those here concerned will address these two statues’—i.e., these two formational kentron’s—differing properties by relying upon differences in the two statues’ makeup and, therefore, differences in their constitutional determinacy. For example, maybe presuming the first statue to be made up of metal and the second to be made up of polystyrene foam.
22.214.171.124. Formational Determinacy
Let formational determinacy consist of a formational kentron setting limits to, and thereby determining, what its own constitutive makeup can be, can do, or both—such that the formational kentron will be the formational determinant, such that the formational kentron’s constituent kentron(s) will be that which is formationally determined, and such that the formational determinant and that which it formationally determines will occur in strict concurrence, thereby entailing that formational determinacy cannot of itself be genesial determinacy.
As with constitutional determinacy, formational determinacy will in and of itself neither require the psychological apprehension of change nor the ontic occurrence of change. In cases where no changes are deemed to occur, formational determinacy will for all here concerned simply be a reversal of perspective in relation to constitutional determinacy. For example, a changeless geometric line as formational kentron which can be deemed constitutionally determined by the changeless geometric points it is made up of also can, as a geometric line, just as validly be deemed by us to of itself be the formational determinant of said constituent geometric points—such that the occurrence of the line as formational kentron of its own wholistic accord concurrently determines the occurrence and placement of the geometric points it is made up of.
More noteworthy will be cases of formational determinacy in which genesial determinacy produces changes in the formational kentron and in its constituents.
As was also the case with constitutional determinacy, any change in the formational kentron and its constituents will not occur via formational determinacy per se but will instead strictly be the result of genesial determinacy a) occurring on the formational kentron as a whole from external factors, b) occurring on one or more, but not all, of the formational kentron’s constituents from external factors, c) occurring on the formational kentron from the same formational kentron as genesial determinant at a previous time, or d) occurring on the formational kentron’s constituents from the same formational kentron’s constituents at a previous time.
Scenario (c)—wherein changes transpire in the formational kentron on account of the said formational kentron being itself a genesial determinant of said changes—will be one or the foremost examples of how formational determinacy concurrently translates changes in the formational kentron into changes in its constituent kentrons. Among the possible concrete examples of such a scenario is that of a human causing changes in the same human over time. Such examples can include those in which changes occur over a relatively long timespan, such as in a human uneducated in some field of study becoming self-educated in the same field of study due to the decisions they make, hence the decisions they bring into being, hence the decisions they generate, and hence the decisions they cause.
Less complexly, a human can arguably cause changes in themselves with one single decision made, such as that of picking up a cup of coffee. In this example, let the human first consciously deliberate on whether they should or should not drink coffee—maybe in part wanting the taste and energetic boost of the coffee while in part wanting the perceived long-term health benefits of not drinking the coffee—each alternative the person has yet to choose from being an alternative potential telos (rather than an actively held telos) which, as such, communicates the possibility of a different potential state of future being toward whose fulfillment one might progress.
Upon deliberation between these two alternatives, the person then decides to drink the coffee—at which juncture they consciously choose one potential telos to actively pursue (i.e., to be telosially determined by) and denounces its alternative. Here, with the decision having been made, the chosen alternative to drink coffee now becomes the person’s actively held telos, the telos which the person now telosates to fulfill.
We will for now assume that the human’s consciousness which makes this conscious decision will be a formational kentron constituted of the human’s unconscious agencies, themselves in turn constituted of the human’s innumerable, individual brain cells’ agencies. Irrespective of whether we deem the said decision to have been freely willed, we will here also assume that this human consciousness as formational kentron shall of itself be the genesial determinant of the said decision which was made, hence brought into being, hence generated.
While the human’s consciousness generates the decision and consequent intending to grasp the cup of coffee, it, importantly, will in no way generate the individual movements of the over 50 muscles in their arm and hand. These movements of the arm and hand will to a significant degree be constitutionally determined by the activities of constituent muscle cells. Yet, these movements of the arm and hand will nevertheless work in concord with the consciousness’s intending to reach for and grasp the cup of coffee.
Genesial determinacy on the part of the consciousness occurs at the conscious level where the consciousness as formational kentron makes (hence, generates) a decision between alternatives; however, the specific concurrent activities of cells which constitute the human’s arm and hand cannot be the effects of said consciousness as cause:
The activities of the arm and hand, and of their constituent cells, will only act in concurrence with the intending which the consciousness genesially determined by effecting a decision. And, so, the consciousness’s behaviors of actively intending to grasp the cup of coffee will not be sequentially differentiated from the concurrent activities of its arm and hand reaching for the cup. (As one extreme but poignant example of this, one’s arm and hand will not move toward the coffee cup only after one’s conscious intention to grasp the cup ends.) Because causation entails a sequential differentiation between cause and effect in the act of determinacy, and because in this example no such sequential differentiation occurs between the intending and the bodily activity, the consciousness cannot then be here a cause which effects the activities of its arm and hand.
Therefore, in this example, one as consciousness does not technically cause one’s arm to move toward the cup of coffee but, instead, merely causes a specific conscious intending which happens to be in harmony with the activities of one’s own body—this being a concurrently occurring harmony between conscious intentions and bodily activities that need not always occur: Sleep paralysis (wherein a person intends to move or talk but is incapable of so doing, this when going to sleep or upon awakening from sleep) can serve as one possible example of such discordancy between conscious intentions and bodily activity; more commonly, a simple slip of the tongue (wherein one says something other than what one intends to say) can serve as another such example.
The normally occurring harmony between conscious intentions and bodily movements—a harmony here assumed to be in large part conducted by the said consciousness via its voluntary behaviors—will hence, again, not be due to said consciousness being the genesial determinant of its bodily movements. Instead of being genesially determined, the consciousness’s bodily movements will here be deemed formationally determined by said consciousness.
In review of this tersely outlined example, when transiently granting its presumptions, it is here deemed that a consciousness as formational kentron determines the inception of movement, and thereby brings about changes, in its constituents of bodily cells via the formational determinacy that occurs throughout the act of this formational kentron genesially determining a decision and seeing it through to completion via active intending—but this without the same formational kentron genesially determining the individual movements which its individual constituents engage in.
Among other—relatively more straightforward—possible examples wherein formational determinacy can be deemed to occur are the following:
A particular ecosystem constituted of organisms and the physical environment(s) with which they interact can be deemed to at least in part formationally determine the possible types of organisms from which the ecosystem can be constituted. These organisms, even when newly originated via the genesial determinacy of other organisms, will need to conform to the preestablished parameters—hence, the preestablished delimitations; hence, the preestablished determinate states of being—of the given ecosystem in order to be constitutive parts of the ecosystem (this for as long as the given ecosystem remains itself and thereby does not change as formational kentron). Notwithstanding, the ecosystem as formational kentron will not genesially determine its own individual constituent organisms. As a more concrete example: The terrestrial ecosystem of a desert (which is thereby devoid of bodies of water) can be deemed to formationally determine that fish cannot be a part of, and thereby cannot constitute, the terrestrial ecosystem of the desert while at least certain types of lizards can—but this terrestrial desert will not of itself as formational kentron bring into being, hence generate, the individual organisms it is composed of, their individual behaviors, nor the occurrence of their individual death. (In this example, both the formational kentron and its constituent kentrons will currently be deemed physical.)
A particular tree constituted of cells and their arrangements can be deemed to at least in part formationally determine the possible types of cells from which the given tree can be constituted. These cells, even when newly originated via the genesial determinacy of other cells, will nevertheless need to conform to the preestablished parameters of the given tree in order to be constitutive parts of the tree (this for as long as the given tree remains itself and thereby does not change as a formational kentron). Notwithstanding, the tree as formational kentron will not genesially determine its own individual constituent cells. As a more concrete example: A maple tree can be deemed to formationally determine that pine tree cells cannot be a part of, and thereby cannot constitute, the maple tree [of note: even if attempts to graft pine tree cells onto maple tree cells were to hypothetically be successful—hypothetically maybe resulting in an altered maple tree that can produce pinecones—the resulting formational kentron would then no longer be a maple tree per se]; this while the maple tree’s formational determinacy allows for a multitude of different maple tree cells (occurring in roots, branches, and so forth) to be constituents of the maple tree. Notwithstanding, the maple tree as formational kentron will not of itself bring into being, hence generate, any of the individual cells it is composed of, their individual alterations and behaviors, nor the occurrence of their individual death. (In this example, again, both the formational kentron and its constituent kentrons will currently be deemed physical.)
A particular paradigm constituted of ideas and their relations can be deemed to at least in part formationally determine the possible types of ideas from which the given paradigm can be constituted. These ideas, even when newly originated via the genesial determinacy of humans, will need to conform to the preestablished parameters of the given paradigm in order to be constitutive parts of the paradigm (this for as long as the given paradigm remains itself and thereby does not change as a formational kentron). Notwithstanding, the paradigm as formational kentron will not genesially determine its own individual constituent ideas. As a more concrete example: The paradigm of biological evolution via natural selection as formational kentron can be deemed to formationally determine that the idea “all currently known life forms have come into being for the first time in less than ten thousand years and have remained unchanged over this span of time” cannot be a part of, and thereby cannot constitute, the said paradigm; this while a variety of different ideas which uphold that “all currently known species of life hold a common ancestry which first occurred on Earth over three billion years ago” can—but this paradigm of biological evolution via natural selection as a formational kentron will not of itself bring into being, hence generate, any of the individual ideas it is composed of, their individual alterations, nor their individual cessations over time. (In this example, both the formational kentron and its constituent kentrons will currently be deemed psychical.)
The meaning of a particular sentence constituted of word-meanings and their ordering can be deemed to at least in part formationally determine the possible types of word-meanings from which the given sentence’s meaning can be constituted. These individual word-meanings, even when novel to the reader or listener, will nevertheless need to conform to the preestablished parameters of the meaning pertaining to the given sentence in order to be constitutive parts of the sentence’s meaning (this for as long as the meaning of the given sentence remains itself and thereby does not change as a formational kentron in the mind of the reader or listener). Notwithstanding, the meaning of the sentence as formational kentron will not genesially determine what its own individual constituent word-meanings are. As a more concrete example: In the two sentences, “The cat chased the mouse until the mouse ran into a nearby wall crevice,” and, “The cat chased the mouse until the person stopped dragging the mouse by its USB-cord all over the room’s floor,” although the perceptual word “mouse” remains the same, the meaning of this same perceptual word differs in accordance to what is formationally determined by the two respective sentences’ meanings. Nevertheless, the meaning of neither sentence as a formational kentron will of itself bring into being, hence generate, the meaning of the individual perceptual word “mouse”—nor that of any other perceptual word from which the sentences are constituted (a sentence’s meaning does not sequentially precede the meaning of its individual words as would be required were the sentence’s meaning to genesially determine the meaning of its individual words; nor, for that matter, does the meaning of individual words sequentially precede the meaning of the sentence: where this to be the case, for one example, the meaning of “mouse” would be permanently set prior to the entire sentence having been red). Differently expressed, here the context of a sentence’s meaning formationally determines the meaning of individual words from which the sentence is constituted. (In this example, again, both the formational kentron and its constituent kentrons will be deemed psychical.)
Lastly here exemplified, a particular culture constituted of the beliefs, values, and behaviors of a certain peoples can be deemed to at least in part formationally determine the possible types of beliefs which the individuals partaking of this culture can hold. These beliefs, even when newly originated via genesial determinacy by individual people, will need to conform to the preestablished parameters of the given culture in order to be constitutive parts of the culture (this for as long as the given culture remains itself and thereby does not change as a formational kentron). Notwithstanding, the culture as formational kentron will not genesially determine its own individual constituent beliefs. As a more concrete example: A traditionalist Abrahamic culture can be deemed to formationally determine that a belief in humans being endowed with a multiplicity of souls [this being a belief that, for example, can be found in Daoism ] cannot be a part of, and thereby cannot constitute, the traditionalist Abrahamic culture; this while variants of the belief that humans are endowed with a single soul can—but this traditionalist Abrahamic culture as formational kentron will not of itself bring into being, hence generate, the individual beliefs it is composed of, their individual alterations, nor their individual cessation in specific peoples. (In this example—when considering the culture to be nonphysical and thereby by default psychical while the humans from which the culture’s individual beliefs come about, and are hence generated, to be physical—the formational kentron will currently be deemed psychical while its constituent kentrons will currently be deemed physical.)
Hence, when genesial determinacy and formational determinacy as herein defined are both deemed ontically occurring, a polluted environment as formational kentron will not of itself cause—i.e., genesially determine—any illness in any organism from which the environment is in part constituted (either permanently so, such as when the organism always dwells in said environment, or transiently so, such as when the organism passes through said environment). The polluted environment will instead formationally determine conditions in its constituent organisms which make it easier for illnesses to be genesially determined in organisms by any number of genesial determinants, with viruses serving as one example of the latter (this when viruses are deemed capable of causing, i.e. genesially determining, illnesses in organisms). A human’s smoking—itself here deemed genesially determined by the human’s decisions—will thereby result in a polluted environment for the same human’s constituent cells, thereby increasing the chances of the human becoming ill (as one example, due to abnormalities in the human’s constituent cells as genesially determined by the human’s constituent cells)—such as via the acquisition of lung cancer. But, again, the polluted environment of the human’s constituent cells will not of itself be the cause of, i.e. the genesial determinant of, any particular illness, such as that of a lung cancer that occurs at time t. The same can also be said of war: a war will formationally determine, in any number of complex ways (psychological as well as physical), the conditions of those individuals who dwell in—and constitute—the war, with these formationally determined conditions being those in which deaths become easier to actualize among the constituents of the war via any number of genesial determinants; but the war as formational kentron will not of itself cause, i.e. genesially determine, the death of particular individuals which constitute the war.
As with the nested quality of constitutional determinacy—wherein, for example, certain molecules can constitutionally determine a sand particle, which can in part constitutionally determine a brick, which can in part constitutionally determine a wall, which can in part constitutionally determine a house, etc.—formational determinacy can be itself conceived as nested: for example, a cell could formationally determines its molecules, and could itself be formationally determined by an organ, which could itself be formationally determined by an organism, which could itself be formationally determined by a (grouping of social organisms’) culture, which could itself be formationally determined by an ecosystem, which could itself be formationally determined by a planet, and so forth.
The only unfalsified certainty offered in this section will be as follows: Were free will as defined in §8.1.1 to be ontically occurrent in us it would then logically necessitate the ontic occurrence of formational determinacy to account for the concord between freely willed mental activities (hence, activities genesially determined via free will by the mind or part(s) thereof) and those bodily activities which occur in concurrency with the former.
126.96.36.199.1. Regarding Ubiquitous Laws
Of main concern here will be laws of nature and laws of thought, the first having ubiquitous application to all of nature and the second to all of cognition—this irrespective of the possible metaphysical relation, or lack thereof, between the two types of ubiquitously applicable laws.
It for now seems safe to affirm that devoid of all nature, laws of nature would not occur. From this stance can be furthermore adduced that laws of nature are themselves specialized formational kentrons constituted of nature at large as their makeup. This view could, furthermore, come to equate a law of nature to a certain type of formational kentron constitutionally determined by nature at large which, as formational kentron, simultaneously constrains all of nature via formational determinacy.
The same could be suggested of laws of thought: they would not occur in the absence of all cognition; they will themselves be specialized formational kentrons constituted of cognition at large as their makeup; and will thereby be a certain type of formational kentron constitutionally determined by cognition at large which simultaneously constrains all individual cognitions via formational determinacy.
Regardless of the reader’s views concerning this offered perspective, it will nevertheless be clear that such ubiquitous laws will not determine that which their spheres of influence pertain to via genesial determinacy, nor via telosial determinacy, nor via constitutional determinacy: A natural law, just as a law of thought, will not of itself as kentron bring into being, hence generate, any particular kentron it determines—much less all the vast kentrons determined by it; there is no sequential differentiation between determinant and that determined in the operations of either a law of nature or law of thought; instead, the determinant and that determined occur in strict concurrency, thereby ruling out any possibility of the former causing the latter. Neither will either type of law be an unactualized subsequent occurrence for the sake of whose fulfillment genesial determinants bring about occurrences—for both are perpetually actualized occurrences for as long as that which they determine occurs, thereby ruling out any possibility of such being teloi. Nor will either be that from which individual kentrons are themselves constituted: as one reason for this, if all natural kentrons were to be deemed constitutionally determined by the same, ubiquitously occurring, natural laws, this would do away with the ability to differentiate between formational kentrons via differences in their constitutive makeup.
However, where both laws of nature and laws of thought (wherever these two types of ubiquitous laws are deemed to be ontologically distinct) to be formational kentrons constituted from out of that which they determine, then they could with relative ease be deemed to formationally determine all aspects of nature and all aspects of thought, respectively.
8.4. Concluding Remarks
It is acknowledged that the definitions and descriptions herein offered for the various categories of determinacy might benefit from more detailed expression or else modification of the expressions heretofore provided. Likewise acknowledged is that, in current times, a plethora of different understandings regarding determinacy is available to the reader—including those of probabilistic causation, backward causation, supervenience, emergence, the philosophical notion of holons, various understandings of downward causation (including those not accounted for by formational determinacy), the Buddhist notion of dependent origination, Indian religions’ notion of karma, and various notions regarding constraints, among others—and that this chapter’s contents has not directly addressed all possible interpretations of such understandings.
However, were the affirmed unfalsified certainties of this chapter to so remain upon scrutiny, this would suffice for the purposes of continuing to ascertain unfalsified certainties in later portions of this work.
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